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Abstract		 This	dissertation	analyzes	Muslim	women’s	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	and	the	 intersection	 of	 these	 processes	with	 discourses	 of	 Pakistani	 nationalism	 and	 Islamic	feminism.		Drawing	primarily	on	interviews	and	participatory	observations	with	Pakistani	women	in	Karachi,	Islamabad,	and	Mississauga	associated	with	two	Sunni	Muslim	groups,	Al-Huda	 International	 and	 the	 Jamaat-e-Islami,	 I	 examine	 how	women	 comprehend	 and	inhabit	their	piety	in	and	through	the	spiritual,	social,	and	political	milieu	of	their	everyday	lives.	 	 I	 argue	 that	 taking	 up	 piety	 while	 understanding	 the	 spiritual	 as	 epistemological	reveals	contradictory	and	relational	dimensions	of	Muslim	women’s	subjectivities,	including	complicities	 with	 structures	 of	 power	 and	 relationships	 with	 the	 secular.	 	 By	 taking	 up	religiosity	as	a	way	of	knowing,	this	dissertation	intervenes	in	the	normative	secularity	of	knowledge	production	about	Muslim	women	that	renders	the	epistemic	dimension	of	their	pious	subjectivities	unintelligible.			To	 explicate	 what	 analytical	 openings	 are	 enabled	 by	 taking	 up	 the	 spiritual	 as	epistemological,	 I	 look	 at	 how	 the	women	 I	 conducted	 research	with	 conceptualize	 their	piety	and	how	their	 Islamic	discourse	coalesces,	 contradicts	and	co-exists	with	dominant	discourses	of	Islam,	religio-nationalism,	and	universal	rights-based	feminism.		I	begin	with	an	exploration	of	the	spaces	created	for	Muslim	women	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	and	what	these	spaces	meant	to	the	women	I	met.		I	juxtapose	my	respondents’	Islamic	praxis	with	a	discourse	analysis	of	Pakistani	religio-nationalism	and	rights-based	Islamic	feminism	that	 also	 stake	 a	 claim	 on	 defining	 the	 relationship	 between	 women	 and	 Islam.	 	 These	discursive	structures	of	nationalism	and	feminism	anchor	analyses	of	Muslim	women’s	piety	in	secular	epistemologies	that	render	practices	such	as	veiling	or	the	qawwam	(authoritative	
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status)	of	men,	for	example,	 in	secular	terms.	 	Focusing	on	how	the	women	I	 interviewed	conceptualize	qawwam,	I	elucidate	the	paradoxical	processes	by	which	they	implement	an	ostensible	gendered	hierarchy,	often	in	face	of	resistant	men,	in	their	everyday	lives.		I	then	turn	to	how	their	piety	is	complicit	with	structures	of	power	by	examining	how	the	focus	on	scripture	in	their	literalist	Islamic	praxis	secures	a	rational	subject	of	piety.		 	
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	Introduction:	Unscripting	Piety		 “Bismillah	ir-rahman	ir-rahim.1		In	the	name	of	God,	the	most	beneficent,	the	most	merciful”.		These	were	the	purposefully	recited	words	with	which	Malala	Yousafzai2	began	her	speech	at	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	on	July	12th,	2013.		Standing	at	the	podium	with	her	head	loosely	covered,	Malala	delivered	a	speech	that	has,	for	many,	come	to	epitomize	what	it	means	to	speak	up	and	stand	up	for	your	rights	in	face	of	religious	extremism.		However,	despite	Malala’s	recurring	and	habitual	references	to	Islam,	her	piety	is	rendered	as	parenthetical	to	her	activism	in	dominant	feminist	and	human	rights	discourses.		International	human	rights	organizations	and	mainstream	media	narratives,3	for	example,	characterize	her	commitment	to	the	values	of	equality	and	education	as	a	
																																																								1	The	transliteration	of	Urdu	and	Arabic	words	in	this	dissertation	attends	to	the	pronunciations	of	the	words	when	they	were	used	in	speech,	with	the	exception	of	instances	where	they	are	in	reference	to	the	usage	in	cited	texts,	for	example,	Saba	Mahmood	(2005)	uses	da’wa	movement	to	refer	to	an	Egyptian	piety	movement.		Arabic	words	such	as	da’wa	can	also	be	transliterated	as	dawah,	with	the	the	apostrophe	signifying	the	absence	or	presence	of	the	letter	ain.		In	vernacular	pronunciations	of	Arabic	words	by	the	Urdu	and	English	speaking	women	I	conducted	research	with,	the	ain	is	rarely	present	in	speech.			2	Malala	is	a	Pakistani	Pashtun	woman	from	the	Swat	valley	who	was	shot	at	point	blank	range	on	her	school	bus	on	October	9th,	2012	when	she	was	15	years	old.			This	excerpt	is	from	Malala’s	first	public	speech	after	the	incident.		The	Swat	contingent	of	the	Tehrik-e-Taliban	Pakistan	took	responsibility	for	the	attack	stating	that	they	wanted	to	send	a	message	deterring	the	spread	of	Western	culture	and	secularist	ideas	in	the	Swat	valley.		Malala	had	become	a	threat	to	their	project	of	implementing	what	they	understood	to	be	Islamic	law	because	of	her	increasingly	prominent	activism	in	Pakistan	for	access	to	education	for	girls.		She	survived	the	attack	and	continued	her	activism	in	partnership	with	international	development	organizations	such	as	the	United	Nations	Global	Education	First	Initiative	and	Because	I	am	a	Girl.	3	Narrative	that	were	articulated,	for	instance,	in	the	international	accolades	she	received	that	valorize	her	resistance	to	extremism.		The	2014	Nobel	Peace	Prize	was	awarded	to	Malala	because	of	her	“struggle	for	education	and	against	extremism”	(“The	Nobel,”	2014).		In	naming	her	“Woman	of	the	Year”,	Glamour	magazine	cited	UN	secretary	general,	Ban	Ki-moon,	in	describing	how	she	stood	up	to	“extremists”	(Leive,	2013).		Time	Magazine	noted	her	“determination	to	not	allow	the	Taliban…to	prevent	her	from	getting	the	education	she	needed	to	realize	her	dreams”	in	their	description	of	her	as	one	of	the	“100	most	influential	people	in	the	world”	(Clinton,	2013).		International	women’s	rights	organizations	like	Women	Living	Under	Muslim	Laws,	wrote	to	express	how	they	“stand	with	[Malala]	to	fight	against	the	extremism	which	blocks	these	advances	[in	girls’	empowerment]”	and	that	she	is	a	“true	hero”	in	the	struggle	for	human	rights	(Bennoune,	2014).			
2	
testament	to	her	commitment	to	universal	human	rights	discourse,	and	not	to	Islam.4		That	is,	the	role	of	Malala’s	religiosity	in	shaping	the	way	she	understands	the	issue	of	girl’s	education	and	her	own	experiences	of	violence	finds	little	resonance	in	these	narratives.		Instead,	implicit	in	these	affirmations	of	Malala	as	a	symbol	of	the	struggle	for	women’s	and	children’s	rights	is	the	cordoning	off	of	her	Muslim	subjectivity	as	separate	from	her	activism.		This	perceived	separation	is	what	makes	the	visible	and	explicit	markers	of	her	piety,	such	as	her	loosely	covered	head	and	her	habitual	opening	of	speeches	with	“bismillah”,	compatible	with	the	normative	secularity	of	human	rights	discourses.		In	other	words,	Malala	is	a	palatable	symbol	of	human	rights	activism	because	she	is	seen	as	rehearsing	secular	scripts	of	religiosity.5		References	to	Islam	that	are	peppered	throughout	her	speeches	and	interviews	are	bracketed	in	order	to	consolidate	her	as	a	beacon	for	human	rights	activism	in	face	of	Islamic	extremism	and,	relatedly,	as	a	secular	subject	of	modernity.			While	the	effacement	of	Malala’s	piety	enables	the	construction	of	her	as	a	heroic	human	rights	activist	in	the	West,6		in	other	instances,	the	hypervisibility	and	
																																																								4	In	her	speech	at	the	UN	General	Assembly,	she	makes	clear	that	her	ideas	of	“equality”	stem	from	her	understanding	of	Islam	when	she	says:	“thank	you	to	God	for	whom	we	all	are	equal”	(Yousafzai,	2013).		She	also	understands	education	as	an	“Islamic	duty”	(Yousafzai,	2014a)	and	cites	the	Quran	in	explaining	why	she	believes	education	is	important:	“‘read’	is	the	first	word	of	the	Quran”	(Yousafzai,	2014b).	5	See	chapter	two	for	a	discussion	of	the	secular	and	secular	scripts	of	religiosity.	6	Notably,	Malala	is	also	a	fraught	figure	for	many	Pakistanis	because	she	elides	the	dichotomized	understanding	of	anti-Taliban	politics	where	being	against	the	Taliban	is	synonymous	with	allegiance	to	the	military.		That	Malala	simultaneously	critiques	the	Pakistani	military	and	the	Taliban	is	messy	for	some,	but	these	are	critiques	that	are	grounded	in	her	experiences	as	a	Pashtun	in	Pakistan.		The	constant	questioning	of	her	allegiance	to	Islam	and	Pakistan	echo	prevalent	forms	of	racialization	and	marginalization	of	the	Pashtun	in	Pakistan.		Malala’s	Pashtun	identity	provides	the	rhetorical	grounds	for	excluding	her	from	the	category	of	Muslim.		Despite	her	overt	practices	of	piety	and	her	proclamations	of	faith,	she	cannot	be	embraced	as	an	ideal	gendered	Muslim	citizen-subject	in	nationalist	discourse	because	she	is	Pashtun.		Instead,	she	is	smeared	as	a	pawn	of	the	West	in	order	to	undermine	her	inconvenient	formulation	of	anti-Taliban	politics.		The	suspicions	cast	over	her	expressions	of	piety	thus	dovetail	with	the	exclusionary	nationalist	construction	of	the	Muslim	citizen-subject	of	Pakistan.	
3	
essentialization	of	Muslim	women’s	practices	of	piety	are	used	to	construct	them	as	victims	and/or	pawns	of	Islamic	patriarchy.		In	Western	foreign	policy,	for	example,	constructions	of	Islam	as	oppressive	to	women	mobilize	visible	practices	of	piety	such	as	veiling	and	
purdah	as	evidence	of	gender	inequality	and	segregation.7		The	discursive	power	and	contemporary	currency	of	labels	such	as	‘fundamentalist’,	‘radical’,	and	‘extremist’	makes	it	difficult	to	dislodge	such	gendered	Islamic	practices	from	Islamophobic	and	orientalist	discourses	of	terrorism.		Feminist	organizations	that	are	committed	to	a	universal	conceptualization	of	women’s	rights	often	utilize	essentialized,	truncated,	and	reductive	understandings	of	women’s	relationships	to	Islam	to	analyze	the	extent	to	which	Islamic	practices	of	piety	obstruct	the	realization	of	universal	human	rights.8		In	the	context	of	Pakistan,	which	is	one	of	the	sites	of	my	research,	many	feminist	organizations	draw	on	such	universal	women’s	rights	discourses	to	fight	against	the	Pakistani	state’s	instrumentalization	of	gendered	markers	of	piety,	which	have	been	paramount	in	articulating	the	nation-state	as	Islamic	and	constructing	the	ideal	Muslim	citizen-subject.		Even	as	such	analyses	and	narrativizations	of	Muslim	women’s	relationships	with	Islam	are	fixated	on	some	markers	of	piety,	there	is	a	continued	resistance	to	engage	with	Muslim	women	and	their	multiple,	relational,	and	nuanced	conceptualizations	and	lived	experiences	of	Islamic	piety.			In	this	dissertation,	I	engage	with	twenty-five	Pakistani	Sunni	Muslim	women	affiliated	with	two	Islamic	organizations,	Al-Huda	International	and	the	Jamaat-e-Islami,	
																																																								7	Purdah	refers	to	the	practice	of	limiting	or	forbidding	the	interactions	of	women	with	men	outside	of	their	immediate	families.		For	some,	purdah	results	in	a	rigid	relegation	of	women	to	private/domestic	spaces,	for	others,	purdah	can	be	upheld	through	practices	of	veiling	and	modesty.		For	more	on	Western	foreign	policy	and	Muslim	women,	see	Abu-Lughod	(2002),	Razack	(2004),	Thobani	(2010),	Toor	(2011),	and	Puar	(2007).	8	See	chapters	one	and	two.	
4	
located	in	three	cities,	Karachi,	Islamabad,	and	Mississauga.		I	draw	on	how	they	conceptualize	and	practice	their	piety	in	order	to	explicate	the	epistemological	impasses	in	knowledge	production	about	Islam	and	Muslim	women.		The	Jamaat-e-Islami	is	a	Pakistani	religio-political	party	that	has	historically	engaged	in	propagating	their	Islamic	discourse	through	grassroots	activities	such	as	organizing	opportunities	for	learning	about	Islam	in	residential	neighbourhoods	and	circulating	print	material.		The	Jamaat-e-Islami	also	has	a	women’s	wing	in	Pakistan	that	engages	in	similar	activities	but	is	led	by	women	(Jamal,	2013).		Farhat	Hashmi,	a	former	student	and	affiliate	of	the	Jamaat,	started	Al-Huda	International	in	the	1990s	as	a	space	for	Islamic	learning	exclusively	for	women	in	Pakistan	and	has	since	developed	into	an	international	institution	of	Islamic	education	and	welfare	services.		Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	also	disseminate	their	Islamic	discourse	through	a	variety	of	print,	audio,	and	digital	materials.		Al-Huda’s	activities	largely	target	women	but	they	also	have	schools	and	publications	for	children	and	teenagers.		The	organization	is	popularly	associated	with	a	‘conservative’	turn	particularly	in	upper	class	women’s	practices	of	piety	(S.	Ahmad,	2009).		Since	the	1990s,	both	these	organizations	have	seen	increasing	participation	from	women	in	the	multiple	opportunities	they	provide	for	Islamic	learning	in	Pakistan	and	in	the	Pakistani	diaspora.9		This	dissertation	focuses	on	women	affiliated	with	these	organizations	as	well	as	women	who	participate	in	piety	groups	that	have	emerged	as	a	result	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat’s	efforts	to	spread	their	Islamic	discourse.	
																																																								9	The	increasing	popularity	of	Al-Huda	and	affiliates	of	the	Jamaat	in	Canada	has	also	been	met	with	increasing	Islamophobic	state	regulation	including	stripping	organizations	of	charitable	status,	accusations	of	inciting	extremism,	and	hate	speech	(see	chapter	one).	
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Although	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	are	separate	and	distinct	organizations,	both	are	influenced	by	the	teachings	of	Maulana	Abdul	Ala	Maududi,	the	prominent	Islamic	scholar	who	emphasized	a	individual,	literal,	and	more	comprehensive	engagement	with	the	truth	of	the	Quran	(S.	Ahmad,	2009;	Jamal,	2013).		Thus,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	expound	similar	Islamic	discourses	and	processes	of	pious	subject	formation,	albeit	with	some	key	differences	in	their	positions	on	matters	such	as	political	participation	and	strategies	for	disseminating	their	message.		Both	organizations	have	made	considerable	efforts	to	reach	women	by	providing	accessible	opportunities	for	women	to	increase	their	knowledge	of	Islam	and	develop	and	refine	their	practices	of	piety	–	arguably,	transforming	the	relationship	between	many	women	and	Islam,	which	has	particular	significance	in	the	religio-nationalist	context	of	Pakistan.		Many	women	described	their	former	engagements	with	Islam	through,	for	example,	the	Arabic	recitation	of	the	Quran	without	attending	to	its	translation	and	exegesis,	as	“superficial”	or	“empty”.		All	of	the	women	I	interviewed	came	to	participate	in	these	organizations	through	home-based	study	circles	or	Quran	classes	held	in	their	neighbourhoods	or	within	their	social	circles	in	Karachi,	Islamabad,	and	Mississauga.10			In	many	ways,	the	approach	to	Islam	popularized	through	these	organizations	clashes	with	normative	ideals	of	rights-based	feminism	as	well	as	nationalist	ideals	of	gendered	piety.		For	example,	many	Pakistani	feminists	and	human	rights	activists,	such	as	those	in	the	Women’s	Action	Forum	(WAF),11	characterize	women	associated	with	such	
																																																								10	See	chapter	one	for	more	information	about	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.	11	The	Women’s	Action	Forum	is	an	umbrella	organization	that	includes	several	women’s	rights	organizations,	each	of	which	specializes	in	different	aspects	of	women’s	rights	such	as	political	representation,	legal	services,	legislative	activism,	advocacy,	health,	and	education.		These	organizations	draw	
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Islamic	discourses	as	victims	or	pawns	of	patriarchy	because	of	their	adherence	to	what	some	might	call	a	literalist	or	traditionalist	approach	to	Islam,	which	they	perceive	to	be	a	patriarchal	and	anti-women	Islamic	discourse	(Jamal,	2005a).		The	historical	development	of	the	women’s	rights	movement	and	the	mobilization	of	universal	human	rights	discourse	in	Pakistan	is	closely	tied	to	state	instrumentalizations	of	religio-nationalist	discourse	that	have	been	detrimental	to	women	and	sexual	and	religious	minorities.		As	such,	preoccupations	with	these	struggles	against	the	Pakistani	state	results	in	women’s	rights	organizations	deeming	the	Islamic	discourses	of	women	associated	with	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	as	antithetical	to	feminist	organizing	because	they	do	not	directly	problematize	or	contest	the	religio-nationalist	state’s	failure	to	guarantee	and	protect	women’s	rights.		For	instance,	embodied	practices	of	piety,	such	as	wearing	the	hijab,	abaya,	and	niqab,12	promoted	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat’s	Islamic	discourse	have	raised	concerns	about	the	extent	to	which	these	organizations	dovetail	with	the	Pakistani	state’s	practices	of	moral	regulation	of	women’s	bodies	in	Pakistan.		However,	these	concerns	elide	an	understanding	of	the	nuances	of	women’s	relationships	with	religio-nationalist	discourse,	including	their	complicities	and	contestations,	that	are	shaped	by	their	Islamic	discourse	and	everyday	practices	of	piety.	
																																																								on	secular	universal	human	rights	discourse	in	their	fight	for	women’s	rights	in	Pakistan	(see	chapter	two	and	three).	12	The	hijab	is	a	headscarf	that	is	employed	in	different	ways	in	different	Muslim	communities.		In	the	practices	of	piety	of	the	women	I	met,	it	mostly	referred	to	covering	their	head	and	chest	in	the	presence	of	men	who	were	not	their	sons,	fathers,	husbands,	or	brothers.		For	a	few	women,	it	referred	more	generally	to	a	notion	of	modesty	that	did	not	require	covering	their	head.		A	large	majority	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	employed	the	hijab	as	a	headscarf.		The	abaya	is	a	loose	buttoned-down,	body-length,	long-sleeved	coat	that	several	women	I	met	wore	mostly	in	public	spaces.		The	niqab	is	a	face-covering	that	only	reveals	the	eyes.		Some	of	the	women	I	met	were	in	the	practice	of	wearing	the	niqab	and	nearly	all	the	women	I	met	desired	to	eventually	wear	it.		Interestingly,	none	of	the	women	I	met	referred	to	their	practices	of	veiling	as	burka,	a	veil	covering	the	whole	body.	
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I	argue	that	these	analytical	foreclosures	of	the	kind	of	Islamic	piety	promoted	by	organizations	like	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	are	the	result	of	the	normative	secularity	of	knowledge	production.		Analytical	frameworks	that	employ	secularized	categories	of	analysis	render	the	epistemic	dimension	of	religious	or	spiritual	subjectivities	as	unintelligible.		That	is,	they	gloss	over	how	different	women	derive	their	subjectivities	from,	give	meaning	to,	and	participate	in	these	Islamic	discourses.		Secular	analytics	preclude	an	engagement	with	how	Muslim	women	conceptualize	their	practices	of	piety	as	part	of	processes	of	pious	subject	formation.		Instead,	analyses	of	Muslim	women’s	practices	of	piety	are	anchored	in	the	secular	epistemology	of	nationalist,	feminist,	and/or	human	rights	discourse	rendering	practices	such	as	veiling,	for	example,	in	secular	terms.		Secular	renderings	of	such	practices	work	with	scripts	of	piety	that	efface	how	some	women	give	meaning	to	these	practices	through	spiritual	epistemologies.		In	other	words,	secular	modes	of	knowledge	production	fail	to	consider	how	religiosity	operates	as	a	way	knowing.		I	contend	that	taking	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	unravels	reductive	and	truncating	analytical	framings	that	elide	the	complex	and	multiple	dimensions	of	women’s	subjectivities,	including	their	complicities	with	structures	of	power	and	relationships	with	the	secular.		This	dissertation	focuses	on	the	everyday	experiences	of	women	engaged,	to	varying	degrees	and	in	varying	ways,	with	the	Islamic	discourse	mobilized	and	disseminated	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.		As	such,	it	is	not	a	comprehensive	account	of	these	organizations	per	se.		This	focus	on	the	women	who	participate	in	these	spaces,	grounded	in	their	everyday	practice	of	Islam,	contributes	to	an	emic	analysis	of	piety,	foregrounding	how	these	women	themselves	understand	their	Islamic	praxis	and	how	it	coalesces,	
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contradicts	and	co-exists	with	dominant	discourses	of	Islam,	nationalism,	and	universal	rights-based	feminism.		I	rely	on	interviews	and	participatory	observations	conducted	over	eight	months	in	2012	with	twenty-five	women	who	participate	in	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	piety	groups	in	Karachi,	Islamabad,	and	Mississauga.13		I	utilized	semi-structured	open-ended	interview	methods	that	resulted	in	extended	conversations	with	a	number	of	my	interlocutors,	and	many	women	shared	intimate	details	of	their	everyday	lives	in	the	interview	process.		This	included	stories	about	their	relationships	with	other	women	in	their	groups,	struggles	to	be	more	pious,	relationships	with	their	families,	everyday	routines	and	habits,	relationships	with	their	domestic	workers,	and	more.		During	my	research,	I	also	gleaned	observations	about	their	Islamic	discourse	and	practices	of	piety	by	participating	in	several	discussion	sessions,	lectures,	classes,	and	social	gatherings,	where	the	interviewees	participated	in	group	discussions,	teaching	and	learning,	and	social	interactions.		These	methods	enabled	an	understanding	of	the	intersectional	and	layered	implications	of	the	spiritual	in	the	everyday	lives	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with.			Drawing	on	these	interviews	and	participatory	observations,	I	examine	the	limitations	posed	by	secular	epistemological	frameworks	in	understanding	the	practices	of	piety	emerging	out	of	their	Islamic	discourses	and	explore	what	analytical	openings	are	enabled	by	taking	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological.		I	further	explore	the	foreclosures	produced	through	Pakistani	religio-nationalist	and	feminist	discourses	using	archival	materials	such	as	public	speeches	by	Pakistani	state	figures,	state	mandated	curricula,	and	print	literature,	toolkits,	and	resources	produced	by	women’s	rights	organizations.		The	epistemological	frameworks	shaping	these	discourses	preempt	an	engagement	with	the																																																									13	See	chapter	one	for	an	explanation	of	why	I	chose	these	sites.	
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processes	of	Islamic	subject	formation	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	and,	in	addition,	they	foreclose	an	analysis	of	how	these	processes	are	implicated	within	interlaced	structures	of	power.		I	look	at	how	the	women	I	met	comprehend	their	practices	of	piety	and	how	they	inhabit	these	practices	in	and	through	the	spiritual,	social,	and	political	milieu	of	their	everyday	lives.	Chapter	one	provides	organizational	and	socio-political	significance	of	Al-Huda	International	and	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	as	organizations	and	the	ways	in	which	the	women	I	met	engaged	with	the	women-only	spaces	created	through	these	organizations	and	their	pedagogical	structures.		I	draw	on	women’s	descriptions	of	their	experiences	in	these	spaces	to	elucidate	the	multiple	and	varied	ways	in	which	these	spaces	were	made	significant	in	and	through	these	women’s	lived	experiences.		Several	women	described	how	these	spaces	gave	them	a	sense	of	ownership	of	their	religiosity,	a	multi-layered	sense	of	belonging	and	community,	and	a	sense	of	authority	over	their	knowledge	of	Islam.		The	advancement	of	Islamic	knowledge	and	practices	of	piety	thus	occur	alongside	the	development	of	women-only	spaces.		This	chapter	also	examines	how	the	advancement	of	their	knowledge	of	Islam	is	constituted	through	pedagogical	structures	and	spaces	that	appeal	to	the	sensibilities	of	Pakistani	urban	upper	classes.		For	many	women,	formal	pedagogical	structures	and	a	literalist	approach	to	Islam	were	a	testament	to	the	legitimacy,	authenticity	and	purity	of	the	content	of	their	learning.		In	other	words,	what	women	learn	through	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	spaces	is	as	significant	as	how	they	learn	it.		This	chapter	explores	connections	between	what	women	learn,	how	they	learn	it,	and	how	it	shapes	their	sense	of	ownership,	belonging,	and	authority.	
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In	chapter	two,	I	provide	a	theoretical	and	methodological	framework	that	grapples	with	issues	of	epistemology	and	knowledge	production	that	emerge	at	the	intersection	of	piety,	nationalism,	and	feminism.		I	unpack	the	normative	secularity	of	some	of	the	central	analytical	categories	in	knowledge	production	about	Islam	and	Muslim	women	–	‘religion’,	‘Islam’,	‘feminism’,	‘women’,	‘agency’	–	in	order	to	make	space	for	taking	seriously	the	notions	of	the	sacred	informing	the	processes	of	subject	formation	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with.		Furthermore,	I	suggest	shifting	the	conversation	from	whether	or	not	Muslim	women	have	agency	and	where	they	draw	their	agency	from,	to	how	we	can	locate	their	agency	within	interlaced	structures	of	power.		I	formulate	this	shift	as	a	recognition	of	how	analyses	of	Muslim	women	are	not	only	limited	by	the	way	the	aforementioned	categories	of	analysis	are	constructed,	but	also	how	analyses	are	limited	to	these	categories	as	though	these	were	the	only	categories	that	are	relevant	to	their	praxis.		I	juxtapose	my	respondents’	notions	of	piety	discussed	in	chapter	two	with	those	articulated	within	debates	on	women’s	relationships	with	Pakistani	religio-nationalist	discourse	in	chapter	three.		I	explicate	the	Pakistani	state’s	exclusionary	conception	of	the	Muslim	citizen-subject	and	how	women’s	rights	groups	have	responded	to	this	exclusion.		Through	an	examination	of	nationalist	discourse,	I	make	visible	some	of	the	Pakistani	state	mechanisms	and	discourses	employed	to	gender	piety	and	produce	the	Muslim	citizen-subject	as	male.		The	Pakistani	state’s	articulations	of	women’s	piety	focus	on	the	symbolic	currency	of	Muslim	women	in	nationalist	discourse	which	is	intertwined	with	the	regulation	of	women	in	multiple	ways	through	state	apparatuses.		These	conceptualizations	of	women’s	piety	emphasize	bodily	comportment,	sexual	regulation,	and	public	propriety,	as	though	these	are	the	only	parts	of	Islam	that	are	relevant	to	women.		Women’s	rights	
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organizations	and	movements	have	agitated	against	these	religio-nationalist	prerogatives	by	crafting	a	form	of	Islamic	feminism	in	an	effort	to	dissipate	the	legitimating	power	of	‘Islam’	as	mobilized	by	the	Pakistani	state.		These	reclamations	of	‘Islam’,	however,	occurred	in	tandem	with	a	commitment	to	universal	human	rights	discourse	and	produced	their	own	scripts	of	religiosity	for	women.		This	chapter	traces	the	development	of	the	Pakistani	Muslim	citizen-subject	and	the	secular	Muslim	feminist	subject	as	competing	scripts	of	piety	that	nevertheless	omit	formulations	of	women’s	relationships	with	Islam	by	women	in	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	piety	groups.	While	these	women	include	some	of	the	gendered	practices	propagated	in	the	Pakistani	state’s	version	of	Islam	in	their	articulations	of	piety,	they	have	a	different	understanding	of	how	and	why	they	need	to	be	practiced.		Many	women	I	interviewed	understood	these	practices	as	one	part	of	Islamic	praxis	wherein	the	focus	is	largely	on	moral	and	ethical	behaviours	and	personal	and	social	conduct.		Drawing	on	interviews,	chapter	four	explores	how	my	respondents	subvert	androcentric	nationalist	claims	on	the	Muslim	citizen-subject	and	how	they	set	in	motion	alternative	scripts	of	women’s	piety.		I	argue	that	these	women’s	Islamic	discourses	contest	the	androcentric	form	of	piety	propagated	by	the	Pakistani	state,	which	claims	the	Prophet	as	male	and	for	males,	by	centralizing	the	Prophet	and	the	sunnah14	in	articulations	of	women’s	piety,	especially	in	relation	to	how	they	conceptualize	ethical	social	and	personal	behavior,	akhlaaq.15			
																																																								14	Sunnah	refers	to	the	Prophet	Mohammed’s	practices	of	piety,	including	his	social	behaviours	and	interactions,	that	some	Muslims,	such	as	the	women	I	conducted	research	with,	use	as	a	model	for	emulation.		15	Related	to	sunnah,	akhlaaq	(or	akhlaaqiat)	refers	to	moral	or	ethical	personal	and	social	behaviours.		The	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	women	I	met	centralized	the	sunnah	as	a	guide	for	what	such	behaviours	should	look	like.		Their	conception	of	akhlaaq	encompasses	domestic	relationships,	everyday	routines	and	habits,	social	conduct	in	public	spaces,	amongst	other	things.		See	chapter	four	for	an	exposition	of	how	the	women	I	met	conceptualize	akhlaaq.	
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Even	as	women	participating	in	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	piety	groups	work	to	de-centre	the	Pakistani	state’s	vision	of	women’s	piety,	they	simultaneously	work	to	sharpen	and	define	Islamic	gender	relations	and	women’s	and	men’s	place	within	them	through	their	conceptualization	of	the	Islamic	concept	of	qawwam.		Qawwam	broadly	refers	to	the	notion	of	men	having	a	higher	status	and	authority	over	women.		Chapter	four	engages	in-depth	in	how	we	can	understand	the	role	of	a	gender	hierarchy	produced	through	the	concept	of	
qawwam	that	is	galvanized	by	women	directing	the	development	of	their	own	piety.		I	locate	this	analysis	in	how	women	define	pious	social	relationships,	how	they	envision	ideal	relationships	between	men	and	women,	and	how	they	described	their	own	relationships	with	the	men	in	their	lives.		Despite	their	commitment	to	developing	these	gendered	relationships,	it	is	important	to	note	that	these	women	also	have	a	strong	sense	of	“equality”;	however,	they	locate	equality	in	the	“eyes	of	Allah”.		That	is,	they	are	firm	in	the	belief	that	men	and	women	are	of	equal	value	in	the	eyes	of	Allah	and	that	in	the	akhira	(hereafter)16	and	on	judgment	day	women	will	be	subjected	to	the	same	level	of	scrutiny	as	men.		This	sense	of	transcendent	equality	catalyzes	the	form	that	gender	relations	take	and	the	women-led	processes	through	which	qawwam	is	established	in	the	here	and	now.		In	other	words,	understanding	women’s	institution	of	qawwam	through	their	spiritual	epistemologies	reveals	how	an	ostensible	gender	hierarchy	or	a	sexual	division	of	labour	does	not	necessarily	indicate	patriarchal	oppression.	
																																																								16	Akhira	can	be	translated	to	the	hereafter,	afterlife,	or,	more	literally,	as	the	final	life.		In	my	respondents’	usage,	it	is	a	time	and	space	that	is	distinct	from	the	material	world	(dunia).		However,	it	implicates	their	lives	in	the	material	world	through	the	notion	of	judgement,	where	Allah	will	decide	whether	one’s	afterlife	will	be	in	heaven	(jannah	in	Arabic	or	jannat	in	Urdu)	or	hell	(dozakh	in	Urdu	or	jahannum	in	Arabic	and	Urdu).		This	judgement	would	be	based	on	practices	of	worship	and	personal	and	social	behaviours	in	the	material	world.		See	chapter	four	for	a	discussion	of	how	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	women	I	met	used	this	term	in	relation	to	developing	their	piety.	
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Chapter	four	also	explores	the	multiple	and	shifting	ways	in	which	women	inhabit	
qawwam	in	their	everyday	lives.		Interestingly,	many	of	the	women	I	met	were	often	the	ones	teaching	the	men	in	their	homes	how	to	be	proper	Muslims,	which	in	their	interpretation	means	that	the	man	has	a	set	of	rights	and	duties	associated	with	his	
qawwam.		They	describe	at	length	their	struggles	to	achieve	personal	relationships	that	abide	by	their	interpretation	of	qawwam,	and	the	corresponding	rights	and	responsibilities,	in	face	of	resistant	men.		Interestingly,	spousal	relationships	emerged	as	a	key	site	of	these	contestations	in	many	of	the	interviews	I	conducted.		Many	of	the	women	I	met	explained	that	their	husbands	resisted	the	idea	of	structuring	their	households	in	accordance	with	
qawwam,	which	would	give	their	husbands	‘authority’	over	their	wives	and	the	household.		Their	descriptions	of	how	their	husbands	articulated	their	resistances	demonstrate	the	valence	of	Orientalist	and	Islamophobic	discourses	of	modernity	and	backwardness,	with	gender	relations	featuring	as	a	central	trope.		In	this	chapter	I	explore	these	resistances	as	evidence	of	the	tension	between	women’s	understandings	of	qawwam	and	the	existing	form	of	heteropatriarchal	relationships	in	their	households.		Questions	of	the	legitimacy	of	various	forms	of	Islamic	learning	loomed	large	in	the	discourses	of	piety	amongst	the	women	I	conducted	research	with.		Chapter	five	examines	how	the	legitimizing	narratives	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	are	produced	through	processes	of	othering	that	associate	the	self	with	a	rational	form	of	piety	centered	on	a	methodical	and	literal	engagement	with	holy	texts.		I	frame	this	chapter	through	anecdotes	from	the	weekly	maasi	(domestic	worker)17	class,	a	special	Islamic	education	and	literacy	class	
																																																								17	In	the	usage	of	the	Al-Huda	women	I	conducted	research	with,	maasi	referred	to	women	domestic	workers	who	were	typically	employed	for	cleaning,	cooking,	laundering,	and	caretaking.		Interestingly,	the	word	maasi	also	means	aunt,	more	specifically,	mother’s	sister,	in	Punjabi,	Gujarati,	and	Hindi.	
14	
offered	for	domestic	workers	employed	by	students	and	teachers	at	Al-Huda.		I	explore	how	the	maasi	class	is	symptomatic	of	the	desire	for	a	“trickle-down”	approach	where	the	domestic	workers’	existing	practices	of	Islam	are	rendered	invisible	or	illegitimate	in	the	name	of	civility	and	progress.		The	maasi	class	exemplifies	the	processes	of	othering	that	are	linked	to	how	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	mobilize	the	Islamic	concepts	of	
biddat	(‘innovations’	that	are	not	true	to	the	teachings	of	the	Prophet)18	and	shirk	(equating	someone	or	something	with	Allah)	19	to	identify	and	categorize	what	they	believe	to	be	un-Islamic	practices.		Nearly	all	the	women	I	met	deployed	these	concepts	to	characterize	and	vilify	‘extremists’,	members	of	the	‘lower	class’,	and	those	engaged	in	competing	practices	of	piety.		Several	women	traced	the	specific	manifestation	of	these	practices	to	the	“cultural	baggage”	from	once	living	amongst	Hindus	in	India.		Many	women	identified	a	range	of	practices	from	visiting	shrines	of	saints	to	the	way	weddings	are	celebrated	to	common	ritualistic	gestures	as	remnants	of	Hinduism	in	the	cultural	and	religious	fabric	of	Pakistan.		In	this	chapter,	I	explore	the	implications	of	conceptualizing	the	distinction	between	Islam	and	Hinduism	along	the	lines	of	a	distinction	between	religion	and	custom	and	what	this	means	for	constructing	a	liberal	dichotomy	between	the	rational	self	and	the	irrational	other.		Through	an	elaboration	of	how	women	participating	in	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	piety	groups	construct	the	self	in	relation	to	the	other,	I	argue	that	their	forms	of	piety	are	complicit	in	entrenching	class,	ethnic,	and	religious	social	hierarchies.																																																									18	In	addition	to	innovation,	biddat	(singular),	or	biddatein	(plural),	also	implies	an	inauthentic	practice	of	Islam	because	it	is	not	substantiated	through	scripture	for	the	women	I	interviewed.		See	chapter	five	for	how	these	women	employed	this	term	to	construct	themselves	as	rational	and	learned	Muslims	by	representing	others	as	irrational	and	illiterate	Muslims.	19	Shirk	was	often	mentioned	together	with	biddat	in	relation	to	practices	that	the	women	I	met	perceived	as	blasphemous.		It	referred	to	a	divergence	from	monotheism,	equating	someone	or	something	with	god	or	giving	someone	or	something	godly	qualities.		For	example,	several	women	understood	commemorations	of	the	Prophet	Mohammed	as	blasphemous	because	they	equate	the	Prophet	with	with	Allah.	
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By	focusing	on	how	my	respondents	articulate	and	experience	their	discourses	of	piety,	this	dissertation	contributes	an	analysis	of	the	politics	of	piety	that	foregrounds	the	complex	and	contradictory	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	elucidated	through	the	everyday.		Understanding	how	these	particular	women	describe	gender	relations,	for	instance,	through	the	epistemological	frameworks	of	their	Islamic	discourse	reveals	aspects	of	their	subjectivity	that	would	be	effaced	within	a	secular	epistemological	framework.		At	the	same	time,	the	focus	on	the	everyday	articulation	and	practice	of	piety	allows	for	a	robust	understanding	of	how	these	women	and	their	discourses	of	piety	are	implicated	within	social	hierarchies.		As	such,	this	dissertation	produces	an	analysis	of	piety	that	takes	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	while	also	interrogating	its	complicities	in	relations	of	power.		
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Chapter	1:	“This	is	mine”:	Cultivating	intimacies	with	Islam				
This	was	the	first	time	I	came	to	know	what	the	Quran	was	saying…I	think	
[Farhat	Hashmi’s]	biggest	contribution	has	been	that	she	has	given	people	back	
a	sense	of	ownership	about	the	Quran.		This	is	mine.		I	can	apply	it	to	my	life.		
This	is	not	something	I	just	study	as	part	of	an	ancient	narrative…So	with	every	
verse	she	connects	it	with	how	you	can	relate	it	to	your	life	today	right	now…It	
was	something	very	new	that	you	relate	it	to	your	life	and	that	is	how	it	is	
supposed	to	be	read…it	was	a	very	deep,	profound	experience	for	all	of	us.		
(Donya)	
	 As	institutions	that	focus	on	providing	opportunities	for	women	to	learn	about	Islam,	both	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	appealed	to	many	women	because	of	the	relationships	they	cultivated	between	women	and	the	Quran	and	hadith20	and	the	spaces	they	created	for	women	to	develop	their	piety.		The	transformation	in	her	relationship	to	the	Quran	that	Donya,	a	graduate	of	Al-Huda’s	advanced	diploma	program	in	Karachi,	describes	above	came	about	through	the	recognition	and	the	claim	that	“this	is	mine”	and	that	it	can	be	applied	to	“my	life”,	“right	now”.			To	be	able	to	claim	the	Quran	as	her	own	meant	that	Donya	could	relate	the	Quran	to	her	life	in	more	personalized	ways.		Donya’s	expressions	of	frustrations	with	the	Quran	being	read	as	“part	of	an	ancient	narrative”	refer	to	how	the	Quran	is	often	treated	as	a	lofty,	flat	and	static	text	that	has	no	relevance	to	most	contemporary	matters.		To	be	able	to	apply	it	to	contemporary	and	everyday	issues	made	the	Quran	present	in	her	life	in	intimate	and	profound	ways.	
																																																								20	Hadith	are	compilations	of	accounts	about	how	the	Prophet	lived	his	life	witnessed	by	those	closest	to	him.		Some	groups	use	these	accounts	as	exemplifications	of	ideal	ways	of	practicing	Islam	to	supplement	the	Quran.		There	are	different	compilations	of	the	hadith	and	different	groups	claim	that	certain	versions	are	more	authentic	others.		Some	groups	do	not	consider	hadith	to	be	an	authoritative	text	and	prefer	to	focus	on	the	Quran	alone.		Hadith	are	a	central	component	of	the	Islamic	discourse	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	and	they	primarily	draw	on	the	collection	of	hadith	in	Sahih	al-Bukhari.		See	chapter	four	for	how	the	women	I	met	employ	the	hadith	in	their	articulations	of	piety.	
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This	dissertation	contributes	an	understanding	of	the	epistemological	implications	of	the	cultivation	of	such	relationships	with	Islam.		The	multiple	dimensions	of	space	created	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	interweave	the	sacred	and	the	everyday	producing	an	Islamic	discourse	that	emphasizes	processes	of	pious	subject	formation.		These	organizations	made	deliberate	efforts	to	reach	women	by	creating	accessible	women-only	spaces	and	opportunities	for	Islamic	learning.		Notably,	these	spaces	created	their	own	structures	of	exclusion	and	privilege	as	they	were	limited	to	urban	women	from	upper	and	middle	classes,	which	I	elaborate	on	in	chapter	five.		In	this	chapter,	I	examine	women’s	experiences	of	participating	in	the	spaces	created	or	inspired	by	these	organizations	in	order	to	provide	an	understanding	of	these	spaces	as	the	women	I	interviewed	described	them.		Through	women-only	spaces	and	opportunities,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	cultivated	a	sense	of	ownership	of	Islam	amongst	women	by	making	Islamic	texts,	the	study	of	Islam,	and	the	development	of	piety	accessible	to	women.		Moreover,	because	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat’s	pedagogical	approaches	utilized	formal	educational	practices,	many	women	I	interviewed	legitimized	their	participation	in	these	spaces	through	logics	of	merit	and	credibility.		I	examine	how	these	logics	and	opportunities	for	women	to	gain	access	to	and	develop	ownership	of	Islamic	knowledge	transformed	their	Islamic	praxis.		Before	discussing	women’s	experiences	in	these	spaces,	I	elaborate	on	the	methodology	and	research	process	through	which	I	gleaned	women’s	ideas	of	these	imbrications	and	these	notions	of	subjectivity.				
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Al-Huda,	the	Jamaat,	and	Women’s	Piety	Although	the	focus	of	this	dissertation	is	the	way	the	women	I	interviewed	understand	and	inhabit	the	Islamic	discourse	disseminated	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	I	first	provide	a	brief	introduction	to	these	organizations	below	to	contextualize	this	Islamic	discourse	and	the	mechanisms	through	which	it	reached	the	women	I	interviewed.		Al-Huda	International	and	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	are	distinct	organizations,	however,	they	share	a	similar	approach	to	Islam	that	draws	on	the	teachings	of	the	twentieth	century	Islamic	scholar,	Maulana	Abdul	Ala	Maududi.		Maududi	emphasized	a	literal,	applied,	and	more	comprehensive	engagement	with	the	Quran	as	a	panacea	for	what	he	perceived	to	be	the	weakness	of	Muslim	communities	especially	in	face	of	colonizing	forces	(S.	Ahmad,	2009;	Iqtidar,	2011).		His	literalist	approach	was	also	in	opposition	to	the	modernist	approach	of	Maududi’s	interlocutors,	such	as	Sayyid	Ahmad	Khan,	who	advocated	a	contextual	reinterpretation	of	Islamic	scripture	to	make	it	compatible	with	modernity.		For	Maududi,	the	strength	of	a	Muslim	community	could	only	be	established	through	implementing	the	“truth”	of	the	Quran.		In	turn,	the	“truth”	of	the	Quran,	according	to	Maududi,	required	a	literal	understanding	that	focused	on	cultivating	acceptance	of	what	the	Quran	says	regardless	of	whether	it	contradicted	normative	notions	of	modernity	and	progress	(S.	Ahmad,	2009).		This	claim	to	following	the	literal	word	of	the	Quran	furnished	Maududi’s	Islamic	discourse	with	a	sense	of	authenticity	because,	ostensibly,	it	did	not	give	in	to	socio-political	pressures	to	change	or	adjust	scripture	to	attend	to	contemporary	contexts.		Indeed,	many	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	associated	Al-Huda	and	
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the	Jamaat’s	claims	to	literalism	as	a	signal	for	a	more	“authentic”	practice	of	Islam	(see	chapter	five).21	Maududi’s	Islamic	ideology	gained	traction	in	the	1940s	in	crafting	a	Muslim	identity,	in	contra-distinction	to	Hindu	and	British	identities,	as	part	of	anti-colonial	struggles	in	India	(Iqtidar,	2011;	Jamal,	2013).		Influenced	by	Deobandi22	Islamic	ideology,	Maududi	established	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	as	a	political	party	in	pre-partition	India	in	1941	and	led	the	party	for	thirty	years,	focusing	on	narrowly	defining	and	representing	the	interests	of	the	Muslim	community	through	statecraft,	party	politics,	proselytization,	and	community	welfare	activities	(S.	Ahmad,	2009;	Iqtidar,	2011;	Jamal,	2013;	Toor,	2011c).23		The	Jamaat	became	a	key	player	in	Pakistani	politics	during	the	late	1970s	and	1980s	when	Zia-ul-Haq’s	military	dictatorship	instrumentalized	them	in	state-led	Islamization	programs	and	in	popularizing	the	American	proxy	war	in	Afghanistan	as	jihad	(Jamal,	2013,	p.	4;	Toor,	2011c,	p.	127).	24		Many	Jamaat	leaders	also	became	part	of	Zia’s	“nominated	parliament”	
																																																								21	At	the	same	time,	both	the	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda	represented	a	literalist	engagement	with	Islam	that	did	not	produce	the	kind	of	austere	practice	associated	with	groups	such	as	the	Tablighi	Jamaat	and	the	Jamaat-ud-Dawah	(Jamal,	2013).		The	Tablighi	Jamaat	and	the	Jamaat-ud-Dawah	are	Islamic	organizations	that	have	considerable	overlaps	with	the	Islamic	discourse	of	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	but	they	do	not	engage	in	electoral	politics.		Rather,	their	focus	is	on	various	forms	of	dawah	including	proselytization	in	Pakistan	and	globally.		See	Iqtidar	(2011)	for	more	on	the	development	of	the	Jamaat-ud-Da’wah	and	its	relationship	with	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	and	electoral	politics.		See	Metcalf	(2003)	on	the	practices	of	the	Tablighi	Jamaat.	22	Deobandi	refers	to	a	Sunni	Islamic	movement	that	emerged	out	of	the	Darul	Uloom	Deoband	in	India	in	1867	in	response	to	the	cultural	impacts	of	colonization	and	has	influenced	movements	and	political	parties	globally	(Pakistan,	Afghanistan,	Bangladesh,	United	Kingdom,	South	Africa,	North	America).		Although	Maududi	attended	Darul	Uloom,	his	religious	philosophy	did	not	strictly	adhere	to	Deobandi	principles	(Metcalf,	2009).	23	See	Toor	(2011)	for	an	analysis	of	the	repercussions	of	this	narrowly	constructed	Muslim	identity	on	religious	minorities.	24	Jihad	refers	to	the	struggle	to	be	a	pious	Muslim	and	to	maintain	Islam.		Understandings	of	jihad	vary	and	it	can	take	multiple	forms	including	armed	struggle.		In	the	case	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	jihad	denoted	the	struggle	to	maintain	and	develop	their	piety	in	face	of	resistance	and	obstacles	from	their	personal	relationships	and	social	environments	(see	chapter	four).		In	the	case	of	the	Zia-ul-Haq	dictatorship’s	relationship	with	the	Jamaat-e-Islami,	jihad	was	mobilized	to	create	legitimacy	for	militant	participation	in	American	proxy	wars.		See	Jalal	(2008)	for	a	discussion	of	the	historical	variations	of	understandings	of	jihad	in	South	Asia.	
20	
and	“provided	legitimacy	for	political	and	legal	measures	aimed	at	imposing	a	puritanical	version	of	Islam	on	Pakistani	society”	(Jamal,	2013,	p.	4).		The	Jamaat	and	the	Jamaat’s	Islamic	discourse	thus	proliferated	through	such	entanglements	with	state,	military,	and	imperialist	politics.			The	Jamaat-e-Islami	Women’s	Wing	operates	as	a	more	or	less	separate	entity	from	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	in	that	it	has	its	own	governance	structures	and	decision	making	bodies,	however	it	does	receive	a	small	allocation	of	funds	from	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	and	is	structured	around	similar	principles	(Jamal,	2013).		The	Women’s	Wing	also	includes	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	Women’s	Commission,	which	was	established	as	a	research,	education,	and	advocacy	body.		The	Commission	concentrates	on	conducting	research	studies,	developing	policy	recommendations,	and	educational	materials	on	women’s	issues,	drawing	on	their	Islamic	perspective	on	matters	such	as	violence,	employment,	education,	health	and	reproductive	rights	(Jamal,	2013).			While	Al-Huda	does	not	explicitly	claim	to	be	grounded	in	Maududi’s	teachings,	Dr.	Farhat	Hashmi,	the	founder	and	a	central	personality	at	Al-Huda,	received	her	initial	religious	education	from	her	parents,	both	of	whom	were	members	of	the	Jamaat,	and	from	attending	Jamaat-e-Islami	home-based	discussion	groups	with	her	mother	in	Sarghodha,	Punjab	(S.	Ahmad,	2009;	Jamal,	2013).		Hashmi	was	also	a	member	of	the	Jamaat’s	women’s	student	wing,	the	Jamiat-e-Talibat,	while	she	attended	Punjab	University	(S.	Ahmad,	2009).		Not	surprisingly,	there	are	key	resemblances	in	her	ideas	about,	for	instance,	taking	a	literalist	approach,	critiquing	mystical	and	devotional	practices,	working	towards	an	Islamic	way	of	life	based	on	an	idealization	of	the	time	of	the	Prophet	Mohammed	as	per	the	Quran	and	hadith,	and	removing	“cultural	accretions”	from	the	practice	of	Islam	(S.	
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Ahmad,	2009,	p.	40).		Al-Huda	emerged	after	the	Jamaat	had	acquired	prominence	in	electoral	politics	and	their	perspective	on	Islam	had	become	a	familiar,	albeit	contested	and	controversial,	part	of	the	discursive	landscape	in	much	of	Pakistan.		These	resemblances	are	an	important	component	of	the	historical	and	socio-political	context	that	was	foundational	in	Al-Huda’s	success	after	Farhat	Hashmi	and	her	husband	established	Al-Huda	in	1994	with	the	vision	of	“Quran	for	all.		In	Every	Hand,	In	Every	Heart”	(“Al-Huda	International,”	n.d.).		A	central	component	of	the	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda’s	activities	is	the	practice	of	dawah.		
Dawah	broadly	refers	to	the	Islamic	duty	to	invite	others	and	spread	the	message	of	Islam	(Mahmood	2005,	57;	Ahmad	2009,	1).		This	invitation	can	take	many	forms	and	different	Islamic	groups	associate	it	with	different	activities.		In	the	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda’s	discourse	of	piety,	dawah	includes	spreading	Islamic	education	in	formal	and	informal	ways,	publishing	and	disseminating	Islamic	materials,	and	engaging	in	social	welfare	activities	such	as	providing	aid	to	impoverished	communities.		Dawah	can	include	spreading	the	message	to	non-Muslims	and	Muslims	but	the	dawah	activities	of	the	women	I	interviewed	were	primarily	aimed	at	other	Muslims.		Because	dawah	takes	their	messages	outside	of	the	institutional	spaces	of	these	organizations,	the	Islamic	discourse	propagated	by	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	is	not	always	under	organizational	supervision	and	constraints.		Notably,	Jamaat	women’s	dawah	is	at	times	entangled	with	electoral	politics,	however,	
dawah	is	a	key	vehicle	through	which	the	Jamaat’s	Islamic	discourse	is	dispersed	beyond	the	realm	of	electoral	politics.			
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Many	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	engaged	in	dawah	by	attending	or	hosting	women’s	dars25	–	mostly	home-based	study	and	discussion	groups,	where	women	would	gather	to	hear	about	the	message	of	the	Quran	and	hadith	and	discuss	it	as	it	relates	to	their	everyday	lives.26		The	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda	also	offer	more	formal	and	structured	courses27	in	Islamic	education	at	their	seminaries,	campuses,	education	centres,	and	through	home-based	Quran	classes.		Hashmi	sought	to	accomplish	her	vision	of	“Quran	for	all”	by	providing	methodical	Islamic	instruction	in	various	forms	to	women.		This	included	the	core	activity	of	a	diploma	program,	which	included	courses	on	Quranic	Arabic	language	training,	seerah	(Prophetic	Biography),	tafseer	(exegesis),	Quranic	and	hadith	sciences,	and	
fiqh	(Islamic	jurisprudence)	(“Al-Huda	International,”	n.d.).		In	addition	to	the	diploma	program,	Al-Huda	offers	stand-alone	public	lectures,	intensive	courses,	workshops,	opportunities	for	listeners	to	sit	in	on	any	class,	and	an	advanced	post-diploma	program	for	select	students.		Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	students	and	graduates	are	also	encouraged	and	trained	to	hold	dars	and	Quran	classes	for	their	respective	communities	as	part	of	their	
dawah.		Many	of	the	women	I	interviewed	held	or	participated	in	dars	and	Quran	classes,	typically	taking	place	in	homes,	and	attended	by	other	women	from	their	social	circles	or	neighbourhoods.	
																																																								25	In	the	accounts	of	the	women	I	met,	dars	refers	to	an	Islamic	lesson	or	lecture	and	discussion	on	a	specific	topic.		Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	not	only	encouraged	women	to	attend	dars,	but	also	encouraged	them	to	give	
dars.		Often	dars	sessions	would	be	held	regularly	but	sometimes	a	dars	would	be	given	at	special	occasions	(such	as	weddings,	funerals,	or	during	the	month	of	Ramzan).		26	Often,	the	provision	of	Jamaat	social	welfare	supports	came	with	the	requirement	that	the	beneficiaries	attend	Jamaat	dars,	recite	verses	of	the	Quran	or	listen	to	a	sermon.		See	Ashfaq	(2006)	on	how	Jamaat	women	would	bring	aid	to	women	in	prison	but	would	ask	that	they	sit	through	a	dars	or	recite	sections	of	the	Quran	before	receiving	aid.	27	Their	curriculum	draws	primarily	on	materials	that	these	organizations	publish	themselves	but	there	is	some	overlap	in	the	materials	they	use	from	outside	sources.	
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While	I	focus	on	how	the	Islamic	discourse	propagated	by	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	influenced	the	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with,	this	is	not	necessarily	a	reflection	or	a	comment	on	the	organizations	themselves.		Throughout	this	dissertation,	I	deliberately	focus	on	interviews	with	women	who	were	not	official	members	of	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	party	or	part	of	the	leadership	of	Al-Huda	in	order	to	temper	the	official	institutional	or	party	line	and	foreground	the	everyday	experience	of	an	Islamic	praxis	informed	by	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda	discourse.28		As	mentioned,	because	both	these	organizations	place	a	strong	emphasis	on	dawah,	the	Islamic	discourse	they	propagate	takes	on	a	necessarily	dispersed	quality.		This	is	reflected	in	the	diversity	of	levels	of	affiliation	with	the	organizations	amongst	the	women	I	interviewed:	Some	women	were	more	formally	linked	to	these	organizations	while	others	were	involved	in	more	peripheral	ways.		By	foregrounding	the	Islamic	praxis	of	women	affiliated	with	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	rather	than	the	organizations	themselves,	this	dissertation	makes	space	for	how	women	take	up	and	incorporate	this	Islamic	discourse	into	their	own	lives,	relationships,	and	practices	of	piety.		This	approach	makes	visible	how	these	discourses	are	inhabited	in	intersectional	and	contradictory	ways	in	relation	to	other,	often	proximate,	Muslims	who	do	not	share	their	processes	of	pious	subjectivation.	In	addition	to	a	deliberate	focus	on	women	who	were	not	members	of	the	political	party,	not	all	the	women	I	met	in	Karachi	were	official	members	of	the	Jamaat-e-Islami:	Many	of	them	were	part-time	volunteers	at	the	Women’s	Commission,	teachers	or	students	at	Jamaat	schools,	or	regular	attendees	of	Jamaat-e-Islami	dars	in	their	neighbourhoods.		A	
																																																								28	For	more	on	Jamaat	women	engaged	more	directly	in	electoral	politics	see	Jamal	(2013)	and	Iqtidar	(2011).	
24	
number	of	women	I	met	at	Al-Huda	had	formerly	been	associated	with	the	Jamaat-e-Islami,	some	officially	as	members,	others	as	participants	of	Jamaat-e-Islami	classes	or	dars.		Also,	several	Jamaat	women	I	met	had	participated	to	varying	degrees	in	Al-Huda	learning	opportunities.		Of	the	twenty-five	women	I	interviewed,	eight	had	overlapping	trajectories	between	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.		Several	others	routinely	referred	to	print,	audio,	and	digital	publications	of	both	groups.		Many	women	also	referred	to	both	groups	as	“authentic”	when	recommending	where	I	should	go	for	my	research.		As	such,	there	was	much	overlap	between	interviewees	from	the	two	groups	that	makes	it	difficult	to	neatly	delineate	their	Islamic	discourse	as	distinct	or	mutually	exclusive.		Furthermore,	participation	in	either	group	in	and	of	itself	does	not	imply	a	stable,	coherent,	or	monolithic	identity	or	practice	of	Islam:		Some	women	I	interviewed	at	Al-Huda	had	more	similarities	in	terms	of	their	Islamic	praxis	with	the	women	I	interviewed	at	the	Jamaat	than	with	other	women	at	Al-Huda,	and	vice	versa.		Although	there	were	important	similarities	between	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	there	were	also	differences	in	how	and	why	women	participated	in	either	organization.		Several	women	at	Al-Huda	who	had	previously	participated	in	Jamaat-e-Islami	learning	opportunities	said	that	they	left	the	Jamaat	because	the	pressure	to	get	involved	in	party	politics	was	overwhelming.		To	them,	Al-Huda	represented	a	similar	approach	to	Islam	without	the	added	pressure	to	join	party	politics.		Indeed,	much	of	the	Jamaat’s	formal	Islamic	educational	opportunities	are	geared	towards	cultivating	participation	in	parliamentary	politics.		Advancement	in	Islamic	education	at	the	Jamaat	is	tied	to	advancement	in	party	politics.		Notably,	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	Women’s	Wing	has	been	instrumental	to	a	shift	in	parliamentary	culture	with	an	increase	in	women	holding	elected	
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positions.		Amina	Jamal	(2013)	suggests	that	this	is	a	testament	to	the	success	of	their	discourse	of	“purdah	in	parliament”	that	diverged	from	campaigns	by	women’s	rights	organizations	for	women’s	involvement	in	electoral	politics	as	a	move	from	“purdah	to	parliament”	(p.	8).		That	is,	Jamaat	women	assuaged	the	pitting	of	piety	against	politics	by	reconciling	purdah	with	participation	in	public	political	spaces.		Jamal	(2013)	goes	on	to	state:	there	is	no	doubt	that	their	activism	has	contributed	to	the	successful	linking	of	Islamic	modesty	and	freedom	of	mobility	by	the	scarf-wearing	women	who	are	appearing	in	large	numbers	in	public	spaces	as	university	students,	clerical	and	retail	workers,	professionals,	and	most	important,	political	representatives	at	the	local	and	national	levels.	(p.	14)		However,	for	the	Al-Huda	members	who	had	formerly	participated	in	the	Jamaat,	the	pressure	to	join	party	politics	represented	a	glass	ceiling	of	sorts	in	the	advancement	of	their	piety.		That	is,	they	wanted	to	proceed	to	advanced	levels	of	the	Jamaat’s	formal	education	without	having	to	participate	in	party	politics.		They	turned	to	Al-Huda	because	of	its	proclaimed	commitment	to	maintain	a	distance	from	electoral	politics.		Correspondingly,	as	Jamal	suggests,	many	women	in	the	Jamaat	who	had	participated	in	Al-Huda	felt	that	the	lack	of	a	connection	to	party	politics	stunted	their	Islamic	praxis	and	obstructed	a	key	aspect	of	piety	(Jamal,	2013).		It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	although	these	connections	were	valuable	to	the	Jamaat	women	I	met,	they	too	kept	their	distance	from	direct	involvement	in	electoral	politics	for	various	reasons.		Foremost	of	these	reasons	was	that	they	did	not	think	that	this	was	a	priority	for	them,	even	though	they	felt	that	it	was	an	important	aspect	of	Islam.		By	contrast	to	the	women	in	Jamal’s	(2013)	account	of	the	Jamaat,	electoral	politics	did	not	figure	as	a	prominent	feature	of	the	Islamic	discourse	espoused	by	the	Jamaat	women	I	met.		For	many	of	the	Jamaat	women	I	
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met,	regular	participation	in	home-based	classes	in	their	neighbourhoods	was	the	extent	of	their	involvement	in	the	Jamaat.	While	this	dissertation	focuses	more	so	on	middle	and	upper	class	women,	it	is	important	to	note	that	there	were	key	differences	in	the	socio-economic	demographics	that	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	targeted	as	organizations.		Reflecting	the	Jamaat-e-Islami’s	strategic	focus	on	the	middle	and	lower	classes	in	urban	and	rural	areas,	many	Jamaat	women	belong	to	and	work	with	this	demographic	audience	in	their	research,	education,	and	advocacy	activities.		Jamal	(2013)	suggests	that	the	Jamaat	has	seen	most	success	amongst	middle-class	women	in	urban	centres	in	Pakistan,	although	it	is	gaining	ground	in	the	upper	classes	as	well.		She	argues	that	this	is	because	of	the	allure	of	a	“modern	Islamic	revivalism”	that	appealed	to	“moderate”	middle-class	sensibilities	through	a	balance	between	“overly	restrictive	practices	of	many	Muslim	groups	and	what	they	reject	as	the	ultra-modern	culture	of	the	elite	classes”	(Jamal,	2013,	p.	4).		By	contrast,	Al-Huda	initially	strategically	focused	on	urban	women	from	elite	upper	and	upper-middle	classes	and	then	extended	to	women	from	lower	classes	in	urban	and	rural	areas.		The	opportunities	provided	for	members	of	the	upper	classes	to	participate	in	Al-Huda	learning	opportunities	is	what	at	one	time	set	it	apart	from	the	Jamaat.		However,	Al-Huda	did	also	eventually	aim	to	include	the	same	demographics	as	the	Jamaat	even	as	their	commitment	to	not	exclude	the	upper	classes	continued	to	be	a	distinctive	feature	of	their	Islamic	praxis.		This	commitment	can	be	seen,	for	example,	in	their	presence	in	affluent	neighbourhoods,	their	pedagogical	approach,	and	their	choice	of	lecture	venues	at	elite	hotels	and	country	clubs.		They	also	offered	instruction	in	English	as	well	as	Urdu	in	an	effort	to	make	their	classes	accessible	to	the	elite	English-medium	demographic	in	Pakistan	as	well	as	diasporic	and	
27	
global	audiences	(S.	Ahmad,	2009).		The	Jamaat	has	also	taken	cues	from	Al-Huda’s	success	and	adopted	some	of	their	pedagogical	approaches	to	Islamic	instruction	as	well	which	led	to	some	diversification	in	the	socio-economic	locations	of	women	getting	involved	with	the	Jamaat	(Jamal,	2013).		Throughout	this	dissertation,	invocations	and	conceptualizations	of	Islamic	concepts,	references	to	scriptural	and	exegetical	texts,	elaborations	on	aspects	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	as	organizations,	are	all	based	on	what	was	brought	up	in	the	interviews	or	in	participatory	observations	with	the	women	I	met.		I	refrain	from	using	excerpts	from	the	Quran	and	hadith	directly	in	order	to	foreground	how	the	women	I	interviewed	understood	these	texts	and	how	they	are	made	relevant	in	these	women’s	everyday	lives.		Moreover,	as	several	women’s	rights	organizations	and	many	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	pointed	out,	the	tendency	to	take	up	excerpts	from	scripture	without	locating	it	within	its	textual,	exegetical,	and	historical	contexts	leads	to	reductive	and	over	simplified	readings	and	mischaracterizations	of	these	excerpts,	as	I	elaborate	in	chapter	four.		As	such,	because	theological	and	exegetical	analysis	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	dissertation,	I	avoid	direct	quotations	from	scripture	and	instead	rely	on	the	varied	and	contextual	explanations	of	how	my	respondents,	the	Pakistani	state,	and	women’s	organizations	conceptualize	and	employ	scriptures.	The	ethnographic	research	I	refer	to,	including	interviews	and	participatory	observations,	took	place	over	the	course	of	eight	months	in	2012	in	Mississauga,	Karachi,	and	Islamabad.		I	met	most	of	the	women	I	interviewed	through	personal	networks	and	used	the	snowball	sampling	method	to	identify	additional	interviewees.		Most	of	the	interviews	were	conducted	in	women’s	homes	and	some	in	private	spaces	at	the	Al-Huda	
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or	Jamaat	centres	and	offices.		I	began	my	research	in	Mississauga,	the	city	in	which	I	reside,	because	of	the	prevalence	of	transformations	in	practices	of	piety	I	observed	amongst	women	in	my	community.		For	instance,	many	women	in	my	community	changed	their	practices	of	modesty	and	veiling	from	loosely	covering	their	heads	with	a	scarf	or	not	covering	their	head	at	all	to	the	hijab	and,	in	many	cases,	the	abaya	and	niqab.		Common	religious	rituals	and	collective	practices	of	piety	such	as	the	Quran	khaani	and	milaad29	came	to	be	considered	cultural	accretions	that	were	inherently	un-Islamic	(see	chapter	five).		The	prevalence	of	these	transformations	was	in	part	the	result	of	the	influence	of	
dawah	activities	of	Al-Huda	and	affiliates	of	the	Jamaat	that	sought	to	spread	their	message	amongst	the	large	concentration	of	Pakistani	Sunni	Muslims	in	Mississauga.		At	the	time,	Al-Huda’s	only	campus	outside	of	Pakistan	was	in	Mississauga,	which	began	conferring	diplomas	in	Islamic	education	to	women	in	2001.30		The	women	I	met	in	Mississauga	attended	home-based	Quran	classes	with	graduates	of	Al-Huda.		I	attended	a	number	of	these	classes	in	different	homes	to	get	a	sense	of	what	these	women	were	learning	and	why	it	appealed	to	them.			When	I	began	approaching	women	for	interviews	in	Mississauga,	I	was	met	with	mixed	reactions:		Some	were	enthusiastic	to	share	their	stories,	some	took	time	to	think	it	over	before	agreeing	to	the	interviews,	and	some	declined	in	part	because	they	did	not	trust	the	process.		For	many	of	those	who	agreed,	a	large	part	of	their	motivation	was	to	clear	the	name	of	Islam	and	to	prove	that,	even	though	they	wore	the	hijab	or	niqab	and	
																																																								29	A	Quran	khaani	is	a	collective	reading	of	the	Quran	in	a	gathering	to	commemorate	a	special	occasion	or	incident.		Milaad	is	a	gathering	to	celebrate	the	Prophet	Mohammed	through	devotional	singing,	poetry,	and/or	discussion.		See	chapter	five	for	an	elaboration	of	what	these	events	entail.	30	Al-Huda	has	since	opened	up	campuses	in	India,	the	United	Arab	Emirates,	the	United	Kingdom,	and	the	United	States	of	America.	
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followed	a	literalist	approach	to	Islam,	they	were	not	Muslims	of	the	terrorist	persuasion,	so	to	speak.		Though	it	was	difficult	to	ascertain	the	motivations	for	all	those	who	declined,	the	ones	who	did	offer	an	explanation	mentioned	that	they	were	not	clear	on	how	I	would	use	the	information	and	whether	it	would	bring	undue	scrutiny	in	an	already	hostile	global	political	environment.		The	legitimacy	of	this	concern	is	particularly	clear	when	taken	in	the	context	of	the	heightened	Islamophobia	and	anti-immigrant	discourse	around	recent	incidents	in	Canada	such	as	the	niqab	ban	(Zine,	2012),	the	arrest	of	Pakistani	youth	under	security	certificates,31	and	accusations	against	Al-Huda’s	Farhat	Hashmi	for	“spreading	hate”	(Köhler,	2006)	and	her	related	deportation	case.		Moreover,	mainstream	Canadian	media	reporting	on	Al-Huda	and	especially	on	the	deportation	case	has	taken	a	stubbornly	hostile	stance	against	these	women	and	their	practices	of	piety,	characterizing	them	as	“puppets”,	“fundamentalists”,	or	“radical”	(Fatah,	2009;	A.	R.	Khan,	2007;	Köhler,	2006).		It	was	not	surprising	then	that	for	many	women	this	was	the	underlying	concern	that	shaped	both	their	reasons	for	participating	and	their	reasons	for	not	participating	in	this	research	project.		I	met	with	women	participating	in	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	piety	groups	in	Karachi	and	Islamabad	to	expand	the	scope	of	my	research	to	Pakistan	because	I	also	saw	considerable	changes	in	the	practices	of	piety	in	my	communities	there.		I	chose	these	two	locations	in	part	for	logistical	reasons	as	I	have	established	networks	in	these	cities.		In	Karachi,	I	met	with	women	who	attended	Quran	classes	at	three	different	Al-Huda	centres.		I	also	met	a	number	of	women	through	the	Jamaat’s	Women’s	Commission	office	in	Karachi	and	I	
																																																								31	After	9/11,	security	certificates	were	established	in	Canada	to	legally	permit	the	detention	and	expulsion	of	non-citizens	without	due	process	in	the	interest	of	national	security.	See	Razack	(2007)	for	a	critical	analysis	of	the	racialized	impact	of	security	certificates.	
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interviewed	several	women	who	attended	home-based	Quran	classes	organized	by	graduates	or	students	of	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	courses.		In	addition,	I	attended	several	classes	at	the	centres,	home-based	Quran	classes,	and	social	gatherings	at	women’s	homes.		In	Islamabad,	my	ethnographic	research	primarily	took	place	at	the	Al-Huda	central	campus	where	I	interviewed	several	women	on	the	campus	and	attended	a	number	of	classes	with	them,	including	some	lectures	delivered	by	Farhat	Hashmi.	Like	the	women	I	met	in	Mississauga,	many	of	the	women	I	met	in	Karachi	and	Islamabad	shared	their	concerns	about	Islamophobia	and	worried	especially	about	misconceptions	of	Muslim	women	in	the	West	and	amongst	modern	‘liberal’	Pakistanis.		I	was	often	met	with	some	suspicion	from	women	I	approached	for	an	interview	in	part	because	of	what	I	represented	as	a	diasporic	Pakistani	academic	based	in	a	Western	institution.		Many	women	raised	concerns	about	potential	“misunderstandings”	where	I	might	not	understand	their	perspective	because	we	did	not	share	the	same	approach	to	Islam.		In	several	instances,	these	suspicions	and	concerns	were	assuaged	because	they	associated	me	with	my	contacts	who	had	referred	me	to	them.		Nevertheless,	paying	heed	to	these	concerns,	I	take	up	their	explanations	of	their	Islamic	praxis	in	a	careful	and	detailed	manner	by	way	of	taking	their	notions	of	the	sacred	seriously,	sharing	their	stories,	and	honouring	the	knowledge	that	they	shared	with	me.		At	the	same	time,	this	does	not	preempt	a	critical	analysis	of	the	ways	in	which	these	women	are	implicated	in	relations	of	power.		For	instance,	I	include	an	analysis	of	how	many	of	these	women	are	engaged	in	a	classed	project	of	religiosity	that	is	complicit	in	the	marginalization	of	impoverished	populations	(see	chapter	five).		The	women	I	met	in	Pakistan	were	primarily	from	middle	and	upper	class	backgrounds	and	some	of	them	lived	in	some	of	the	most	elite	
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neighbourhoods	in	Karachi	and	Islamabad.		The	women	I	met	in	Mississauga	came	from	upper-middle	class	backgrounds	in	Pakistan,	some	of	them	having	moved	to	Canada	very	recently,	and	considered	themselves	middle	class	in	the	context	of	Mississauga.				
Note	on	the	Spatiality	of	Piety	This	dissertation	draws	on	interviews	with	women	geographically	located	in	Karachi,	Islamabad,	and	Mississauga.		All	the	women	I	met	identify	as	‘Pakistani’	in	complex	and	contradictory	ways	(see	chapters	three	and	five),	however,	not	all	of	them	lived	within	the	geographic	borders	of	the	Pakistani	nation-state.		Furthermore,	while	I	make	geographic	identification	of	cities	such	as	Karachi,	Islamabad,	and	Mississauga,	this	is	not	meant	to	represent	them	as	homogenous	spaces.		The	differences	within	these	cities,	from	neighbourhood	to	neighbourhood,	bring	into	question	the	usefulness	of	the	city	as	a	spatial	designation.		Perhaps	a	more	useful	identifier	would	be	their	neighbourhoods	–	women	from	the	Defence	Housing	Authority,	Clifton,	the	F	sector,	Erin	Mills,	or	Streetsville.		In	addition,	many	of	the	women	I	met	in	Karachi	and	Islamabad	had	lived,	visited,	or	had	family,	friends,	or	business	relations	outside	of	Pakistan	and	many	of	the	women	I	met	in	Mississauga	had	similar	connections	to	Pakistan	and	elsewhere.		The	women	I	met	in	Mississauga	had	all	migrated	from	Pakistan	(Karachi,	Lahore,	and	Islamabad)	within	the	last	one	to	fifteen	years	and	were	attached	to	Pakistan	in	multiple	ways	–	affect,	belonging,	economic,	familial.		Even	Farhat	Hashmi,	the	founder	of	Al-Huda	completed	her	doctoral	degree	from	the	University	of	Glasgow	in	Scotland	and	lived	in	Mississauga	for	a	number	of	years.			
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While	these	direct	transnational	connections	are	important,	the	Islamic	discourse	espoused	by	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	is	transnational	in	multifaceted	ways.		For	instance,	when	I	walked	into	one	of	the	Al-Huda	centers	in	Karachi,	I	was	greeted	with	a	poster	of	the	Al-Huda	campus	in	Mississauga	on	the	billboard	highlighting	Al-Huda’s	international	status.		A	woman	I	met	at	the	centre	who	had	been	involved	with	Al-Huda	from	its	early	stages	told	me	a	story	about	how	Hashmi	included	the	suffix	“international”	in	Al-Huda’s	official	name	to	signal	the	organization’s	cosmopolitan	outlook	and	her	aspirations	to	expand	the	organization	beyond	Pakistan.		This	“global	outlook”	was	one	of	the	central	reasons	my	respondents	gave	for	the	appeal	of	the	organization	to	the	upper	classes.		That	is,	it	fostered	a	sense	of	a	cosmopolitan	Islamic	discourse	that	effectively	affirmed	upper	class	women’s	self-perceptions	as	participants	in	global	networks	and	cultures.			Moreover,	for	some	women	in	both	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	allegiance	to	the	nation-state	was	sacrilege	since	their	ideals	of	Islamic	piety	required	identification	with	a	transnational	Muslim	ummah	(community).32		These	allegiances	notwithstanding,	their	piety	intersected	with	Pakistani	nationalist	discourses	in	complex	and	contradictory	ways.		For	instance,	diasporic	engagements	with	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	were	constituted	through	conceptualizations	of	a	spatial	displacement	that	distanced	diasporic	women	from	the	lure	of	Hindu/Indian	cultural	practices	in	Pakistan.		This	understanding	of	a	kind	of	diasporic	purity	or	authenticity	draws	on	problematic	Pakistani	religio-nationalist	discursive	logics	of	Hindu/Muslim	animosity	that	are	tied	to	the	basis	of	the	independence	
																																																								32	Ummah,	or	ummat,	in	the	usage	of	the	women	I	met,	refers	to	a	transnational	Muslim	community.		See	Asad	(2003)	and	Jalal	(2000)	for	more	on	conceptualizations	of	the	ummah.	
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of	Pakistan	from	India	(see	chapter	five).		As	will	become	clearer	in	subsequent	chapters,	diasporic	and	transnational	mental	maps	are	integral	to	how	Islamic	subjectivity	is	articulated,	validated,	and	produced	in	my	respondents’	discourses	of	piety.		
Discursive	Spaces	In	the	following	sections,	I	draw	on	how	the	women	I	met	understood	the	significance	of	these	organizations	in	order	to	foreground	what	these	organizations	meant	to	them.		Several	women	characterized	their	learning	experiences	as	a	shift	in	how	they	understood	Islam;	it	became	more	“accessible”,	“practical”,	“applicable”	and	“relatable”	to	them.	33		For	many	women,	participation	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	made	them	realize	that	the	Quran	was	an	instructive	text		for	women	that	could	be	applied	to	their	everyday	lives.		Like	Donya’s	analysis	of	the	changes	brought	about	in	women’s	relationships	to	Islamic	texts	described	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	many	women	reiterated	the	paradigm	shift	borne	out	of	the	idea	that	the	Quran	is	applicable	to	contemporary	everyday	life	and	not	just	part	of	an	ancient	narrative.		For	instance,	Muna,	a	graduate	and	a	teacher	at	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	Karachi,	was	skeptical	when	she	first	came	to	Al-Huda	but	was	“blown	away”	by	how	“Al-Huda	really	teaches	you	about	how	to	handle	the	situations	of	today”.		Muna’s	comments	also	betray	how	she	assumed	that	Al-Huda’s	Islamic	teachings	would	not	resonate	with	her	contemporary	and	personal	life.		Seeing	the	relevance	of	the	content	of	
																																																								33	These	notions	of	access	and	relatability	to	the	Quran	echo	19th	century	Islamic	reform	movements	in	South	Asia	that	sought	to	establish	a	modern	Islamic	identity	through	an	emphasis	on	unmediated	and	direct	individual	engagement.	These	movements	were	shaped	by	colonial	era	politics,	legislative	and	legal	developments,	education	reform,	and	the	introduction	of	the	printing	press.		See	Jalal	(	2000)	and	Metcalf	(2009)	for	analyses	of	these	movements.		Also	see	Jamal	(2013)	for	a	discussion	of	the	connections	between	these	movements	and	contemporary	developments	in	the	Jamaat-e-Islami.	
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Al-Huda’s	teachings	was	a	new	and	exciting	experience,	reflecting	a	sense	of	appreciation	for	the	existence	of	a	space	where	she	would	be	able	to	relate	to	Islam.		Zainab,	another	Al-Huda	graduate,	volunteer,	and	organizer	of	a	home-based	Quran	class	in	Karachi,	described	the	impact	of	Al-Huda’s	technique	of	applying	the	text	to	everyday	life:		In	our	class	we	had	500	students	and	if	we	go	to	this	class	with	a	problem	from	our	homes,	the	tafseer	(exegesis)34	from	that	day	would	somehow	address	it.		I	would	turn	to	my	friend	and	say	‘this	is	the	problem	I	was	having	at	home	and	today	the	
tafseer	has	solved	my	problem’.		My	friend	would	say	yes	but	she	would	also	find	some	solution	in	the	same	tafseer	for	a	different	problem!		If	you	asked	each	of	the	500	people	there,	all	of	them	would	say	this	that	my	problem	has	been	solved	through	today’s	tafseer	even	when	everyone’s	problem	was	different.		Now	what	can	I	say.		I	don’t	know	how,	but	this	is	what	happened	with	everyone.		Zainab	conveys	her	amazement	that	so	many	different	people	were	able	to	relate	to	the	same	message	when	she	implies	the	miraculous	ubiquity	of	relatability	of	the	message	of	the	lesson.		The	novelty	of	the	connection	between	the	text	and	everyday	life	for	many	of	these	women	cannot	be	understated.		For	Donya,	Muna,	and	Zainab,	these	connections	were	central	to	transformations	in	their	relationships	to	Islam	where	it	became	an	integral	part	of	their	lived	experiences	and	processes	of	subject	formation.	Furthermore,	it	was	not	only	the	connection	to	practical	everyday	life	but	the	ways	in	which	these	groups	and	institutes	were	attentive	to	gendered	dimensions	of	the	everyday	that	made	them	especially	appealing	to	many	women.		Many	women	were	“amazed”	that	Islam	is	also	applicable	to	their	physical	and	sexual	life	in	significant	ways.		
																																																								34	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat’s	focus	on	tafseer	has	been	an	effective	way	of	generating	a	sense	of	relevance	of	Islam	in	everyday	life.		The	practice	of	tafseer,	which	is	a	form	of	exegesis,	would	generally	be	taken	up	by	women	who	were	considered	more	learned.		This	authority	to	do	tafseer	was	established	through	progressions	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat’s	stages	of	learning	though	there	was	no	set	level	of	advancement	especially	in	the	context	of	home-based	groups.		Women	who	presented	tafseer	in	study	groups	and	classes	would	refer	to	a	mix	of	Islamic	history	(sometimes	including	a	history	of	the	exegesis	of	a	certain	passage)	and	contemporary	material.		The	contemporary	material	would	include	references	to	current	affairs,	everyday	struggles	women	go	through,	social	interactions	in	various	contexts	(hospitals,	schools,	marketplaces),	and	more.		Their	exegesis	would	more	often	than	not	heavily	reference	other	exegetical	sources.	
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Donya	explained	that	women	are	able	to	relate	to	the	teachings	of	another	woman:	“There	are	things	[women]	don’t	want	to	talk	to	anybody	about	because	they	can’t	relate	to	that	person.		What	happened	with	this	is	that	religion	became	more	accessible,	more	relatable	to	women”.		For	Donya,	learning	about	Islam	from	another	woman	enabled	her	to	be	more	candid	and	to	bring	up	matters	that	she	would	not	have	been	able	to	discuss	with	a	male	teacher.		Farida,	another	teacher	at	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	Karachi,	elaborated	on	how	she	started	to	see	Islam	after	attending	a	few	sessions	of	a	home-based	Quran	class	in	her	neighbourhood:	“Islam	not	only	tells	us	about	our	(individual)	life	but	also	about	collective	life…It	tells	you	about	families,	husband,	and	wife,	everything	really.		So	when	we	go	out	in	the	world,	we	know”.		Farida’s	comments	bring	the	matter	of	social	and	ethical	behaviour	into	conversation	with	what	Islam	says	in	her	emphasis	on	collective	life.	Farida	characterizes	Islam	as	a	way	for	her	to	learn	how	to	conduct	herself	in	various	social	relationships	and	situations	that	made	her	feel	more	prepared	to	participate	in	these	relationships	as	a	woman	-	to	“know”	how	to	be	in	the	world,	as	she	put	it.			The	opening	up	of	this	space	is	especially	relevant	for	topics	that	would	otherwise	be	considered	taboo	or	would	have	some	sort	of	shame	attached	to	them.		These	tended	to	be	matters	related	to	women’s	bodies	and	sexualities.		For	instance,	a	few	women	mentioned	specifically	that	they	were	glad	that	they	were	made	aware	of	“paki	ka	ghusl”	which	loosely	translates	to	“purifying	wash”	referring	to	an	Islamic	method	of	washing	your	body	after	having	sexual	relations.		That	Islam	recognized	the	woman’s	body	as	a	sexual	body	in	need	of	care	was	a	revelation	to	many	women.		This	sentiment	was	echoed	in	how	women	described	moments	in	their	classes	at	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	where	they	were	able	to	openly	ask	questions	about	intimacy.		Muna,	for	example,	was	amazed	that	she	
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was	able	to	bluntly	ask	questions	during	her	coursework	at	Al-Huda	that	she	never	thought	she	would	be	able	to	ask	in	a	religious	environment:	“[Where]	else	can	you	ask	if	you	can	give	your	husband	a	blowjob	and	still	be	a	good	Muslim?”		Muna	explained	that	she	was	grateful	for	finding	a	place	where	she	did	not	have	to	worry	about	the	risk	attached	to	asking	a	question	that	revealed	something	about	her	sexuality.		Prior	to	these	experiences	at	Al-Huda,	Muna	imagined	her	sexuality	to	be	in	opposition	to	being	a	“good	Muslim”.		Learning	about	Al-Huda’s	Islamic	exegesis	on	whether	or	not	a	“blowjob”	is	permitted	and	under	what	conditions,	bridged	the	divide	that	she	had	perceived	between	her	sexuality	and	her	religiosity.	Sumaya,	an	organizer	and	participant	of	a	home-based	Quran	class	in	Mississauga,	pointed	out	that	women	who	did	not	have	relationships	with	other	women	in	their	family	and	community	where	they	felt	comfortable	discussing	intimate	and	sexual	matters	found	themselves	engaged	in	these	conversations	at	Al-Huda	or	the	Jamaat.		Sumaya	recounted	how	she	felt	when	she	first	found	the	space	to	discuss	such	matters	in	one	of	the	first	Quran	classes	she	attended	during	the	holy	month	of	Ramzan:35	One	of	the	first	things	I	remember	from	the	class	that	started	in	Ramzan	–	well	I	was	newly	married	and	when	[my	husband]	would	leave	for	work	in	the	morning	I	would	give	him	a	peck	on	the	cheek	even	in	Ramzan.		That	day	only	in	her	class	it	clicked	to	me	to	ask	if	this	is	even	allowed?		Does	your	fast	break	because	of	this?		The	teacher	talked	about	how	it	does	not	break	your	fast	[when	you]	give	your	husband	a	peck	on	the	cheek	and	I	was	so	excited	that	I	exclaimed	‘really?’	And	everyone	was	laughing.		That	day	I	realized	that	[this	teacher]	understands,	that	she	can	relate	to	examples	that	we	live	through.		
																																																								35	Ramzan	is	the	month	of	fasting	in	the	Islamic	calendar.		For	many	of	the	women	I	met,	it	is	a	particularly	auspicious	time	where	practices	of	piety	are	elevated	through	ritual	fasting,	worship,	and	abstaining	from	entertainment	and	pleasure.	
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In	Sumaya’s	telling	of	her	experience	in	a	Quran	class,	she	coveys	her	appreciation	of	a	space	where	she	was	able	to	talk	about	giving	her	husband	a	peck	on	the	cheek,	and	to	get	a	response	that	did	not	shame	her.		As	she	explained,	that	she	was	able	to	exclaim	“really?”	and	be	excited	about	continuing	her	everyday	expression	of	affection	for	her	husband	in	a	space	for	learning	about	Islam	was	in	itself	an	exciting	realization	about	what	learning	about	Islam	can	mean	for	her.		She	described	this	incident	as	the	moment	when	she	began	to	see	the	possibilities	of	the	extent	to	which	Islam	can	be	made	part	of	her	life	with	the	proper	guidance	from	a	teacher	who	can	relate	to	her.		Sumaya	went	on	to	explain,	“I	had	[more]	questions	that	had	never	been	taken	up	by	my	family,	by	my	mother,	for	the	sake	of	modesty.		And	I	did	not	ask”.		She	highlights	that	these	spaces	allowed	her	to	have	conversations	about	her	body	and	sexuality	in	ways	that	she	had	not	had	with	her	family.		Having	a	teacher	she	can	relate	to,	who	she	does	not	need	to	be	“modest”	around,	whose	purpose	is	to	guide	and	not	judge,	and	who	was	knowledgeable	about	Islam,	gave	Sumaya	the	opportunity	to	ask	the	questions	about	her	body	and	sexuality	that	she	could	not	with	other	women	in	her	life.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	these	women	did	not	only	bring	up	learning	about	Islamic	ways	of	approaching	their	bodies	and	sexuality	because	they	felt	that	there	were	Islamic	rules	and	regulations	that	they	were	missing	from	their	lives	–	although	that	was	part	of	it.		Rather,	they	brought	up	these	matters	as	examples	of	feeling	validated,	intrigued	and	enticed	by	the	idea	that	everyday	private	or	personal	things	that	are	important	to	them	are	also	important	in	Islam.		These	conversations	contributed	to	the	validation	of	their	desires	and	sexuality	as	women,	the	removal	of	shame	and	embarrassment	from	their	expressions	of	sexuality,	and	the	recognition	of	their	bodies	as	
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worthy	of	care.		Furthermore,	these	were	marked	shifts	from	the	ways	in	which	Islam	had	been	mobilized	by	the	Pakistani	state	to	regulate	women’s	sexuality	through,	for	example,	the	Hudood	Ordinances	discussed	in	chapter	three.		It	is	in	the	context	of	a	regulatory	socio-political	environment	that	stories	of	sexuality	and	women’s	relationships	with	their	bodies	acquire	particular	significance	for	many	of	the	women	I	interviewed.		That	is,	they	were	able	to	reconfigure	relationships	between	women,	sexuality,	and	Islam	through	the	spaces	provided	by	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.		Speaking	about	Al-Huda	in	particular,	many	women	chose	to	join	because	it	seemed	like	a	relatively	safer	space	that	was	less	“harsh”	and	“non-judgmental”	compared	to	some	of	the	other	piety	groups	they	explored.		This	facilitated	participation	from	women	who	would	otherwise	feel	judged,	defensive	or	stifled	in	a	more	rigid	atmosphere	for	their	lifestyles.		As	Sumaya	put	it,	“Some	[other]	classes	I	found	kind	of	harsh.		They	would	make	it	sound	like	you	are	condemned	for	life	and	cannot	be	rectified!”		Al-Huda	was	different.		The	prospect	of	redemption	was	particularly	appealing	for	the	urban,	educated,	upper	class	women	who	were	the	initial	primary	audience	of	Al-Huda’s	teachings.			Perceptions	that	their	‘modern’	lifestyles	would	be	a	barrier	to	their	participation	in	spaces	for	Islamic	learning	were	quickly	dismissed	for	many	women	when	they	joined	Al-Huda.		For	instance,	Rabia	described	why,	after	much	searching,	she	ended	up	at	Al-Huda:	“Initially	when	I	went	to	Al-Huda,	I	never	used	to	cover	myself	[hijab].		And	I	thought	when	I	feel	that	I	have	to	do	it	then	I	will	do	it”.		Her	teacher	at	the	time	told	her	that	she	did	not	need	to	cover	as	an	everyday	practice	to	be	part	of	Al-Huda,	however,	she	would	need	to	wear	a	hijab	as	part	of	the	Al-Huda	uniform.		Appreciating	the	distinction	between	the	hijab	as	religious	practice	and	as	uniform,	Rabia	complied	and	valued	that	there	was	no	pressure	
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on	her	to	wear	the	hijab	as	a	religious	practice	outside	the	class.		She	mentioned	that	other	institutes	she	explored	did	not	offer	the	same	flexibility	and	expressed	her	admiration	of	Al-Huda’s	approach:	“[They]	let	her	listen.	Let	her	decide	for	herself.		Why	force	her?		That	also	gave	me	a	lot	of	reason	to	think	[about	myself]	–	let	people	decide	for	themselves	and	don’t	be	judgmental”.		Rabia’s	comments	indicate	how	she	was	relieved	to	not	feel	judged	by	other	women	at	Al-Huda,	but	also	how	this	gave	her	pause	to	think	and	be	more	open	and	non-judgmental	herself.			Shumaila	concurred	with	Rabia’s	impression	when	she	told	me	about	how	she	felt	when	she	joined	Al-Huda	and	was	not	in	the	practice	of	wearing	an	abaya:		When	I	first	went	[to	Al-Huda],	I	didn’t	wear	the	abaya,	I	was	just	wearing	a	scarf	and	some	of	my	hair	was	showing	and	it	still	does	sometimes	(laughs)…[but]	that	kind	of	freedom	where	they	tell	you	this	is	the	right	thing	but	you	make	the	decision,	you	make	the	choice…I	think	that’s	what’s	important.		Similarly,	Muna,	mentioned	that	she	valued	that	“they	are	not	saying	you	must	do	this,	you	must	do	that”	and	affirm	the	idea	that	“Allah	will	always	take	you	back”	no	matter	what	kind	of	a	life	you	have	lived	before	or	what	religious	codes	you	have	failed	to	live	up	to:	“Like	don’t	even	worry	about	not	being	covered,	not	covering	your	boobs	or	whatever…just	forget	about	it	and	just	do	what	you	can”.		The	understanding	that	they	would	be	redeemable	despite	their	mistakes	produced	a	sense	of	unconditional	belonging	for	Shumaila	and	Muna,	which,	in	turn,	legitimated	their	aspirations	to	piety.		Shumaila	laughing	about	her	hair	still	showing	every	now	and	again	reflects	how	she	perceived	Al-Huda	as	a	flexible	space	where	she	could	have	these	imperfections	in	her	practice	of	hijab.		As	reflected	in	Muna’s	comments,	the	perception	that	it	would	be	good	enough	to	simply	“do	what	you	can”	made	these	learning	environments	more	friendly,	accessible,	and	
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facilitated	relationships	between	women	that	were	not	based	on	assessing	each	other’s	levels	of	piety.	Foundational	to	what	women	such	as	Sumaya,	Rabia,	Shumaila	and	Muna	saw	as	a	non-judgmental	atmosphere	was	the	recognition	and	acknowledgement	of	many	women’s	‘modern’	lifestyles	that	did	not	require	them	to	hide	or	deny	where	they	were	coming	from.		Rather,	the	strategy	of	directly	engaging	with	and	relating	to	these	‘modern’	lifestyles	facilitated	the	transitions	many	women	were	attempting	to	undertake.		Referring	to	one	of	her	favorite	teachers,	Sumaya	observed	that	this	flexibility	was	because	her	teacher	was	coming	from	similar	experiences:		She	was	very	humble	in	the	sense	that	she	would	say	that	everyone	makes	mistakes.		So	probably	she	was	more	from	our	kind	of	background	–	those	who	are	coming	from	a	lifetime	of	doing	all	those	[wrong]	things…For	example,	those	of	us	who	have	had	a	certain	kind	of	academic	upbringing	with	co-education,	or	having	grown	up	watching	movies	and	dancing	to	music,	like	in	dholkis36	–	we	are	coming	from	this	background	and	if	someone	can’t	relate	to	that	then	there	are	very	few	people	who	would	continue	[in	the	class].				Sumaya’s	teacher’s	ability	to	relate,	regardless	of	whether	something	fell	in	line	with	Islamic	ideals	or	not,	generated	a	sense	of	implied	solidarity	that	Sumaya	describes	as	imperative	for	her	and	others	to	continue	in	the	class.		That	her	teacher	had	participated	in	singing	and	dancing	at	weddings	demonstrated	her	relatability	for	Sumaya.		This	was	the	challenge	of	teaching	content	that	directly	negated	how	many	women	had	grown	up	and	how	they	and	their	communities	outside	of	Al-Huda	lived	their	lives.		Although	many	women	who	came	across	such	teachings	would	reject	them	and	discontinue	any	involvement	despite	Al-Huda’s	attempts	to	relate	to	their	lives,	for	many	of	the	women	who	
																																																								36	A	dholki	is	social	gathering	held	in	the	weeks	leading	up	to	a	wedding.		It	includes	eating,	singing,	dancing,	decorating,	and	preparing	for	wedding	events.	
41	
stayed,	this	relatability	was	a	selling	feature	in	Al-Huda’s	approach	to	religious	learning.37		Thus,	for	some,	acceptance	of	the	repudiation	of	their	former	lifestyles	was	made	possible	through	the	creation	of	an	accommodating	and	flexible	space	where	many	of	the	upper	class	women	I	met	felt	welcomed,	safe	and	accepted.				
Authorizing	Pedagogies		While	these	spaces	were	integral	in	cultivating	intimacies	and	a	sense	of	ownership	of	Islam	as	it	applied	to	their	everyday	lives,	they	also	cultivated	a	sense	of	authority	for	many	women	in	their	knowledge	of	Islam.		This	was	constituted,	in	part,	through	the	formality	of	their	pedagogical	structures	and	their	related	mobilization	of	claims	to	authenticity,	rationality,	and	merit	(also	see	chapter	five).		These	spaces	facilitated	women’s	engagement	in	formal	Islamic	education,	the	formality	of	which	held	some	weight	in	legitimizing	their	authority	over	religious	matters.		This	legitimacy	was	especially	relevant	in	instances	where	women	found	themselves	in	a	role	where	other	family	members	were	not	interested	in	developing	their	piety	in	the	same	way	and	they	saw	themselves	as	the	corner	stone	of	the	practice	of	piety	in	their	households.		Often,	these	women	were	the	only	ones	in	their	families	attempting	to	make	changes	at	multiple	levels	of	Islamic	praxis	in	their	households.		For	some	women,	this	meant	that	they	were	the	ones	teaching	the	men	in	their	households	how	to	be	proper	Muslims,	which	in	their	
																																																								37	Relatedly,	in	the	conclusion	of	her	book	on	Al-Huda,	Sadaf	Ahmed	(2010)	expresses	her	regret	in	seeing	the	transformation	of	her	cultural	landscape	in	Pakistan.		She	specifies	Al-Huda’s	discouragement	of	events	such	as	mehndi,	mayyun	(wedding	celebrations),	basant	(spring	festival),	and	colloquialisms	such	as	khuda	hafiz	(a	parting	phrase	that	translates	to	“May	god	protect	you”	that	Al-Huda	discourages	because	of	the	ambiguity	of	the	word	“god”	preferring	allah	hafiz	instead).	
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interpretation	meant	that	men	had	authority	over	women,	and	the	rights	and	responsibilities	that	come	with	it	(see	chapter	four).		The	pedagogical	approach	that	many	teachers	took	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	contributed	to	shaping	how	many	women	made	these	interventions	in	their	households.		For	many	women,	gaining	authority	over	their	practices	of	piety	was	derived	from	confidence	in	their	advanced	knowledge	of	Islam	and	validated	by	pedagogical	structures	that	appealed	to	the	sensibilities	of	the	urban,	literate	classes	in	Pakistan	and	the	diaspora.		In	other	words,	what	women	learnt	is	as	significant	as	how	they	learnt	it.		Many	women	legitimized	their	learning	with	references	to	highly	structured	meritocratic	classes,	organized	lesson	plans,	globalized	points	of	reference,	use	of	technology,	space	for	discussion	and	disputation,	and	an	emphasis	on	literacy	and	religious	texts.		For	these	women,	this	form	was	a	testament	to	the	credibility,	rationality,	and	authenticity	of	the	content	of	their	learning,	which	helps	them	wield	some	power	–	albeit	to	varying	degrees	–	over	the	form	and	direction	of	piety	in	their	households.	For	several	women,	this	pedagogical	pedigree	was	particularly	instrumental	when	it	came	to	convincing	the	less	religious	family	members,	and	especially	spouses,	to	make	changes	to	conform	to	their	understanding	of	an	Islamic	lifestyle.		As	mentioned,	transforming	the	spousal	relationship	was	a	critical	aspect	of	piety	for	many	of	the	women	I	interviewed.		This	was	because	of	the	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	marriage	in	the	Quran	and	hadith,	in	many	women’s	understanding	of	Islam,	as	the	site	in	which	“half	your	faith”	is	practiced.		That	is,	marriage,	and	the	relations,	activities,	roles	and	responsibilities	that	come	with	it,	were	understood	as	a	central	site	for	their	practice	of	piety.		As	such,	rectifying	spousal	relationships,	often	in	the	face	of	resistant	spouses,	became	a	common	struggle	for	many	of	my	respondents.		Beenish,	a	volunteer	at	the	Jamaat	Women’s	
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Commission	and	a	teacher	at	a	Jamaat	class	for	girls	in	Karachi,	described	her	struggles	to	do	just	this	with	her	husband	who	was	not	initially	as	inclined	towards	piety	as	she	was:		I	did	find	it	difficult	to	be	in	a	family	and	take	my	husband	with	me	on	this	journey.		That	was	a	lot	of	work.		Of	course,	your	husband,	you	cannot	force	your	husband	to	do	something.		When	we	got	married,	my	husband	didn’t	pray	and	that	really	hurt	me.		Now,	alhamdulillah38	he	prays	and	he	also	has	a	beard.		He	changed	a	lot.		Accordingly,	if	I	say	something	like	we	shouldn’t	be	going	to	this	party	or	that	I	cannot	attend,	he	now	says	okay	you	don’t	go	and	I	won’t	go	either	and	we	can	declare	together	that	we	don’t	go	to	things	like	mehndi	and	mayyun39	to	our	families.		So,	there	are	some	things	that	were	difficult	like	this…to	walk	with	your	family	and	take	them	with	you.		Beenish	described	how	it	was	difficult	for	her	to	develop	her	piety	in	line	with	what	she	was	learning	at	the	Jamaat	classes	while	having	to	come	home	to	a	family	and	husband	who	were	not	with	her	on	this	journey.		She	explained	that	she	saw	it	as	her	duty	to	bring	her	husband	along	with	her	on	this	journey,	which	required	“a	lot	of	work”	on	her	part.		Her	investment	of	time	and	labour	into	this	work	was	a	reflection	of	her	belief	that	marriage	was	an	integral	component	of	her	piety.		Beenish’s	appreciation	of	the	changes	that	did	come	about	in	her	husband	because	of	her	work	also	reflect	a	sense	of	relief	at	no	longer	being	alone	in	taking	a	stand	against	what	she	perceived	to	be	un-Islamic	practices	in	their	family	and	community.		As	she	developed	her	knowledge	and	practice	of	Islam,	Beenish	was	able	to	convince	her	husband	to	make	these	changes	alongside	her.	Muna,	another	Al-Huda	graduate	described	similar	struggles	with	her	husband.		She	mentioned	that	she	was	already	facing	difficulties	because	she	was	coming	from	an	
																																																								38	Alhamdulillah	is	term	used	colloquially	to	express	gratitude	to	Allah.		It	translates	to	“praise	be	to	Allah”.	39	Mehndi	and	mayyun	are	wedding	celebrations	that	are	considered	to	be	a	form	of	biddat	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat’s	understanding	of	piety	(see	chapter	five).		In	the	social	contexts	of	the	women	I	met,	the	mehndi	was	an	occasion	where	women,	and	sometimes	men	as	well,	gather	prior	to	the	marriage	ceremony	(nikkah).		This	event	symbolically	marks	the	day	the	bride-to-be	puts	mehndi	or	henna	on	her	hands	and/or	feet.		The	
mayyun	generally	marks	the	first	of	several	wedding	occasions	leading	to	the	marriage	ceremony.		This	event	usually	includes	ceremonies	of	beautifying	the	bride.		Both	occasions	often	include	singing	and	dancing.	
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American	school	–	which	meant	that	she	was	often	accused	of	being	too	Westernized	to	have	any	credible	knowledge	of	Islam.		She	described	exchanges	with	her	husband	where	she	had	to	reiterate	and	establish	her	credentials	as	a	conscientious	and	knowledgeable	Muslim:	My	hubby	still	asks	me	‘you	used	to	teach	at	Al-Huda?’	and	I’m	like	‘yeah	I	did!	And	for	god’s	sake,	take	me	seriously’	and	he’s	like	‘that’s	a	big	thing’	and	I’m	like	‘yeah	I’ve	been	telling	you	that	ever	since	we	got	married!		I	showed	you	my	worksheets.		I	showed	you	my	certificate.		You	know,	like,	get	on	with	it’.		According	to	Muna,	her	husband,	who	was	himself	part	of	Jamaat-ud-Dawah,	perceived	Al-Huda	as	having	a	high	standard	of	rigor	–	a	perception	that	aided	Muna	in	making	claims	about	Islam	and	their	practices	of	piety	as	a	household.		Muna’s	references	to	“worksheets”	and	her	“certificate”	illustrate	how	she	deferred	to	formal,	structured,	meritocratic	pedagogical	practices	to	establish	her	authority,	knowing	that	this	would	resonate	with	her	husband.		She	herself	greatly	valued	this	pedagogy	and	much	of	our	conversation	about	her	learning	experience	at	Al-Huda	was	littered	with	references	to	rigor,	classroom	structure,	tests,	assignments,	and	grades.		By	identifying	as	an	authority	on	Islam	within	the	context	of	her	household	based	on	Al-Huda’s	pedagogy,	Muna	was	able	to	participate	in	creating	a	domestic	space	and	relationships	that	adhered	to	what	she	had	learnt	about	Islamic	piety.	Correspondingly,	Zainab’s	siblings,	who	poked	fun	at	her	for	becoming	a	‘taliban’	when	she	joined	Al-Huda	and	started	wearing	the	hijab	and	abaya,	eventually	came	to	respect	the	knowledge	she	was	gaining	at	Al-Huda	and	often	came	to	her	for	advice.		She	explained:		With	my	brothers	and	sisters	there	is	this	much	that	they	trust	my	knowledge,	my	information.		If	they	need	to	ask	something	or	get	a	fatwa	(legal	decision)	…or	if	they	need	a	link,	then	they	will	call	me	and	ask	me.		They	know	this	much.		Now	I	know	that	if	I	say	to	them	that	this	hadith	says	this,	they	will	accept	what	I	am	saying.				
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Zainab	explains	that	she	became	a	resource	and	a	guide	for	Islamic	knowledge	for	her	siblings	because	they	had	developed	“trust”	in	her	knowledge.		She	went	on	to	elaborate	that	they	were	impressed	with	the	formality	and	the	rigor	of	the	classes	she	partook	in	at	Al-Huda.		The	changes	Zainab	saw	in	her	relationships	came	from	the	changes	she	went	through	herself.		More	specifically,	she	became	more	confident	over	her	time	at	Al-Huda.			Gaining	confidence	was	built	in	to	the	Al-Huda	curriculum	as	they	encouraged	women	to	not	only	come	and	learn,	but	also	to	learn	to	teach,	to	stand	in	front	of	an	audience,	to	know	how	to	approach	a	discussion	in	various	settings,	and	to	learn	how	to	most	effectively	intervene.		Zainab	talked	about	how	she	gained	confidence	through	Al-Huda:		I	couldn’t	speak	in	front	of	people.		I	had	become	very	submissive	after	I	came	to	my	in-laws’.		I	couldn’t	speak	and	I	would	feel	anxious	when	I	saw	people.		I	lacked	confidence	and	I	didn’t	think	I	was	capable	of	doing	anything.		All	of	my	everything	was	cut	off	from	the	outside	world.				Zainab	characterized	herself	as	a	submissive,	quiet,	and	hesitant	student	who	generally	lacked	confidence	when	she	first	came	to	Al-Huda.		She	attributed	the	development	of	these	characteristics	to	her	troubled	domestic	set-up	where	she	was	“cut	off”	from	spaces	outside	the	home.		As	she	went	through	and	excelled	in	the	rigorous	coursework,	she	became	more	confident	in	her	intellectual	and	social	skills.		Zainab	related	an	anecdote	of	when	she	was	asked	to	fill	in	for	a	lecturer	who	was	unable	to	make	it	to	class	when	she	first	started	volunteering	at	Al-Huda	after	she	graduated.		At	first	she	declined	saying	that	she	could	not	speak	in	front	of	people.		But	after	much	coaxing	and	support	from	her	friends	and	colleagues	she	agreed	to	do	it.		Her	supporters	were	literally	at	her	side	when	she	went	to	do	her	first	lecture.		Exhilarated	at	the	success	of	the	lecture	and	the	feeling	of	being	supported,	Zainab	said	that	she	continued	to	do	lectures	and,	moreover,	she	described	this	
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moment	as	her	turning	point	in	feeling	confident	about	the	knowledge	she	had	and	the	authority	with	which	she	could	share	it.	While	the	formality	of	the	lessons	is	one	of	the	reasons	a	number	of	women	joined	these	classes,	many	also	mentioned	how	the	subject	matter	of	everyday	life	gave	some	of	the	classes	and	lessons	an	informal	touch	that	fostered	closer	relationships	between	students	and	teachers.		Students	were	not	only	encouraged	to	bring	up	questions	about	everyday	and	intimate	matters	as	discussed	earlier,	but	they	were	also	encouraged	to	question	and	interrogate	more	generally.		Donya	explained	Farhat	Hashmi’s	approach	to	teaching:	“She	is	very	strict	in	her	opinions,	say	for	example	about	covering	of	the	face	and	so	many	other	things.		But	she	allowed	us	to	talk	and	voice	our	opinions	and	this	was	something	very	novel	and	very	unique”.		Shumaila,	a	diploma	student	at	Al-Huda	in	Karachi,	added	that	the	novelty	of	this	pedagogical	approach	was	especially	pronounced	in	the	context	of	a	religio-nationalist	discourse	where	such	open	questioning	of	Islam	would,	in	effect,	pose	an	existential	threat	to	the	Pakistani	nation-state	and	risk	the	penalties	posed	by	the	Hudood	Ordinances	and	Blasphemy	laws.		She	described	her	experience	as	follows:	I	had	a	lot	of	questions	at	that	time	about	religion	that	you	can’t	really	ask	anyone	because	you’re	like	what	are	they	going	to	say,	what	are	they	going	to	think.		There	is	this	thing	with	us	in	Pakistan,	this	questioning	religion	thing.		You	can’t	do	that.		A	lot	of	people	get	offended	and	they	are	like	no	you	have	to	believe	this.		I	wanted	a	lot	of	those	questions	answered	and	I	felt	like	that	could	be	done	here	[at	Al-Huda].		Shumaila	explained	how	she	found	a	space	in	Al-Huda	to	ask	questions	that	she	had	not	dared	to	ask	in	other	spaces	for	fear	of	being	accused	of	questioning	Islam	and	not	being	a	good	Muslim.		She	went	on	to	explain	that	the	idea	of	believing	in	some	aspect	of	Islam	without	really	understanding	its	significance	or	how	it	is	supposed	to	be	practiced	was	meaningless	to	her.		She	attributed	the	prevalence	of	what	she	understood	to	be	
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misappropriations	of	Islam	–	that	is,	normative	practices	that	did	not	comply	with	her	understanding	of	Islam	–	to	this	lack	of	a	culture	of	questioning	religion	within	the	context	of	a	religio-nationalist	environment.		Nevertheless,	there	were	parameters	within	which	such	questioning	took	place	even	within	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.		As	Shumaila	explained,	you	have	to	“question	to	learn”	not	“question	to	deny”.		Thus,	the	pedagogical	culture	enabled	through	these	groups	has	inspired	many	women	to	approach	vexed	issues,	such	as	
qawwam	for	example,	with	the	intention	to	gain	a	deeper	understanding	of	Islam	through	study	and	discussion	–	rather	than	taking	an	adversarial	approach.		 The	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda	also	mitigated	adversarial	engagement	from	students	by	developing	strong	relationships	between	students	and	teachers	and	by	encouraging	students	to	teach	at	home	or	at	the	centres	as	a	form	of	dawah.		That	is,	in	addition	to	cultivating	a	sense	of	ownership	of	Islam	as	discussed	earlier,	women	in	teaching	roles	also	made	concerted	efforts	to	cultivate	a	sense	of	ownership	of	processes	of	learning	Islam	by	encouraging	students	to	become	teachers	or	to	partake	in	lesson	planning.		This	sense	of	ownership	in	developing	spaces	of	learning	mitigated	adversarial	encounters	because	it	blurred	the	lines	between	students	and	teachers	for	some.		Many	women	at	Al-Huda	maintained	that	Farhat	Hashmi	set	the	standard	for	fostering	such	student-teacher	relationships.		This	was	especially	admirable,	according	to	several	women,	given	that	the	size	of	the	cohorts	in	the	diploma	program	at	the	main	Al-Huda	campus	in	Islamabad	where	she	often	taught	exceeded	200	students.		Donya	described	Farhat	Hashmi’s	relationships	with	the	students	in	Al-Huda’s	diploma	programs	as	follows:	That	one-on-one,	she	has	managed	to	have	that	with	almost	all.		I	don’t	know	how	but	she	knew	the	names	of	all	of	her	students…I	don’t	think	she	sleeps	much.		I	think	she	works	all	the	time.		I	think	she	has	been	a	role	model	for	us.		I	think	how	humble	she	is…you	know	there	is	generally	an	impression	we	get	of	scholars,	that	thing	she	
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has	changed…Everyday	one	student	at	least	would	get	a	chance	to	spend	an	entire	day	with	her…She	[tries	to	be]	available	for	her	students.		Donya’s	comments	convey	her	admiration	for	the	effort	that	Farhat	Hashmi	put	into	cultivating	personal	relationships	with	her	students.		As	Donya	noted,	this	was	an	unusual	practice	given	the	inaccessibility	of	other	Islamic	scholars	for	whom	connections	with	people	and	their	everyday	lives	was	not	a	priority	in	the	same	way.		Donya	appreciated	that	Hashmi	did	not	engage	in	the	kind	of	scholarly	elitism	that	would	alienate	her	students	or	make	them	feel	inferior.		Giving	each	student	a	glimpse	of	her	day	was	Hashmi’s	way	of	humanizing	herself	for	these	students	and	to	show	them	what	she	goes	through	to	do	what	she	does.	Many	other	students	and	graduates	who	had	the	opportunity	to	study	with	Farhat	Hashmi	reiterated	Donya’s	description.		Those	who	only	heard	her	in	the	larger	public	lectures	she	held	or	through	her	audio,	video,	or	digital	recordings	would	invariably	make	note	of	how	her	“gentle”,	“polite”	and	“logical”	manner	appealed	to	them.		Other	teachers	at	Al-Huda	would	follow	these	pedagogical	cues	from	Farhat	Hashmi	and	in	their	own	ways	attempt	to	create	similar	learning	environments	for	their	students.		Students	and	teachers	involved	with	the	Jamaat	also	described	their	learning	experiences	in	similar	terms,	although	there	was	not	a	central	personality	such	as	Farhat	Hashmi	who	set	the	pedagogical	tone.		Finding	a	teacher	who	was	relatable	was	an	important	aspect	of	the	decision	to	join	a	Jamaat	class	for	many	women.		In	addition,	many	of	the	women	I	met	occupied	a	dual	role	as	student	and	teacher	or	transitioned	from	student	to	teacher.		As	Beenish	explained,	her	learning	was	enhanced	through	her	role	as	a	teacher	at	a	Jamaat	school:			
49	
When	you	are	teaching,	you	also	become	very	involved	with	your	practical	life.		Questions	etcetera	start	coming	that	need	to	be	weighed	out	and	you	have	to	think	if	we	can’t	do	it	like	this	then	what	do	we	need	to	do	to	figure	out	how	to	get	there.				Moreover,	for	Beenish,	her	role	as	teacher	intensified	her	practice	of	Islam	as	she	began	to	pay	more	attention	to	its	applications.		Beenish	went	on	to	explain	how	much	she	cherished	developing	her	ability	to	articulate	connections	to	everyday	activities	and	use	them	in	her	lessons	for	the	purpose	of	illustrating	the	applicability	of	Islamic	texts.		Taking	on	teaching	roles	and	participating	in	dawah	activities	thus	gave	many	women	an	enduring	sense	of	ownership	and	authority	over	Islam.				
Spaces	of	Belonging	Several	women	I	interviewed	referred	to	how	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	made	it	easy	for	them	to	participate	in	religious	learning	because	of	the	flexibility	and	accessibility	of	the	different	types	of	sessions	they	offered.		Both	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	offered	sessions	requiring	different	levels	of	commitment	as	well	as	accessible	materials	in	Urdu	and	English,	which	created	learning	opportunities	for	many	urban,	middle	and	upper	class	women.		Also,	different	women	were	involved	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	in	different	capacities.		Some	were	formally	enrolled	as	students	or	teachers;	some	were	involved	as	administrative	or	field	workers;	some	ran	or	attended	home-based	classes;	some	attended	a	lecture	here	and	there;	some	listened	to	audio	lectures	at	home.		Many	were	involved	at	multiple	levels	simultaneously	and/or	shifted	from	one	role	to	another	in	accordance	with	transitions	in	their	personal	lives.		Though	there	was	some	pressure	to	get	involved	in	the	organizations’	various	activities,	both	the	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda	made	it	easy	for	women	to	vary	their	level	of	involvement	based	on	fluctuations	in	their	personal	lives	without	fear	of	
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any	consequences.		For	nearly	all	the	women	I	interviewed,	these	women-friendly	spaces	for	religious	learning	made	for	a	novel	experience	and	marked	a	shift	in	the	relationship	between	Pakistani	women	and	Islam	and	also	allowed	them	to	foster	relationships	with	other	women.			For	many	women,	their	involvement	in	Al-Huda	or	the	Jamaat	precipitated	through	the	daura-e-Quran	(journey	through	the	Quran),	a	series	of	special	daily	sessions	during	the	holy	month	of	Ramzan.		For	these	women,	as	with	many	Muslims,	Ramzan	marks	an	exceptionally	holy	time	in	the	Islamic	calendar.		The	purpose	of	these	daily	sessions	was	to	discuss	the	contents	and	application	of	one	chapter	of	the	Quran	everyday	as	part	of	the	pious	practices	that	many	were	engaged	in	during	Ramzan	such	as	fasting	and	abstaining	from	pleasure.		The	pre-defined	commitment	of	one	month,	the	existing	sense	of	enhanced	piety	during	Ramzan,	and	the	comprehensiveness	of	the	content	of	these	sessions	made	it	an	easy	choice	for	women	to	participate	as	a	limited	engagement.		For	many	women,	this	would	be	the	first	time	they	experienced	a	collective	engagement	with	the	Quran	as	a	text	that	can	be	applied	to	their	everyday	lives.		This	compressed	yet	comprehensive	experience	with	other	women	during	the	holy	month	of	Ramzan	gave	many	women	a	taste	for	the	possibilities	of	how	they	can	engage	with	Islam	in	more	robust	ways	as	women.	Thus,	attending	the	daura-e-Quran	left	many	of	the	participants	wanting	to	continue	meeting	and	learning.			Describing	the	lack	of	access	to	such	spaces	of	learning	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	when	she	was	“searching”,	Donya	said,	“We	were	not	so	fortunate.	We	didn’t	have	classes	for	women	all	around	like	now”.		Beenish,	attributed	this	proliferation	of	religious	learning	
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for	women	to	the	Jamaat’s	model	of	bringing	religious	learning	to	the	space	of	the	home	and	to	residential	neighbourhoods.		She	explained:		Bringing	women	towards	Quran…Jamaat-e-Islami	has	taken	many	steps	in	this…to	go	from	house	to	house	and	spread	Islam.	From	one	house	to	another	you	see	study	circles	made	by	Jamaat-e-Islami.		This	made	it	easy	for	women	to	come	towards	Quran…The	home-based	study	circles	and	the	thing	that	everyone	has	access	to	them	and	women	gathering	from	different	houses	and	coming	to	study	the	Quran…the	Jamaat-e-Islami	played	a	big	role	in	this.		Before,	this	did	not	exist	at	all.		People	talk	about	their	ancestors	but	I’m	just	talking	about	my	own	mother	who	tells	me	that	it	wasn’t	even	something	people	imagined	doing	in	her	time	–	to	study	and	understand	the	Quran.				Beenish’s	comments	refer	to	how	the	the	Jamaat	made	a	deliberate	effort	to	start	reaching	out	to	women,	especially	in	middle	class	neighbourhoods,	that	then	influenced	many	other	institutions,	such	as	Al-Huda,	to	provide	spaces	for	learning	that	would	be	especially	catered	to	women.		The	study	circles	at	home	have	provided	an	easily	accessible	and	casual	environment	for	women	to	enter	into	a	more	conscientious,	formal	and	collective	relationship	with	Islam.		For	many	women,	the	idea	of	going	to	someone’s	home,	rather	than	a	public	institution,	was	a	more	palatable	entry	point	because	of	the	familiarity,	comfort	and	safety	associated	with	going	to	a	known	neighbour’s	home.		Because	it	blurred	the	lines	between	public	and	private	space	in	this	way,	the	model	of	the	home-based	Quran	classes	became	a	popular	choice	for	many	women	who	wanted	to	learn	more	about	Islam,	or	even	to	just	get	out	of	their	homes	for	a	short	time.		Beenish	characterized	this	as	a	game-changing	strategy	that	yielded	a	major	shift	in	how	women	developed	their	relationship	to	Islam.	Beenish	further	described	how	she	herself	only	got	involved	with	the	Jamaat	and	started	learning	the	Quran	because	of	the	convenience	of	proximity	offered	by	a	study	circle	that	was	being	held	in	her	neighbourhood.		She	found	a	class	near	her	home	and	
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would	drop	in	whenever	she	could	to	study	and	discuss	passages	of	the	Quran	with	other	women	in	her	neighbourhood.		These	home-based	study	circles	gave	way	to	what	some	refer	to	as	the	“institute	model”	where	the	religious	learning	offered	by	organizations	like	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	operates	like	a	“franchise”	(Donya)	where	learning	materials	and	teacher/dawah	training	is	centralized.		This	centralization	has	in	turn	increased	the	credibility	of	home-based	study	circles.		Graduates	of	more	formal	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	programs	would,	for	example,	start	home-based	study	groups	as	a	practice	of	dawah.		Many	women	described	their	trust	in	the	“authenticity”	of	the	materials	being	taught	at	these	sessions	because	of	the	teacher’s	affiliations	with	a	credible	Islamic	institute.			However,	for	Al-Huda,	this	pedagogical	reputation	was	also	carefully	crafted	through	what	Donya	called	“red-tapeism”,	where	the	style	and	content	of	teaching	under	the	banner	of	Al-Huda	at	home	or	at	the	centres	required	women	to	go	through	a	series	of	approval	processes	and	certifications.		As	Donya	went	on	to	explain,	these	restrictions	came	about	as	a	result	of	many	groups	popping	up	under	the	name	of	Al-Huda	that	had	no	official	link	with	the	institute.		This	may	in	part	be	because	of	the	emphasis	on	dawah	at	Al-Huda	and	the	accompanying	proliferation	of	home-based	classes	and	study	groups.			However,	as	Donya	further	explained,	this	“red-tapeism”	caused	many	“good	people”	to	leave	Al-Huda	because	they	felt	constricted	and	start	their	own	institutes	or	home-based	classes	for	Islamic	learning.	Nevertheless,	as	these	institutes	became	larger	and	more	organized,	they	were	able	to	offer	a	greater	variety	of	religious	learning	opportunities	in	addition	to	the	home-based	study	groups.		This	included	formal	diploma	courses	that	required	a	two	to	three-year	commitment,	one-week	intensive	programs,	three-day	modules,	public	lectures,	special	
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sessions	for	the	month	of	Ramzan,	and	readily	available	audio	and	digital	lectures	and	materials.		Women	had	several	options	to	choose	from	to	enhance	their	religious	knowledge	and,	in	some	ways,	this	made	it	difficult	to	decline.		As	Beenish	put	it,	“now	if	she	is	not	learning,	then	its	because	she	has	chosen	not	to”.		This	variety	also	provided	several	options	that	allowed	women	to	vary	their	levels	of	involvement,	which	ensured	many	women’s	continued	engagement.		Zainab,	for	example,	described	how	she	adapted	her	religious	learning	to	changing	personal	circumstances:	“I	was	in	a	joint	family	system	for	a	while	and	the	engagement	was	quite	a	bit	so	I	didn’t	even	have	half	an	hour	to	study…so	I	started	listening	to	the	cassettes”.		Zainab	had	to	negotiate	time	for	her	religious	learning	in	the	context	of	a	heavy	domestic	workload	and	the	emotional	labour	of	living	with	her	husband’s	family	with	whom	she	had	unfriendly	and	sometimes	hostile	relationships.		The	Al-Huda	cassettes	became	a	source	of	some	private	time	where	she	could	not	only	learn	to	strengthen	her	piety,	but,	as	she	explained,	it	also	made	her	feel	like	she	was	part	of	something	outside	of	the	home.		The	everyday	applicability	of	the	content	of	the	cassettes	also	made	them	a	relevant	and	useful	part	of	her	life,	guiding	her	on	how	to	get	through	her	days	during	a	particularly	difficult	time	in	her	life.	Many	women	also	observed	a	more	general	change	amongst	women	through	the	proliferation	of	religious	media,	which	gave	women	(domestic	space)	unprecedented	access	to	religious	knowledge.		Beenish,	mentioned	that	changes	in	media	content	have	had	a	significant	impact	on	women	in	Pakistan.		Whereas	Beenish	used	to	consider	the	media	to	be	the	root	of	many	problems	especially	in	relation	to	women’s	exposure	to	ideas	of	fashion	and	sexuality	from	all	over	the	world,	now,	she	values	the	media’s	role	in	increasing	women’s	access	to	and	understanding	of	Islam	because	of	the	plethora	of	religious	
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television	shows	featuring	women	religious	scholars	like	Farhat	Hashmi.		As	Beenish	put	it,	“now	there	is	a	boldness	and	confidence.		Where	there	was	harm	before	there	is	a	benefit	now.		She	is	now	introduced	to	Islamic	education.		Everything	is	exposed	and	she	sees	it”.		In	addition,	Donya	saw	the	role	of	women	religious	figures	in	particular	as	beneficial	to	society	more	broadly,	as	Donya	mentions:			They	are	somehow	better	agents	of	peace	building.		They	have	less	extremist	tendencies,	which	is	beautiful…The	role	of	religious	women	has	been	very	good.		They	talk	about	the	cooler	things,	they	are	naturally	inclined	to	talk	about	ethics	and	
akhlaaq	and	family	life	and	social	welfare	and	things	nobody	disagrees	with	-	even	the	United	States	doesn’t	disagree	with!		Donya	indicates	that	the	increase	in	women	religious	leaders	has	created	a	more	palatable	and	accessible	version	of	Islam	because	of	the	content	of	their	teachings.		She	juxtaposes	the	“extremist	tendencies”	of	presumably	male	religious	leaders	with	the	“cooler	things”	of	female	leaders	to	explain	their	popularity	amongst	women.		Donya	brings	up	the	US	to	validate	these	women	scholars	as	less	extremist,	and	to	explain	their	appeal	to	the	upper	classes,	drawing	on	global	discourses	of	terrorism	–	and	inadvertently	pointing	to	the	complicity	of	the	upper	classes	with	these	discourses.		The	presence	of	women	religious	figures	in	the	media,	as	Donya	and	Beenish	explain,	adds	a	sense	of	breadth,	longevity	and	accessibility	to	the	practice	of	women-led	religious	subject	formation,	which	have	led	to	key	shifts	in	the	gendered	conceptualization	and	practice	of	Islam	especially	for	women	in	the	upper	classes	and	in	the	diaspora.			In	addition	to	bringing	modes	of	learning	to	domestic	spaces	in	innovative	ways,	many	women	pointed	out	how	easy	it	was	to	find	an	Al-Huda	or	Jamaat	class	that	suited	one’s	daily	schedule	in	urban	centres	like	Karachi	and	Islamabad.		Whether	at	homes	or	at	the	centres,	classes	were	available	in	the	morning,	afternoon	and	evenings.		This	made	it	
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easy	for	women	with	a	diversity	of	personal	and	professional	commitments	to	get	involved.		For	instance,	Rabia,	a	graduate	of	Al-Huda’s	advanced	diploma	program	and	a	teacher	at	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	Karachi,	was	also	a	science	teacher	at	a	prestigious	English-medium	secondary	school	in	Karachi.		She	described	how	these	flexible	timings	helped	her	negotiate	and	balance	her	commitments	at	home	and	at	work	to	complete	the	Al-Huda	diploma	courses:	“I	did	the	first	course	in	the	afternoons.		I	did	not	leave	my	job	also.		My	daughter	was	only	5	or	6	years	of	age	and	I	used	to	take	her	with	me”.		Rabia’s	comments	illustrate	how	she	valued	the	availability	of	afternoon	classes	that	allowed	her	to	balance	childcare,	work,	and	Al-Huda	courses,	which	made	her	commitment	to	complete	the	diploma	program	possible.			Many	other	women	also	conveyed	their	relief	at	the	idea	of	being	able	to	bring	their	children	to	class	when	they	needed	to	and	not	having	to	worry	about	childcare.		In	fact,	some	sessions	at	the	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	centres	for	women	would	have	corresponding	sessions	for	children	to	alleviate	the	stress	of	childcare.		Generally,	many	classes	at	women’s	homes	and	at	the	centres	accommodated	women	who	would	bring	their	children.		At	one	of	the	classes	I	attended	at	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	Karachi,	the	teacher,	Mehvish,	had	her	toddler	sitting	in	her	lap	as	she	delivered	her	lecture.		Several	students	in	the	class	pointed	out	to	me	that	Mehvish	was	particularly	exemplary	for	them	because	she	would	deliver	seamless,	well	thought-out	lectures	whilst	attending	to	her	child’s	needs.		Indeed,	as	I	listened	to	her	lecture,	she	did	not	skip	a	beat	even	when	her	child	tugged	at	her	hijab,	cried,	sang	a	song,	or	ran	around	her	desk.		For	many	women	I	spoke	with	at	the	class,	Mehvish	represented	the	possibility	of	fulfilling	several	Islamic	duties	as	a	woman	–	she	attended	to	her	child,	was	continuously	developing	her	knowledge	and	practice	of	Islam,	
56	
and	did	her	dawah	through	delivering	exceptional	lectures	as	a	teacher.		Similarly,	when	I	would	visit	the	Jamaat	office	in	Karachi,	there	would	invariably	be	a	couple	of	children	playing	on	the	computers	while	their	mothers	were	working	on	various	projects	such	as	compiling	materials	for	a	publication	or	handling	accounting	matters.		The	Jamaat	office	also	had	snacks	and	juice	available	for	the	children,	indicating	that	this	was	a	regular	practice	that	they	accommodated.	These	spaces	were	conscientiously	cultivated	to	welcome	women	with	children	not	only	as	a	matter	of	accommodation	but	also	to	correspond	with	and	facilitate	the	practice	of	Islamic	gendered	roles	and	responsibilities	(see	chapter	four).		That	is,	these	accommodating	spaces	allowed	women	to	fulfill	their	reproductive	duties,	as	per	their	understandings	of	a	household	structure	where	men	have	qawwam	(authority)	over	women,	while	engaging	in	activities	and	spaces	outside	the	home.		By	bringing	their	children	to	the	class,	these	women’s	husband’s	would	have	little	grounds	for	objecting	to	their	wives	leaving	the	home	to	partake	in	religious	education.		
	“This	study	group	is	my	lifeline”	The	facilitation	of	women’s	knowledge	and	ownership	of	Islam	through	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	spaces	developed	alongside	a	sense	of	belonging	to	a	community	outside	of	the	home	and	family	for	many	women.		In	addition	to	these	new	opportunities	for	the	development	of	their	Islamic	knowledge	and	piety,	most	women	I	interviewed	were	appreciative	of	the	social	supports	that	participation	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	had	created	for	them	and	they	greatly	valued	the	community	of	women	they	had	found	through	this	because	it	gave	them	a	source	of	power	and	support	outside	of	the	household.		Al-Huda	and	
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the	Jamaat	thus	also	figure	in	many	women’s	lives	as	spaces	to	build	friendships	and	communities	alongside	developing	their	piety.			To	provide	a	sense	of	the	types	of	supports	and	friendships	women	found	through	their	participation	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	I	recount	the	stories	of	three	women,	Ghazala,	Fatima,	and	Zainab,	who	described	how	these	spaces	were	a	critical	part	of	what	got	them	through	a	difficult	time	in	their	lives.		Ghazala,	a	regular	participant	at	a	Jamaat	home-based	dars	and	Quran	class,	described	a	particularly	troubled	time	in	the	early	years	of	her	marriage	when	she	was	ostracized	by	her	husband’s	family.		When	she	and	her	husband	decided	to	get	married,	her	husband’s	parents	and	extended	family	were	set	against	it.		They	refused	to	meet	her	and	they	boycotted	the	wedding.		As	Ghazala	explained,	“They	still	don’t	see	me.		They	don’t	allow	me	to	visit	their	place.		My	children	are	going,	my	husband	is	going	everyday	but	only	I’m	not	acceptable”.		While	she	was	pregnant	with	her	second	child,	Ghazala	became	so	frustrated	and	angered	with	her	husband’s	inability	to	stand	up	to	his	parents	that	she	decided	that	she	couldn’t	live	with	him	and	told	him	to	leave:	“I	wanted	a	divorce”.		In	the	context	of	these	rising	tensions	in	her	household,	Ghazala	came	across	a	Jamaat	Quran	class	held	at	her	sister’s	house.		Her	sister	had	previously	encouraged	her	to	attend	but	Ghazala	explained	that	she	had	preconceived	ideas	that	these	classes	were	of	no	use	to	her	because	she	could	read	and	understand	the	Quran	on	her	own	if	she	wanted	to.		She	happened	upon	the	class	when	she	was	visiting	her	sister	one	day	and	they	were	discussing	sections	of	the	Quran	that	addressed	divorce.		In	this	session,	some	women	in	attendance	spoke	openly	about	the	troubles	they	were	having	in	their	relationships	and	many	of	their	stories	resonated	with	Ghazala	and	she	felt	relieved	that	she	was	not	alone	in	facing	these	questions.		She	
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described	how	she	became	a	regular	attendee	and	one	of	the	most	vocal	people	in	the	sessions,	asking	questions,	pushing	the	teachers	and	students	to	elaborate	and	explain	different	parts	of	the	Quran	and	how	it	related	to	their	experiences.			Ghazala	further	described	how	these	sessions	brought	about	some	clarity	for	her	in	terms	of	why	a	household	structured	in	compliance	with	the	Quran	and	hadith	would	be	more	functional.		She	eventually	decided	to	stay	married	to	her	husband	but,	with	the	support	of	the	women	she	was	studying	with,	she	began	a	deliberate	process	of	making	changes	to	her	marriage	through	what	she	was	learning	at	the	Jamaat	Quran	class	about	marriage	in	Islam.		These	changes	were	not	only	to	how	she	was	present	in	her	marriage,	but	also	to	the	division	of	labour	and	roles	and	responsibilities	in	her	home.		The	smoother	functioning	of	her	home,	as	she	explained,	gave	her	a	sense	of	accomplishment	and	progress	that	she	understood	to	be	a	critical	part	of	her	piety.		Even	though	she	continued	to	be	rejected	by	her	husband’s	family,	she	was	able	to	find	some	validation	from	her	peers	for	sustaining	her	marriage	as	an	Islamic	imperative.	Fatima,	an	avid	listener	at	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	Karachi,	described	the	community	of	women	she	found	at	Al-Huda	as	an	invaluable	resource	for	getting	through	health	and	financial	issues.		When	Fatima	first	got	married,	she	moved	to	Dubai	with	her	husband.		Early	on	in	their	marriage	he	got	a	mysterious	illness	that	went	undiagnosed	for	two	years.		She	described	the	agony	with	which	she	watched	her	husband’s	health	deteriorate	at	an	alarming	rate.		Fatima	characterized	herself	as	having	been	an	“out”	type	of	girl	–	that	is,	someone	who	wore	sleeveless	clothes,	hung	out	with	boys,	always	had	her	eyebrows	done,	and	her	hair	down.		When	this	perplexing	illness	came	into	her	life,	she	turned	to	religion	and	found	herself	becoming	more	“modest”	and	praying	to	Allah	to	forgive	her	for	her	
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previous	lifestyle.		Her	friend	noted	her	turn	to	religion	and	suggested	that	she	start	going	to	Al-Huda	in	Dubai.		Fatima	explained	that	she	began	attending	casually	as	a	listener,	attending	classes	whenever	she	could	without	being	formally	enrolled.		She	learnt	the	virtue	and	practice	of	patience	at	Al-Huda,	which,	she	says,	helped	her	deal	with	her	husband’s	illness	in	transformative	ways.		As	his	health	deteriorated	further,	her	husband	lost	his	job	and	Fatima	was	forced	to	move	back	to	Karachi	with	her	children	to	live	with	her	parents	because	they	could	not	afford	to	live	together	in	Dubai.		Fatima	sought	out	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	Karachi	and	started	attending	classes	regularly	as	a	listener	again.		Fatima	said	that	this	was	an	important	part	of	her	life	in	order	to	maintain	some	semblance	of	balance	and	normality	in	face	of	what	seemed	like	unrelenting	upheavals.		She	described	the	benefits	of	being	part	of	Al-Huda	not	only	in	terms	of	the	knowledge	she	gained	about	the	Quran,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	people	she	met	there.		Ranging	from	awe	and	admiration	for	some	to	empathy	and	camaraderie	with	others,	Fatima	found	an	array	of	relationships	with	other	women	at	Al-Huda	that	she	began	to	value	immensely.		Zainab	also	shared	a	painful	time	in	her	life	that	led	to	her	joining	Al-Huda.		As	mentioned	earlier,	Zainab	lived	in	a	joint	family	household	with	her	husband	and	his	family.		Zainab	and	her	husband	had	decided	to	adopt	a	child	because	they	were	experiencing	difficulties	conceiving	a	child.		They	met	a	woman	who	was	pregnant	and	wanted	to	give	them	her	child	when	the	child	was	born.		“This	person	told	me	that	because	I	don’t	have	children	and	I	love	children	so	much,	she	would	give	me	her	child”	(Zainab).		Zainab	described	how	she	and	her	husband	spent	nine	months	preparing	themselves	and	their	home	to	receive	this	adopted	child.		Then,	as	Zainab	explained:		When	the	child	was	delivered,	the	mother	had	a	change	of	heart.		She	couldn’t	give	me	the	child…I	was	so	disturbed.		It	felt	like	every	inch	of	my	body	was	in	pain…I	
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didn’t	complain	to	anyone.		I	stayed	in	my	normal	routine	but	everyone	could	see	on	my	face	that	I	was	in	severe	pain	but	I	didn’t	say	it.		My	hair	turned	white.		Zainab	confessed	that	although	she	tried	her	best	to	understand	and	move	on,	she	found	herself	blaming	Allah:	“It	slipped	out	of	my	mouth	and	I	said	‘Allah,	why	are	you	so	cruel?’”	and	“a	baddua	(curse)	came	out	of	my	heart	for	her	(for	the	woman	who	would	not	give	her	the	child)	…I	had	prayed	to	Allah	that	she	suffer	because	of	the	child	that	she	refused	to	give	me.”		One	of	Zainab’s	friends	recognized	that	she	was	in	need	of	support	and	suggested	to	her	that	she	join	the	Al-Huda	diploma	program	primarily	as	a	way	to	keep	herself	busy	and	to	get	some	time	to	herself.		Zainab	was	intrigued	by	the	idea	of	getting	out	of	the	house	as	she	had	already	been	contemplating	going	to	stay	with	her	mother	to	get	a	break	from	her	in-laws:	“I	was	in	a	lot	of	pain	and	I	wanted	to	go	to	my	mother’s	house	but	I	knew	that	if	I	went	to	my	mother’s	house	I	would	be…”	she	trailed	off,	insinuating	that	she	would	be	put	in	an	even	more	difficult	position	with	her	in-laws	if	she	took	this	course	of	action	because	of	the	implied	allegiance	to	her	mother	over	her	in-laws.			Zainab	felt	that	her	marital	home	would	not	be	the	place	where	she	would	be	able	to	come	to	terms	with	losing	the	child.		She	explained	that	she	was	always	under	pressure	and	that	her	“mother-in-law	had	a	lot	of	power	in	the	household”.		Zainab	“just	wanted	to	go	away	from	this	place”	but	she	had	few	other	friends	to	turn	to	for	help.		She	had	had	some	experience	with	home-based	Al-Huda	Quran	classes	and	listening	to	the	Al-Huda	cassettes,	as	mentioned	earlier.		So	she	started	looking	into	it	further	as	an	option	for	a	place	to	get	away.		Zainab	thought	that	her	in-laws	would	accept	her	going	away	to	study	the	Quran	with	less	hostility	than	if	she	were	to	go	away	to	her	mother’s	house.			Although	joining	these	spaces	was	not	easy	for	many	women	(see	chapter	four),	several	women	I	interviewed	echoed	the	relief	Zainab	felt	at	the	prospect	of	being	outside	
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the	home	in	a	way	that	was	seen	as	legitimate	because	it	was	for	religious	learning.		However,	Zainab	explained	that	getting	permission	to	join	Al-Huda	was	not	without	its	challenges.		For	instance,	she	wanted	to	go	and	stay	at	the	Al-Huda	campus	hostel	and	study	there	to	get	away	from	the	distressing	situation	at	home,	however,	she	explained	that	her	mother-in-law	would	not	allow	it:	I	told	[my	mother-in-law]	that	I	wanted	to	go	to	the	hostel	and	study	Quran.		She	knew	that	I	wanted	to	get	some	peace.		So	she	suggested	a	compromise.		She	said	‘what	is	the	need	to	go	to	the	hostel?		Go	in	the	morning	and	come	home	in	the	evening	and	do	the	morning’s	work	the	night	before’.		I	said	okay.		Allah	was	trying	me.		Zainab’s	comments	reveal	how	she	understood	this	moment	as	a	test40	from	Allah	because	she	knew	how	difficult	it	would	be	to	complete	the	courses	while	living	with	her	mother-in-law	and	fulfilling	her	household	duties.		Nevertheless,	taking	the	limited	permission	she	was	able	to	attain	from	her	mother-in-law,	Zainab	went	to	Al-Huda	to	enroll	for	the	diploma	courses.		Initially,	for	Zainab,	joining	Al-Huda	was	primarily	a	route	to	escaping	the	overwhelming	problems	she	was	having	with	her	in-laws	at	home	that	were	exacerbated	by	the	painful	experience	of	a	thwarted	adoption	plan.		Getting	away	for	a	bit	and	interacting	with	people	who	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	tensions	at	home	was	an	appealing	possibility	for	her.		Zainab	juxtaposed	her	experiences	with	her	mother-in-law	with	her	first	interaction	at	Al-Huda:	When	I	went	there	for	an	interview,	a	girl	was	standing	there	and	she	asked	me	if	I	was	there	for	an	interview	and	she	smiled	at	me	and	told	me	to	go	inside.		I	gave	the	interview	and	the	test	and	did	all	this.		It	took	nearly	four	hours.		Later	I	saw	her	again	and	she	was	smiling	again.		I	just	thought	to	myself	‘what	is	this?’		I	thought	her	duty	would	be	finished	by	now	because	she’s	been	smiling	since	eight	in	the	morning	and	it’s	now	four!		How	can	she	still	be	smiling?		It	didn’t	click.		What	power																																																									40	Other	women	described	such	struggles	through	the	concept	of	jihad.		See	chapter	four.	
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is	inside	her	that	she	can	still	smile	and	greet	everyone?		I	just	felt	so	baffled	that	she	was	still	smiling	and	it	wasn’t	a	drawing	room	smile.		It	wasn’t	artificial.		It	was	genuine.		For	Zainab,	this	woman	represented	the	kind	of	strength	and	peace	one	can	potentially	achieve	through	Islam.		Zainab’s	comments	imply	how	she	perceived	this	woman’s	smile	as	a	reflection	of	an	elevated	piety	that	materialized	in	her	genuine	smile.41		Underlying	her	sense	of	admiration	for	this	woman’s	enduring,	sincere	smile	were	Zainab’s	frustrations	with	her	tensions	at	home,	where	smiling	sincerely	for	this	long	was	unfathomable.		Joining	Al-Huda	represented	the	possibility	of	bringing	some	of	this	power	and	peace	into	her	life.	She	further	described	how	such	encounters	with	other	women	and	the	lessons	she	was	learning	at	Al-Huda	led	Zainab	to	pray	to	Allah	to	take	back	her	baddua	and	for	the	well	being	of	the	woman	and	the	child	who	had	been	the	source	of	her	pain.		Zainab	explained	that	she	eventually	found	a	way	to	forgive	this	woman	and	made	an	effort	to	cultivate	a	closer	relationship	with	her.		The	woman	even	started	attending	some	Al-Huda	sessions	with	Zainab.		Al-Huda	became	a	vehicle	through	which	Zainab	was	able	to	resolve	this	tension	in	her	life	through	forgiveness,	but	she	also	saw	a	more	general	transformation	in	herself	through	Al-Huda.		She	described	this	transformation	as	follows:		When	I	would	come	from	Al-Huda,	even	if	it	took	me	an	hour	to	get	home,	I	would	still	be	fresh	and	not	tired.		So	to	me	it	seemed	like	I	was	very	thirsty	and	someone	has	given	me	something	really	good	to	drink	and	I	was	always	fresh.		I	wouldn’t	feel	bad	at	all.		No	matter	what	anyone	said	or	how	busy	I	was,	I	never	felt	it.		I	felt	like	I	was	bigger.		Zainab’s	feelings	of	nourishment	and	strength,	as	suggested	in	her	comments,	helped	her	go	about	her	daily	life	with	a	different	approach.		She	handled	the	tensions	at	home	with	her	in-laws	in	more	productive	ways	and	said	that	she	felt	more	confident	in	the	ways	she																																																									41	See	Shumaila’s	discussion	of	smiling	as	sunnah	in	chapter	four.	
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was	present	in	those	relationships.		After	she	graduated,	she	continued	to	stay	involved	in	Al-Huda	as	a	volunteer	administrator	and	teacher.		Even	when	her	involvement	became	more	limited	due	to	other	personal	circumstances,	she	mentioned	that	she	set	up	a	weekly	home-based	study	group	to	ensure	she	had	continued	access	to	these	supports.		As	Zainab	put	it,	“this	study	group	is	my	lifeline.”	Ghazala,	Fatima,	and	Zainab’s	experiences	are	illustrative	of	the	complexity	of	the	intersection	of	Islam	and	gender	as	it	is	formed	through	women’s	groups.		Each	of	these	women	was	struggling	with	issues	that	emerged	out	of	heteronormative	and	patriarchal	relationships.		For	Ghazala	this	was	the	persisting	tension	between	her,	her	husband,	and	her	in-laws;	for	Fatima,	it	was	the	precarity	of	her	reliance	on	her	ailing	husband;	and	for	Zainab,	it	was	a	complex	confluence	of	failing	to	fulfill	reproductive	expectations	and	navigating	the	toxic	and	overwhelming	patriarchal	power	relations	in	her	household.		What	they	learnt	about	Islam	helped	mitigate	some	of	the	everyday	stresses	they	were	faced	with.		In	Ghazala’s	case,	for	example,	learning	about	Islamic	ideals	of	marriage	was	a	validating	experience	that	gave	meaning	to	her	struggles	with	her	husband	by	investing	them	within	the	development	of	piety.		This	not	only	meant	that	she	was	able	to	locate	these	struggles	in	relation	to	what	would	ultimately	benefit	her	in	the	akhira,	but	also	that	she	was	able	to	reconfigure	her	marriage	with	the	guidance	of	the	Quran	and	hadith.			Recasting	her	marital	problems	as	part	of	a	project	for	the	improvement	and	development	of	her	piety	produced	a	different	affective	as	well	as	practical	approach	to	these	struggles	for	Ghazala.		For	Fatima	and	Zainab,	Al-Huda	provided	a	sense	of	balance,	peace,	and	strength	that	were	critical	to	them	getting	through	some	difficult	turning	points	in	their	lives.		The	precarity	and	tensions	produced	through	their	dependence	on	patriarchal	
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relationships	were	mitigated	by	the	spaces	of	learning	and	belonging	they	found	with	other	women	at	Al-Huda.			For	some,	these	spaces	of	Islamic	learning	presented	an	opportunity	to	be	outside	domestic	spaces	and	relationships	for	reasons	that	were	seen	as	legitimate	by	their	families.		Even	though	their	degrees	of	involvement	differed,	the	connections	to	these	spaces	and	communities	outside	their	homes	produced	moments	of	respite	and	changes	in	affective	dispositions	for	both	–	as	is	evident	in	their	sentiments	of	patience,	peace,	and	forgiveness.		
Conclusion	Like	Ghazala,	Fatima,	and	Zainab,	many	other	women	described	stories	of	difficult	times	and	personal	transformations	as	what	brought	them	to	the	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda.		However,	it	was	the	way	that	they	were	treated	by	other	women	that	made	them	stay.		As	Muna	put	it,	“It’s	the	people	there	who	make	you	want	to	stay…a	group	of	women	who	have	respected	me	to	the	height	of	respectfulness”.		The	relationships	constituting	these	spaces	of	Islamic	subject	formation	were	novel	and	crucial	elements	in	the	experiences	of	many	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with.		As	mentioned	earlier,	as	organizations,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	made	deliberate	efforts	to	create	accessible	and	flexible	spaces	for	women.		They	also	made	deliberate	efforts	to	foster	amenable	interactions	between	women	in	order	to	make	these	women	feel	respected	and	welcomed.		Notably,	these	spaces	produced	their	own	classed	hierarchies	and	exclusions,	which	are	discussed	further	in	chapter	five.		It	is	thus	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	it	was	these	particular	women	from	urban,	middle	and	upper	class	backgrounds	who	developed	a	sense	of	belonging	in	these	spaces.		In	addition,	as	chapter	four	elaborates,	there	were	many	women	for	who	had	to	contend	with	
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Islamophobic	discourses	about	these	organizations	and	the	women	associated	with	them	in	order	to	join	these	spaces.	The	process	of	reclaiming	religion	and	piety	for	women	has,	as	would	be	expected,	set	in	motion	an	array	of	changes	in	the	way	women	themselves	practice	and	understand	Islam	and	in	the	structure	of	gendered	relationships	that	are	considered	to	be	in	line	with	their	notions	of	piety.		These	changes	have	been	cause	for	alarm	for	women’s	rights	organizations	and	for	the	‘liberal’	upper	classes	(see	chapter	three	and	four).		This	is	in	part	because,	as	organizations,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	carry	reputations	of	conservatism	and	orthodoxy	that	are	connected	to	how	they	are	perceived	as	anti-woman.		However,	as	this	chapter	demonstrates,	the	spaces	these	organizations	have	generated	for	women	are	given	meaning	and	acquire	significance	within	the	context	of	women’s	everyday	lives	and	experiences.			 	
66	
Chapter	2:	Secular	Epistemologies	and	Knowledge	Production	
About	Islam	and	Muslim	Women		 Participation	in	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	spaces	has	precipitated	a	deeper	commitment	and	engagement	with	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	for	many	women.		In	this	chapter,	I	elaborate	on	theoretical	concerns	in	taking	religious	praxis	and	notions	of	the	sacred	seriously	within	dominant	epistemologies	and	knowledge	production	about	Islam	and	Muslim	women.		These	epistemologies	have	two	pitfalls:	One,	the	“discursive	colonization”	(Mohanty,	2003,	p.	63)	of	understandings	of	Muslim	women’s	relationships	to	Islam;	and	two,	the	limitation	of	analyses	of	Muslim	women	to	the	categories	of	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’.		First,	in	terms	of	the	former,	I	suggest	that	understandings	of	Muslim	women’s	piety	are	often	limited	by	the	ways	in	which	the	categories	of	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’	are	entangled	in	the	normative	secularity	of	knowledge	production	and	in	the	re-entrenched	universalism	of	Western	ethnocentric	feminism.		In	terms	of	the	latter,	I	elaborate	on	how	this	dissertation	methodologically	seeks	to	move	beyond	the	analytical	parameters	of	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’	to	look	at	piety	in	intersectional	and	relational	ways	while	taking	the	sacred	seriously.		This	mitigates	the	compartmentalizing	and	monopolizing	impetus	of	categories	of	analysis	such	as	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’	in	analyses	of	Muslim	women.		In	other	words,	I	want	to	address	how	Muslim	women’s	piety	is	not	only	limited	by	these	categories,	but	also	how	it	is	limited	to	these	categories.		A	central	aspect	of	the	way	this	project	addresses	these	limitations	is	by	looking	at	the	interconnections	between	spiritual	epistemologies	and	processes	of	subject	formation	–	asking	what	subject	is	presumed	and	produced	through	a	particular	articulation	of	Islamic	piety	and	how	this	constructs	the	pious	subject	through	its	others.		
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Taqwa:	Always,	Everyday,	Everything,	Everywhere	Before	elaborating	on	these	overarching	theoretical	and	methodological	concerns,	I	want	to	provide	a	sense	of	how	the	women	associated	with	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	articulated	Islamic	piety	and	their	notions	of	the	sacred.		To	become	a	pious	Muslim	woman,	members	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	aim	to	develop	their	piety	such	that	it	permeates	their	akhlaaq	(ethical/moral	conduct)	and	ibadaat	(practices	of	ritual	worship).42		Notably,	for	some,	there	was	no	distinction	between	conduct	and	worship	as	conveyed	in	a	common	refrain	in	the	interviews	I	conducted:	“everything	you	do	is	ibadat”.		Accordingly,	piety	is	developed	through	a	comprehensive	and	intersecting	training	of	their	ritual	practices	of	worship,	embodied	behaviours	and	conduct,	affective	dispositions,	emotional	responsiveness,	everyday	habits	and	relationships,	among	other	things,	in	order	to	elevate	their	fear	and	consciousness	of	the	presence	of	Allah.	Many	of	the	women	I	interviewed	described	piety	as	“Allah-consciousness”	and	the	“fear	of	Allah”	–	a	dual	meaning	captured	in	the	Islamic	term	taqwa.			While	in	many	ways	
taqwa	is	an	ideal	state	of	being,	members	of	these	piety	groups	emphasize	that	according	to	scripture	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	perfect	Muslim.		As	Muna,	a	teacher	at	Al-Huda,	described	it,	a	good	Muslim	is	“looking	for	hidayat,43	guidance,	continuously	to	strengthen	
taqwa”.		Thus,	the	impossibility	of	its	attainment	renders	piety	a	lifelong	and	ongoing	process	of	subject	formation.		As	a	process	of	subject	formation,	taqwa	operates	on	
																																																								42	Ibadaat	(ibadat	for	singular)	commonly	refers	to	forms	of	worship	in	Islam.		This	can	include	performing	
salat/namaaz	five	times	a	day,	fasting	in	accordance	with	the	Islamic	calendar,	reciting	verses	from	the	Quran,	praying,	performing	the	pilgrimage	to	Mecca.		However,	in	the	way	women	I	met	understood	it,	it	also	included	personal	and	social	conduct.	43	In	the	usage	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with,	hidayat	referred	to	guidance	from	Allah.		This	could	come	in	many	forms	including	through	deeper	engagements	with	scripture	and	exegesis.	
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multiple	registers	(bodily,	visceral,	affective,	emotional,	social,	personal)	that	are	interconnected	and	co-constitutive.	To	these	ends,	these	women	employ	various	pedagogical	tools	that	are	disseminated	through	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	classroom	lessons,	audio/digital	materials,	and	dars	sessions.			My	respondents’	references	to	how	their	relationship	with	Islam	changed	illustrates	how	taqwa	manifested	in	their	lives.		For	many	of	these	women,	this	conception	of	piety	translated	to	a	major	shift	in	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	their	everyday	lives.		For	example,	Zainab,	a	graduate	of	Al-Huda,	described	how	her	relationship	to	Islam	developed	from	the	“Quran	on	the	shelf	in	an	ornate	cover”	to	“Allah	as	a	lively,	throbbing	presence”	in	her	life,	“always	awake”	and	with	her	“24	hours	a	day”.		Another	student	of	Al-Huda,	Shumaila,	suggested	that	to	have	taqwa	is	to	“remember	all	the	time	that	Allah	is	watching	you	so	that	no	matter	where	you	are	–	you	don’t	have	to	be	in	a	religious	gathering	or	anything	–	you	will	want	to	do	the	right	thing”.		Taqwa	is	thus	conceptualized	in	ubiquitous	terms	as	permeating	all	aspects	of	life.		Both	Zainab	and	Shumaila’s	comments	were	also	referring	to	the	inadequacy	of	conventional	ceremonial	confinements	of	Islam	to	particular	spaces,	times,	places	and	occasions.		This	is	a	frustration	that	many	expressed	in	relation	to	how	Islam	was	taught	to	them	growing	up	in	Pakistan	(see	chapter	five).			Efforts	to	acquire	taqwa	profoundly	impact	and	structure	these	women’s	everyday	lives	in	a	way	that	it	had	not	before	they	joined	Al-Huda	or	Jamaat	spaces,	as	they	struggle	to	submit	to	Allah	in	every	little	thing	they	do	from	praying	to	drinking	water	to	making	their	bed	to	how	they	conduct	themselves	in	social	gatherings.		As	Fariha,	a	student	of	a	home-based	Al-Huda	class	explained:	
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You	see	in	Pakistan	we	pray	namaaz44	and	things	like	that,	but	in	other	situations	we	never	thought	that	deen	(religion	or	faith)	was	relevant.		When	you	are	violating	someone’s	rights,	we	didn’t	think	it	was	something	un-Islamic.		Like	when	people	park	their	cars	and	block	in	someone	else’s	car	they	don’t’	see	it	–	our	deen	does	not	say	that	these	things	are	okay.		Islam	teaches	us	akhlaaq	and	often	Muslims	don’t	think	of	akhlaaq	as	part	of	Islam.		They	go	and	pray	at	the	mosque	and	then	come	out	and	feel	that	they	left	their	deen	there	and	now	its	time	for	dunia	(material	world).		This	thing	is	very	common.			For	Fariha,	the	flawed	separation	of	deen	and	dunia	relegates	Islam	to	particular	times	and	places	and	contradicts	her	understanding	of	the	everyday	applicability	of	Islam	that	range	from	matters	of	violating	someone’s	rights	to	parking	lot	courtesies.		As	Zainab	proclaimed,	“This	is	Islam.		Islam	is	not	just	having	beards,	doing	hajj,45	wearing	a	long	kurta.46		Social	matters,	interpersonal	relationships	–	these	are	where	Islam	is.”		Zainab	refers	to	ritual	practices	and	outward	markers	of	piety	to	highlight	what	she	thought	was	the	more	substantial	part	of	Islam	–	social	matters	and	interpersonal	relationships.		Her	comments	imply	that	preoccupations	with	these	rituals	and	outward	markers	of	piety	have	become	a	stand-in	for	a	more	comprehensive	engagement	with	Islam	and	the	development	of	a	substantial	form	of	piety.	To	what	extent	do	such	re-articulations	of	‘where	Islam	is’	challenge	the	discursive	foreclosure	of	the	space	allotted	to	‘Islam’	through	secular	understandings	of	‘religion’?		As	is	clear	in	the	women’s	expression	of	piety	above,	taqwa	is	constituted	through	‘everyday’,	‘everywhere’,	‘everything’,	‘always.’		These	articulations	of	piety	are	indicative	of	how	piety	
																																																								44	Namaaz	refers	to	what	many	Muslims	believe	to	be	obligatory	prayers	that	have	to	be	performed	five	times	daily.		All	the	women	I	met	performed	namaaz	regularly	and,	in	their	understanding	of	Islam,	it	was	a	compulsory	part	of	practicing	their	piety.	45	Hajj	is	the	pilgrimage	to	Mecca	that	many	Muslims,	including	the	women	I	met,	believe	to	be	compulsory,	if	one	can	afford	it,	and	should	be	completed	at	least	once	in	a	lifetime.	46	Kurta	translates	to	shirt.		In	Zainab’s	case,	she	is	referring	specifically	to	men’s	shirts	that	are	part	of	the	
shalwar	kameez	outfit.		Wearing	a	particularly	long	kurta	along	with	pants	that	are	above	the	ankle	are	considered	to	be	outward	markers	of	piety	for	men.	
70	
bleeds	out	of	the	pre-given	bounds	of	‘religion’	and	mobilizes	processes	of	subject	formation	that	implicate	these	women	within	an	array	of	spaces,	social	relationships	and	structures.		What	are	the	implications	of	this	ubiquitous	notion	of	piety	on	secular	renderings	of	women’s	relationships	to	religion?		
Secular	‘Religion’	To	understand	the	forms	of	piety	that	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	were	engaged	in,	it	is	imperative	to	first	dislodge	the	normativity	of	analytical	framings	that	take	for	granted	a	liberal	secular	definition	of	religion.		This	definition	of	religion	is	ensnared	in	dichotomized	understandings	of	tradition/modernity,	public/private,	mind/body,	submission/agency,	and	oppression/resistance	that	are	foundational	in	constructions	of	the	ideal	autonomous	subject	of	liberalism.47		In	terms	of	knowledge	production,	the	dominance	of	liberal	discursive	structures	is	problematic	because	these	dichotomies	produce	categories	of	analysis	that	implicitly	or	explicitly	centralize	and	valorize	the	trajectory	of	the	secular	liberal	subject	as	universal	teleology.		Under	the	liberal	secular	formulation	of	the	category	of	‘religion’,	Islam	remains	a	discursively	colonized	category	of	analysis	that	forecloses	an	understanding	of	how	the	women	I	met	engage	with	Islam.			To	elaborate	on	this	problematic,	I	turn	to	critical	scholarship	on	Islam	that	have	contributed	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	liberal	secular	epistemology	of	religion	and	the	binaries	that	structure	it.		The	category	of	religion	posits	a	hegemonic	and	universal	notion	
																																																								47	Explorations	of	these	dichotomies	in	constructions	of	the	liberal	subject	draw	important	links	to	the	racial	and	gender	politics	of	colonial	and	imperial	discourse.		See	for	example,	Abu-Lughod	(1998),	Alexander	&	Mohanty	(2013),	Asad	(2003),	Chakrabarty	(2007),	Chatterjee	(1993),	Mcclintock	(1995),	Mignolo	(2000),	Said	(1978),	Spivak	(1999).	
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of	the	sacred	that	is	embedded	in	the	history	of	liberal	secularism	in	the	West.		As	Talal	Asad	(1993)	argues,	there	can	be	no	universal	definition	of	religion	“not	only	because	its	constituent	elements	and	relationships	are	historically	specific,	but	because	that	definition	is	itself	the	historical	product	of	discursive	processes”	(p.	29).	For	instance,	the	genealogy	of	the	normative	definition	of	‘religion’	is	embedded	within	Western	liberal	secularism	and	its	corresponding	European	Judeo-Christian	social	and	political	history.		Asad	(1993)	points	out	a	few	problematic	features	of	the	normative	definition	of	religion	that	signal	its	genealogy	in	Western	liberal	secularism.		Foremost	of	these	features	is	the	relegation	of	religion	to	a	“distinctive	space	of	human	practice	and	belief”	that	is	autonomous	from	science,	politics,	and	common	sense	(Asad,	1993,	p.	27).			Asad’s	(1993)	critique	of	the	universal	definition	of	religion	put	forward	by	the	prominent	work	of	the	anthropologist,	Clifford	Geertz,	48	is	instructive	for	unpacking	the	genealogy	of	the	“autonomous	essence”	attributed	to	religion	(p.	28).	Geertz’s	definition	is	founded	on	the	premise	that	religion	is	a	system	of	symbols	(Asad,	1993,	p.	53).		In	Asad’s	reading	of	Geertz,	this	system	of	symbols,	as	a	generic	feature	of	religion,	is	distinct	from	social,	political	and	economic	life.		That	is,	for	Geertz	religion	is	in	some	ways	a	theory	or	an	abstraction	that	is	a	vehicle	of	meaning	for	empirical	life	but	is	not	produced	through	empirical	life	per	se	(Asad,	1993,	p.	36).		Furthermore,	in	this	conceptualization	of	‘religion’,	for	something	to	be	identified	as	‘religious’,	it	needs	to	draw	on	articulated	systems	of	symbols.		Asad	(1993)	maintains	that	this	assertion	itself	has	a	specifically	Christian	history	
																																																								48	‘Religion’	is	“1)	a	system	of	symbols	which	act	to	2)	establish	powerful,	pervasive,	and	long-lasting	moods	and	motivations	in	men	by	3)	formulating	conceptions	of	a	general	order	of	existence	and	4)	clothing	these	conceptions	with	such	an	aura	of	factuality	that	5)	the	moods	and	motivations	seem	uniquely	realistic”	(Geertz	cited	in	Asad,	29-30).	
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that	can	be	seen	in,	for	instance,	the	historical	development	of	the	needs	of	the	medieval	Church	to	consolidate	authority	in	one	place	through	the	construction	of	an	authorizing	discourse	that	was	used	to	distinguish	truth	from	falsehood	and	the	sacred	from	the	profane.		To	establish	the	authority	of	“one	true	church”	(Asad,	1993,	p.	39),	religious	practices	that	contradicted	or	did	not	support	the	system	of	symbols	of	the	one	true	church	were	dispossessed	of	their	status	as	“religious”.		As	such,	defining	religion	as	a	system	of	symbols	is	entangled	in	regulative	processes	of	establishing	power	and	authority	through	the	identification	and	separation	of	the	religious	from	the	non-religious.		However,	as	Sherine	Hafez	puts	it,	Geertz’s	definition	of	religion	as	primarily	a	hermeneutic	tradition	“masks	the	actual	power	relations	that	created	the	category	of	religion”	and	“takes	for	granted	the	separation	of	meaning	from	power”	(Hafez,	2011,	p.	40).	The	relegation	of	religion	to	autonomous	space	is	also	tied	to	the	emergence	of	the	authoritative	discourse	of	liberal	secularism	as	a	political	doctrine	and	the	attending	centrality	of	individual	rationality	and	autonomy.		This	doctrine	defines	and	locates	religion	in	peculiar	ways	through	its	structuring	of	society	along	a	particular	conceptualization	of	the	public-private	divide	that	attempts	to	contain	religion	within	the	private	sphere	while	effacing	how	it	is	present	in	the	public	sphere.		That	is	to	say,	the	political	doctrine	of	liberal	secularism	has	built	into	it	a	contradictory	place	for	religion.		Critiques	of	this	doctrine	of	secularism	(Asad,	1993;	Mahmood,	2006)	unsettle	the	association	between	‘secularism’	and	‘secular’	by	challenging	the	foundational	dichotomy	between	the	secular	and	religious	that	underpins	liberal	secularism.		Drawing	on	Christian	history	and	traditions,	the	doctrine	of	secularism	produces	and	imposes	a	moral	economy	in	its	public	and	private	spheres	and	deploys	disciplinary	mechanisms	to	define,	confine	and	remake	the	religious	
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(Asad,	2003;	Mahmood,	2006).		Furthermore,	religion	occupies	a	paradoxical	centrality	within	structures	of	secularism	where	religion	not	only	serves	as	the	constitutive	outside	of	the	secular,	but	it	also	serves	as	an	intimately	integral	and	enduring	component	of	secularism.		Thus,	the	secularity	of	normative	definitions	of	the	secular	is	brought	into	question.			Notably,	this	is	not	to	say	that	the	links	between	Christianity	and	secularism	are	categorically	denied	in	dominant	discourses	of	secularism.		Rather,	the	immanence	of	Western	Christianity	and	secularism	is	often	narrated	in	terms	of	progress	–	implying	that	Christianity	is	a	“divine	parent	metamorphosing	into	its	human	offspring	(modernity),	as	transcendence	embodying	itself	in	worldly	life	(secularity),	as	the	particular	introducing	the	universal	in	thought”	(Asad,	2009,	p.	23).		This	teleological	narrative	thus	constructs	a	separation	between	Christianity	and	secularism	through	a	temporal	displacement	of	Christianity	as	the	origin	of	a	universal	secularism	that	is	then	safely	tucked	away	through	the	separation	of	church	and	state.		Moreover,	as	Alexander	(2006)	argues,	this	creates	a	“hierarchy	that	conflates	Christianity	with	good	tradition	while	consigning	‘others’	to	the	realm	of	bad	tradition	and	thus	to	serve	as	evidence	of	the	need	for	good	Christian	tradition”	(p.	296).		Christianity	then	acquires	a	special	place	in	the	progression	of	humanity	–	conceived	of	in	universal	terms	–	as	a	stalwart	of	secularism	and	what	ultimately	redeems	humanity.		This	narrative	itself	bears	a	remarkable	resemblance	to	Christian	discourse	of	the	redemption	of	humanity	through	the	life,	death,	and	transcendence	of	Jesus	(Asad,	2009).			Returning	to	the	question	of	how	“religion”	is	defined	as	a	normative	category	of	analysis,	the	attribution	of	an	“autonomous	essence”	to	religion	is	thus	entangled	in	the	
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particular	history	of	the	development	of	the	doctrine	of	secularism	in	Europe.		Sylvia	Wynter	(Scott,	2000),	Gayatri	Spivak	(1999),	Chandra	Mohanty	(2003)	and	others	have	sharpened	our	terms	of	reference	by	adding	the	prefix	“ethno”,	as	in	“ethnohumanism”	and	“ethnouniversalism”,	to	foreground	the	particularity	of	dominant	articulations	of	normativity	and,	indeed,	of	‘religion’.		That	is,	“parochializing”	(Mahmood,	2005)	dominant	terms	of	analysis	such	as	‘religion’	is	integral	to	opening	up	analytical	spaces	for	a	meaningful	consideration	of	the	politics	of	piety.			The	rendering	of	an	ethnocentric	or	parochial	articulation	of	‘religion’	as	“transhistorical”	and	“transcultural”	(Asad,	1993,	p.	28)	can	itself	be	read	as	an	act	of	power	that	materializes	through	colonialism	and	imperialism.		The	ascendance	of	an	ethnocentric	conceptualization	of	‘religion’	is	tied	to	the	construction	of	a	universal	trajectory	of	human	progress	that	gained	discursive	power	as	an	instrument	of	colonialism.		As	David	Scott	(2000)	puts	it,	“humanism	and	colonialism	inhabit	the	same	cognitive-political	universe	inasmuch	as	Europe’s	discovery	of	its	Self	is	simultaneous	with	its	discovery	of	its	Others”	(p.	120).		This	is	not	to	say	that	colonialism	has	a	monopoly	on	‘humanism’,	but	rather,	“modern	liberalism	deploys	powers	that	are	immeasurably	greater,	including	the	flexible	power	to	construct	a	‘universal,	progressive	history,’	which	the	other	tradition	does	not	possess”	(Asad,	1993,	p.	236).		That	is,	the	modern	liberal	“ethnohumanism”	(Wynter	in	Scott,	2000)	that	parades	as	universal	acquired	discursive	dominance	through	enactments	of	colonial	power.		The	flexibility	to	construct	and	reconstruct	the	universal	in	alignment	with	shifting	pursuits	and	objectives	is	a	testament	to	the	degree	of	power	colonial	discursive	mechanisms	retain	over	time	and	space.		What	remains	constant	is	the	ability	and	the	impunity	to	make	and	assert	claims	on	and	about	the	universal.	
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Conceptualizations	of	the	modern	nation-state	aid	in	producing	and	securing	the	universality	of	this	ethnohumanism.		The	secularization	thesis	of	modernity	necessitates	the	movement	towards	secularism	as	a	prerequisite	for	being	considered	modern	(Asad,	2003).		Thus,	the	normative	temporality	of	the	modern	nation-state	secures	liberal	secularism	as	a	marker	of	progress.		These	temporal	dynamics	of	the	modern	nation-state	structure	secular	epistemologies	through	analytical	frameworks	that	are	ensnared	in	methodological	nationalism.		Manu	Goswami	(2004)	defines	methodological	nationalism	as	follows:		…entailing	the	common	practice	of	presupposing,	rather	than	examining,	the	sociohistorical	production	of	such	categories	as	a	national	space	and	national	economy	and	the	closely	related	failure	to	analyze	the	specific	global	field	within	and	against	which	specific	nationalist	movements	emerged.	(p.	4)		Taking	up	such	categories	as	produced	and	entangled	within	sociohistorical	contexts	destabilizes	conceptualizations	of	the	nation-space	as	pre-given	and	territorially	bounded.		In	other	words,	unpacking	the	production	of	national	categories	of	analysis,	rather	than	taking	them	for	granted,	uncovers	the	transnational	and	global	constitution	of	the	nation-state.		Moreover,	critiques	of	methodological	nationalism	expose	how	it	works	to	dehistoricize	the	nation-state	and,	as	Mongia	(2012)	suggests,	present	it	within	a	“circular	logic”	where	“the	very	notions	–	of	nation,	nationality	and	the	nation-state	–	most	in	need	of	explanation	are	both	the	starting	and	ending	points	of	analysis”	(p.	201).		That	is,	analyses	operating	through	methodological	nationalism	invariably	produce	an	analysis	where	the	nation-state	and	its	universality	remains	intact.		In	chapter	three,	I	engage	in	a	critique	and	dismantling	of	analytical	associations	between	Pakistani	women	and	Islam	that	are	framed	through	the	Pakistani	nation-state	by	way	of	opening	up	a	space	to	move	beyond	methodological	nationalism	in	how	women’s	discourses	of	piety	are	perceived.	
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Analytical	framings	that	are	bounded	by	the	nation-state	preclude	what	Asad	(2003)	refers	to	as	“complex	time”	and	“complex	space”	(p.	179).		Complex	space,	according	to	Asad,	refers	to	how	space	is	neither	autonomous	nor	contained	in	absolute	ways,	in	contrast	to	what	the	notion	of	borders	might	suggest.		Rather,	space	impinges	on,	overlaps	with,	and	leaks	through	resulting	in	complex	entanglements	with	the	outside	and	the	other	(Asad,	2003,	p.	178).		Asad	(2003)	conceptualizes	complex	time	as	a	means	to	think	about	the	heterogeneity	of	temporality	and	the	multiple	and	shifting	notions	and	relationships	between	the	past,	present,	and	future,	that	are	obfuscated	through	the	secular	time	of	the	nation-state	(p.	179).		For	Asad,	complex	time	and	complex	space	are	useful	ways	of	foregrounding	the	transnational,	heterogeneous	and	intersectional	ways	in	which	the	nation-space	is	inhabited,	and	thereby	undo	its	boundedness.			This	has	important	implications	for	how	we	think	about	the	relationship	between	the	modern	nation-state	and	secular	definitions	of	religion.			What	are	the	analytical	possibilities	and	limitations	of	grasping	the	Islamic	discourse	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	as	‘Pakistani’?		As	Mongia	(2012)	reminds	us,	the	“dominant	tendency	of	area	studies	to	inquire	into	the	specificities	of	national	and	native	cultures	has	served	to	essentialize	culture	and	suture	it	to	space”,	thus	producing	culture	as	“space-specific”	and	displacing	questions	of	temporality	(p.	198).		As	such,	it	is	necessary	to	undo	the	equivalencies	made	between	culture	and	the	nation-state.		At	the	same	time,	however,	Mongia	(2012)	suggests	that	critical	interventions	in	cultural	studies	and	transnational	studies	that	attempt	to	unmoor	culture	from	the	nation-space	have	often	elided	a	historicization	of	the	state	and	have	resulted	in	the	persistence	of	a	type	of	methodological	nationalism,	which	she	refers	to	as	“methodological	stateism”	(p.	202).		Avoiding	
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methodological	nationalism	does	not	translate	to	ignoring	an	analysis	of	the	nation-state,	rather,	it	means	to	historicize	the	nation-state	and	unsettle	it	from	its	privileged	place	as	a	pre-given	unit	of	analysis.		In	turn,	the	transnational	cannot	only	be	taken	up	as	the	space	between	nation-states	or	outside	of	nation-states	because	this	approach	would	contradictorily	re-centre	the	nation-state	and	again	leave	it	intact	as	a	unit	of	analysis.		For	Mongia	(2012),	formulations	of	the	transnational	are	beholden	to	the	nation-state	in	paradoxical	ways	because	they	already	conceptualize	it	in	national	terms,	as	the	“nomenclature”	suggests	(p.	203).		She	suggests	that	a	more	productive	approach	would	consider	the	way	the	nation	and	transnational	are	“temporally	and	spatially	co-dependent”	(Mongia,	2012,	p.	211)	in	heterogeneous	and	shifting	ways,	which	would	lead	to	a	historicization	of	both	the	nation-state	and	the	transnational.			The	multi-sited	dynamics	of	power	discussed	above	construct,	protect,	and	reify	the	secular	subject	as	the	quintessential	ideal	of	modernity.		The	political	doctrine	of	secularism	prescribes	scripts	for	the	secular	subject’s	practice,	place,	and	role	of	religion	that	are	entrenched	in	notions	of	progress	as	movements	towards	liberal	secularism.		Mahmood	(2006)	suggests:		the	political	solution	offered	by	the	doctrine	of	secularism	resides	not	so	much	in	the	separation	of	state	and	religion	or	in	the	granting	of	religious	freedoms,	but	in	the	kind	of	subjectivity	that	a	secular	culture	authorizes,	the	practices	it	redeems	as	truly	(versus	superficially)	spiritual,	and	the	particular	relationship	to	history	that	it	prescribes.	(p.	328)			In	other	words,	the	doctrine	of	secularism	does	not	do	away	with	religion	entirely,	nor	does	it	adequately	address	the	politics	of	governance	in	religiously	pluralistic	societies.		Rather,	secularism	constructs	a	monolithic	and	singular	ideal	of	how	to	be	religious	within	a	secular	framework	–	or,	in	other	words,	how	to	be	a	secular	religious	subject.		The	
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translation	of	non-Western	religions	through	this	episteme,	then,	requires	arbitration,	selection,	and	repudiation	in	order	to	make	a	set	of	beliefs	and	practices	intelligible	under	normative	secular	conceptualizations	of	religion,	which	in	turn	are	invested	in	producing	and	securing	the	secular	subject.		Religious	subjectivities	that	do	not	correspond	to	scripts	of	the	normative	secular	subject	occupy	an	insidious	and	vulnerable	space	within	such	liberal	secular	epistemological	frameworks	as	inimical	to	progress	and	modernity.			
Translating	‘Islam’	Islam	is	made	to	enter	this	ethnocentric	discursive	terrain	as	a	primitive	and	static	religion	that	is	intrinsically	incapable	of	separating	church	and	state	and,	therefore,	as	unable	to	produce	and	progress	to	secularism	the	way	Western	Christianity	did.		The	definition	of	religion	inaugurated	through	the	doctrine	of	secularism	produces	a	monolithic	and	teleological	conception	of	Islam	as	primitive	in	comparison	to	the	West.		This	not	only	assumes	a	distinct	separation	between	Islam	and	the	West	that	has	been	problematized	profusely	in	critical	academic	analysis	(Abu-Lughod,	1998;	L.	Ahmed,	1993;	Moallem,	2001),	but	it	also	mobilizes	‘Islam’	as	a	homogenizing	concept.		As	Edward	Said	(1997)	asks,	“how	really	useful	is	‘Islam’	as	a	concept	for	understanding	Morocco	and	Saudi	Arabia	
and	Syria	and	Indonesia”	(p.	1v,	emphasis	in	original)?		For	Saadia	Toor	(2011a),	the	contemporary	mobilization	of	‘Islam’	as	a	unitary	concept	is	part	of	the	ideological	framework	necessitated	by	neo-colonial	projects	–	primarily	led	by	the	United	States	–	in	the	‘Muslim	world’	(para.	2).		Because	‘Islam’	is	implicated	within	these	ideological	frameworks,	it	is	imperative	to	unpack	dominant	usage	and	foreground	the	heterogeneity	
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and	specificity	of	how	it	is	being	used	in	this	dissertation.		As	such,	in	this	section	I	explicate	some	of	the	epistemological	foreclosures	that	occur	in	analyses	of	‘Islam’.			Several	scholars	have	turned	to	“fundamentalist	Islam”,	ostensibly	the	most	repugnant	manifestation	of	Islam	to	the	West,	to	argue	against	the	construction	of	the	simplistic	binary	opposition	of	Islam	and	the	West.		As	Leila	Ahmed	(1993)	puts	it,	fundamentalist	Islam	“is	an	Islam	redefining	itself	against	the	assaults	of	the	West	but	also	an	Islam	revitalized	and	reimagined	as	a	result	of	its	fertilization	by	and	its	appropriation	of	the	languages	and	ideas	given	currency	by	the	discourses	of	the	West”	(p.	236).		That	is,	the	permeability	and	porosity	of	the	boundary	between	‘Islam’	and	the	‘West’	is	evident	when	one	recognizes	that	encounters	with	the	‘West’	are	constitutive	of	fundamentalist	discourse	and,	indeed,	as	Lila	Abu-Lughod	argues,	vice	versa.		Minoo	Moallem	(2001)	similarly	suggests	that	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	the	West	is	a	contemporaneous	and	co-constitutive	one:	“fundamentalism…is	a	by-product	of	the	process	of	modernization	and	in	dialogue	with	modernity”	(p.	122).		Claims	of	Islam	being	fixed	in	a	primitive	version	of	normative	conceptions	of	religion	thus	invoke	a	false	dichotomy	between	Islam	and	the	West	and	construct	Islam	as	an	aberration	in	the	universal	teleology	of	the	progress	of	religion	toward	secularism.	Furthermore,	in	liberal	iterations	of	secularism,	(non-Judeo-Christian)	religion	is	not	only	considered	to	be	the	antithesis	of	modernity	and	rationality	but	also,	as	Jasbir	Puar	(2007)	argues,	it	is	considered	to	be	“always	already	pathological”	(p.	55).		Religious	violence	then,	is	considered	to	be	gratuitous	in	the	modern	imaginary	in	a	way	that,	for	example,	state	violence	is	not	(Asad,	1993).		Anxieties	over	this	pathology	are	evident,	for	example,	in	the	way	the	demonization	of	“political	Islam”	is	constructed	in	contemporary	
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geopolitics	as	a	failure	of	the	separation	between	religion	and	politics	and	in	the	ensuing	moral	panic	over	this	violation.		These	discursive	constructions	of	political	Islam	exemplify	how	Islam	is	homogenized	as	“mired	in	religion,	primitivity,	and	backwardness”	(Said,	1997,	p.	10).		In	her	analysis	of	discourses	of	terrorism,	Puar	(2007)	points	to	US	foreign	policy	documents	to	demonstrate	how	this	pathological	quality	is	reserved	to	describe	the	activities	of	‘Islamic	fundamentalists’	and	is	not	extended	to	Christian	or	Jewish	fundamentalists.		Puar	(2007)	suggests	that	Christian	and	Jewish	fundamentalists	then	not	only	fall	out	of	the	purview	of	the	category	of	‘terrorism’	but	are,	in	absentia,	“rendered	on	par	with…state	terrorisms	of	Israel	and	the	United	States”	(p.	56).		She	interprets	the	absence	of	Christian	and	Jewish	fundamentalists	from	these	documents	as	an	indication	of	the	imbrications	of	these	fundamentalisms	with	state	violence.		The	ever-present	potentiality	of	gratuitous	violence	in	followers	of	Islam	is	constructed	through	attributing	a	“magical	quality”	to	Islamic	texts	where	the	texts	are	both	“univocal”	and	“infectious”	–	a	quality	that	is	not	attributed	to	Judeo-Christian	texts	in	the	same	way	(Asad,	2003,	p.	11).		In	other	words,	the	flexibility	and	plurality	of	interpretations	of	Islamic	texts	is	denied,	even	as	that	of	Christian	and	Jewish	texts	is	maintained.		Such	differentiated	repudiations	of	religious	identities	often	authorized	by	the	Western	states	and	their	foreign	policies	entrenches	Orientalist	understandings	of	Islam	and	Muslims	and	gives	license	to	Islamophobia	in	the	name	of	secular	progress.		Junaid	Rana	(2011)	argues	that	Islamophobia	is	part	of	a	long	history	of	constructing	“monstrous	races”	(p.	36)	in	the	project	of	empire	through	the	trope	of	religion.		He	traces	the	historical	interconnections	between	the	tropes	of	religion	and	race	to	argue	that	Islam	is	not	only	mobilized	in	terms	of	religion	but	also	as	a	racial	category.		Through	the	example	of	how	
81	
religion	was	used	as	a	measure	of	human	evolution	in	Christian	European	encounters	with	Native	American	populations	in	the	15th	century,	Rana	(2011)	suggests	that	the	concept	of	race	was	inseparable	from	religion.		He	further	suggests	that	preceding	European	encounters	with	the	Muslim	Moors	established	the	religio-racial	lexicon	that	was	then	used	to	racialize	and	colonize	the	Americas.		For	Rana	(2011),	the	“scientific	racism”	that	developed	through	the	Enlightenment	obscured	these	connections	between	religion	and	race,	as	religion	became	a	purportedly	discrete	category	via	secularism	(p.	34).		However,	contemporary	articulations	of	Islamophobia	betray	the	persistence	of	the	interconnections	between	race	and	religion	as	can	be	seen	in	the	essentialization	of	Muslims	as	beholden	to	static,	totalizing	and	omnipotent	Islamic	texts.		Static	and	singularized	conceptualizations	of	Islamic	text,	then,	can	be	seen	as	part	of	the	ontological	basis	for	the	construction	of	‘Muslim’	as	a	racialized	category	of	difference.	Notably,	constructions	of	Muslims	as	beholden	to	Islamic	texts	are	entangled	in	secular	epistemologies	of	religion	and	colonial	histories	and	practices	of	governance.			More	specifically,	in	the	South	Asian	context,	colonial	practices	of	enumeration	and	codification	centralized	the	Quran	in	conceptualizations	of	Islam,	which	in	effect,	reified	and/or	constructed	the	populations	they	sought	to	know	in	order	to	govern	the	colonies	(Appadurai,	1996;	Bose	&	Jalal,	1997;	Chatterjee,	1993;	Cohn,	1996;	Jalal,	2000;	Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	2002).		The	Quran	came	to	occupy	a	palimpsestic	yet	foundational	role	in	the	codification	of	Islam	and	Islamic	law	and	the	categorization	of	Muslims	in	colonial	India	(Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	2002).		Enacting	a	gesture	of	so-called	colonial	benevolence,	the	British	Raj	attempted	to	incorporate	separate	religious	personal	laws	for	Hindus	and	Muslims	into	their	liberal	governance	structures,	which	required	the	codification	of	Hinduism	and	Islam	
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such	that	they	were	intelligible	within	a	secular	system	based	on	“rule-of-law”	(Metcalf,	2009,	p.	35;	Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	2002,	p.	57).		The	static	text	was	further	necessitated	in	the	interest	of	reducing	reliance	on	‘native’	religious	authorities,	dispossessing	local	jurists,	and	facilitating	neutral,	unmediated,	direct	access	to	an	authoritative	compendium	of	religious	laws	for	the	colonial	administration	to	use	for	adjudication	(Jalal,	2000;	Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	2002).		As	many	critiques	of	colonialism	in	India	have	pointed	out,	this	not	only	constructed	‘Hindu’	and	‘Muslim’	political	and	legal	categories	resulting	in	the	solidification	and	intensification	of	caste	and	sectarian	hierarchies	and	‘communal’	divisions	and	conflicts,	it	also,	relatedly,	reduced	a	multiplicity	of	religious	practices	into	a	treacherously	simple	duality	of	Hindu	and	Muslim	(Bose	&	Jalal,	1997;	Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	2002;	Thapar,	1989).			In	addition	to	the	reduction	of	the	plurality	of	Islamic	practices,	the	construction	of	these	categories	that	centralized	the	text	also	denied	the	possibility	of	the	porosity	of	Islam	as	it	historically	formed	dialectically	in	the	context	of	South	Asia	(Bose	&	Jalal,	1997;	Jalal,	2000;	Metcalf,	2009;	Thapar,	1989).		The	entangled	development	of	Muslim	and	Hindu	religious	practices	prior	to	British	colonization	thus	finds	no	place	within	the	hardened	boundaries	in	the	colonial	schematic	of	South	Asian	religious	identities.		The	category	of	the	Muslim	(and	also	the	Hindu)	was	in	turn	bifurcated	only	to	the	end	of	erecting	the	figures	of	good	and	bad	Muslims,	to	put	it	in	Mahmood	Mamdani’s	(2004)	terms	–	a	simple	but	powerful	discursive	trick	that	has	proven	its	resilience	as	it	continues	to	inform	and	sustain	contemporary	forms	of	imperialism.		Moreover,	in	line	with	the	methodical	yet	capricious	workings	of	empire,	the	contents	of	the	categories	of	the	good	and	bad	Muslim	shift	over	time	and	space	in	service	of	old	and	new	imperial	projects.		While	the	Islamic	modernism	of	
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‘Sir’	Sayid	Ahmed	Khan	and	the	like	consistently	endures	as	the	poster-child	for	the	preferred	mode	of	engagement	with	Islamic	texts	because	of	their	‘poetic’	reading	of	the	text,	at	times	some	strands	of	Sufism	also	acquired	favour	for	their	purportedly	benign	devotionalism,	and	at	still	other	times	‘fundamentalist’	groups	have	received	support	because	of	the	militancy	which	allegedly	emerges	out	of	a	literalist	approach	(Hirschkind	&	Mahmood,	2002;	Jalal,	2000;	Mahmood,	2006;	Metcalf,	2009).			The	normative	association	between	Islam	and	the	Quran	in	the	South	Asian	context	is	thus	mired	within	the	legacy	of	colonial	“epistemic	violence”	(Spivak,	1999,	p.	280)	that	rendered	the	plurality	and	relationality	of	religious	practices	invisible.		As	Asad	(2003)	points	out,	the	multiplicity	of	meanings	attributed	to	the	text	requires	an	analytical	framing	that	is	attentive	to	the	particularity	of	a	given	tradition.		He	states:		…the	way	people	engage	with	such	complex	and	multifaceted	texts,	translating	their	sense	and	relevance,	is	a	complicated	business	involving	disciplines	and	traditions	of	reading,	personal	habit	and	temperament,	as	well	as	the	perceived	demands	of	particular	social	situations.	(Asad,	2003,	p.	10)			Moreover,	homogenizing	Islam	by	privileging	scripture	reifies	what	Leila	Ahmed	(1993)	refers	to	as	“establishment	Islam”	(p.	239)	–	historically	situated	interpretations	of	Islam	by	the	politically	dominant	who	had	the	means	to	induct	their	interpretations	into	doctrine.		Most	notably,	according	to	Ahmed,	establishment	Islam	is	a	reflection	of	the	social	and	cultural	norms	of	the	Abbasid	period49	because	the	Abbasid	dynasty	contributed	most	heavily	to	the	codification	of	legal	and	institutional	doctrine	(p.	238).			
																																																								49	The	Abbasid	period	refers	to	evolution	of	Islam	during	the	rule	of	the	Abbasid	Caliphate	established	in	750.		See		Leila	Ahmed	(1993)	for	a	discussion	of	the	influence	of	the	Abbasid	dynasty	on	how	Islam	was	codified	and	disseminated.	
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The	suppression	of	the	heterogeneity	of	Islam	is	not	only	about	the	suppression	of	multiple	interpretive	practices,	but	it	is	also	a	marginalization	of	non-textual	and	non-androcentric	practices	of	Islam.		Leila	Ahmed	(1993)	frames	these	elisions	as	a	consequence	of	the	tension	between	establishment	Islam	and	the	“ethical	voice”	of	Islamic	societies	(p.	239).		For	Ahmed,	the	‘ethical	voice’	of	Islam	refers	to	the	multiplicity	of	Islamic	praxis	in	lived	experiences,	which	counters	claims	to	one	pure	version	of	Islam	purported	through	“establishment	Islam”	(p.	239).		She	further	argues	that	the	social	and	political	formations	linked	to	the	“ethical	voice”	of	Islam	indicate	an	ethic	of	equality	that	establishment	Islam	denies.		However,	while	Ahmed’s	(1993)	conception	of	the	ethical	voice	of	Islam	is	one	that	reiterates	“the	equal	humanity	of	all”	(p.	229),	I	would	add	that	the	ethical	voice	of	Islam	is	what	reveals	its	contextual	relationality,	that	is	to	say,	‘Islam’	is	lived	and	experienced	in	multiple	ways	and	is	constituted	dialectically	through	particular	encounters	in	particular	social	contexts	–	including	encounters	with	establishment	Islam.		This	is	not	to	say	that	the	ethical	voice	of	Islam	is	any	more	pure	or	any	less	problematic	than	establishment	Islam	or	even	that	it	is	completely	separate	from	establishment	Islam,	but,	rather,	that	‘establishment	Islam’	is	not	a	totalizing	representation	of	Islam,	even	though	it	is	often	deployed	as	such.		Thus,	the	colonial	discursive	privilege	accorded	to	a	scripture	based	Islam	is	an	ahistorical	and	flawed	project	insofar	as	it	depends	on	invoking	a	particular	manifestation	of	‘Islam’,	while	denying	its	particularity.		This	invocation	results	in	the	construction	of	‘Islamic	subjects’	as	essentially	passive	and	submissive	in	face	of	scripture,	which,	in	turn,	is	conceived	of	as	a	totalizing	and	powerful	force.		So,	Islam	is	not	only	essentialized,	but	the	possibility	of	nuances	in	relationships	between	Islam	and	Islamic	subjects	even	within	a	scriptural	conception	of	‘Islam’	is	obscured.			
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The	construction	of	Islam	as	inherently	incapable	of	progressing	to	secularism	thus	relies	on	a	secular	epistemology	of	religion	that	structures	a	series	of	essentializations	and	exclusions.		The	narrative	of	the	progression	of	the	enlightened	ideal	secular	subject	of	modernity	stands	as	a	contrast	to	conceptualizations	of	passive,	yet	potentially	violent,	Islamic	subjects	beholden	to	singular	and	totalizing	Islamic	scripture.		The	setting	up	of	this	contrast	relies	on	effacing	the	co-constitutive	relationships	between	Islam	and	the	West,	fixing	the	text	as	central	to	the	practice	of	Islam	–	which	is	in	itself	entangled	with	colonial	histories	of	governance	in	the	context	of	South	Asia	–	and	emptying	Islamic	subjects	of	agency	in	their	relationships	to	Islam.		Such	reductive	and	homogenizing	conceptualizations	of	Islam	also	exclude	Islamic	practices	that	do	not	revolve	around	the	text	or	that	take	the	text	up	differently,	thus	muting	the	multiplicity	of	Islamic	praxis.	The	women	I	interviewed	identified	as	espousing	a	text-centric	and	literalist	understanding	of	Islam.		Within	a	liberal	secular	epistemological	framework,	their	literalist	approach	signals	a	lack	of	agency	that	cements	their	status	as	passive	but	dangerous	pawns	under	the	command	of	omnipotent	texts.		However,	their	relationships	to	scripture	are	complex,	fluid,	and,	at	times,	fraught.		Moreover,	singularized	and	static	definitions	of	Islam	elide	my	respondents’	understanding	of	taqwa	as	a	continuous	and	ongoing	process.		That	is,	even	though	these	women	centralize	the	text,	this	does	not	translate	to	a	static	conceptualization	of	scripture	or	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	Muslim.				
S/subject	of	‘Feminism’	Theorizations	of	the	relationships	between	women	and	Islam	are	not	only	truncated	by	dominant	conceptualizations	of	Islam,	but	also	by	the	universalisms	underpinning	
86	
dominant	understandings	of	feminism.		The	notion	that	‘feminism’	is	‘women’	having	‘agency’	in	face	of	‘patriarchy’	persists,	for	example,	in	the	debate	on	the	possibilities	and	limitations	of	Islam	as	a	vehicle	for	feminism	(see	chapter	three).		Many	feminists	of	colour	have	intervened	in	this	conceptualization	of	feminism	by	questioning	the	basis	of	‘women’	as	a	universal	category	of	analysis	denoting	homogeneous	desires,	interests	and	ideals.		These	interventions	have	brought	in	an	analysis	of	race	as	it	operates	in	the	universalization	of	this	category.	Critiques	of	the	category	‘women’	by	feminists	of	colour	stem	from	the	need	to	address	the	hegemonic	status	of	white,	Western	feminism.		By	foregrounding	differences	and	plurality	within	this	purportedly	homogeneous	category,	these	critiques	provide	some	insight	into	the	types	of	violences,	exclusions,	and	omissions	that	constitute	dominant	ideas	and	practices	of	feminism.		As	Sylvia	Wynter	(Scott,	2000)	suggests,	variables	such	as	‘race’	insert	a	contradiction	“into	the	consolidated	field	of	meanings	of	the	ostensibly	‘universal’	theory	of	feminism”,	which	at	one	time	was	itself	a	disruption	of	the	universal	theories	of	“Liberal	Humanism”	and	“Marxism/Leninism”	through	its	insertion	of	the	variable	‘gender’	(p.	357).		In	other	words,	dominant	theories	of	feminism	perpetuate	the	same	epistemic	violences	as	those	they	were	meant	to	disrupt.		Moreover,	these	epistemic	violences	secure	universalist	ideas	by	constructing	a	“‘consolidated	field’	of	being/feeling/knowing”	that	presumes	and	produces	an	ideal	feminist	subject	through	multiple	sites	(Wynter,	1990,	p.	364).		Chandra	Mohanty	(2003)	suggests	that	these	violences	are	due	to	the	analytical	foreclosure	generated	through	the	category	‘women’.		She	argues	that	Western	feminism	discursively	colonizes	this	category	through	an	a	priori	suppression	of	the	heterogeneity	of	this	category	of	analysis.		In	addition	to	assuming	the	homogeneity	of	‘women’,	this	
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analytical	foreclosure	occurs	through	the	centralization	of	the	“authorial	subject”	as	the	“primary	referent	of	theory	and	praxis”	(Mohanty,	2003,	p.	64).			Responding	to	the	absence	of	women	of	colour	and	queer	women	from	the	category	‘women’,	Valerie	Amos	and	Pratibha	Parmar	(1984)	argue	that	the	inability	of	white	feminism	to	incorporate	and	account	for	difference	is	a	testament	to	the	farcicality	of	their	claims	to	a	universal	womanhood.		Rather,	as	Amos	and	Parmar	(1984)	suggest	in	reference	to	the	problematic	of	the	discursive	treatment	of	black	women,	“the	process	of	accounting	for	their	historical	and	contemporary	position	does,	in	itself,	challenge	the	use	of	some	of	the	central	categories	and	assumptions	of	recent	mainstream	feminist	thought”	(p.	4).		Thus,	the	inability	of	feminist	theory	to	speak	to	the	experiences	of	Muslim	women,	for	example,	is	not	just	about	the	absence	of	Muslim	women	–	therefore,	it	is	not	simply	a	matter	of	correcting	the	absence	by	making	Muslim	women	present.		Muslim	women’s	experiences	bring	the	very	basis	of	mainstream	feminism	into	question	by	challenging	the	universal	applicability	of	the	foundational	categories,	modes	of	understanding,	and	eschatological	assumptions	of	feminism.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	feminist	claims	of	universalism	have	not	ignored	the	question	of	difference	altogether;	rather,	it	is	precisely	their	incorporation	of	difference	that	motivates	the	critiques	of	their	universalism.		Difference,	in	dominant	feminism,	is	understood	through	a	pre-given	and	universalized	trajectory	for	all	women;	that	is,	a	universalized	feminist	teleology	forms	the	basis	of	understandings	of	difference	and	thus	constrains	and	disciplines	it.		Feminism,	then,	becomes	a	prescriptive	project	that	acts	to	correct	deviations	from	this	trajectory	and/or	an	evaluative	project	that	assesses	‘women’	and	places	them	along	the	trajectory	in	relation	to	a	universal	telos.		Moreover,	the	
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ways	in	which	Western	feminism	incorporates	difference	fortifies	the	universal	claims	of	its	categories	of	analysis.			The	privileging	of	‘women’	as	a	universal	basis	of	feminist	solidarity	assumes	a	common	oppression	and	exonerates	women	from	complicity	in	oppressive	systems	and	practices.		In	other	words,	while	the	category	of	‘women’	is	presented	as	inclusive	of	all	women,	it	obscures	the	unequal	and	hierarchal	relations	between	women	that	this	category	perpetuates.		For	instance,	Mohanty	(2003)	contends	that	the	construction	of	the	sub-category	of	“third	world	woman”	is	premised	on	a	Western	self	as	the	yardstick	for	developmental	goals	and	is	symptomatic	of	an	asymmetrical	relation	of	power	that	is	made	invisible	through	claims	to	universality	(21).		Furthermore,	it	narrates	the	encounter	between	Western	and	third	world	women	as	occurring	at	the	moment	of	developmentalist	intervention,	thus	effacing	a	history	of	imperialism.		The	third-world	woman	is	incorporated	into	a	universal	trajectory	as	the	other	or	the	“not	(like)	us	(yet)”	(S.	Ahmed,	2000,	p.	165).		Western	feminist	selves	are	thus	constructed	as	the	primary	referent,	ideal,	and	telos,	which	enables	the	persistence	of	unequal	relationships	under	the	guise	of	feminist	solidarity.		This	centralization	of	the	Western	self	in	feminist	theory	elides	an	intersectional	analysis	that	would	account	for	the	multiple	and	simultaneous	categories	that	inform	processes	of	subject	formation.		That	this	problematic	runs	deeper	than	a	question	of	absence/presence	or	visibility/invisibility	is	even	more	pronounced	in	attempts	in	mainstream	feminism	to	incorporate	difference	and	address	exclusions.		Such	attempts	to	reconsolidate	the	category	of	‘woman’	as	the	basis	of	feminist	solidarity	in	response	to	encounters	with	differences	amongst	women	have	morphed	into	evaluative	anthropological	projects	
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enmeshed	in	the	power	matrices	of	knowledge	production.		Amos	and	Parmar	(1984)	argue	that	anthropological	works	have	rendered	black	women	as	“subjects	for	interesting	and	exotic	comparison”	(p.	6).		The	comparative	impetus	of	such	anthropological	projects	invariably	includes	a	yardstick	against	which	other	women’s	progress	is	measured.		As	Amos	and	Parmar	(1984)	point	out,	There	is	no	apology	for,	nay	awareness	even,	of	the	contradictions	of	white	feminists	as	anthropologists	studying	village	women	in	India,	Africa,	China	for	evidence	of	feminist	consciousness	and	female	solidarity.	(p.	6)		Such	projects	exemplify	what	Radhika	Mongia	(2007)	characterizes	as	the	effacement	of	power	that	occurs	through	the	“standardization”	of	units	of	analysis.		She	suggests	that	standardization	implies	equivalence,	obscuring	the	ways	in	which	comparative	analysis	is	“the	standardization	of	inequality	structured	through	the	form	of	equivalence”	(p.	410,	emphasis	in	original).		The	category	of	‘women’	as	a	unit	of	comparative	analysis,	then,	is	a	form	of	equivalence	that	obscures	how	this	category	produces	hierarchal	difference.			In	this	sense,	comparative	frameworks	both	presume	and	produce	a	subject.		Spivak	makes	a	crucial	distinction	between	the	“philosophical	and	ethical	Subject”	conceived	in	universal	or	transcendental	terms,	and	“political	subjects”,	as	in	the	“king’s	subjects”,	conceived	of	as	a	relation	of	power	(Birla,	2002,	p.	90).		She	argues	that	conceptions	of	the	subject-as-agent	are	predicated	on	the	philosophical	ethical	Subject	and	elide	an	understanding	of	political	subjection	as	a	relation	of	power.		Moreover,	by	attributing	agency	to	Subjects	and	subjects	in	the	same	way,	relations	of	power	and	oppression	are	covered	over	(Birla,	2002,	p.	8).		Spivak	(1999)	makes	this	distinction	between	the	Subject	and	subject	to	call	into	question	the	“transparency”	claimed	by	Western	intellectuals	that	is	based	on	a	conflation	of	these	two	notions	of	S/subject.		She	argues:	
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The	S/subject,	curiously	sewn	together	into	a	transparency	by	denegations,	belongs	to	the	exploiters’	side	of	the	international	division	of	labour.		It	is	impossible	for	contemporary	French	intellectuals	to	imagine	the	kind	of	Power	and	Desire	that	would	inhabit	the	unnamed	subject	of	the	Other	of	Europe.		It	is	not	only	that	everything	they	read,	critical	or	uncritical,	is	caught	within	the	debate	of	the	production	of	that	Other,	supporting	or	critiquing	the	constitution	of	the	subject	as	Europe.		It	is	also	that,	in	the	constitution	of	that	Other	of	Europe,	great	care	was	taken	to	obliterate	the	textual	ingredients	with	which	such	a	subject	could	cathect,	could	occupy	(invest?)	its	itinerary.	(Spivak,	1999,	p.	265)		Knowledge	production	about	the	other	as	the	Other	invariably	recentres	the	Subject	while	denying	spaces	of	alterity.		For	Spivak	(Spivak,	1999),	individualistic	denegations	made	by	Western	intellectuals	that	proclaim	a	non-judgmental	or	non-universalizing	stance	do	little	by	way	of	curbing	the	epistemic	violence	enacted	through	the	Subject	as	“irreducible	methodological	presupposition”	(p.	265).		The	discursive	orientation	of	the	subject	towards	or	in	relation	to	the	Subject	remain	in	such	epistemological	frameworks.	In	addition,	such	comparative	projects	that	reify	the	Subject	are	complicit	in	the	developmentalist	logics	through	which	colonialism	and	modern	day	imperialism	are	justified,	where	the	native	other	is	understood	as	being	on	the	same	developmental	trajectory	as	the	colonizer	but	not	as	far	along,	thus	justifying	intervention	as	an	ethical	imperative.		The	issue	then	is	not	that	there	is	no	attempt	to	incorporate	difference,	but	that	the	attempts	themselves	are	inflected	with	power	that	is	then	obscured	in	order	to	posit	an	ontological	and	teleological	universality	–	which	is	underpinned	by	assumptions	of	an	ethical	universality.		Moreover,	as	Sunera	Thobani	(2010)	argues,	the	process	of	incorporating	difference	in	this	way	also	contributes	to	the	construction	of	a	“fantasy”	(p.	131)	of	Western	benevolence	and	innocence,	which	is	integral	to	the	imperialist	logics	and	practices	of	intervention.		Thus,	engaging	in	a	comparative	and,	ultimately,	evaluative	project	does	little	to	make	space	for	differences	in	epistemologies;	in	fact,	the	reiteration	
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and	imposition	of	the	dominant	episteme	in	this	way	reinforces	exclusions	under	the	guise	of	inclusion.	For	instance,	in	contemporary	discourses	of	terrorism,	the	construction	of	Islam	as	a	patriarchal	religion	and	the	saving	of	Muslim	women	as	a	feminist	imperative	are	based	on	a	secular	discourse	of	tradition	(religion)	and	modernity	(secular),	where	the	lived	experiences	of	Muslim	women	are	refracted	through	this	dichotomy.		The	racialized	and	gendered	body	of	the	Muslim	woman	comes	to	be	known	through	the	reductive	frame	of	this	secular	epistemology,	severed	from	the	multiple	structures	of	power	and	modes	of	subject	formation	that	constitute	lived	experiences.		Thus,	the	ways	in	which	‘Islam’	is	mobilized	as	a	gendered	category	of	difference	reveals	how	such	comparative	projects	operate	through	secular	epistemologies.				
Spiritual	as	Epistemological		The	exclusion	of	non-secular	knowledges	and	subjectivities	from	the	category	of	the	modern	is	based	on	the	disavowal	of	the	contemporaneity	of	religious	knowledge	and	modes	of	subject	formation.		The	cosmological	systems	constituting	spiritual	knowledge	and	practice	are	made	to	figure	as	static	cultural	artifacts	that	are	evidence	of	the	persistence	of	tradition	and	lack	of	progress,	rather	than	an	epistemology.		But	what	would	it	mean	to	take	the	sacred	seriously?		Alexander	suggests	that	taking	the	sacred	seriously	means	to	“shake	the	archives	of	secularism”	through	an	understanding	of	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	and	not	as	“lapses	outside	the	bounds	of	rationality”	(Alexander,	2006,	p.	327).		She	argues	that	the	spiritual	must	be	taken	into	consideration	as	epistemological,	
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rather	than	as	a	cultural	remnant	understood	within	the	linear	temporality	of	secular	time	that	imagines	the	progress	of	time	as	the	movement	from	tradition	to	modernity.					Walter	Mignolo	(2000)	suggests	that	conceptualizations	of	secular	temporality	acquire	normative	epistemic	status	through	the	“subalternization	of	knowledge”	(p.	59).		He	argues	that	the	veneer	of	universality	acquired	by	the	temporality	of	modernity	is	inextricable	from	colonial	processes	of	the	subalternization	of	knowledge	and	the	related	denial	of	intersubjectivity	(Mignolo,	2000,	pp.	59–60).		That	is,	the	rational	subject	at	the	heart	of	the	colonial	project	produces	a	subject-object	relationship	with	the	other	that,	in	turn,	renders	the	other	as	the	“known	subject”	and	the	self	as	the	“knowing	subject”	(Mignolo,	2000,	p.	60).		The	denial	of	the	other	as	a	knowing	subject	in	effect	denies	forms	of	knowledge,	and	the	related	temporalities	of	subject	formation,	that	are	rendered	unintelligible	within	a	colonial	paradigm.		Furthermore,	the	temporal-spatial	collapse	underpinning	colonial	discourse	renders	othered	forms	of	knowledge	and	modes	of	subject	formation	as	failed,	backwards,	or	invisible	leading	to	legitimization,	expansion	and	entrenchment	of	colonial	power.			The	propensity	to	subjugate	othered	epistemologies	is	apparent	in	the	re-entrenchment	of	the	universalist	strand	of	feminism	through	the	War	on	Terror.		For	instance,	the	figure	of	the	oppressed	Muslim	woman	has	been	deployed	as	a	powerful	trope	to	reconsolidate	and	justify	the	re-establishment	of	a	universal	ethic	for	feminist	theory	and	praxis	(Thobani,	2010;	Toor,	2011a).		Comparative	frameworks	that	take	up	‘Islam’	and	the	‘West’	as	separate	and	stable	categories	have	yielded	the	“West’s	gendered	subject	as	the	mark	of	the	‘universal’,	and	the	world	of	the	Muslim	gendered	subject	as	that	of	death,	violence,	and	misogyny”	(Thobani,	2010,	p.	129).		Considered	in	relation	to	these	
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discursive	frameworks,	the	need	to	“save”	oppressed	Muslim	women	not	only	suggests	saving	someone	from	something,	but	also	saving	someone	to	something	(Abu-Lughod,	2002).		That	is,	there	is	a	universalized	idea	of	what	is	good	for	everyone	implicit	in	the	logic	of	“saving”.		In	mainstream	feminist	discourses	of	the	War	on	Terror,	for	example,	the	Muslim	woman	must	be	saved	from	the	religious	to	the	secular.		The	very	possibility	of	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	is	negated	at	the	outset	of	constructing	a	universal	feminist	subject	that	then	serves	the	ultimate	legitimization	of	a	sort	of	ethical	imperialism	through	the	logic	of	intervention	for	the	purposes	of	‘saving	them’	for	their	own	good.			The	idea	of	‘saving’	the	oppressed	Muslim	woman	is	also	indicative	of	the	hierarchical	ordering	of	the	secular	and	the	religious.		Alexander	(2006)	suggests	that	secular	feminist	desires	to	save	or	cure	women	from	becoming	“consorts	of	manly	male	gods”	depends	on	an	a	priori	“masculanization	of	the	social	organization	of	the	Sacred”	(p.	323).		That	is,	the	need	to	save	women	from	religion	is	premised	on	a	pre-defined	conceptualization	of	religion	as	masculine	and	patriarchal.		For	example,	in	Leela	Fernandes’s	(2003)	otherwise	constructive	theorization	of	“spiritualized	feminism”	as	transformative	feminist	practice,	she	suggests	the	need	for	recuperating	spirituality	from	“conservative	religious	and	political	forces”	(p.	9).		She	refers	to	this	process	as	the	“decolonization	of	the	divine”	(p.	11).		Untangling	spirituality	from	its	association	with	institutionalized	religion	is	key	to	this	process	of	decolonization	in	her	view.		Moreover,	for	Fernandes	(2003)	the	colonization	of	the	spiritual	occurs	not	only	through	its	monopolization	by	institutionalized	religion,	but	also	through	its	repudiation	by	secular	feminists.		That	is,	secular	feminists	throw	the	baby	out	with	the	bath	water,	so	to	speak,	when	they	excise	spirituality	from	feminist	praxis	for	the	sake	of	fighting	against	
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“conservative”	religious	forces.		By	removing	its	association	with	“conservative”	forces,	Fernandes	(2003)	suggests	that	spirituality	can	be	reclaimed	for	social	justice,	and	also	that	social	justice	is	unachievable	without	spirituality.		While	decolonizing	“spirituality”	in	this	way	is	important	in	that	it	counters	hegemonic	scripts	of	religiosity	and	makes	space	for	difference,	it	is	based	on	a	perception	of	‘religion’	as	inherently	and	irredeemably	anti-feminist.		This	precludes	a	consideration	of	the	agency	of	women	involved	in	institutionalized	religion	and	exemplifies	how	feminism	is	sutured	to	the	secular	in	ways	that	affirm	secularism	as	the	ultimate	guarantor	of	freedom	and	equality.		Such	antithetical	relationships	between	‘religion’	and	‘feminism’	rely	on	layers	of	discursive	colonization.		Decolonizing	the	divine	would	not	only	require	us	to	grapple	with	the	ways	in	which	these	normative	categories	of	analysis	are	constructed	and	mobilized	through	secular	epistemologies	but	also	to	understand	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	(Alexander,	2006).		Several	scholars	turn	to	practices	of	religious	subject	making	through	the	development	of	piety	in	order	to	explicate	the	spiritual	as	epistemological.		As	discussed	earlier,	secular	frameworks	(informed	by	the	doctrine	of	secularism)	relegate	religion	to	the	private	sphere	in	complex	ways.		Piety,	in	turn,	is	located	even	deeper	in	the	private	sphere	as	a	mode	of	existence	where	individuals	enact	certain	disciplinary	practices	focused	on	their	own	individual	body	and	mind	with	limited	orchestrated	activities	in	the	public	sphere	–	a	conception	that	is	informed	by	the	history	of	the	development	of	the	Christian	tradition	and	its	counterpart,	secularism	(Asad,	1993,	p.	205;	Mahmood,	2005,	p.	4).		Read	within	a	secular	framework,	women’s	piety	is	a	sign	of	their	relegation	to	the	private	sphere	and	the	disciplining	of	their	bodies	via	(patriarchal)	religion.		In	turn,	Muslim	women’s	piety	groups,	like	the	ones	emerging	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	are	
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characterized	as	a	step	in	the	wrong	direction	since	their	engagement	with	‘Islam’	is	not	necessarily	premised	on	gender-progressive	goals.		Moreover,	the	piety	groups	discussed	in	this	dissertation	affirm	the	authority	of	men	over	women	as	part	of	their	practice	of	piety,	which	is	easily	read	as	regressive	especially	within	the	frameworks	discussed	above.		Some	scholars	such	as	Lara	Deeb	(2006),	Sherine	Hafez	(2011),	and	Saba	Mahmood	(2005)	argue	that	dominant	feminist	frameworks	lead	to	reductive	and	over	simplified	understandings	of	piety	movements	and	practices	of	piety.		Mahmood’s	(2005)	influential	work	on	the	women’s	“da’wa	movement”	in	Egypt	has	led	to	key	analytical	shifts	in	the	discussion	on	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’	on	multiple	fronts.		In	particular,	Mahmood	draws	on	the	experiences	of	Muslim	women	in	an	Egyptian	piety	movement	to	illustrate	the	epistemic	traps	of	secular	frameworks.		Most	significantly,	it	is	her	reconceptualization	of	‘agency’	that	has	opened	up	a	space	to	push	the	limits	of	theorizations	of	Islam	and	feminism.		Mahmood	(2005)	makes	two	interventions	in	mainstream	feminist	theories	of	agency	through	her	analysis	of	piety	that	are	particularly	relevant	to	the	theoretical	framing	of	this	dissertation:	One,	a	reconfiguration	of	the	relationship	between	desire	and	agency	and,	two,	an	expansion	of	the	meaning	of	agency	beyond	the	framework	of	subordination	and	resistance	to	include	“inhabiting	norms”	(p.	15)	as	a	form	of	agency.			Mahmood	(2005)	makes	the	first	intervention	by	interrogating	assumptions	about	interiority	and	exteriority	of	the	subject.		She	suggests	that	the	development	of	piety	is	not	premised	on	a	unidirectional	relationship	between	interiority	and	exteriority	–	as	assumptions	about	mind/body	in	liberal	subjects	might	suggest.		In	other	words,	the	formation	of	a	pious	Muslim	subject	in	the	da’wa	movement	proceeds	through	embodied	practices	that	mobilize	the	body	as	a	sign	of	as	well	as	a	medium	for	piety	(Mahmood,	2005,	
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p.	122).		To	illustrate,	Mahmood	(2005)	gives	the	example	of	performing	the	Islamic	ritual	of	salat	five	times	a	day	(p.	123).		For	members	of	the	da’wa	movement,	performing	salat	is	not	only	an	action	that	signifies	the	fulfillment	of	a	ritual,	but	it	is	also	a	means	through	which	the	desire	to	perform	salat	is	inculcated	through	repetition,	affective	attachment,	and	experiencing	beneficial	results	in	mental	and	physical	health.		Thus,	to	bring	this	alignment	of	the	interior	(desire)	and	exterior	(action)	into	being,	the	da’wa	movement	includes	‘desire’	as	an	“object	of	pedagogy”	(Mahmood,	2005,	p.	123)	that	is	produced	through	embodied	practice	and,	notably,	does	not	necessitate	or	privilege	the	presence	of	desire	prior	to	action.		This	reconfiguration	opens	up	a	space	for	engaging	with	piety	as	a	complex	site	of	agency	in	that	it	cannot	be	measured	against	liberal	prerequisites	of	freedom	and	autonomy	of	desire	and,	indeed,	the	desire	for	freedom	and	autonomy.		Thus,	the	evaluative	function	of	conceptions	of	desire	and	agency	that	has	conventionally	been	used	to	measure	levels	of	oppression	or	resistance	is	rendered	moot.		The	second	key	intervention	that	Mahmood	(2005)	makes	in	theorizing	agency	is	to	move	beyond	the	framework	of	subordination	and	resistance	and	include	“inhabiting	norms”	(p.	15),	where	norms	are	the	“scaffolding”	(p.	148)	through	which	the	subject	is	realized,	as	a	form	of	agency.	As	Mahmood	(2005)	suggests,	secular	approaches	to	social	phenomenon	flatten	the	scope	of	human	experience	to	either	succumbing	to	or	resisting	relations	of	domination.		Approaching	the	gendered	body	only	as	symbol,	for	example,	would	be	limiting	in	an	analysis	of	piety	in	that	it	renders	the	body	a	passive	site	of	signification	of	either	individual	or	collective	will	or	of	normative	discourses.		Instead,	Mahmood	(2005)	frames	pious	subject	formation	in	the	da’wa	movement	in	Aristotelian	
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terms	as	a	movement	toward	habitus,50	that	is,	the	co-alignment	of	the	interior	with	the	exterior	through	a	mutually	constitutive	relationship	between	the	two	(p.	136).		This	stands	in	contrast	to,	for	example,	English	Puritanism	where	piety	refers	to	the	formation	of	inward	spiritual	states	(Mahmood,	2005).		Mahmood	(2005)	argues	that	inhabiting	norms	through	iteration	is	a	form	of	agency	not	only	because	performativity	disrupts	norms,	but	also	because	it	consolidates	them.		Through	this	conceptualization,	we	can	simultaneously	de-centre	acts	of	resistance	as	indicators	of	agency	and	initiate	a	conversation	on	piety	as	an	act	of	agency.		This	is	not	to	say	that	piety	cannot	be	resistant,	rather,	the	point	is	that	resistance	is	not	the	only	way	we	can	read	piety	as	agential.		This	intervention	in	theories	of	agency	again	places	politics	within	the	purview	of	piety	by	recasting	piety	in	the	idiom	of	inhabitance	rather	than	submission.		As	such,	this	intervention	in	the	literature	facilitates	a	discussion	about	women	and	Islam	beyond	a	question	of	whether	or	not	Muslim	women	have	agency	and	into	a	conversation	about	the	spiritual	or	sacred	epistemologies	that	give	meaning	to	practices	of	piety.			Being	cognizant	of	the	epistemological	pitfalls	discussed	throughout	this	chapter,	I	suggest	that	the	conceptualization	and	practices	of	piety	that	emerge	out	of	the	women’s	groups	discussed	in	this	dissertation	not	be	read	within	a	rigid	framework	of	the	universal	and	the	particular.		Rather,	drawing	on	the	critical	scholarship	on	religion	and	the	work	of	feminists	of	colour,	I	argue	for	a	reading	of	this	“local”	form	of	piety	that	is	attentive	to	its	“genealogy”,	“systematicity”	and	“historicity”	(Alexander	&	Mohanty,	2013;	Grewal	&	
																																																								50	Mahmood	(2005)	distinguishes	her	use	of	the	Aristotelian	conceptualization	of	habitus	as	distinct	from	Pierre	Bourdieu’s	theorization	of	habitus,	which	she	suggests	is	tied	to	the	often	unintended	or	unconscious	formation	of	dispositions.		For	Mahmood,	the	Aristotelian	habitus	includes	an	emphasis	on	the	acquisition	of	a	moral	or	practical	craft	through	deliberate	practice	and	learning	until	it	becomes	part	of	the	self,	which	she	suggests	resonates	more	closely	with	the	practices	of	piety	of	the	women	she	conducted	research	with	(136).	
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Kaplan,	1994;	Mahmood,	2005;	Scott,	2000;	Spivak,	1999).		While	on	one	hand	I	want	to	provide	a	sense	of	how	piety	is	thought	of	within	the	discourse	of	these	groups,	this	is	not,	on	the	other	hand,	to	suggest	a	reductionist	particularizing	narrative	of	a	local/authentic	version	of	piety	isolated	from	broader	power	relations.		I	engage	with	how	women	conceptualize	and	inhabit	their	piety	in	relational	and	shifting	ways.			Many	anthropologists	and	historians	turn	to	the	“local”	as	a	site	of	explicating	more	appropriate	and	authentic	explanatory	terms	in	order	to	redress	the	inadequacy	of	universalized	terms	of	reference.		However,	in	addition	to	the	danger	of	romanticizing	the	“local”	and	the	power	imbalances	inherent	in	rendering	something	“locateable”,	they	often	succumb	to	the	trappings	of	isolating	the	“local”	or	the	“authentic”	in	accounts	of	non-Western	religious	practices	in	the	name	of	unsettling	normative	definitions	of	religion	(Asad,	1993,	p.	9).		Mahmood’s	(2005)	work,	for	instance,	succumbs	to	this	limitation	to	an	extent	in	the	interest	of	“parochializing”	(p.	191)	the	universalized	terms	of	reference	that	could	be	projected	onto	a	reading	of	the	Egyptian	women’s	da’wa	movement.		While	Mahmood’s	interventions	in	theories	of	agency	are	integral	to	unpacking	the	politics	of	piety,	she	seems	to	limit	her	analysis	to	“Islamic	norms”	as	the	only	scaffolding	through	which	the	pious	self	is	realized	-	as	though	“Islamic	norms”	are	discrete	and	exist	in	isolation.		Mahmood	(2005)	recognizes	that	“the	relationship	between	Islamism	and	liberal	secularity	is	one	of	proximity	and	coimbrication	rather	than	a	simple	opposition	or,	for	that	matter,	accommodation”	(p.	25).		However,	her	analysis	implicitly	upholds	a	dichotomy	between	the	piety	of	the	da’wa	movement	and	secular-liberal	values	through	the	language	of	“Islamic	norms”.			
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To	some	extent	this	reduction	is	understandable	given	the	tendency	in	scholarship	on	religion	to	reduce	religious	practices	to	social	phenomenon	at	the	expense	of	a	cosmological	or	transcendental	understanding	of	religion.		This	tendency	poses	the	risk	of	projecting	liberal	society	as	a	universalized	horizon,	which	confines	any	alternative	formations	within	dominant	epistemological	frameworks	or	conceives	of	them	as	exceptions	facing	the	looming	inevitability	of	their	eventual	(re)orientation	toward	the	universal	horizon	(Asad,	2003;	Chakrabarty,	2007;	Mahmood,	2005;	Mehta,	1999;	Scott,	2013;	Spivak,	1999).		Many	have	pointed	to	“translation”	(Asad,	1993;	Mahmood,	2005;	Mehta,	1999;	Spivak,	1999)	as	the	moment	at	which,	for	instance,	the	presence	of	practices	that	walk	and	talk	like	liberalism	can	mistakenly	be	read	in	hegemonic	terms	as	liberal	and	as	constitutive	of	liberal	subjectivities	at	the	expense	of	a	more	nuanced	analysis	of	these	practices	and	the	social	and	political	imaginaries	of	those	practicing	them.		For	instance,	in	her	book	exploring	the	relationship	between	secularization	and	Islamism	in	Pakistan,	Humeira	Iqtidar	(2011)	argues	that	the	coimbrication	of	secularism	and	Islamism	alone	is	not	necessarily	indicative	of	the	formation	of	liberal	subjectivities	even	though	secularism	is	a	central	liberal	value.		Mahmood	(2005)	also	includes	words	of	caution	in	her	book	about	the	“analytic	foreclosure”	that	accompanies	the	“teleological	certainty”	of	a	“cosmopolitan	horizon”	(pp.	197-198).		Mahmood’s	emphasis	on	‘Islamic	norms’	is	in	some	ways	an	effort	to	foreground	the	spiritual	as	epistemological.		However,	theorizing	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	does	not	mean	that	we	empty	it	of	relations	of	power.		Spiritual	epistemologies	are	not	just	epistemologies	of	the	spiritual	–	that	is,	it	is	not	only	about	how	practices	identified	as	part	of	the	development	of	piety	are	given	meaning.		Rather,	to	consider	the	spiritual	as	
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epistemological	would	mean	to	“pry	open	the	terms,	symbols,	and	organizational	codes”	that	are	used	“to	make	sense	of	the	world”	(Alexander,	2006,	p.	293).		Thus,	it	is	important	to	consider	how	spiritual	epistemologies	give	meaning	to	the	“world”.			The	web	of	normativity	women	in	piety	groups	are	drawing	on	and	consolidating	consists	of	more	than	“Islamic	norms”	and,	moreover,	“Islamic	norms”	is	not	a	stable	category	of	analysis.		Hafez	(2011)	and	Deeb	(2006),	respectively,	draw	our	attention	to	Suad	Joseph’s	conceptualization	of	religious	subject	making	as	“relational”	to	emphasize	complex	imbrications	of	multiple,	inseparable	discourses.		As	Hafez	(2011)	suggests	in	her	work	with	Egyptian	women	activists	involved	in	al-Hilal,	reductive	understandings	of	Islamic	practices	are	symptomatic	of	how	the	“religious	subject”	is	employed	as	a	unit	of	analysis	that	is	distinct	from	the	“modern	subject”	(p.	27).		Hafez	argues	against	assuming	a	“bounded	subject”	(p.	29)	because	of	the	limits	it	places	on	how	we	understand	subjecthood	and	processes	of	subject	making.		She	instead	suggests	that	“subject	making	cannot	be	understood	as	a	continuous	process	within	a	single	paradigm”	but,	rather,	“subject	making	should	be	considered	as	deeply	embedded	in	wider,	complex,	and	imbricated	social	and	historical	processes”	(p.	5).		This	emphasis	on	the	multiplicity	and	simultaneity	of	discourses	and	processes	of	subject	formation	is	also	reflected	in	Deeb’s	(2006)	work	on	women’s	Shi’i	piety	groups	loosely	associated	with	Hizbullah	in	Lebanon.		For	instance,	she	gives	the	example	of	how	the	women	she	worked	with	articulated	the	relationship	between	“scientific	rationality”	and	Islam	where	“the	two	are	able	to	coexist	in	an	enchanted	modern”	(Deeb,	2006,	p.	28).		Deeb	suggests	that	this	relationship	unravels	normative	notions	of	a	secular	modern	based	on	an	opposition	between	science	and	religion.		Through	her	conceptualization	of	the	“enchanted	modern”	(p.	5-6),	Deeb	
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illustrates	the	inextricability	of	formulations	of	spiritual	and	material	progress	and	of	religion	and	politics	in	their	practices	of	piety.	Although	Mahmood’s	(2005)	analysis	of	the	piety	movement	in	Egypt	sheds	light	on	the	inadequacies	of	liberal	conceptions	of	subject	formation	and	desire/agency,	there	appears	to	be	a	slippage	between	critiquing	the	inadequacy	of	liberal	political	theory	to	deeming	liberalism	irrelevant	in	the	discourse	of	the	piety	movement.		It	would	be	integral	to	distinguish	between,	for	instance,	individualism	as	an	ethical	value	in	a	particular	manifestation	of	piety	and	liberal	individualistic	understandings	of	practices	of	piety.		For	example,	in	the	interviews	I	conducted	for	this	dissertation,	it	was	often	made	explicit	that	the	authority	of	a	particular	“Islamic	norm”	was	formed	through	its	commensurability	with	liberal	notions	of	modernity,	rationality,	and	progress.		Collapsing	liberal	secular	epistemology	with	liberal	values	also	precludes	the	possibility	of	a	nuanced	understanding	the	complex	relationships	between	liberalism	and	forms	of	“systematicity”	or	with	the	“historicity”	of	piety	(Asad	1993;	Birla	2010;	Scott	2013).			As	I	explain	further	in	chapter	five,	my	respondents’	trajectories	of	pious	subject	formation	were	constituted	through	a	particular	mapping	of	tradition	and	modernity,	mind	and	body,	and	self	and	other	that	resonate	with	liberalism	in	significant	ways.		More	specifically,	I	argue	that	their	mobilization	of	a	discourse	of	rationality	produced	forms	of	categorizing	and	othering	the	irrational	that	are	complicit	with	liberal	structures	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	that	bestow	franchise	and	freedoms	based	on	the	pre-requisite	of	individual	autonomy	and	rationality.		Many	of	the	women	I	met	at	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	made	an	explicit	delineation	of	good	and	bad	Muslims	based	on	the	possession	of	rationality,	and	relatedly,	on	the	possession	of	literacy	skills,	which,	in	turn,	produced	a	
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developmentalist	politics	of	intervention	in	the	practice	of	Islam	amongst	the	illiterate.		Thus,	while	liberal	secular	epistemologies	may	be	inadequate	frameworks	for	grasping	the	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	of	the	women	I	met,	this	does	not	mean	these	women	are	outside	of	liberalism	or	that	liberalism	is	irrelevant	to	their	social	imaginaries.		Rather,	the	significance	of	liberalism	for	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	is	evident	if	liberalism	is	understood	as	part	of	an	“enchanted	modern”	(Deeb,	2006)	–	as	a	discourse	of	inclusion,	exclusion,	and	intervention	that	is	not	entirely	separate	from	the	spiritual	but	also	not	entirely	encompassing	of	it	either.	In	some	ways,	Mahmood	(2005)	ends	up	reproducing	the	containment	of	the	spiritual	even	as	she	works	to	dislodge	it	from	liberal	secular	epistemologies.		That	is	to	say,	the	power	and	agency	of	“local”	practices	and	discourses	is	confined	or	made	invisible	by	conceptualizing	them	as	isolated,	disconnected,	pure/authentic	and	disengaged	from,	or	uninterested	in,	matters	outside	of	the	local	space.		As	Asad	(1993)	argues,	an	analysis	of	authorizing	discourses	is	instrumental	to	understanding	how	these	economies	of	desire	and	modes	of	subject	formation	are	produced,	secured,	and	lived.		Accordingly,	in	this	dissertation,	I	intend	to	broaden	an	understanding	of	the	politics	of	piety	by	taking	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	and	also	by	explicating	how	the	women	I	spoke	with	inhabit	matrices	of	multiple	norms	and,	moreover,	how	social	hierarchies	and	power	relations	author	and	authorize	their	discourses	of	piety.		
Conclusion	To	take	the	sacred	seriously	means	not	only	understanding	the	spiritual	as	epistemological,	but	also	to	reconsider	the	categories	of	analysis	mobilized	in	producing	
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knowledge	about	Muslim	women.		In	this	chapter,	I	have	suggested	that	engaging	in	decolonizing	categories	of	analysis	such	as	‘nation’,	‘religion’,	‘Islam’,	‘feminism’,	‘women’	and	‘agency’	is	an	important	step	towards	de-centering	secular	epistemologies.		However,	processes	of	discursive	decolonization	must	also	include	an	interrogation	of	the	ways	in	which	analysis	of	Muslim	women	is	often	limited	to	these	categories.		Moreover,	to	understand	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	poses	the	risk	of	privileging	the	spiritual	in	ways	that	might	reproduce	the	distinction	between	the	secular	and	religious.		What	‘archives	of	secularism’	continue	to	haunt	our	processes	of	knowledge	production?		It	is	important	to	continuously	interrogate	what	moments,	relationships	and	practices	are	noted	as	spiritual	epistemologies.		This	not	only	means	to	interrogate	what	we	read	as	spiritual	and	why,	but	also	what	we	do	not	read	as	spiritual.				
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Chapter	3:	Heteropatriarchal	Religio-Nationalism,	Gender,	and	
Islam		 Taking	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	is	particularly	poignant	for	an	analysis	of	gender	and	Islam	in	the	context	of	‘Pakistan’	where	relationships	between	women	and	Islam	are	often	rendered	in	terms	of	the	relationship	between	women	and	the	religio-nationalist	state.		While	the	discourses	of	piety	espoused	by	the	women	I	met	are	in	conversation	with	the	state,	–	at	times	inadvertently	so	–	they	are	not	contained	by	the	spatiality	of	the	religio-nationalist	state.		Recall,	how	some	of	my	respondents	described	piety	in	terms	that	emphasized	its	ubiquity	–	‘everyday’,	‘everywhere’,	‘everything’,	‘always’	in	the	previous	chapter.		The	ways	in	which	the	divine	and	the	quotidian	are	imbricated	(Alexander,	2006,	p.	293)	in	their	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	presents	an	opportunity	to	interrogate	and	explicate	a	robust	and	historicized	understanding	of	the	spatiality	of	piety	that	is	at	once	entangled	with	the	spatiality	of	the	nation-state	but	not	contained	by	it.			The	Pakistani	state’s	multifaceted	attempts	to	establish	a	basis	of	unity	for	the	diverse	population	of	Pakistan	implicate	gender	in	constructions	of	a	monolithic	Islamic	identity.		These	constructions	privilege	and	secure	the	Sunni51	Muslim	male	as	the	
																																																								51	Sunni	refers	to	those	Muslims	who	believe	that	Abu	Bakr,	the	Prophet	Mohammed’s	father-in-law	succeeded	the	Prophet	after	his	death	as	the	first	Caliph.		The	majority	of	Pakistanis	identify	as	Sunni.		Minority	non-Muslim	religious	populations	such	as	Hindu	and	Christian	are	categorically	marginalized	or	demonized	in	nationalist	discourse.		Other	Islamic	identities	such	as	Shia,	Ismaili,	and	Ahmadi	do	not	enjoy	the	same	normative	status	as	Sunnis.		According	to	the1998	Pakistan	census,	Ahmadis	comprise	2.2%	of	the	population.		Shias,	including	Ismaili,	form	a	significant	minority.		Interestingly,	the	1998	census	does	not	report	population	statistics	broken	down	by	Shias	and	Sunnis,	collapsing	them	under	the	category	“Muslim”	(“Population	by	Religion,”	1998).		Many	of	these	minority	communities	face	violent	forms	of	marginalization,	which	are	at	times	sanctioned	by	the	state.		See,	for	example,	the	legislative	history	of	categorizing	Ahmadis	as	non-Muslims	(Jalal,	2000;	Toor,	2011c).		Also	see	the	state’s	inaction	in	face	of	targeted	attacks	against	the	Shia	Hazara	community	in	Balochistan	(“I	am	Hazara,”	2012).		In	addition,	the	Council	of	Islamic	Ideology	in	the	Pakistani	government	draws	exclusively	on	Sunni	Islamic	thought.		Also	see	the	explicit	privileging	of	Sunni	Islam	in	the	national	curriculum	(Ali,	2008).	
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normative	citizen-subject	of	Pakistan	through	religio-nationalist	discursive	and	legislative	tactics.		Arguably,	the	contours	of	this	normative	citizen-subject	were	most	acutely	sharpened	during	Zia-ul-Haq’s	military	dictatorship	that	ruled	Pakistan	for	eleven	years	under	martial	law	from	1977-1988.		The	Zia-ul-Haq	regime’s	Islamization	program,	Nizam-
i-Mustafa	(governance	of	the	Prophet),	promulgated	a	multi-sited	“Sunnification”	(Toor,	2011c,	p.	160)	of	Islam	in	Pakistan	through	introducing	new	legislation,	altering	juridical	structures,	and	conducting	media	and	grassroots	campaigns	to	strengthen	and	spread	this	version	of	Sunni	Islam	(Toor,	2011c).		This	Islamization	program	was	produced	through	the	Zia	regime’s	close	ties	with	the	Jamaat-e-Islami,	drawing	on	the	teachings	of	Maulana	Maududi	(Jalal,	1995b;	Toor,	2011c).		These	programs	were	particularly	detrimental	to	women	and	sexual	and	religious	minorities	because	of	legal	mechanisms,	such	as	the	Hudood	Ordinances	and	the	Blasphemy	Law,	that	aimed	to	regulate	women’s	bodies	and	silence	or	eliminate	religious	pluralism	in	Pakistan.			Many	women’s	organizations,	and	particularly	those	that	came	together	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Women’s	Action	Forum	(WAF)	in	1981,	fashioned	a	form	of	‘Islamic	feminism’	that	employed	universal	human	rights	discourse	to	resist	these	religio-nationalist	developments	at	the	level	of	the	state.		The	WAF	mobilized	an	articulation	of	a	Muslim	feminist	subject	in	order	to	contest	the	Pakistani	state’s	construction	of	the	religio-nationalist	citizen-subject	and	to	recast	Islam	as	compatible	with	their	feminist	ideals.		Their	struggles	in	face	of	often	violent	and	drastic	state	measures	have	been	formative	for	academic	scholarship	that	analyze	the	relationships	between	Pakistani	women,	Islam,	and	
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the	state.52		Because	of	these	historical	political	imbrications	of	Islam	and	the	Pakistani	state,	this	scholarship	focuses	on	how	the	religio-nationalist	state	and	human	rights	discourse	mediate	the	relationship	between	Pakistani	women	and	Islam.		In	this	chapter,	I	elaborate	on	the	ways	in	which	the	Pakistani	state	articulates	and	mobilizes	the	relationship	between	women	and	Islam,	and	how	women’s	rights	organizations	formulate	their	resistance	to	these	articulations	through	universal	human	rights	discourse.		I	analyze	their	competing	mobilizations	of	the	gendered	Pakistani	citizen-subject	and	the	secularized	Muslim	feminist	subject	in	order	to	elucidate	the	epistemological	foreclosures	these	discourses	employ	and	reproduce.		I	argue	that	these	articulations	of	the	relationship	between	women	and	Islam	through	the	frameworks	of	the	nation-state	and	universal	human	rights	discourse	remain	limited	to	what	I	theorized	as	secular	epistemologies	in	the	previous	chapter.		That	is,	in	privileging	how	religion	is	rendered	through	the	secular	time-space	of	the	nation-state	or	of	universal	human	rights	in	reading	women’s	relationships	with	Islam,	the	sacred	is	amiss.		The	interplay	of	these	competing	narratives	produces	an	antagonistic	relationship	between	women’s	rights	organizations	and	women’s	piety	groups	such	as	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.		While	the	gendered	relationships	propagated	through	the	Islamic	discourse	of	the	women	I	interviewed	ostensibly	serve	the	interests	of	nationalist	constructions	of	the	gendered	citizen-subject,	the	ways	in	which	these	women	articulate	and	inhabit	their	
																																																								52	State	measures	against	these	women’s	organizations	included,	for	example,	police	forces	baton	charging	and	arresting	women	who	were	protesting	the	Zia-ul-Haq	regime’s	Islamization	program	(Toor,	2014).		Some	women’s	activists/advocates	have	also	been	individually	targeted	in	homicidal	attacks	(Toor,	2011c).		The	scholarship	analyzing	these	developments	includes	works	authored	by	women	associated	with	the	WAF	as	well	as	other	Pakistani	scholars.		See,	for	example,	Mumtaz	and	Shaeed	(1988),	N.	S.	Khan	(2004),	S.	Khan	(2006),	Rouse	(2004),	Toor	(2011a,	2011c,	2014),	Jamal	(2005,	2006),	and	Saigol	(2000).	
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understanding	of	pious	gender	roles	does	not	lend	itself	to	a	seamless	consolidation	of	the	Pakistani	nation-state	(see	chapter	four).		At	the	same	time,	these	women	do	not	mobilize	universal	human	rights	discourse	to	articulate	their	relationships	with	Islam,	which	are	in	many	ways	detractions	from	religio-nationalist	Islam.		I	explore	the	competing	narratives	of	relationships	between	women	and	Islam	in	Pakistani	religio-nationalist	and	women’s	rights	discourse	and	how	their	underpinning	discursive	structures	elide	and/or	obstruct	an	understanding	of	the	Islamic	praxis	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with.			
Heteropatriarhcal	Religio-Nationalism	To	some	extent,	the	deep	suspicions	of	women	who	participate	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	festering	amongst	women’s	rights	organizations	are	the	result	of	these	organization’s	struggles	against	the	ideological	power	of	the	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalist	state.		Heteropatriarchy	refers	to	the	“twin	processes	of	heterosexualization	and	patriarchy”	that	structure	the	state’s	regulation	of	women’s	bodies	and	sexualities	(Alexander,	1997,	p.	65).		This	process	“privileges	men’s	experiences,	definitions,	and	perceptions	of	sexuality”	and	renders	expressions	of	heterosexual	women’s,	lesbian,	and	transgender	sexual	desires	as	hypersexual	or	deviant	(Kempadoo,	2004,	p.	9).		I	use	the	term	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalism	with	reference	to	the	Pakistani	state	in	order	to	foreground	the	scripts	of	subject	formation	produced	through	interconnected	structures	of	heteronormativity,	patriarchy,	and	religion-based	nationalism	that	privilege	the	heterosexual,	Sunni	Muslim	male	as	the	normative	citizen-subject.			The	Hudood	Ordinances	and	the	Pakistani	state’s	discursive	construction	of	the	normative	citizen-subject	exemplify	how	the	Pakistani	state	constructs	and	mobilizes	the	
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relationship	between	women	and	Islam	as	part	of	its	heteropatriarchal	nationalist	project.		The	dubious	interstices	of	religion	and	state-led	moral	regulation	of	women	in	Pakistan	have	been	explored	at	length	in	feminist	scholarship	on	the	Hudood	Ordinances	that	explicitly	regulated	women’s	bodies,	sexuality,	and	mobility	through	juridical	structures.		To	briefly	provide	some	context,	the	Hudood	Ordinances	were	a	set	of	‘Islamic’	laws	promulgated	in	1979	during	the	rule	of	Zia-ul-Haq’s	military	dictatorship.		They	aimed	to	define	the	role	of	women	in	Islamic	society	through	the	tenets	of	chadar	aur	chardiwari	(veil	and	four	walls)	as	part	of	the	Zia-ul-Haq	regime’s	plans	to	implement	Nizam-i-Mustafa.		That	is,	envisioning	a	nation	where	the	ideal	Muslim	woman	would	be	veiled	and	would	be	confined	within	the	four	walls	of	the	home,	the	Zia-ul-Haq	regime	sought	to	produce	this	woman	and	penalize	those	who	did	not	adhere	to	this	ideal	through	a	number	of	laws	and	modes	of	enforcement.		These	laws	included	the	Zina	Ordinance,	which	explicitly	sought	to	regulate	sexual	activity	by	defining	the	parameters	of	“legal”	sex	acts.		This	included	defining	rape,	pre-marital	sex,	and	extra-marital	sex	as	“illicit	sex”	and	making	them	crimes	against	the	state.		More	significantly,	the	Zina	Ordinance	opened	up	a	serious	legal	quagmire	through	its	law	of	evidence	where	the	testimony	of	four	male	Muslim	witnesses	was	required	to	bring	forward	accusations	of	rape.		In	practice	what	this	meant	was	that	women	who	reported	incidents	of	rape	and	could	not	meet	the	said	witness	requirements,	which	were	impossible	to	meet	in	any	case,	would	in	turn	be	incarcerated	and	punished	for	engaging	in	pre	or	extra-marital	sex	(S.	Khan,	2006;	Toor,	2011b).			In	her	ethnographic	account	of	women	incarcerated	under	the	Zina	Ordinances,	Shahnaz	Khan	(2006)	suggests	that	these	laws	have	had	an	uneven	impact	on	Pakistanis	based	on	class	and	gender.		While	women	have	borne	the	brunt	of	the	impact	of	the	Zina	
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Ordinance,	she	argues	that	impoverished	and	illiterate	women	have	been	more	vulnerable	and	faced	harsher	penalties.		This	is	in	part	due	to	a	lack	of	basic	literacy	skills	and	access	to	financial	and	socio-political	resources	required	to	navigate	the	legal	system.		As	Khan	(2006)	further	suggests,	neoliberal	economic	hardships	generated	in	Pakistan	through	structural	adjustment	programs	have	been	a	key	factor	in	the	rise	of	violence	against	women.		As	such,	these	repercussions	of	the	Hudood	Ordinances	cannot	be	equated	with	the	problems	of	Islam,	so	to	speak,	rather	they	must	be	understood	within	a	broader	context	of	neoliberalization	and	development.		While	impoverished	communities	experienced	these	laws	in	more	acute	and	detrimental	ways,	literate	middle	and	upper	class	women	were	not	immune	to	the	imposition	of	these	laws.		As	Toor	(2014)	explains	“ideas/discourses/projects	of	‘respectability’	specifically	or	‘propriety’	in	general,	mediate	the	social	production	of	class	and	gender”	(p.	130).		Matters	of	property	and	class	and/or	caste	status	underpin	some	of	the	most	infamous	examples	of	the	regulation	of	middle	and	upper	class	women’s	sexuality	through	the	Hudood	Ordinances	(Toor,	2011c).53	It	is	important	to	note,	as	Shahnaz	Rouse	(2004)	argues,	that	these	legislative	tactics	were	not	an	aberration	resulting	solely	from	the	historical	trajectory	of	Pakistani	politics.		Rather,	she	suggests	that	“the	process	that	culminated	in	the	changes	brought	about	by	Zia-ul-Haq’s	regime	can	only	be	understood	if	their	antecedents	are	traced	back	to	early	post-
																																																								53	See	Toor’s	discussion	on	the	cases	of	Veena	Hayat,	Samia	Sarwar,	and	Saima	Waheed.		Caste	hierarchies	tend	to	be	obfuscated	in	nationalist	discourses	and	academic	analysis	of	Pakistan.		This	is	in	part	symptomatic	of	nationalist	investments	in	distancing	from	Hindu/India.	Although	caste	is	an	operative	category	for	many	communities,	there	is	little	by	way	of	academic	analysis	of	caste	in	nationalist	or	human	rights	discourse.		Caste	not	only	continues	to	be	covered	over,	but	the	analytical	tools	for	conducting	an	analysis	of	caste	are	few	and	far	between.		When	I	asked	women	I	interviewed	about	caste	in	Pakistan	or	about	how	they	understood	caste,	the	conversation	was	invariably	diverted	to	India,	Hinduism	or	the	early	days	of	independence	–	suggesting	that	in	the	contemporary	moment	caste	was	not	a	factor	for	Pakistani	Muslims.		For	a	critical	analysis	of	caste	dynamics	in	Pakistan	see	Caste	in	Pakistan:	The	Elephant	in	the	Room	by	Shahbano	Aliani	(2006).			
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independence	tendencies”	(Rouse,	2004,	p.	93).		Pointing	to	the	example	of	Ayub	Khan’s	1961	Family	Laws	Ordinance,	Rouse	argues	that	state	encroachment	into	the	private	realm	was	occurring	through	legal	mechanisms	prior	to	the	Zia-ul-Haq	dictatorship.		She	further	suggests	that	colonial	rule	had	a	transformative	impact	on	norms	of	gender	and	sexuality	through	legal,	family,	market	and	educational	institutions	that	“served	to	maintain	and	reinforce	the	privilege	of	men	over	women”	and	that	continue	to	influence	Pakistani	state	institutions	to	date	(Rouse,	2004,	p.	7).		Toor	(2011a)	also	argues	for	the	importance	of	understanding	“colonial	antecedents”	to	the	law	in	postcolonial	states	like	Pakistan,	where	the	law	is	embedded	in	colonial	histories	of	codifying	and	managing	the	Indian	population	(para.	35).54		The	imbrications	of	religion,	law,	and	the	regulation	of	women	are	thus	not	an	example	of	“Islamic	exceptionalism”	–	what	Toor	(2011a)	defines	as	a	contemporary	form	of	Orientalism	that	obscures	an	understanding	of	the	interconnected	ways	in	which	patriarchy	operates	between	and	across	different	sites,	reducing	it	to	an	exceptional	problem	of	Islam	(para.	45).		Furthermore,	the	continuity	of	imperial	relations	of	power	in	post-independence	geo-politics,	such	as	Pakistan’s	pivotal	role	in	the	Cold	War	as	an	ally	of	the	United	States	of	America,	is	a	key	factor	in	the	development	of	the	actions	of	the	Zia-ul-Haq	regime	(Toor,	2011c).		The	Hudood	Ordinances	must	thus	be	read	contextually	within	transnational	historical	continuums	of	gendered	discrimination	and	as	articulated	within	the	context	of	imperial	geo-politics	and	not	as	an	example	of	Islamic	exceptionalism.			The	broader	nationalist	imaginary	underpinning	the	promulgation	of	the	Hudood	Ordinances	implicates	processes	of	constructing	and	producing	a	normative	citizen-subject	
																																																								54	More	specifically,	Toor	(2011a)	refers	to	how	colonial	“Family	Laws”	in	India	formulated	the	family	in	terms	of	religion	–	Muslim	Family	Laws,	Hindu	Family	Laws,	Christian	Family	Laws	(para.	35).			
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as	a	means	to	manage	difference	in	a	nation-state	where	the	fragile	basis	of	unity	is	persistently	questioned	and	threatened	through	the	varied	allegiances	of	racialized	and	marginalized	populations	(Rouse,	2004).		In	the	dominant	discourse	perpetuated	by	the	Pakistani	state	apparatuses,	Islam	functions	as	a	vehicle	for	facilitating	identification	with	and	legitimization	of	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalism	and	its	corresponding	production	of	citizen-subjects.		The	codification	of	religion	that	is	borne	out	of	dominant	nationalist	imaginaries	is	particularly	significant	because	it	incorporates	practices	of	piety	into	notions	of	ideal,	post-colonial	citizen-subjects,	which	are	invariably	gendered.		That	is	to	say,	the	coalescing	of	gender,	nationalism	and	religion	brings	practices	of	piety	into	the	purview	of	nationalist	projects	as	a	site	of	regulation	and	subordination	of	women.		
Gender	and	Nation	Pakistani	religio-nationalist	iterations	of	the	relationship	between	gender	and	the	nation	reproduce	the	imperatives	of	secularism	in	the	modern	nation-state	discussed	in	chapter	two.		Although	the	explicit	intersections	of	religion	and	nationalism	in	the	case	of	Pakistan	have	led	to	marginalization	in	international	discourses	of	the	modern	nation-state,	the	ways	in	which	gendered	tropes	operate	in	articulations	of	Pakistani	religio-nationalism	reproduce	the	secular	temporality	of	the	nation-state.		This	is	particularly	evident	in	how	gender	is	mobilized	in	resolving	the	tension	between	authenticity	and	progress	in	the	nation-state.			Prominent	scholars	of	post/anti-colonial	nationalism	such	as	Lila	Abu-Lughod	(1998),	Partha	Chatterjee	(1993),	Deniz	Kandiyoti	(1991),	Anne	McClintock	(1993;	1995),	Radhika	Mohanram	(1999),	and	Nira	Yuval-Davis	(1997)	critique	nationalist	configurations	
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of	gender	roles	and	domestic	space	for	the	various	ways	in	which	the	temporal-spatial	construction	of	nationhood	is	gendered.		As	these	scholars	of	anti-colonial	nationalisms	have	shown,	gendered	significations	underpinning	nationalist	discourse	instrumentalize	filial	affectations	to	construct	non-filial	relations	as	familiar,	intelligible,	natural,	and	desirable.		In	this	way,	affiliation	with	the	nation	represents	both	a	continuity	and	a	break	from	the	family	in	the	sense	that	the	nation	is	simultaneously	constructed	as	an	extension	of	the	family	as	well	as	a	progression	away	from	the	centrality	of	the	family	in	informing	social	and	political	life.		McClintock	(1993)	argues	that	the	trope	of	the	‘family’	is	key	to	constructing	the	historical	“organic	continuity”	(p.	63)	of	the	nation	as	emerging	from	and	reflecting	the	family	while	capitalizing	on	its	putative	status	as	natural	and	universal	or,	as	she	puts	it,	“nations	are	symbolically	figured	as	domestic	genealogies”	(p.	65).		In	other	words,	the	trope	of	the	family	furnishes	nationalist	discourse	with	an	ontological	tenor.		This	is	especially	useful	for	managing	the	central	challenge	in	nationalism	of	mitigating	the	threat	posed	by	social	difference	to	nationalist	claims/promises	of	unity	and	belonging.		Refracted	through	the	trope	of	the	family,	hierarchies	based	on	social	difference	are	justified	and	legitimized	through	the	naturalization	of	familial	hierarchies	–	husband,	wife,	child	(Mcclintock,	1995).		Accordingly,	the	gendered	hierarchy	of	the	family	mobilized	in	Pakistani	religio-nationalist	discourse	serves	to	establish	differentiated	relationships	to	the	nation	for	those	rendered	as	subordinate	members	of	the	patriarchal	family	(wife,	children).			This	conceptualization	of	difference	is	also	instrumental	in	resolving	the	temporal	tension	in	nationalism	“between	nostalgia	for	the	past,	and	the	impatient,	progressive	sloughing	off	of	the	past”	where	women	represent	“the	living	archive	of	the	national	
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archaic”	and	evidence	of	authenticity	while	men	are	the	agents	of	progress	(McClintock	1993,	p.	67).		In	an	effort	to	resolve	this	tension,	nationalist	struggles	against	colonialism	were	also	“cultural	or	discursive	project[s]	in	which	ideals	of	womanhood	and	notions	of	the	modern	were	key	elements”	(Abu-Lughod,	1998,	p.	17).		Anti-colonial	discourses	of	Indian	nationalist	movements,	for	instance,	established	the	legitimacy	of	their	claims	to	sovereignty	by	simultaneously	asserting	similarity	with	British	colonizers	in	the	material	realm	and	difference	from	the	colonizers	in	the	cultural	or	spiritual	realm	(Chatterjee,	1993).		Chatterjee	(1993)	argues	that	the	discursive	techniques	of	Indian	anti-colonial	nationalist	movements	speaks	to	how	the	construction	of	such	an	oppositional	identity	–	involving	claims	of	authenticity	and	superiority	in	the	cultural	or	spiritual	realm	–	is	a	powerful	but	constructed	trope	that	implicates	women	as	markers	of	authenticity.	The	link	between	gender	and	nation	is	not	limited	to	symbolic	systems.		Women	are	also	implicated	in	biologically	and	culturally	reproducing	the	nation	(Yuval-Davis,	1997).		In	addition,	the	symbolic	currency	conferred	upon	women’s	bodies	is	inextricable	from	their	biological	and	cultural	reproductive	roles.		In	this	sense,	ideas	of	the	nation	are	produced	and	maintained	through	instrumentalizing	women’s	bodies	as	reproducers	of	citizens,	disseminators	and	repositories	of	culture,	and	symbols	of	national	identity	(Yuval-Davis,	1997).		The	social	control	of	women	thus	becomes	central	to	nationalist	projects	because	of	the	implications	for	biological	and	cultural	reproduction	of	the	nation-state	and	because	of	the	temporal	reconciliation	that	the	woman-as-symbol	affords.		The	Hudood	Ordinances	discussed	earlier	exemplify	how	these	gendered	mechanisms	of	social	control	are	entangled	in	Pakistani	religio-nationalist	claims	to	Islam	as	a	marker	of	a	distinct	and	authentic	national	identity.		This	control	of	women	in	turn	establishes	the	legitimacy	of	the	
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sovereign	nation	as	one	that	is	rooted	in	authenticity	and	is	at	the	same	time	invested	in	and	capable	of	modernity	–	time	is	thus	domesticated	(McClintock,	1993).			This	utilization	of	women	as	symbols	and	reproducers	of	the	nation	constructs	uneven	gendered	relationships	to	the	nation.		As	Radhika	Mohanram	(1999)	suggests,	women	“are”	the	nation	while	men	“have”	the	nation.		That	is,	“within	discourses	of	the	nation,	the	woman	as	agent	virtually	disappears	except	insofar	as	she	upholds	the	nation”	(Mohanram,	1999,	p.	58).		While	women	are	given	a	central	reproductive	role	in	the	nation,	they	are	located	as	a	“woman	within	the	nation”	(Mohanram,	1999,	p.	60)	and	within	the	family,	which	is	an	extension	of	the	postcolonial	state.		This	gendered	bifurcation	of	relationships	to	the	nation,	Mohanram	(1999)	argues,	stems	from	the	need	for	an	“idealized”	(p.	58)	body	in	nationalist	discourse	–	and	this	idealized	body	is	always	gendered.			The	symbolic	role	of	idealized	women’s	bodies	is	not	only	tied	to	anti-colonial	nationalist	distancing	from	the	colonial	West,	but	are	also	central	to	complicated	entanglements	with	the	West	(Abu-Lughod,	1998,	p.	18).		In	postcolonial	state-building	processes	women	are	not	only	used	as	markers	of	‘authenticity’	but	they	are	also	used	“to	symbolize	the	aspirations	of	secularist	elite”	(Kandiyoti,	1991,	p.	3)	for	progress.		Though	pulled	in	different	directions	at	different	moments	in	nationalist	processes,	the	idealized	woman’s	body	continues	to	serve	as	a	“potent	symbol”	(Abu-Lughod,	1998,	p.	4)	of	national	identity.		Thus,	whether	signifying	a	continuity	of	authenticity	or	a	departure	from	it	in	the	name	of	progress	and	modernity,	the	instrumentalization	of	women	as	signifiers	and	corresponding	forms	of	social	regulation	are	derived	from	the	discursive	naturalization	of	their	subordination	through	nationalist	discourse.		
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The	aforementioned	theoretical	discussion	is	central	to	my	argument	regarding	how	we	understand	women’s	practices	of	piety	in	the	context	of	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalist	discourse.		Women’s	everyday	practices	of	piety	in	Pakistan,	where	Islam	is	imagined	as	the	basis	of	unity	for	the	nation,	acquire	political	significance	in	terms	of	the	extent	to	which	they	affirm,	inhabit,	or	subvert	the	nationalist	imaginary	on	multiple	fronts	–	biological,	cultural,	symbolic.		The	importance	of	delineating	domestic	space	from	public	space;	women’s	roles	as	reproducers	of	the	nation;	and	the	symbolic	work	of	women’s	bodies	is	evident	in	the	gendered	ways	in	which	Pakistani	national	identity	is	conjured	and	sustained	as	an	Islamic	identity.		Toor	(2011a)	characterizes	the	ways	in	which	Islam	is	mobilized	in	relation	to	women	by	the	Pakistani	state	and	its	cognates	as	“patriarchal	opportunism”	where	Islam	becomes	a	readily	available	part	of	an	“ideological	toolbox”	used	to	subjugate	and	regulate	women	in	the	service	of	particular	classed,	state,	and/or	imperial	projects	(para.	22).		She	argues	that	“Islam	is	invoked	selectively”	and	that	“sometimes	the	rights	granted	to	women	under	Islamic	law	become	inconvenient	for	the	purposes	of	patriarchal	control”	(Toor,	2011a,	para.	22).		As	such,	collapsing	women’s	experiences	of	oppression	as	their	experience	with	Islam	misses	the	role	of	the	nation-state	and	its	selective	instrumentalization	of	Islam.		Furthermore,	Toor	(2011a)	suggests	that	these	mobilizations	are	not	only	varied	and	shifting	in	Pakistan,	but	they	are	also	entangled	with	imperial	projects	and	discourses	of	terrorism.		The	gendering	of	the	normative	Muslim	citizen-subject	of	Pakistan	is	thus	constituted	through	a	complex	discursive	field	that	mobilizes	Islam	selectively	and	purposefully.	
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Religio-Nationalist	Curricula:	Constructing	the	Citizen-Subject	Studies	of	the	Pakistani	state’s	mandated	nationalist	curricula	exemplify	how	the	aforementioned	constructions	of	women’s	roles	in	the	nation	centres	on	the	Sunni	Muslim	male	as	the	normative	citizen-subject	of	Pakistan	and	relegates	women	to	the	role	of	reproducing	the	nation	to	consolidate	a	singular	national	identity.		Mobilized	as	an	ideological	apparatus	of	nation-building,	the	Pakistan	Studies	curriculum	in	particular	is	carefully	developed	and	closely	guarded	by	the	state	and	has	been	stubbornly	resilient	in	face	of	criticisms,	contradicting	historical	evidence,	and	public	dissent	(Ali,	2008;	Aziz,	1998;	Jalal,	1995a;	Saigol,	1994,	2000).		This	is	in	part	because	the	Pakistani	state	has	worked	hard	to	cultivate	a	sense	of	nationalism	and	belonging	amongst	its	population	since	the	1947	partition	of	India	through	a	deliberate	process	of	nationalizing	the	past	and	perpetuating	the	idea	that	(Sunni)	Islam	was	the	basis	of	the	nation-state	(Ali	2008;	Pandey	2001;	Jalal,	1995).		The	extent	of	such	manipulations	of	history	led	Hamza	Alavi	(2002)	to	declare	“today	we	are	separated	from	our	past	by	half	a	century	of	lies”	(p.	5120).		Pakistan	Studies	was	made	a	mandatory	secondary	school	subject	in	1971	by	Zulfikar	Ali	Bhutto’s	government	in	face	of	the	fragmentation	of	the	nation-state	with	the	independence	of	Bangladesh.		While	the	content	of	Pakistan	Studies	has	shifted	in	line	with	the	interests	of	the	political	party	or	dictator	in	power,	the	emphasis	on	constructing	and	producing	a	basis	of	unity	and	an	ideal	citizen-subject	has	persisted	since	its	inception.		In	what	follows,	I	examine	parts	of	the	English	language	Pakistan	Studies	curriculum	as	an	articulation	of	state-led	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalism	in	order	to	elucidate	how	Islam	and	gender	come	to	be	entangled	in	the	nationalist	project.	
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Commonly	referred	to	as	‘Pak	Studies’	in	popular	parlance,	which	aptly	translates	to	‘pure	studies’,	the	Pakistan	Studies	program	is	notorious	for	its	revisionist	history	and	patriotic	propaganda	that	constructs	a	purified	nationalist	narrative	of	the	creation	of	Pakistan	that	sidelines	the	socio-political	circumstances	and	experiences	of	partition	by	centralizing	the	achievement	of	independence	for	Muslims.		The	“ideology	of	Pakistan”	in	various	Pak	Studies	texts,	for	instance,	is	represented	as	a	monolithic	spirit	that	has	been	around	for	centuries	and	fulfilled	its	destiny	in	the	independence	struggle	of	pious	leaders,	such	as	Quaid-i-Azam	(Mohammad	Ali	Jinnah)	and	Allama	Iqbal,	to	save	Indian	Muslims	from	socio-economic	distress	and	establish	Pakistan	in	1947	(“National,”	2006;	Saigol,	1994).		As	Ayesha	Jalal	(1995),	argues,	such	representations	of	the	founding	leaders	of	Pakistan	are	historically	inaccurate.		For	example,	she	explicates	the	contradictions	between	Jinnah’s	role	and	representations	of	him	in	the	making	and	remembering	of	partition.		Jalal	(1995)	argues	that	Jinnah	and	the	Muslim	League	were	not	interested	in	securing	a	territorially	defined	separate	Islamic	state,	rather,	their	assertion	of	the	“two-nation	theory”	imagined	the	co-existence	of	two	nations,	Hindustan	and	Pakistan,	within	India	where	both	nations	would	be	afforded	equal	status	and	representation	in	the	workings	of	the	government.		Jalal	and	others	argue	that	this	vision	of	Pakistan	was	invoked	in	order	to	protect	minority	rights	within	the	state	of	India,	not	to	demand	a	separate	Pakistani	state.		The	“aestheticizing	impulse”	(Pandey,	2001,	p.	4)		in	the	Pak	Studies	curriculum	leads	to	the	omission	of	this	contradiction	between	the	expressed	goals	of	the	Muslim	League	and	the	outcomes	of	1947.		Instead,	Pak	Studies	textbooks	shift	the	focus	away	from	the	political	negotiations	leading	up	to	1947	as	the	originary	moments	of	Pakistan	and	locate	the	origins	of	the	‘ideology	of	Pakistan’	in	the	ancient	past,	pre-existing	
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the	Muslim	League	(Jalal	1995).		The	leaders	of	the	Muslim	League	then	are	characterized	as	an	almost	prophetic	manifestation	of	the	historic	force	of	the	‘ideology	of	Pakistan’.	The	emphasis	on	‘ideology’	in	the	national	curriculum	is	evidence	of	prioritizing	the	need	to	depict	Muslim	unity	as	a	historic	feature	of	the	subcontinent	through	a	deliberate	mystification	and	mythologization	of	the	origins	of	‘Pakistan’,	which	would	otherwise	be	revealed	as	a	far	more	tenuous	and	fragile	foundation	for	the	nation-state.		Sugata	Bose	and	Ayesha	Jalal	(1997)	argue	against	official	nationalist	narratives	that	prefigure	an	all-India	Muslim	unity	prior	to	the	creation	of	Pakistan,	however,	they	also	argue	against	a	revisionist	history	that	narrates	the	social	identity	of	‘Indian	Muslims’	as	wholly	shaped	by	colonialism.		That	is	to	say,	the	partition	of	India	was	not	based	on	a	historically	unified	Muslim	community,	nor	was	it	solely	the	result	of	colonial	constructions	of	social	identities	(through,	for	example,	separate	electorates).		Ultimately,	for	Bose	and	Jalal,	the	partition	was	the	result	of	a	series	of	developments	at	the	political	centre	where	the	interests	of	the	Indian	National	Congress	(INC)	in	particular	prevailed	and	the	INC’s	actions	determined	the	outcome	of	1947.		Bose	and	Jalal’s	(1997)	thesis	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	nationalist	narratives	of	both	India	and	Pakistan:		In	India,	the	official	history	of	partition	represents	Jinnah	as	the	“destroyer	of	Bharatmata”	(p.	196)	and	in	Pakistan,	partition	is	remembered	as	the	realization	of	the	‘ideology	of	Pakistan’	through	an	ongoing	struggle	for	an	Islamic	state	led	by	Jinnah.		Neither	of	these	official	narratives	leaves	any	room	for	imagining	the	INC	as	the	primary	agent	behind	partition	and	Jinnah	its	main	opponent,	as	Bose	and	Jalal	contend.		Additional	evidence	of	the	wildly	inaccurate	national	history	in	Pakistan	Studies	textbooks	has	been	pointed	out	in	several	other	academic,	journalistic,	and	non-governmental	publications	as	well	(Aziz,	1998;	Jalal,	1995;	Saigol,	2014,	1994).		
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Pakistan	Studies	textbooks	are	thus	rife	with	blatant	efforts	to	consolidate	and	homogenize	national	identity	and	build	a	sense	of	civic	duty	and	patriotism	often	articulated	as	synonymous	with	Sunni	Islam	and	antithetical	to	India	(read:	Hindu).			The	ideology	of	Pakistan	is	further	strengthened	by	invoking	scripture	to	establish	the	basis	of	national	unity.		The	mobilization	of	Quranic	verses	to	establish	the	principle	of	fraternity	in	Pakistan	Studies	textbooks	is	indicative	of	how	the	Pakistani	state	attempts	to	trump	other	allegiances	by	calling	on	all	Muslim	men	to	identify	as	Muslim	brothers.		The	effacement	of	difference	and	the	construction	of	national	unity	in	nationalist	educational	materials	occurs	through	an	appeal	to	a	Muslim	“brotherhood”	or	“fraternity”.		As	an	English-language	Pakistan	Studies	textbook	published	in	2004	states:	In	the	words	of	the	Holy	Qur’an	‘All	the	believers	are	brothers	to	each	other’.		The	principle	of	fraternity	is	an	important	aspect	of	Islamic	Society.		As	brothers,	they	share	the	problems	of	each	other,	and	their	happiness	also.		The	feelings	of	brotherhood	promote	affection,	mutual	cooperation,	selfless	service	and	sacrifice.		In	this	way,	the	society	becomes	peaceful	and	a	place	of	comfort	for	all.	(Pakistan	
Studies,	2004,	p.	9)		The	above	quotation	illustrates	how	anxieties	about	the	fragmentation	of	the	nation	are	managed	by	invoking	a	particular	translation	and	interpretation	of	Quranic	scripture	to	appeal	to	the	commonality	of	being	Muslim	men.		Indeed,	the	textbook	is	largely	addressed	to	a	male	Muslim	audience	with	incessant	references	to	the	need	to	unite	and	behave	like	brothers.		Furthermore,	the	notion	that	to	be	part	of	an	‘Islamic	society’	requires	one	to	identify	with	the	fraternity	implies	that	those	who	do	not	accord	primacy	to	their	Muslim	identity	over	other	forms	of	identification	cannot	be	in	an	Islamic	society,	and,	by	extension,	the	nation.		As	this	excerpt	illustrates,	articulations	of	nationalist	identity	in	the	state	curriculum	mobilize	gender	in	strategic	ways	as	a	pivotal	site	for	establishing	a	basis	of	unity,	which	is	tied	to	the	denial	of	the	multiplicity	of	nations	and	identities	within	
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Pakistan’s	geographic	borders	as	well	as	a	denial	of	how	some	of	these	identities	are	not	contained	by	national	boundaries	(Jalal,	1995a;	Saigol,	2000).	Women	and	religious	and	ethnic	minorities	appear	to	be	excluded	as	stakeholders	in	the	nationalist	project,	however,	they	are	made	to	enter	the	nationalist	narrative	in	strategic	and	instrumental	ways.		As	Rouse	(2004)	suggests,	this	construction	of	national	identity	centred	on	the	Sunni	Muslim	male	also	constructs	the	idealized	woman	who	complies	with	these	gender	roles	and,	by	extension,	constructs	those	who	do	not	as	“woman	as	other”	(p.	101)	and	as	a	threat	to	the	nation.		In	a	section	of	the	textbook	that	describes	the	central	tenets	of	Pakistani	national	culture,	the	status	of	men	and	women	is	articulated	as	follows:	Male	member	has	occupied	a	unique	status	in	Pakistani	culture.		He	is	the	head	of	the	family.		He	is	the	dominant	member.		But	a	woman	is	also	considered	an	important	part	of	the	family	who	governs	and	manages	all	family	affairs	within	the	four	walls.		Household	keeping	and	upbringing	of	children	is	entrusted	to	her	in	a	family.			She	has	the	right	to	education,	right	to	property	and	right	to	business	in	accordance	with	the	principles	of	Islam.		The	rights	and	duties	of	men	and	women	are	determined	in	light	of	the	teachings	of	Islam.		These	principles	are	equally	followed	in	all	the	four	provinces	of	Pakistan	and,	hence,	form	common	cultural	heritage	of	Pakistan.	(Pakistan	Studies,	2004,	p.	134)		What	is	striking	about	this	passage	is	the	sweeping	proclamation	that	these	principles	are	equally	followed	in	all	the	four	provinces	of	Pakistan.		That	is,	the	imagined	prevalence	of	a	monolithically	conceived	patriarchal	household	is	presented	as	a	testament	to	the	existence	of	a	united	national	Islamic	culture.		That	these	gender	roles	are	claimed	to	be	“in	accordance	with	the	principles	of	Islam”	further	reiterates	the	Pakistani	state’s	investment	in	instrumentalizing	Islam	to	invent	a	uniting	national	identity.		The	reference	to	the	four	provinces	especially	acquires	particular	significance	in	a	context	where	ethnic	and	linguistic	differences	are	organized	around	provincial	borders.		Significantly,	the	Federally	
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Administered	Tribal	Areas,	Gilgit-Baltistan,	and	the	disputed	territories	of	Azad	Jammu	and	Kashmir	are	absent	altogether	from	this	iteration	of	the	nation.		Much	is	at	stake	in	the	codification	of	patriarchal	gender	roles	for	the	construction	and	maintenance	of	a	uniting	national	culture.		Patriarchy	is	thus	mobilized	in	the	national	curriculum	as	a	panacea	for	the	palpable	insecurities	about	the	potential	fragmentation	of	the	nation.		This	albeit	fragile	codification	of	a	uniting	national	identity	in	androcentric	terms	works	in	tandem	with	the	relegation	of	women	to	the	private	sphere	and	to	domestic	labour.	The	centrality	of	the	male	Sunni	Muslim	in	nationalist	conceptualizations	of	the	pious	Pakistani	citizen-subject	is	further	solidified	through	state	discourses	that	claim	the	Prophet	as	a	male	role	model	for	Muslim	men	to	emulate.		When	it	comes	to	models	of	piety	for	women	in	the	nation,	Pakistani	state	figures	put	forward	female	Islamic	figures	such	as	Khadija,	Ayesha55	and	Fatima.		The	notable	emphasis	in	public	and	National	Assembly	speeches	by	Pakistani	state	actors	on	the	Prophet	Mohammed’s	daughter,	Fatima,	as	a	role	model	for	women	speaks	to	how	the	state	imagines	the	role	of	women	in	the	nation.		Fatima	serves	as	a	perfect	role	model	because	she	was	not	only	the	daughter	of	the	Prophet,	but	also	the	wife	of	the	Prophet’s	closest	living	male	relative	and	a	major	Islamic	figure,	Ali;	the	mother	of	the	two	prominent	Islamic	figures,	Hassan	and	Hussain;	and	a	legendary	caretaker	of	soldiers	on	the	battlefield.		Fatima	is	also	characterized	as	living	her	life	with	“simplicity,	patience,	tolerance,	nobility,	and	piety”,	as	noted	in	a	speech	by	Prime	Minister	Nawaz	Sherif	(“Nawaz,”	1991).		During	her	time	as	Prime	Minister,	Benazir	Bhutto	
																																																								55	Khadija	was	Prophet	Mohammed’s	first	wife	who	was	a	prominent	merchant	and	a	number	of	years	older	than	the	Prophet.		She	is	believed	to	be	the	first	convert	to	Islam.		Ayesha	was	Prophet’s	second	or	third	wife	(the	order	is	disputed)	who	he	married	when	he	was	53	and	she	was	six	or	seven	years	old.		She	is	said	to	be	a	key	force	in	the	spread	of	Islam	and	in	the	recording	of	the	hadith.	
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also	made	similar	remarks	about	Fatima,	stating	that	“she	had	complete	faith	in	Allah	Almighty,	patiently	faced	the	hardships	of	life	and	brought	up	her	children	in	an	ideal	manner”	(“Muslim,”	1993).		Such	proclamations	about	the	significance	of	Fatima	emphasize	her	reproductive	role	within	the	family	and	call	on	Pakistani	Muslim	women	to	fulfill	multiple	domestic	roles	in	this	manner.			In	addition	to	the	significance	of	Fatima’s	personal	qualities	and	reproductive	labour,	the	invocation	of	Fatima	also	places	the	burden	of	consolidating	the	Pakistani	nation-state	on	women’s	shoulders.		This	placement	exemplifies	the	imperatives	of	the	nation-state	to	strategically	mobilize	women	in	relation	to	symbolic,	cultural,	and	biological	reproduction.		As	the	wife	of	Ali	–	whose	followers	believed	in	his	right	to	succeed	the	Prophet	and	later	came	to	be	known	as	Shias	–	Fatima	symbolizes	the	common	ground	for	overcoming	sectarianism	between	Shia	and	Sunni	Muslims	in	Pakistan.		Fatima’s	reproductive	labour	is	caught	up	in	fantasies	of	an	idyllic	time	prior	to	the	death	of	the	Prophet	Mohammed	and	before	the	birth	of	a	major	rift	in	Islamic	history.		The	figure	of	Fatima,	thus	simultaneously	serves	as	an	exemplar	of	domesticity	and	a	symbol	of	national	unity,	which	on	the	surface	appears	to	temper	the	normativity	of	Sunni	Islam	in	Pakistan.	As	Saigol	(2000)	argues,	such	gendering	of	national	identity	has	implications	for	the	way	citizenship	is	differentiated	for	men	and	women:	“Male	identity	comes	to	be	constructed	in	terms	of	his	rights	as	an	individual	citizen	of	the	state,	while	female	identity	is	predicated	upon	her	duties	to	the	nation/state	as	a	mother”	(p.	132).		As	the	role	model	of	Fatima	illustrates,	the	ideal	Pakistani	woman’s	place	in	the	nationalist	imaginary	is	tied	to	her	role	and	duties	as	a	daughter,	wife,	and	mother.		The	Pakistani	state	is	thus	invested	in	gendering	citizenship	in	terms	of	“his	rights”	and	“her	duties”	(Saigol,	2000,	p.	129).		
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Even	in	instances	where	the	Pakistani	state	extends	certain	rights	to	women	–	such	as	the	right	to	education	and	the	right	to	vote	–	they	are	construed	as	part	of	women’s	reproductive	duties	that	serve	to	consolidate	the	nation-state	and	protect	it	from	divisive	forces	(Jalal,	1991;	Rouse,	2004).		For	many	women	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	this	is	an	insufficient	and	androcentric	articulation	of	the	role	of	women	in	Islam	that	sidesteps	Islamic	duties	ordained	for	men	and	the	Islamic	rights	given	to	women.		Religio-nationalist	instantiations	of	heteropatriarchy	through	the	Quran,	and	the	expressions	of	Islam	therefrom,	find	little	resonance	in	the	way	my	respondents	conceptualize	domestic	relationships	(see	chapter	four).				
Formulating	Resistance:	‘Islamic	feminism’	The	Pakistani	state’s	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalism,	and	especially	the	Hudood	Ordinances,	have	elicited	strong	reactions	from	Pakistani	women’s	rights	organizations	as	well	as	international	human	rights	organizations	(such	as	Amnesty	International,	Human	Rights	Watch,	United	Nations,	Women	Living	Under	Muslim	Laws).		The	way	these	organizations	articulate	and	rearticulate	relationships	between	women	and	Islam	centres	on	resisting	the	religio-nationalist	state	by	mobilizing	universal	human	rights	discourse.		Many	prominent	women’s	rights	groups	in	Pakistan	articulate	their	resistance	to	the	Pakistani	state’s	instrumentalization	of	Islam	through	a	form	of	‘Islamic	feminism’.		The	main	project	of	some	women’s	rights	organizations	is	to	reformulate	Islam	for	the	benefit	of	women	by	wrestling	Islam	away	from	the	Pakistani	state	and	into	their	conceptualization	of	universal	human	rights.		Drawing	on	liberal,	secular,	universal	rights-based	feminist	discourse,	these	groups	strategically	challenged	the	state	by	recasting	
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‘Islam’	as	an	inherently	egalitarian	religion	through,	for	example,	progressive	interpretations	of	religious	texts.		However,	in	an	attempt	to	liberate	‘Islam’	from	the	grips	of	the	Pakistani	state,	this	‘women’s	movement’	in	effect	reproduced	the	discursive	techniques	of	the	state	by	promoting	an	alternative	but	still	essentialized	version	of	‘Islam’.		That	is	to	say,	while	the	Pakistani	state	represented	‘Islam’	as	inherently	patriarchal,	the	‘women’s	movement’	represented	it	as	inherently	egalitarian.	Many	women’s	organizations	mobilized	Islam	as	a	tool	of	universal	rights	discourse,	seeing	this	as	the	most	expedient	and	optimal	way	for	improving	the	status	of	women	in	Pakistan	(Jamal,	2005b;	Mumtaz	&	Shaheed,	1988).		For	example,	some	of	these	groups	strategically	challenged	the	Pakistani	state	by	recasting	‘Islam’	as	an	inherently	egalitarian	religion	through	what	they	claim	to	be	progressive	interpretations	of	religious	texts.		Organizations	such	as	Shirkat	Gah,	Women	Living	Under	Muslim	Laws,	and	Aurat	Foundation	that	are	invested	in	the	political	project	of	universal	rights-based	(Western)	feminism,	are	engaged	in	such	reformist	projects,	fashioning	themselves	as	‘Islamic	feminists’.		This	approach	has	seen	some	success	in	resisting	religio-nationalist	state	projects	but	it	ultimately	consolidates	potent	categories	of	difference	within	feminist	praxis	that	secure	and	privilege	the	secular	subject	of	modernity	(Jamal,	2005a).		The	epistemological	frameworks	that	structure	such	an	approach	to	feminist	praxis	preempt	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	feminism	because	they	construct	and	work	within	an	Islam-feminism	spectrum:	On	one	end,	‘Islam’	is	understood	within	the	parameters	of	secular	notions	of	religion	and	its	corresponding	binaries,	and,	on	the	other,	‘feminism’	is	essentialized	as	a	‘secular’	project	for	‘women’	to	acquire	‘agency’	in	the	face	of	‘patriarchy’.		The	emancipatory	potential	of	women	in	Islam	is	thus	evaluated	by	
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how	far,	if	at	all,	they	are	able	to	negotiate	their	way	away	from	‘Islam’	and	toward	‘feminism’.		In	what	follows,	I	examine	more	closely	how	these	categories	of	analysis	produce	analytical	frameworks	that	constrain	subjectivity	within	the	bounds	of	intelligibility	set	up	through	the	secular	feminist	subject	as	an	authorial	referent.		That	is,	I	analyze	how	‘Islamic	feminism’	is	implicated	in	processes	of	securing	the	normative	secular	subject	of	modernity.	A	brief	recounting	of	the	broader	debate	on	‘Islamic	feminism’	may	be	useful	here	to	illustrate	what	secular	epistemologies	look	like	and	how	they	operate	in	terms	of	producing	an	understanding	of	women’s	relationships	to	Islam.		I	argue	that	within	this	debate,	‘Islamic	feminism’	is	identified	and	homogenized	as	women	engaged	in	reclaiming	‘Islam’	for	women	primarily	through	gender-progressive	(re)interpretations	of	scripture.		Feminist	scholarship	assessing	the	possibilities	and	limitations	of	‘Islamic	feminism’	often	reduce	‘Islam’	to	scripture	and	understand	it	as	inescapably	patriarchal	and,	in	turn,	define	‘feminism’	as	a	secular	project	involving	‘women’	having	‘agency’	in	face	of	‘patriarchy’.		Located	somewhere	in	between	these	two	endpoints,	‘Islamic	feminism’	is	understood	as	either	an	oxymoron	or	a	compromised	feminism	that	is	the	best	that	can	be	hoped	for	in	Islamic	societies.		I	suggest	that	tracing	how	these	categories	of	analysis	are	mobilized	in	discussions	about	‘Islamic	feminism’	reveals	that	neither	of	these	interpretations	challenge	the	dominance	of	secular	epistemological	frameworks	that	construct	the	diametric	opposition	of	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’	and,	moreover,	reiterate	them	as	fixed	categories	of	analysis.			One	of	the	central	concerns	in	this	debate	is	the	possibility	of	Islamic	feminism	to	satisfactorily	resolve	the	issue	of	the	authority	given	to	men	over	women	in	the	Quran,	
126	
which	I	elaborate	on	at	length	in	chapter	four	in	relation	to	how	the	women	I	interviewed	understand	and	inhabit	the	Quranic	concept	of	qawwam.		Here,	I	provide	some	examples	of	how	Quranic	injunctions	that	ostensibly	affirm	male	authority	have	been	subjected	to	
ijtihad56	by	Islamic	feminists,	such	as	Asma	Barlas	(2009),	Riffat	Hassan	(1996;	2001),	Fatima	Mernissi	(1991),	and	Amina	Wadud	(2006),	who	are	interested	in	developing	“liberation	theology”,	“feminist	theology”	or	“gender	progressive”	interpretations	of	the	Quran.		For	these	Islamic	feminists,	gendered	hierarchies	justified	through	Islam	are	the	result	of	male	monopolization	of	interpretive	practices	of	Islamic	texts.		Thus,	displacement	of	androcentric	interpretations	and	reclamation	of	“egalitarian”	aspects	of	the	Quran	through	gender	inclusive	ijtihad	by	women	are	key	processes	in	their	reformist	projects.		The	women	I	met	categorically	disagreed	with	such	contemporary	practices	of	ijtihad	and	instead	fashioned	themselves	as	literalists.	It	is	important	to	note	that	while	the	aforementioned	‘Islamic	feminists’	employ	similar	approaches,	their	engagements	are	grounded	in	specific	political	projects	and	social	contexts.		I	focus	here	on	how	they	grapple	with	the	pervasiveness	of	androcentric	interpretations	of	Islamic	texts	as	what	they	perceive	to	be	a	primary	source	of	Muslim	women’s	oppression	in	order	to	tease	out	aspects	of	their	practices	that	are	homogenized	and	decontextualized	in	academic	debates.		These	scholars	first	turn	to	the	Quran	to	establish	women’s	authority	and	duty	to	engage	in	ijtihad.		Amina	Wadud	(2006),	for	example,	conceptualizes	this	“struggle	to	establish	gender	justice	in	Muslim	thought	and	
																																																								56	Ijtihad	is	an	Islamic	term	referring	to	independent	reasoning	or	original	interpretation	of	the	Quran.		In	some	strands	of	Islam	this	practice	is	reserved	for	those	deemed	to	be	authoritative	“Islamic	scholars”	and	is	only	available	to	them	for	selective	circumstances.		In	other	strands,	this	practice	is	available	to	everyone	and	can	be	used	to	adapt	Islam	to	any	social	environment.		Others,	such	as	the	women	I	conducted	research	with,	believe	this	practice	is	no	longer	required	and	that	the	gates	of	ijtihad	are	closed.	
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praxis”	as	“gender	jihad”	(p.	10).		Buttressed	by	her	explication	of	“egalitarian	principles”	in	Islamic	scripture,	she	not	only	establishes	gender	inclusive	readings	of	the	Quran	by	women	as	a	legitimate	practice,	but	she	also	establishes	it	as	an	Islamic	duty	enshrined	in	the	central	tenets	of	Islam	(Wadud,	2006,	p.	2).		In	endorsing	gender-inclusive	ijtihad	as	an	Islamic	practice	and	finding	legitimacy	for	it	in	Islamic	principles,	Wadud	highlights	the	built-in	mechanisms	for	challenging	dominant	interpretations	and,	by	extension,	male	superiority	in	Islam.		In	addition,	Wadud	diligently	points	out	faulty	translations	and	misinterpretations	of	key	words	and	phrases	in	the	Quran	that	would	drastically	change	the	implications	of	the	text	for	women.		For	instance,	she	refers	to	the	dominant	association	of	“Islam”	with	“submission”	and	suggests	that	the	correct	translation	is	“engaged	surrender”	(Wadud,	2006,	p.	23).		According	to	Wadud,	the	distinction	between	the	two	has	vast	implications	for	an	Islamic	conception	of	agency	because	“submission”	conveys	a	sense	of	coercion	while	“surrender”	connotes	voluntary	choice.		Thus,	she	argues	that	read	in	the	context	of	“male	interpretive	privilege”	(Wadud,	2006,	p.	22),	the	equation	of	Islam	with	submission	establishes	a	foundational	myth	that	implicitly	condones	coercion	and	subordination	in	social	relations	more	broadly	and	forms	the	basis	for	interpretations	that	uphold	the	subjugation	of	women.			Like	Wadud,	Riffat	Hassan	(2001)	locates	the	subordinated	status	of	women	in	(mis)interpretations	of	the	Quran	by	male	Islamic	scholars	–	interpretations	that	she	argues	become	particularly	insidious	as	they	acquire	the	status	of	“self-evident	truths”,	or	common	sense,	in	Muslim	societies	(p.	59).		For	her,	the	purpose	of	an	‘Islamic	feminism’	is	to	engage	in	theological	assessment	of	the	credibility	of	dominant	self-evident	truths	that	were	derived	from	the	Quran	and	mobilized	to	sanction	women’s	inferior	status.		Hassan’s	
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approach	to	ijtihad	is	to	read	the	oft-quoted	passages	of	the	Quran	that	ostensibly	create	a	gendered	hierarchy	against	the	broader	egalitarian	messages	of	the	Quran.		She	argues	that	because	Islam	“rejects	the	idea	of	there	being	any	intermediary	between	a	believer	and	God,”	(Hassan,	1995,	p.	33)	there	is	no	room	for	the	possibility	of	men	to	occupy	a	superior	status	that	would	mediate	women’s	relationship	to	Allah.		Asma	Barlas	(2009)	adds	the	question	of	interpretive	methods	to	trace	the	genealogy	of	conceptualizations	of	women’s	inferiority	in	Islam.		She	argues	that	conservative	readings	of	the	Quran	employ	textual	strategies	that	are	not	attentive	to	the	Quran	as	a	“complex	hermeneutic	totality”	or	as	“historically	situated”	(Barlas,	2009,	p.	8).		That	is,	as	Barlas	contends,	misreadings	of	the	Quran	emerge	out	of	techniques	that	take	up	the	Quran	as	a	linear	text	without	considering	its	intra-textual	connections	and	explications.		This	leads	to	isolating	verses	and	reading	them	outside	of	thematic	and	structural	context,	which,	in	turn,	results	in	a	cherry-picked	compilation	of	Quranic	verses	to	support	“patriarchal	exegesis”	(Barlas,	2009,	p.	9).		Coupled	with	the	lack	of	historical	context,	these	“conservative”	and	“patriarchal”	readings,	according	to	Barlas,	lack	rigor	and	elide	an	understanding	of	the	deeper	significance	of	Islamic	revelation.	In	her	canonical	works	on	women	and	Islam,	Fatima	Mernissi	(1987,	1991,	1996)	traces	what	she	perceives	as	the	subjugated	status	of	women	in	Islam	to	historical	moments	where	particular	gender	ideologies	influenced	Islamic	exegesis.		She	argues	that	the	universalization	of	this	interpretation	obscures	the	contingency	of	the	context	in	which	it	was	produced,	which,	in	turn,	speciously	presents	the	inferior	status	of	women	as	intrinsic	to	Islam.		Mernissi	(1991)	methodically	reviews	parts	of	the	hadith	related	to	women,	for	example,	to	contextualize	them	within	the	historical	moments	that	informed	
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their	authors’	lived	experiences	and,	through	this,	bring	their	infallibility	into	question.		Moreover,	for	Mernissi	(1996)	dominant	exegetical	practices	obfuscate	the	many	different	ways	in	which	Islam	is	liberatory	for	women	and	justify	women’s	subservience.		Pointing	to	examples	of	how	women’s	sexuality	is	expounded	in	the	Quran,	Mernissi	(1987)	argues	that	Islam	not	only	permits	a	robust	sexuality,	but	that	it	is	an	exceptional	vehicle	for	attaining	women’s	liberation	because	of	how	sexuality	is	conceptualized	in	the	Quran.		For	these	Islamic	feminists,	women’s	emancipation	and	empowerment	is	not	only	possible,	but	also	preferable	in	and	through	Islam.		This	form	of	‘Islamic	feminism’	appeals	to	many	women’s	rights	organizations	and	feminist	scholars	such	as	Margot	Badran	(Badran,	1999),	Fadwa	El	Guindi	(2005),	and	Afsaneh	Najmabadi	(2000)	because	of	its	compatibility	with	secular	feminist	goals.		For	instance,	Badran	(1999),	a	strong	proponent	of	‘Islamic	feminism’	as	the	only	vehicle	through	which	gender	equality	can	be	realized	in	the	Middle	East,	locates	Islamic	feminism	somewhere	“between	secular	feminism	and	masculinist	Islamism”	(p.	164).		Badran	thus	constructs	a	spectrum	that	enables	a	spatial	conceptualization	of	‘Islamic	feminism’,	whereby	it	is	(de)legitimized	through	its	distance	or	proximity	from	Islamic	fundamentalism	and	secular	feminism.		The	impetus	behind	Badran’s	endorsement	of	Islamic	feminism	is	her	belief	that	“the	majority	of	Muslims	can	associate	only	with	a	‘feminism’	that	is	explicitly	‘Islamic’”	(p.	164).		According	to	Badran	(1999),	even	though	it	is	a	classed	practice,	gender-inclusive	ijtihad	presents	a	new	opportunity	that	provides	an	entry	point	to	public	spaces	for	at	least	some	women	in	Islamic	societies.		Mernissi,	Barlas,	Hassan,	and	Wadud	thus	represent	exemplary	approaches	to	issues	such	as	men’s	authority	over	women	for	Badran	because	they	seek	to	
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negate	it	by	identifying	faulty	interpretive	techniques	and	propose	their	own	interpretations	of	Islamic	texts.			By	identifying	specific	elements	of	‘Islamic	feminism’	that	make	it	‘Islamic’	or	‘feminist’,	much	scholarship	on	‘Islamic	feminism’	functions	within	the	dichotomous	framework	of	an	Islam-feminism	spectrum.		Fadwa	El	Guindi	(2005),	for	example,	upholds	‘Islamic	feminism’	as	an	authentic	feminist	project	that	is	“feminist	because	it	seeks	to	liberate	womanhood”	and	“Islamic	because	its	premises	are	embedded	in	Islamic	principles	and	values”	(p.	71).		Though	El	Guindi	makes	an	important	contribution	in	arguing	for	the	recognition	of	the	cultural	“groundedness”	(p.	60)	of	all	feminisms,	she	still	has	a	universal	idea	of	the	eschatology	of	feminism.		This,	in	turn,	produces	a	normative	Muslim	feminist	subject.		That	is	to	say,	El	Guindi	attributes	relationality	to	the	means	of	achieving	feminist	goals,	but	does	not	allow	for	a	relational	understanding	of	how	these	goals	are	continually	constituted	and	reconstituted	through	different	historical	and	social	contexts	and	encounters.			For	Afsaneh	Najmabadi	(2000),	another	strong	proponent	of	‘Islamic	feminism’,	gender-inclusive	ijtihad	acquires	significance	as	a	‘feminist’	practice	because	it	claims	a	space	for	women	to	publicly	participate	in	ijtihad.		By	engaging	in	ijtihad,	women	would	be	able	to	contribute	to	“a	radical	decentering”	(Najmabadi,	2000,	p.	31)	of	male	clergy	from	the	domain	of	interpretation.		Though	Najmabadi’s	works	(2005,	2000,	2006)	make	a	significant	contribution	to	blurring	the	boundary	between	‘Islam’	and	‘secularism’,	a	dichotomy	between	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’	haunts	her	comments	on	ijtihad	in	that	her	affirmations	of	feminist	ijtihad	are	based	on	their	ability	to	dismantle	androcentricity	in	
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Islamic	praxis		(2000,	p.	31).		As	such,	women’s	reinterpretations	of	Islamic	doctrine	only	gain	‘feminist’	ground	insofar	as	they	challenge	male-centered	institutions.		Implicit	in	these	endorsements	is	the	idea	that	Islamic	feminism	is	not	quite	feminist	and	not	quite	fundamentalist	but	the	best	that	can	be	hoped	for	in	Islamic	societies.		For	those	who	argue	that	Islamic	feminism	is	the	only	viable	‘feminism’	for	Islamic	societies,	the	‘Muslim	woman'	figures	as	an	empowered	and	revolutionary	agent	who	not	only	presents	a	challenge	to	fundamentalist	subordination	of	women	but	also	withstands	Western	influence	in	her	struggle	because	she	is	protected	from	“westoxication”	(Abu-Lughod,	1998,	p.	14)	by	virtue	of	retaining	her	Muslim-ness.		Her	agency	is	thus	located	in	her	resistance	to	subordination	through	her	access	and	ability	to	navigate	and	negotiate	the	discursive	terrain	of	‘Islam’	through	culturally	sensitive,	gender-inclusive	interpretations	of	the	Quran	and	the	hadith.		The	appeal	of	this	figuring	of	the	‘Muslim	woman’	as	a	viable	agent	in	a	liberatory	project	is	thus	grounded	in	the	idea	that	her	resistance	to	subordination	is	an	authentic	and	local	response.		So,	for	instance,	because	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	women	do	not	engage	in	an	explicit	or	intelligible	program	of	challenging	patriarchy,	they	would	not	be	considered	agential	in	this	framing	of	feminism.	By	contrast,	in	their	respective	scholarship,	Haideh	Moghissi	(1999)	and	Shahrzad	Mojab	(2001)	express	little	hope	for	this	form	of	Islamic	feminism	in	terms	of	bringing	about	substantive	reforms	that	would	challenge	gender	inequality	in	Muslim	societies.		They	argue	that	reifications	of	Islamic	feminism,	like	the	ones	discussed	above,	are	a	capitulation	to	the	threat	of	being	accused	of	imposing	Western,	modernist	notions	on	non-Western	societies.		For	Moghissi	and	Mojab,	the	logic	of	these	reifications	is	problematically	caught	in	the	dichotomy	of	Islam	and	secularism	where	women	in	Islamic	societies	are	
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discursively	homogenized	and	essentialized	as	‘Islamic’,	which,	in	turn,	establishes	the	basis	for	endorsing	an	authentic	‘Islamic’	variation	of	feminism	for	these	women.		In	this	sense,	as	Moghissi	and	Mojab	argue,	proponents	of	Islamic	feminism	conceptualize	‘Islam’	as	an	over	determined	phenomenon	in	face	of	which	secular	feminists	must	concede	defeat.		Endorsements	of	‘Islamic	feminism’,	in	their	view,	are	the	result	of	a	compulsion	to	work	within	an	‘Islamic’	framework,	for	lack	of	any	other	viable	options.		Though	their	critiques	of	cultural	relativism	in	feminist	scholarship	are	an	important	intervention,	they	are	still	structured	by	a	dichotomy	between	‘Islam’	and	the	‘West’	whereby	feminisms	in	Islamic	contexts	are	only	legitimated	because	of	their	similarities	to	Western	feminism.		These	critiques	of	Islamic	feminism,	then,	recentralize	secular,	liberal,	rights-based	feminism	as	the	best	way	to	improve	the	status	of	women	and	oppose	patriarchal	social	relations.	Both	Moghissi	and	Mojab	see	Quranic	passages	that	affirm	male	authority	over	women	as	evidence	of	unequivocal	misogyny	in	Islam.		The	basis	for	Moghissi’s	(1999)	argument	against	‘Islamic’	feminism	and	for	‘secular’	feminism	is	her	belief	that	the	concepts	of	“equality”	(p.	142)	in	Islam,	particularly	shariah	law,	and	feminism	are	diametrically	opposed.		Referring	to	Islamic	doctrine,	Moghissi	argues	that	in	‘Islam’	equality	translates	to	equality	in	the	eyes	of	god	with	a	necessary	hierarchical	differentiation	in	prescribed	gender	roles.		While	Moghissi	(1999)	acknowledges	the	existence	of	a	variety	of	interpretations	of	the	Quran	and	the	hadith,	she	maintains	“…no	amount	of	twisting	and	bending	can	reconcile	the	Quranic	injunctions	and	instructions	about	women’s	rights	and	obligations	with	the	idea	of	gender	equality”	(p.	140).		She	contrasts	this	conception	of	‘Islam’	with	“feminism’s	core	idea”	(Moghissi,	1999,	p.	140)	where	men	and	women	are	biologically	different	but	equal	in	legal	and	social	status.		
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Similarly,	Mojab’s	(2001)	assertion	of	an	inherent	incompatibility	between	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’	is	based	on	historical	examples	of	the	institutionalization	of	misogynistic	‘Islamic’	practices	that	were	justified	by	‘Islamic’	law.		Because	of	what	they	perceive	as	incongruent	conceptions	of	‘equality’	in	‘Islam’	and	‘feminism’,	Moghissi	and	Mojab	argue	that	‘Islamic	feminism’	is	essentially	an	“oxymoron”	(Moghissi,	1999,	p.	142;	Mojab,	2001,	p.	131)	that	cannot	lead	to	gender	equality.		Contradictorily,	Moghissi	and	Mojab	respectively	argue	against	cultural	relativism	and	for	a	nuanced	approach	to	‘Islamic’	societies	while	they	point	to	Quranic	scriptures	to	argue	that	Islam	is	inherently	incompatible	with	gender	equality.		In	doing	so,	they	deploy	a	static	definition	of	Islam	and	
shariah	where	both	are	essentially	and	irreducibly	fixed	in	their	reading	of	scripture,	thereby	ignoring	the	contingent	ways	Islam	is	constituted	and	lived.		Furthermore,	their	analysis	is	structured	by	their	commitments	to	a	particular	conception	of	“gender	equality”	as	a	central	feminist	desire.	Such	articulations	of	‘Islamic	feminism’	employ,	to	put	it	in	Saadia	Toor’s	(2011a)	words,	“a	framework	which	begins	with	the	prior	assumption	that	something	called	‘Islam’	determines	the	status	of	women	and	sexual	minorities	in	‘the	Muslim	world’”,	which	is	“simply	not	intellectually	useful	and	is	in	fact	politically	dangerous”	(para.	2).		The	danger	of	this	framework	is	evident	in	the	reductive	understanding	of	women’s	experiences	of	oppression,	where	Islam	is	understood	to	be	the	central	source	of	women’s	oppression.		Toor’s	(2011b)	work	is	an	important	intervention	in	the	literature	on	the	relationship	between	gender	and	Islam	as	it	moves	away	from	conventional	frameworks	that	suggest	that	it	is	important	to	understand	the	construction	of	Islam	to	understand	how	gender	is	regulated	and,	instead,	suggests	that	it	is	important	to	understand	norms	of	gender	and	
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sexuality	to	understand	how	Islam	is	constructed	and	deployed	in	particular	instances.		The	implications	of	Toor’s	(2011b)	inversion	are	significant	in	terms	of	how	we	understand	the	gendered	politics	of	piety	emerging	out	of	women’s	participation	in	organizations	like	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.		For	one,	it	supports	a	shift	away	from	the	problematic	Islamic	exceptionalism	that	seeks	to	understand	the	moral	regulation	of	gender	and	sexuality	through	the	“singular	frame	of	Islam”	(Toor,	2011b,	p.	139)	–	a	pitfall	that	plagues	much	of	the	literature	on	gender	and	Islam	in	Pakistan.		It	also	opens	up	a	space	for	considering	multiple	and	intersecting	structures	of	privilege	that	constitute	a	particular	manifestation	of	patriarchal	power.			Clearly,	much	of	the	discussion	in	the	literature	on	Islamic	feminism	understands	the	struggles	of	Muslim	women	through	the	“singular	frame	of	Islam”.		In	particular,	questions	around	the	compatibility	between	‘Islam’	and	a	scripted,	secular,	rights-based	‘feminism’	frame	analyses	of	the	possibilities	and	limitations	of	‘Islamic	feminism’.		Despite	the	divergence	in	the	means	to	achieving	feminist	goals	between	the	advocates	and	critics	of	Islamic	feminism	discussed	above,	they	do	converge	on	the	goals	of	feminist	organizing:		That	is,	a	similar	feminist	“subject	of	freedom”	(Mahmood,	2005,	p.	1)	underwrites	their	relationships	to	Islam.		Both	these	conceptualizations	discursively	locate	‘Islamic	feminism’	on	a	spectrum	based	on	its	proximity/distance	from	secular	feminism,	which,	sets	up	secular	feminism	as	an	implicit	referent	and	its	telos	as	universally	desired.		As	Sara	Ahmed	(2000)	reminds	us,	the	universalization	of	feminist	ideals	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	one	has	“gotten	close	enough	to	the	truth	of	the	Other’s	(well)	being”	(p.	166).		Knowledge	claims	about	the	other	thus	not	only	include	who	the	other	is,	but	also	who	the	other	should	become,	whether	they	know	it	or	not.		These	prescriptive	claims	institute	processes	
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of	subject	formation	that	reflect	and	are	limited	to	the	secular	temporality	of	a	universalized	feminist	subject.		While	the	mobilization	of	universal	rights	discourse	in	the	struggle	for	women’s	rights	in	Pakistan	is	meant	to	counter	the	religio-nationalist	state,	it	produces	its	own	forms	of	governmentality	that	is	linked	to	the	workings	of	the	“empire-state”	(Mongia,	2012,	p.	199).		Mongia’s	formulation	of	the	empire-state	has	significant	implications	for	how	we	understand	discourses	of	universal	human	rights	because	it	brings	into	question	the	possibility	of	transcending	the	nation-state	by	appealing	to	mechanisms	of	international	governance.		Moreover,	it	brings	into	question	this	very	separation	between	the	nation-state	and	imperial	circuits	of	power.		Mongia	suggests	that	the	empire-state	enables	a	reformulation	of	spatio-temporal	analysis	that	moves	away	from	privileging	the	nation-state	as	a	contained	category	of	analysis	and	focuses	on	imperial	connectivities	and	colonial	formations,	which	contributes	to	“historiciz[ing]	the	transnational”	(p.	199).		Inderpal	Grewal	(2005)	suggests	that	universal	human	rights	discourse	is	imbricated	in	global	geo-politics	as	a	“regime	of	truth”	that	is	connected	to	vast	transnational	networks	of	knowledge	and	power.		By	producing	a	so-called	universal	morality	against	which	the	welfare	of	populations	all	over	the	world	can	be	measured,	“human	rights	regimes”	(Grewal,	2005,	p.	126)	serve	the	interests	of	imperialist	interventions	because	they	claim	to	have	a	universal	solution	to	injustice	and	inequality.		Grewal	(2005)	goes	on	to	suggest	that	the	assertion	of	“women’s	rights	as	human	rights”	(p.	127)	relies	on	the	characterization	of	the	state	as	incapable	of	or	unwilling	to	address	the	injustices	women	face	through	the	demarcation	of	public	and	private	spheres,	and	on	the	assumption	that	international	law	is	more	just	and	equitable	than	state	law.		The	notion	of	“women’s	rights”	thus	assumes	a	
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universal	sisterhood	that	mobilizes	the	category	of	women	as	a	form	of	equivalence	through	which	a	comparative	mode	of	assessment	and	intervention	is	legitimated	(see	chapter	two).		As	such,	women’s	rights	and	human	rights	regimes	are	inextricable	from	the	complex	operations	of	the	empire-state	and	its	“imperial	territorial,	economic,	state,	social	and	subjective	formations”	(Mongia,	2012,	p.	199).			Pakistani	women’s	rights	organizations	secularize	the	Muslim	feminist	subject	in	their	articulations	of	resistance	to	the	religio-nationalist	state	through	universal	human	rights	discourse.		These	organizations	seek	to	contest	the	ways	in	which	the	Pakistani	state	uses	juridical	instruments	to	subjugate	women	by	looking	to	international	governance	structures	for	alternatives.		Through	their	mobilization	of	universal	rights	discourse	as	a	form	of	resisting	the	Pakistani	nation-state,	many	women’s	organizations	in	Pakistan	become	complicit	in	the	operations	of	the	empire-state	–	for	example,	in	imperial	discourses	of	the	War	on	Terror.		For	these	organizations,	the	relationship	between	women	and	Islam	is	caught	in	a	binarized	understanding	of	the	religio-nationalist	state	and	the	transnational	via	universal	rights	discourse.				
Trajectories	of	Pakistani	‘Islamic	feminism’	In	their	articulations	of	‘Islamic	feminism’,	many	Pakistani	women’s	rights	organizations	such	as	Shirkat	Gah,	Women	Living	Under	Muslim	Laws,	and	Aurat	Foundation	reproduce	prescriptive	claims	that	presume	and	produce	a	secular	feminist	subject.		As	mentioned	earlier,	some	of	these	organizations	acquired	prominence	when	they	came	together	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Women’s	Action	Forum	(WAF)	and	agitated	against	Zia-ul-Haq’s	military	dictatorship	and	its	imposition	of	the	Hudood	Ordinances	and	
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policies	that	discriminated	against	women	(Jamal,	2005a;	Mumtaz	&	Shaheed,	1988).		The	struggle	to	repeal	these	laws	continued	well	after	the	Zia-ul-Haq	regime	and	saw	some	success	with	the	passing	of	the	Women’s	Protection	Bill	in	2006.		While	the	WAF	engaged	with	Islam	in	this	way,	founding	WAF	members’	accounts	of	resistance	to	the	Zia-ul-Haq	regime	reflect	a	sense	of	compromise	–	“an	Islamic	framework	is	a	necessity	and	not	a	choice”	(Mumtaz	&	Shaheed,	1988,	p.	158).		That	is,	they	viewed	this	engagement	with	Islam	as	a	necessary	compromise	of	their	secular	progressive	feminist	principles	for	the	sake	of	strategic	interests	(Mumtaz	&	Shaheed,	1988).		Reasons	given	for	the	direction	the	WAF	took	included	the	need	to	appeal	to	a	broad-based	section	of	society,	the	need	to	stay	within	a	religio-nationalist	imaginary,	and	also	finding	the	most	expedient	path	to	repealing	these	laws	and	furthering	their	feminist	cause	(Mumtaz	&	Shaheed,	1988).	Dubbed	the	‘women’s	movement’	in	Pakistan	by	popular	media	and	in	academic	literature,	this	ad	hoc	group	of	feminists	focused	on	discursively	reconfiguring	‘Islamic’	identity	in	order	to	undermine	and	diffuse	the	power	of	the	Pakistani	state’s	singularized	construction	of	Islamic	national	identity	and	through	this,	improve	the	status	of	women	in	Pakistan.		In	my	interview	with,	Tabassum,57	a	senior	employee	at	Shirkat	Gah,	one	of	the	central	organizations	in	WAF,	she	articulated	the	various	tensions	over	Islam	that	they	as	an	organization	have	been	trying	to	navigate.		She	mentioned	that	working	with	and	through	Islam	was	the	only	way	to	have	an	effective	impact	especially	on	rural	areas	in	Pakistan:	“Islam	cannot	be	ignored”.		As	such,	Shirkat	Gah,	like	many	other	rights-based	women’s	organizations	in	Pakistan,	have	engaged	in	a	strategic	process	of	rendering	
																																																								57	I	use	a	pseudonym	here	because	much	of	her	interview	wove	in	an	out	of	her	“personal	opinion”	and	Shirkat	Gah’s	official	stance.	
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“universal	rights”	–	as	articulated	in	the	UN	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	the	Convention	Eliminating	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	(CEDAW)	–	in	Islamic	idioms.			Part	of	this	process	has	included	a	commitment	to	demonstrating	the	plurality	of	interpretations	of	the	Quran	in,	for	example,	Shirkat	Gah’s	(2006)	publication	Aurtein:	Qurani	Ayaat	Ki	Roshni	Mein	(Women:	In	the	Bountiful	Light	of	Quranic	Verses),	where	they	provide	multiple	interpretations	of	key	passages	in	the	Quran	that	relate	to	the	status	of	women	by	prominent	Islamic	scholars.		For	Tabassum,	this	was	an	important	tool	for	demonstrating	that	the	most	conservative	version	is	not	the	only	option:	“Why	do	we	go	for	the	most	conservative	option	and	not	the	most	empowering?”		The	publication	contrasts	Urdu	translations	and	interpretations	of	the	Quran	by	Maulana	Maududi,	Maulana	Fateh	Mohammed	Jalandhari,	and	Maulana	Abdul	Kalaam	Azad.58		According	to	the	introduction	of	the	book,	the	editors	used	the	works	of	these	scholars	because	they	were	the	most	readily	available	translations	and	interpretations	of	the	Quran	in	Urdu.59			Tabassum	explained	that	this	publication	is	often	used	in	the	organization’s	work	in	the	field	to	refute	“anti-women”	practices	that	are	legitimized	through	the	claim	that	they	are	Islamic	by	presenting	different	translations	of	the	same	passage.		These	anti-women	practices	include	practices	related	to	family	planning,	abortion,	child	marriages,	female	infanticide,	and	education	for	girls.		However,	she	said	that	one	of	the	major	pitfalls	of	
																																																								58	Maulana	Abdul	Kalam	Azad	(1888-1958)	was	a	prominent	Islamic	scholar	and	a	member	of	the	Indian	National	Congress	in	pre-partition	India.		He	produced	his	Urdu	translation	of	the	Quran,	Tarjuman	al-Quran,	as	part	of	his	anti-colonial	efforts	to	strengthen	Islamic	identity	in	India	(Hay,	1988;	Jalal,	2000).		Maulana	Fateh	Mohammed	Jalandhari’s	translation,	is	titled	Qur’an	Majid.		Maududi	published	his	Urdu	translation,	
Tahfim-ul-Quran,	in	1972.		See	chapter	one	for	a	discussion	of	Maulana	Maududi.	59	Shirkat	Gah	also	published	a	similar	book	using	English	translations	by	Allama	Abdullah	Yusuf	Ali,	Maulana	Maududi,	and	Muhammad	Marmaduke	Pickthall.	
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engaging	with	Islam	in	this	way	is	re-centering	the	voices	and	authority	of	male	clerics	in	trying	to	bring	about	changes	in	these	practices.		Conveying	her	frustrations	with	having	to	seek	legitimacy	through	male	clerics	for	Shirkat	Gah’s	rights-based	developmental	efforts	in	the	field,	Tabassum	said	“we	don’t	want	to	end	up	empowering	the	clerics	instead	of	empowering	the	women”.		She	went	on	to	explain	that	many	women	in	Shirkat	Gah	are	devout	Muslims,	but	they	can	separate	their	personal	beliefs	from	their	work	in	delivering	women’s	empowerment	programs.		When	I	met	with	Tabassum,	she	expressed	that	she	was	exhausted,	frustrated,	tired,	and	angry	from	feeling	forced	to	have	to	speak	through	Islam	and/or	through	male	clerics.		She	felt	perturbed	that	the	secular	language	of	“universal	rights”	was	insufficient.		Nevertheless,	she	said	that	Shirkat	Gah	was	strategically	committed	to	changing	the	way	Islam	was	understood	in	relation	to	women’s	rights	by	producing	and	circulating	an	alternative	representation.	Another	illustrative	example	of	this	representation	of	Islam	can	be	found	in	some	of	Shirkat	Gah	and	WLUML’s	publications	that	aim	to	historically	legitimize	rights-based	feminism	as	innate	to	Muslim	societies.		Here	I	analyze	their	information	and	training	kit	titled	Great	Ancestors:	Women	Asserting	Rights	in	Muslim	Contexts,	authored	by	Farida	Shaheed	(2004)	and	jointly	published	by	Shirkat	Gah	and	WLUML.		The	purpose	of	this	publication	is	to	refute	the	myth	that	the	fight	for	women’s	rights	was	a	strictly	Western	phenomenon	by	recovering	historical	narratives	of	Muslim	women	in	order	to	produce	a	counter-narrative	that,	in	turn,	authenticates	feminism	as	Muslim	(Shaheed,	2004,	p.	xi).		The	book	is	meant	to	be	a	resource	for	activism	that	empowers	women	living	in	Muslim	contexts	by	identifying	heroes	from	the	past	who	would	make	women	feel	like	history	is	on	the	side	of	women	who	fight	for	their	rights.		In	addition,	this	publication	is	also	meant	to	
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be	a	resource	for	refuting	unrelenting	and	damaging	accusations	leveled	against	women’s	organization	in	Pakistan	of	being	pawns	of	the	West.		Filling	in	the	gaps	of	history	and	bringing	it	into	popular	consciousness	is	an	important	undertaking	especially	in	the	context	of	a	dominant	narrative	where	such	stories	about	Muslim	women	are	covered	over.		To	that	end	this	publication	is	a	productive	contribution	to	a	counter-narrative.		Nevertheless,	the	process	through	which	these	stories	were	recovered,	chosen,	and	published	reveals	an	adherence	to	a	singular,	universalist	feminist	teleology	that	explicitly	seeks	to	bring	Muslim	women	in	line	with	feminist	politics.			Shaheed	articulates	her	understanding	of	feminism	in	her	reflections	on	this	process	in	the	introduction	of	the	book.		Initially,	the	research	phase	of	this	publication	was	envisioned	as	a	collective	process	with	participation	from	women	living	in	different	Muslim	contexts.		These	women	were	asked	“to	collect	narratives	of	women	they	considered	to	be	‘great	ancestors’	from	their	own	historical	context”	(Shaheed,	2004,	p.	viii).		Later,	this	methodology	was	abandoned	because		not	all	the	‘great	ancestors’	so	identified	displayed	a	feminist	perspective:	several	women	who	simply	fit	the	definition	of	classical	heroines,	known	for	military	conquests	or	supreme	sacrifices;	only	a	few	had	taken	steps	to	promote	women’s	rights.	(Shaheed,	2004,	p.	viii)		Shaheed	thus	took	on	the	task	of	finding	and	compiling	the	narratives	herself	and	ends	up	using	a	mixed	method	of	primary	document	archival	research	and	borrowing	existing	historical	productions	by	mostly	Western	academics.		The	tension	between	historically	contextualizing	and	universalizing	feminism	is	evident	in	Shaheed’s	authorization	of	certain	narratives	as	befitting	of	inclusion	in	the	category	of	great	ancestors.		The	shift	from	collective	to	single	authorship	betrays	the	underlying	motivation	behind	this	project	to	legitimize	universal	rights	discourse	by	retrospectively	validating	it	as	historically	present	
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in	Muslim	societies	–	as	is	made	clear	in	the	abandonment	of	stories	that	did	not	fit	into	and	reproduce	this	discourse.			Furthermore,	this	shift	in	authorship	also	signals	the	deliberate	covering	over	of	the	irreconcilable	heterogeneity	between	Muslim	women	that	would	thwart	the	forging	of	“Muslim	women”	as	a	coherent	category.		In	her	explanation	for	why	she	had	to	change	the	methodology	of	the	collection,	Shaheed	dismisses	the	stories	the	initial	team	collected	because	they	were	not	feminist	enough:	The	researchers	had	brought	back	stories	about	military	conquests	and	supreme	sacrifices	–	stories	that	presumably	did	not	resonate	with	the	intended	construction	of	“great	ancestors”.		Shaheed	misses	or,	arguably,	rejects,	an	opportunity	here	to	engage	with	these	stories	through	the	idioms	of	the	women	and	the	communities	in	the	field	who	brought	them	forth.		Instead,	Shaheed	focuses	on	constructing	and	maintaining	a	monolithic	feminist	identity	for	all	Muslim	women.		The	construction	of	likeness	between	Muslim	women	also	problematically	assumes	that	all	Muslim	women	are	seeking	to	fight	a	monolithic	Muslim	patriarchy	rooted	in	a	singular	and	universal	Islam.		The	rejection	of	the	stories	the	researchers	brought	back	is	also	a	rejection	of	articulations	of	the	kinds	of	structures	of	power	and	privilege	women	seek	to	contest	and	inhabit.		The	complex	matrices	of	power	that	women	inhabit,	subvert,	and	secure	are	effaced	in	favour	of	producing	a	strategic	grand	narrative	about	women’s	resistance	in	Muslim	societies.		Thus,	the	move	to	single	authorship	reflects	the	need	for	a	single	story	about	Muslim	women.	Moreover,	although	these	stories	are	an	important	intervention	and	contribution	to	the	historiography	of	Muslim	women	to	some	extent,	it	is	important	to	consider	how	and	why	they	are	being	invoked	and	re-told.		Because	of	the	increasing	NGOization	of	many	of	
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the	women’s	organizations	(N.	S.	Khan,	2004,	p.	92),	projects	like	the	Great	Ancestors	publication	are	conceived	of	in	terms	of	“capacity	building”	and	“empowerment”.		Thus,	these	narratives	are	being	mobilized	in	strategic	and	programmatic	ways	with	the	explicit	purpose	of	cultivating	a	particular	type	of	“civil	society”	made	up	of	“Muslim	women”	that	would	be	equipped	to	promote	rather	narrowly	conceived	women’s	rights.		The	“training	module”	included	in	Great	Ancestors,	for	instance,	is	designed	as	a	60-minute	“oral	narrative”	session.		In	this	module,	women	would	read	out	loud	extracts	from	the	great	ancestor’s	narratives	that	have	been	converted	into	“a	script	of	narrative	pieces”	(Shaheed,	2004,	p.	xix).		The	trainees	would	essentially	take	on	the	scripted	voice	of	the	great	ancestors	to	learn	how	to	fight	for	their	rights.		Given	that	these	narratives	were	carefully	selected	by	a	single	author	in	order	to	fit	a	particular	idea	of	feminism,	this	activity	serves	a	more	disciplinary	and	prescriptive	function.		The	oral	narrative	component	of	this	activity,	for	example,	is	not	one	that	authorizes	and	makes	space	for	the	multiplicity	of	stories	of	the	women	participating	in	the	session,	but,	rather,	it	literally	has	them	take	on	the	voice	of	a	great	ancestor	in	order	to	reproduce	a	singular	and	coherent	narrative	about	Muslim	women	that	is	compatible	with	normative	rights-based	feminist	goals.			Such	alternative,	gender-progressive	articulations	of	Islam	and	Muslim	history	became	even	more	crucial	to	the	‘women’s	movement’	in	the	post-Zia	era	when	“talibanization”	became	the	concern	of	the	hour	in	tandem	with	the	ascent	of	War	on	Terror	discourse.		Toor	(2011c)	describes	the	popularity	of	the	use	of	the	term	“talibanization”	by	“Pakistani	liberals”	(p.	194)	as	the	cause	of	the	anti-progressive	and	anti-democratic	direction	liberal	classes	and	organizations	have	taken	in	recent	decades,	as	exemplified	by	the	open	support	of	General	Musharraf’s	coup	d’etat	in	1999.		She	argues	
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that	“talibanization”	has	become	a	“catch-all	term”	that	includes	“everything	from	state-led	Islamization	efforts	to	the	rise	in	social	conservatism	and	an	increase	in	public	displays	of	piety”	(Toor,	2011c,	p.	194).		The	infamous	July	2007	stand-off	between	the	Pakistani	state	and	female	students	at	the	Jamia	Hafsa	madrassah	in	Islamabad,	also	known	as	the	Lal	Masjid	(Red	Mosque),	exacerbated	particular	concerns	over	the	involvement	of	women	in	the	dreaded	“talibanization”	of	Pakistan.		This	translated	to	concerns	over	the	threat	posed	by	women	involved	in	“orthodox”	or	“extremist”	groups.		Kamila	Hyat	(2008)	chronicled	the	Lal	Masjid	incident	in	Shirkat	Gah’s	annual	review	publication	Resist	Terror	–	Work	for	Change:	2007	Events	and	Analysis,	which	includes	several	other	“talibanization”	related	topics.			The	Lal	Masjid	incident	precipitated	over	the	planned	demolition	of	mosques	built	on	what	the	Pakistani	state	deemed	to	be	illegally	occupied	land.		This	led	some	students	and	staff	at	the	Jamia	Hafsa	to	protest	through	a	series	of	direct	actions.		These	actions	included	the	months-long	occupation	of	a	library	and	a	“morality	drive”	involving	the	abduction	of	prostitutes	and	women	running	brothels,	shutting	down	video	stores,	and	assaults	on	women	wearing	‘improper’	attire.		The	Pakistani	state	responded	to	these	direct	actions	by	surrounding	the	mosque	and	launching	a	“full-fledged	assault”	on	the	Lal	Masjid	that	lasted	for	hours	resulting	in	over	a	hundred	deaths	(Hyat,	2008,	p.	8).		The	state’s	actions	received	widespread	support	from	the	urban	liberal	classes	in	part	due	to	rumors	that	these	students	were	harboring	well-known	terrorists	at	the	Lal	Masjid.		During	the	standoff,	Maulana	Abdul	Aziz,	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	mosque	and	a	wanted	man,	attempted	to	escape	disguised	in	a	burka	with	a	group	of	female	students	who	tried	to	abet	his	escape	(“Mosque,”	2007).		The	Lal	Masjid	incident	further	entangled	‘conservative’	
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gendered	religious	practices,	such	as	wearing	the	burka,	in	discourses	of	terrorism	and	security.	What	made	this	incident	exceptional	in	the	minds	of	many	Pakistanis	was	that	these	“extremist”	actions	were	primarily	led	and	carried	out	by	women:		What	made	these	women	do	these	things?		What	led	them	to	join	this	extremist	madrassah?		In	an	attempt	to	answer	these	ubiquitous	questions,	Hyat	(2008)	explains	that	the	motivating	factors	leading	to	the	participation	of	over	4,000	female	students	in	the	Jamia	Hafsa	were	largely	socio-economic.		She	suggests	that	many	of	the	students	were	from	“far-flung	northern	parts	of	the	country	or	from	Azad	Kashmir	and	belonged	to	impoverished	families,	though	there	was	also	a	smattering	of	girls	from	affluent	families”	(Hyat,	2008,	p.	9).		According	to	Hyat,	it	was	the	Lal	Masjid’s	ability	to	provide	these	students	with	basic	needs	such	as	food,	shelter,	clothing	and	an	education	that	drew	the	students	–	many	of	whom	joined	after	the	2005	earthquake	that	devastated	large	parts	of	northern	Pakistan.		Thus,	in	Hyat’s	and	Shirkat	Gah’s	narrative	of	this	incident,	‘talibanization’	primarily	operated	by	taking	advantage	of	desperate	and	vulnerable	classes	from	northern	Pakistan	–	areas	inhabited	by	historically	marginalized	communities	in	Pakistan	such	as	the	Pashtun.		The	turn	to	religious	‘conservatism’,	with	the	burka	operating	as	a	key	symbol,	is	articulated	here	through	discursively	dispossessing	the	Jamia	Hafsa	students	of	political	agency	through	a	narrative	of	passivity	and	vulnerability.		Notably,	this	Shirkat	Gah	publication	arrives	at	a	time	when	a	nuanced	understanding	of	‘extremism’	is	urgently	necessary	to	move	away	from	Orientalist	discourses	of	Islam	as	inherently	violent.		However,	socio-economic	explanations	that	rely	on	the	construction	of	a	passive	and	vulnerable	subject	that	piggybacks	on	existing	racializations	of,	for	example,	the	Pashtun,	fall	short	of	a	nuanced	
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engagement	with	the	politics	of	the	students	at	Jamia	Hafsa	and	render	them	in	terms	of	victimhood	and	desperation	with	a	subtext	of	racialized	predispositions	to	violence.		While	the	religious	conservatism	of	the	Jamia	Hafsa	students	is	understood	as	a	story	of	northern	(read:	Pathan),	rural,	poor,	vulnerable,	racialized	victims,	the	rise	of	religious	conservatism	amongst	the	educated,	urban,	primarily	Punjabi	and	Mohajir,	middle	and	upper	classes	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	is	far	more	confounding	for	rights-based	women’s	organizations.		Within	these	organizations’	discourse	of	Islamic	feminism,	groups	like	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	who	do	not	profess	adherence	to	universal	human	rights	and	do	not	problematize	conventional	interpretations	of	the	Quran	and	
hadith,	are	characterized	as	hopelessly	bound	to	a	patriarchal	version	of	Islam	that	is	intrinsically	contrary	to	feminist	goals.		For	them,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat’s	practices	of	piety	are	questionable	in	terms	of	the	extent	to	which	they	can	be	read	as	agential	or	as	a	resistance	to	patriarchy.		According	to	Tabassum,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	represent	“some	kind	of	third-rate	compromise”	between	women	and	Islam	in	Pakistan.		In	fact,	for	Tabassum,	the	popularity	of	these	groups	indicated	a	failure	on	the	part	of	rights-based	organizations	like	Shirkat	Gah	and	WLUML	to	effectively	promote	universal	rights	discourse.					Indeed,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	do	not	appear	to	espouse	the	same	teleological	Islamic	feminist	politics	of	the	women’s	rights	organizations	mentioned	above.		Neither	Al-Huda	nor	the	Jamaat	claim	to	engage	in	the	interpretive	practice	of	ijtihad.		Rather,	their	“gender	jihad”,	to	borrow	Wadud’s	(2006)	term,	only	appears	to	overlap	with	the	women’s	organizations	mentioned	above	insofar	as	they	challenge	the	dominance	of	androcentric	religious	praxis	by	claiming	ownership	of	Islamic	texts	for	women.		Certainly,	as	piety	
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groups	led	by	and	for	women,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	do	come	up	against	the	androcentricity	of	state	sanctioned	norms	of	Islamic	praxis.		However,	even	as	women	participating	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	reclaim	access	to	the	Quran,	it	is	not	for	articulating	resistance	to	the	notion	of	male	superiority	in	Islamic	idioms.		Although	they	believe	in	and	draw	from	the	historical	practice	of	ijtihad,	they	assert	that	there	is	no	compelling	reason	for	contemporary	ijtihad.		Instead,	they	insist	on	following	the	literal	word	of	the	Quran	supplemented	by	the	hadith.		As	such,	they	demand	access	for	the	purpose	of	learning	and	developing	their	practice	of	piety	including	a	deeper	understanding	and	acceptance	of	the	‘subordinate’	position	of	women	in	Islam,	not	against	it.		As	Muna,	an	Al-Huda	graduate	and	teacher,	explained,	“the	thing	is	that	if	your	husband	tells	you	not	to	go	somewhere,	you	shouldn’t	go.		Don’t	disobey	because	then	you	are	getting	in	the	way	of	hidayat	(Allah’s	guidance).		If	Allah	wants	you	to	go,	he	will	make	a	path	for	you”.		In	Muna’s	understanding,	submitting	to	her	husband’s	authority	to	a	certain	extent	was	a	path	to	hidayat.		She	felt	that	if	she	did	not	adhere	to	this	gender	hierarchy	she	would	obstruct	the	development	of	her	own	piety.		Similarly,	Rabia,	another	Al-Huda	graduate	and	teacher	shared	an	illustrative	encounter	she	had	with	her	ten-year-old	daughter	over	her	understanding	of	the	authority	given	to	men	in	Islam:	“The	other	day	I	saw	my	youngest	daughter	in	tears	when	she	came	back	from	her	Quran	class	–	she	was	upset	because	it	says	that	when	your	husband	says	no,	you	shouldn’t	even	go	to	Khaana-e-Kaaba	(Mecca)”.		She	comforted	her	daughter	by	telling	her	to	have	faith	and	to	remember,	“Allah	is	on	your	side”	and	that	“there	must	be	a	reason	for	it”.		For	Rabia’s	daughter,	the	thought	that	her	future	husband	could	obstruct	her	desire	to	perform	the	pilgrimage	to	Mecca	–	a	fundamental	aspect	of	piety	in	her	view	–	was	
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difficult	to	accept.		That	Allah	would	allow	a	man	to	have	this	power	over	her	such	that	he	could	obstruct	her	devotion	was	a	heartbreaking	notion	to	swallow.		Rabia	comforted	her	daughter	by	reminding	her	that	Allah	does	not	ordain	such	things	for	no	reason	and	that	it	was	incumbent	on	her	to	understand	the	context	and	logic	behind	this	command.		Like	Rabia	and	Muna,	many	women	describe	learning	to	approach	such	topics	with	less	hostility	by	first	establishing	intentionality	based	on	faith	in	Allah	and	the	Quran,	and,	at	the	same	time,	they	would	describe	their	commitment	to	rigorously	interrogate	and	understand	the	topic	through	the	space	and	pedagogical	tools	provided	in	Al-Huda	or	Jamaat	classes.		As	such,	their	intended	and	unintended	challenges	and	complicities	to	the	dominance	of	androcentric	Islamic	praxis	in	Pakistan	are	articulated	through	the	Quran	and	hadith	and	not	through	an	explicit	adherence	to	universal	rights	discourse.		Nevertheless,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	are	often	perceived	by	women’s	rights	organizations	as	pawns	of	Islamic	patriarchy	and/or	co-conspirators	with	the	religio-nationalist	state.		In	her	study	of	how	scholar-activists	involved	in	the	WAF	perceived	women	involved	in	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	Women’s	Wing,	Amina	Jamal	(2005)	contends	that	prominent	women	in	the	WAF	understood	Jamaat	women’s	activism	as	a	strategic	mobilization	by	Jamaat-e-Islami	men	against	the	WAF’s	struggle	to	repeal	the	Hudood	Ordinances.		Certainly,	for	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	the	optics	of	women	supporting	the	Hudood	Ordinances	was	an	effective	strategic	tool	in	countering	the	WAF’s	efforts	to	repeal	it	using	universal	rights	discourse.		The	WAF	scholar-activists	in	Jamal’s	study	took	this	to	mean	that	Jamaat	women	lacked	autonomy	because	they	derived	their	subject	positions	from	men.		Conceptualizations	of	Jamaat	women’s	agency	and	politics	were	thus	tied	to	how	they	were	perceived	as	a	“site	of	a	battle	between	fundamentalist	men	and	elite	women	in	Pakistan”	(Jamal,	2005,	p.	62).		
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Notably,	as	Jamal	acknowledges,	WAF	women’s	perceptions	of	Jamaat	women	changed	over	time	as	they	came	to	reflect	on	the	problematic	objectification	that	underpinned	their	view	of	Jamaat	women.		However,	Jamal	(2005)	argues	that	the	rhetorical	endorsement	of	universal	rights	discourse	by	the	WAF	still	facilitated	an	othering	of	“Islamic	fundamentalist	feminism”	that	secured	a	secular	feminist	subject	(p.	60).			The	discourse	of	Islamic	feminism	that	women’s	rights-based	organizations	like	Shirkat	Gah	and	WAF	perpetuate	is	illustrative	of	the	limitations	of	secular	epistemologies	that	privilege	resistance	as	an	analytic	for	agency.		To	reiterate	some	of	the	trappings	of	reading	feminism	through	resistance,	the	reduction	of	agency	to	resistance	in	normative	articulations	of	rights-based,	Western	feminism	leads	to	a	reading	of	feminist	agency	as	it	materializes	as	resistance	to	patriarchy.		This	is	in	part	because	of	the	overlapping	prescriptive	and	analytical	projects	of	Western	feminism	that	seeks	to	discipline	what	it	claims	to	analyze	(Mahmood	2005,	p.	9).		Thus,	a	problematic	dynamic	is	evident	in	much	literature	on	gender	and	Islam	that	seeks	to	evaluate	the	feminist	potential	of	a	given	relationship	between	Islam	and	women	in	terms	of	its	ability	to	resist	a	monolithically	conceived	patriarchy.		Coupled	with	a	conception	of	Islam	as	inherently	patriarchal	and	monopolized	by	the	state,	this	conception	of	agency	often	translates	to	women	resisting	or	reforming	religio-nationalist	iterations	of	Islam	in	the	context	of	Pakistan.		Essentialized	figures	of	the	other	subjugated	woman	in	Islam	emerge	within	this	critique	of	patriarchal	mobilizations	of	‘Islam’	by	the	Pakistani	state,	which	led	to	the	casting	of	particular	forms	of	Islamic	revivalism	amongst	women	as	an	extension	or	an	effect	of	patriarchal	nationalism.		As	such,	in	terms	of	how	rights-based	organizations	like	the	WAF	perceive	the	possibilities	and	limitations	of	the	relationship	between	women	and	Islam,	there	appears	to	
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be	a	persistent	slippage	between	Islam	and	patriarchy	that	lends	itself	to	an	intolerance	and	even	repugnance	towards	‘educated’	women	purportedly	compromising	their	freedom	and	agency	by	following	an	interpretation	of	Islam	that	does	not	comply	with	universal	rights	discourse.		This,	in	turn,	is	interpreted	as	evidence	of	the	successful	seductions	of	a	patriarchal	‘Islam’	rather	than	a	consequence	of	intersectional	interests	and	experiences.		
Conclusion		 Between	these	competing	narratives	of	the	relationship	between	women	and	Islam,	the	ways	in	which	the	women	I	met	understand	and	inhabit	their	practices	of	piety	is	rendered	in	terms	of	the	extent	to	which	they	resist	the	religio-nationalist	state.		That	their	Islamic	praxis	ostensibly	coincides	with	some	of	the	ways	the	Pakistani	state	mobilizes	Islam	is	taken	to	be	evidence	of	their	complicity	in	upholding	a	state	sanctioned	patriarchy.		Moreover,	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	proclaimed	their	Islamic	discourse	as	“literal”,	which	stands	in	contrast	with	the	emphasis	on	ijtihad	and	plurality	of	interpretations	in	the	Islamic	feminism	of	women’s	rights	organizations	discussed	above.		However,	understanding	these	women’s	Islamic	praxis	while	taking	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	reveals	how	they	are	not	contained	by	constructions	of	the	gendered	Muslim	citizen-subject	or	the	Muslim	feminist	subject.		Grasping	their	Islamic	praxis	through	these	constructions	invariably	succumbs	to	the	analytical	pitfalls	of	secular	epistemological	frameworks	and	elides	an	understanding	of	the	sacred	as	formative	in	conceptualizations	of	pious	subjectivity.		This	is	not	to	say	that	they	are	not	complicit	in	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalism	or	universal	rights	discourse.		Rather,	the	complexity	of	their	complicities	(Upadhyay,	2015),	especially	in	relation	to	how	it	functions	in	relation	
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to	racialized	and	marginalized	communities,	is	better	understood	through	an	analytical	framing	that	takes	their	particular	notions	of	the	sacred	seriously.		It	is	in	women’s	notions	of	the	sacred,	that	do	not	necessarily	map	on	to	secular	definitions	of	‘religion’	or	in	nationalist	definitions	of	gender	and	Islam,	where	a	more	nuanced	and	careful	analysis	of	dynamics	of	power	can	be	evinced.	
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Chapter	4:	Contested	Pieties:	Sacred	Epistemologies	of	
‘Qawwam’		 One	of	the	first	things	mentioned	by	my	first	interviewee,	Sumaya,	was	her	struggle	to	develop	her	piety	while	abiding	by	her	understanding	of	the	qawwam	(authority)	of	men	in	Islam.		Sumaya	described	how	she	moved	to	Mississauga	from	Karachi	after	she	got	married	at	the	age	of	24.		Before	moving	to	Mississauga,	she	was	a	primary	school	teacher	with	a	degree	in	education	from	a	university	in	Karachi	and	she	loved	her	job.		However,	in	addition	to	the	challenges	of	translating	her	accreditation	and	finding	a	job	as	a	new	immigrant,	Sumaya	ended	up	not	pursuing	her	career	in	teaching	primary	school	after	she	moved	for	several	other	reasons.		Her	husband	had	accrued	a	number	of	degrees	from	North	American	universities	and	worked	in	well-paying	positions	in	multi-national	corporations.		Even	though	financial	stability	meant	that	they	did	not	need	a	dual-income	household,	a	major	part	of	her	motivation	for	opting	for	domestic	labour	over	a	job	that	she	loved	was	her	dedication	to	crafting	what	she	understood	to	be	the	ideal	Islamic	household	organized	around	a	clear	gendered	division	of	labour,	rights,	and	responsibilities.		When	we	met,	she	had	three	children	and	was	the	main	provider	of	reproductive	labour	in	her	household	while	her	husband	worked	outside	the	home	and	was	the	main	provider	of	financial	resources.			Sumaya	explained	that	her	understanding	of	this	Islamic	household	structure	emerged	out	of	her	participation	in	weekly	semi-formal	home-based	Quran	classes	taught	by	Al-Huda	graduates.		For	nearly	six	years,	Sumaya	organized	and	attended	such	classes,	where	she	learnt	about	different	aspects	of	the	Quran	and	the	hadith.		When	I	spoke	with	Sumaya,	she	had	strong	opinions	about	what	makes	a	good	Quran	class.		She	mentioned	
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that	she	coached	her	current	teacher,	Dr.	Rana,	on	how	to	deliver	a	good	lecture,	how	to	make	use	of	media,	how	to	assess	and	evaluate	student	learning,	and	how	to	cultivate	an	engaging	discussion.		However,	she	also	mentioned	that	she	knew	that	she	would	need	to	formally	complete	the	Al-Huda	diploma	program	in	order	to	be	recognized	as	an	authority	to	teach	these	classes.			As	such,	Sumaya	wanted	to	join	the	Al-Huda	diploma	program	in	order	to	bring	her	passion	for	teaching	to	her	religious	praxis	while	still	adhering	to	what	she	understood	to	be	the	ideal	structure	of	Islamic	domestic	relationships.		However,	she	explained	that	her	husband	would	not	grant	her	permission	to	join	the	diploma	program	because	of	his	concerns	about	the	shape	Sumaya’s	piety	was	taking.		She	stated:	After	taking	many	home-based	Quran	classes,	I	approached	my	husband,	hopeful	that	the	time	was	right	to	ask	him	for	his	permission	to	take	the	Al-Huda	diploma	course.		He	could	see	that	this	was	something	I	really	wanted	to	do	but	he	was	afraid	he	would	lose	his	wife	to	what	he	was	thinking	was	a	religious	cult	or	something.		He	hesitated	but	then	said	yes	for	the	sake	of	freedom,	equality	and	all	that	–	that	I	should	be	able	to	pursue	whatever	I	like.		I	was	so	happy	to	have	his	permission	because	I	would	not	want	to	disobey	my	husband’s	wishes.		I	was	so	happy	because	he	even	offered	to	drive	me	to	the	Al-Huda	campus.		I	got	all	the	registration	forms	together	and	got	into	the	car	with	him	and	I	was	thanking	him	for	his	support	the	entire	way.		When	we	got	there,	I	got	out	of	the	car	and	started	running	up	the	steps.	I	was	so	excited.		But	then	I	heard	the	car	horn.		My	heart	sank.		I	turned	around	and	saw	my	husband	gesturing	for	me	to	come	back.		I	stood	on	the	steps	for	a	while	and	then	walked	back	to	the	car	hoping	that	he	just	wanted	to	give	me	something	that	I	had	left	behind.		He	told	me	to	get	back	in	the	car.		I	got	in.		We	drove	home	in	silence.		Sumaya’s	telling	of	her	unfulfilled	desire	to	join	the	Al-Huda	diploma	course	reflects	the	tension	that	many	women	I	interviewed	faced	in	developing	their	piety	through	women-only	spaces.			As	Sumaya	mentions,	Al-Huda	reminded	her	husband	of	a	cult,	which	speaks	to	his	suspicion	of	exclusively	women’s	spaces	outside	the	home	that	posed	the	potential	of	altering	his	wife’s	practice	of	Islam	in	ways	that	he	would	not	be	able	to	counteract.		His	
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suspicions	may	in	part	be	due	to	rumours	about	how	joining	Al-Huda	leads	to	broken	families	because	of	an	intensification	of	women’s	devotion	to	Islam.		Indeed,	Sumaya	expresses	her	commitment	to	obey	her	husband	when	she	turns	back	from	the	steps	and	goes	home	with	her	husband.		As	she	explained,	her	desire	to	wait	for	his	permission	was	driven	by	her	devotion	to	developing	a	pious	spousal	relationship	where	her	husband	would	have	authority	over	her	activities	both	inside	and	outside	the	household.		But,	in	some	ways,	this	articulation	of	authority	worked	in	contradictory	ways	as	a	barrier	to	the	development	of	Sumaya’s	piety.		When	Sumaya	described	his	momentary	granting	of	permission	as	a	matter	of	“freedom	and	equality	and	all	that”,	she	was	referring	to	her	perception	of	his	commitments	to	liberal	rights-based	discourse.		However,	the	withdrawal	of	his	permission	marks	the	limits	of	these	principles	in	face	of	non-normative	practices	of	religion.		Sumaya	obeyed	her	husband	because	his	authority	to	give	her	permission	was	part	of	her	conception	of	piety,	but	he	invoked	his	authority	to	withdraw	his	permission	in	order	to	disrupt	the	development	of	this	very	conception	of	piety.		Sumaya’s	description	of	his	fears	and	discomfort	of	her	religious	praxis	make	it	clear	that	she	believed	that	only	certain	scripts	of	religiosity	were	intelligible	within	his	ideas	of	“freedom”	and	“equality”.	Sumaya	is	not	alone	in	facing	resistance	to	participation	in	a	women’s	piety	group	from	family	members.		In	this	chapter,	I	examine	how	many	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	had	similar	experiences	in	relation	to	their	involvement	in	Al-Huda	or	the	Jamaat.		Their	involvement	was	often	met	with	anxieties	about	the	corrosion	of	a	modern,	liberal	sensibility	amongst	the	urban,	educated,	middle/upper	classes.		While	resistance	to	participation	in	these	groups	came	through	all	kinds	of	relationships,	the	spousal	relationship	is	probably	the	one	that	women	I	interviewed	struggled	with	the	most.		In	
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their	capacities	as	husbands,	men	often	posed	challenges	to	the	types	of	changes	their	wives	desired	and	embodied,	however,	many	husbands	also	occupied	a	paradoxical	position	as	both	the	obstacles	and	the	enablers	of	piety.		That	is	to	say,	many	women	maintained	that	their	husbands	were	often	the	ones	who	were	unwilling	to	lose	their	“modern”	wives	–	who	played	an	important	role	in	their	social	and	professional	life	–	to	religious	conservatism,	and	at	the	same	time	women’s	“subordinate”	position	in	a	spousal	relationship	was	a	key	site	in	the	development	of	piety	for	many	women.		We	can	see	this	tension	play	out	in	Sumaya’s	story	above	when	she	described	how	her	husband	did	not	want	her	to	enroll	in	Al-Huda’s	diploma	course	because	it	signified	a	more	conservative	turn	in	her	religiosity,	and,	at	the	same	time,	Sumaya	obeyed	her	husband	in	order	to	comply	with	her	understanding	of	Islamically	ordained	gender	roles.	In	this	chapter,	I	critically	analyze	such	(re)institutions	of	a	gendered	(re)configuration	of	domestic	relationships	that	are	galvanized	by	women	directing	the	development	of	their	own	piety.		I	focus	especially	on	women’s	struggles	to	achieve	personal	relationships	that	abide	by	their	interpretations	of	Quranic	passages	on	men’s	
qawwam	(authority)	over	women	and	the	concomitant	gender	roles	defined	in	terms	of	haq	(right/entitlement)	and	farz	(responsibility).		These	struggles	to	abide	by	qawwam	are	connected	to	broader	conceptualizations	and	commitments	to	developing	moral	social	behaviours	and	relationships,	as	mobilized	in	their	centralization	of	akhlaaq	in	their	formulations	of	Islamic	piety.		The	emphasis	on	akhlaaq	in	the	development	of	piety	is	symptomatic	of	the	complex	ways	in	which	many	women	focus	on	the	Prophet	Mohammed’s	life,	sunnah,	as	a	guide	for	moral	social	behaviours	and	relationships	in	their	own	lives.		Situating	an	analysis	of	qawwam	in	relation	to	akhlaaq	illustrates	how	
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instantiations	of	ostensibly	patriarchal	structures	by	women	work	through	a	complex	process	of	women	reclaiming	the	sunnah	and	rescripting	their	piety,	often	in	contradistinction	to	how	relationships	between	women	and	Islam	are	articulated	in	religio-nationalist	discourse	(as	discussed	in	chapter	three).		Thus,	I	also	explore	the	extent	to	which	my	respondents’	religious	praxis	corresponds	with	articulations	of	gendered	religiosity	in	dominant	forms	of	Pakistani	national	identity.		More	specifically,	I	examine	how	these	aspirations	to	establish	and	abide	by	qawwam	relate	to	the	Pakistani	religio-nationalist	state’s	claims	to	configuring	the	domestic	space	and	gender	relations	in	accordance	with	their	interpretation	of	Islam.		I	place	the	processes	of	religious	subject	formation	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	in	conversation	with	Pakistani	nationalist	temporalities	in	order	to	chart	their	intersubjective	itineraries	and	explicate	how	they	coalesce,	contradict,	and	co-exist	in	constructions	of	the	domestic	space	and	gendered	relationships.	Drawing	on	the	interviews	I	conducted	with	women	formally	and	informally	affiliated	with	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	I	elaborate	on	how	women	envision	ideal	Islamic	relationships	between	men	and	women	through	the	concept	of	qawwam,	and	how	they	described	their	own	relationships	with	the	men	in	their	lives.		Notably,	several	women	also	found	qawwam	to	be	one	of	the	more	difficult	injunctions	to	implement	in	their	lives	because	of	how	it	came	up	against	their	ideas	of	modernity	and	progress.		That	is,	for	several	women	qawwam	represented	thorny	terrain	that	had	the	potential	of	placing	them	on	par	with	how	their	communities	and	social	circles	perceived	backwards	and	regressive	practices.		Nevertheless,	though	ideas	of	and	commitments	to	qawwam	put	women	in	difficult	situations	at	times,	as	illustrated	in	Sumaya’s	story	above,	many	of	the	women	I	
156	
met	still	held	sacred	and	partook	in	this	prescribed	gendered	system	as	part	of	their	practice	of	piety.		I	demonstrate	how,	for	many	women,	their	existing	heteropatriarchal	relationships	did	not	abide	by	their	understandings	of	qawwam.		That	is,	even	though	these	relationships	ostensibly	mapped	on	to	the	kind	of	gendered	household	structures	that	would	be	in	line	with	qawwam,	they	failed	to	satisfy	my	respondents’	notions	of	a	comprehensive	and	meaningful	instantiation	of	qawwam.			Their	expressions	of	the	inadequacies	of	existing	heteropatriarchal	household	structures	reflect	the	discursive	tension	between	how	the	women	I	met	conceptualized	Islamic	piety	and	how	it	was	mobilized	in	religio-nationalist	projects.		To	some	extent	the	set	up	of	domestic	relationships	based	on	qawwam	appears	to	be	commensurate	with	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalist	configurations	of	gender	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.		That	is,	their	reconfiguration	of	the	domestic	space	includes	the	establishment	of	the	husband	and/or	father	as	the	head	of	the	family	and	household	and	the	relegation	of	women	to	reproductive	duties	and	symbols	of	Islamic	identity.		However,	this	reconfiguration	based	on	qawwam	sits	in	an	uneasy	relationship	with	the	ways	in	which	gender	figures	in	Pakistani	nationalist	discourses.		On	the	surface,	the	women	I	conduced	research	with	appear	to	succumb	to	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalist	prerogatives	through,	for	example,	their	emphasis	on	developing	domestic	relationships	that	comply	with	qawwam;	the	related	importance	they	place	on	motherhood;	and	the	regulation	of	their	bodies	as	part	of	their	commitments	to	modesty.		However,	in	what	follows,	I	argue	that	the	religious	praxis	of	the	women	I	met,	guided	through	their	belief	in	the	akhira	(hereafter)	and	the	corresponding	emphasis	on	akhlaaq	through	reclaiming	the	Prophet	
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and	sunnah,	unsettles	and	reformulates	the	significance	and	meaning	of	each	of	these	components	of	religio-nationalist	discourse.			At	the	same	time,	this	unsettling	does	not	bring	them	into	compliance	with	discourses	of	universal	rights	engendered	by	the	women’s	rights	organizations	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.		Despite	their	commitment	to	developing	what	appears	to	be	a	patriarchal	gender	hierarchy	in	their	domestic	relationships,	many	women	maintain	a	strong	sense	of	“equality”	located	in	the	“eyes	of	Allah”	in	their	practices	of	piety.		That	is,	they	are	firm	in	the	belief	that	men	and	women	are	of	equal	value	in	the	eyes	of	Allah	and	that	in	the	hereafter	and	at	the	time	of	judgment	women	will	be	subjected	to	the	same	level	of	scrutiny	as	men.		This	sense	of	transcendental	equality,	that	is,	a	notion	of	equality	formulated	on	the	premise	of	belief	in	the	akhira,	catalyzes	the	form	that	gendered	relationships	take	and	the	women-led	processes	through	which	it	is	established	in	the	here	and	now.				
	Qawwam	First,	I	turn	to	how	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	themselves	understand	and	live	qawwam	in	order	to	ground	their	understanding	of	Islamic	gender	relations	and	domestic	space	in	the	specificity	of	their	lived	experience.		The	absence	of	scriptural	sources	in	this	analysis	of	qawwam	is	intentional	in	order	to	foreground	the	different	and	shifting	ways	in	which	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	conceptualized	and	inhabited	
qawwam.		In	an	effort	to	avoid	fixing	the	meaning	of	qawwam	through	reference	to	scriptures,	I	provide	insights	gleaned	from	interviews	into	how	different	women	described	
158	
their	own	ideas	of	the	concept	and	how	they	implemented	it	in	their	lives	-	keeping	in	mind	that	these	ideas	have	likely	shifted	since	we	last	spoke.	There	were	some	common	threads	that	ran	through	several	women’s	understanding	of	qawwam	that	presumably	drew	from	the	more	technical	aspects	of	conceptualizations	of	
qawwam	circulated	by	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	as	a	theological	concept.		In	the	interpretation	followed	by	the	women	I	interviewed	at	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	qawwam	refers	to	the	authority	of	men	over	women	within	the	context	of	domestic	gender	relations	and	is	associated	with	the	gendered	sexual	division	of	labour,	rights,	and	responsibilities.		From	what	I	gathered	from	conversations	I	had	with	several	women,	they	understood	the	idea	of	qawwam	as	part	of	a	broader	system	of	social	relationships	with	specific	relevance	to	particular	relationships.		The	qawwam	of	men	over	women	did	not	refer	to	the	authority	of	all	men	over	all	women.		That	is,	the	women	I	interviewed	understood	qawwam	as	relevant	to	familial	relationships	and	only	in	matters	related	to	the	domestic	space	and	limited	to	the	functionality	of	the	household.		Having	qawwam	in	the	context	of	a	spousal	relationship	meant	that	the	husband	would	have	the	responsibility	to	ensure	that	the	household	was	financially	provided	for	and	that	there	was	harmony	within	the	household,	which	also	meant	that	men	would	ensure	that	their	wives	live	up	to	their	responsibility	to	provide	reproductive	labour	in	the	household.		These	responsibilities	could	translate	to	the	regulation	of	women’s	bodies	and	activities	by	the	men	in	their	family,	however,	this	did	not	translate	to	absolute	domination	over	women.		So,	for	instance,	in	this	interpretation	men	did	not	have	direct	qawwam	over	women’s	practices	of	piety,	nor	did	husbands	have	
qawwam	over	their	wives’	personal	wealth	and	property.		Qawwam	operated	through	a	conscientious,	deliberate,	and	calculated	arrangement	in	the	lives	of	many	women	at	Al-
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Huda	and	the	Jamaat	and	understandings	of	qawwam	were	constantly	deepened	and	reformulated	in	consultation	with	study	groups,	teachers,	and	peers	in	face	of	challenges	to	its	implementation	(mostly	by	men).		Thus,	it	would	be	reductive	to	read	it	as	women’s	submission	to	male	domination	since,	more	often	than	not,	the	women	I	interviewed	had	a	difficult	time	convincing	the	men	in	their	lives	to	comply	with	qawwam.		Despite	these	common	threads	in	the	way	the	women	I	met	with	conceptualized	
qawwam,	it	was	clear	that	qawwam	is	a	shifting	concept	that	acquires	different	dimensions	of	meaning	and	significance	within	particular	contexts	and	circumstances.		When	I	interviewed	Fariha,	one	of	the	regular	attendees	of	the	Quran	classes	in	Mississauga	that	Sumaya	organized,	she	explained	how	she	understood	qawwam.		She	stated	that:	Women	have	a	lot	of	protection	in	Islam.		Men	have	been	given	qawaam.		I	don’t	know	the	English	word	for	that.		But	basically	there	is	a	status	given	to	men.		Men	have	twice	the	status	of	women.		People	take	this,	even	in	Pakistan,	as	a	way	of	saying	that	Islam	has	put	women	down	and	lowered	them.		That	too	is	not	exactly	wrong	but	there	are	also	a	lot	of	reasons	for	this.		Look,	women	are	not	required	to	work.		You	should	luxuriate	(ayyashi),	take	pleasure,	sit	at	home	and	relax.		Let	the	man	handle	his	responsibilities	and	you	handle	yours	at	home.		If	you	want	to	work	and	take	that	on	yourself	then	go	ahead	but	it	is	not	imposed	by	Allah.	That	is	your	call	as	a	family.		It’s	a	different	thing	if	you	want	to,	but	Allah	has	left	you	free	of	that	[responsibility].		You	don’t	do	it,	that’s	fine,	handle	your	home	and	your	children.		That	is	very	important.		Fariha	frames	her	understanding	of	qawwam	as	part	of	how	Islam	protects	women.		Her	understanding	of	qawwam	is	based	on	her	underlying	assumption	and	belief	that	Islam	does	not	set	out	to	harm	or	subjugate	women.		It	is	important	to	note	as	well	that	the	discourse	of	protection	mobilized	in	Fariha’s	comments	draws	an	association	between	protection	of	women	and	the	clarity	of	rights,	responsibilities,	and	labour.		Fariha	maintains	that	it	is	incumbent	upon	women	to	understand	that	domestic	duties	are	their	primary	responsibility,	as	it	is	for	men	to	understand	that	providing	a	livelihood	is	their	
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primary	responsibility.		She	also	states	that	anything	women	do	in	addition	to	their	domestic	responsibilities	is	allowed	but	is	optional.		So,	for	instance,	to	work	outside	the	domestic	space	and	contribute	financially	to	her	household	is	an	option	a	woman	may	exercise	but	does	not	have	to,	according	to	Fariha.			In	Fariha’s	case,	this	clarity	was	crucial	to	how	she	inhabited	qawwam.		Most	of	the	time,	Fariha	was	managing	her	household	alone	with	her	two	children	while	her	husband	worked	outside	of	the	country.		With	her	husband	being	away	for	long	stretches	of	time,	the	responsibility	to	maintain	the	household	and	raise	their	children,	one	of	whom	lives	with	a	chronic	health	condition,	became	solely	Fariha’s	responsibility.		Accordingly,	there	was	a	sense	of	relief	in	the	idea	of	qawwam	that	is	reflected	in	her	use	of	the	Urdu	word	“ayyashi”,	which	I	translated	in	the	above	quotation	as	luxuriating.		Fariha’s	use	of	this	term	is	a	reference	to	how	qawwam	gave	her	some	respite	in	not	having	to	be	responsible	for	certain	aspects	of	the	household	such	as	working	outside	the	home	and	bringing	in	an	income	–	a	small	luxury,	so	to	speak,	in	an	otherwise	hectic	roster	of	duties.		In	addition,	the	notion	that	Allah	ordained	this	division	of	labour	also	made	her	everyday	struggles	meaningful	as	being	part	of	the	development	of	her	piety.		Thus,	Fariha’s	taxing	experiences	of	having	to	take	care	of	her	children	and	household	while	her	husband	was	away	ground	her	explanation	of	qawwam.		According	to	Fariha,	this	division	of	labour	is	recognition	and	protection	from	Allah	from	the	stress	the	double-duty	of	home	and	work	may	place	on	her.			Fariha’s	example	illustrates	how	lived	experiences	give	meaning	to	the	notion	of	
qawwam.		As	such,	for	different	women,	the	concept	related	to	their	lives	in	different	ways.		While	for	Fariha	it	was	a	sense	of	relief	and	recognition	of	her	domestic	labour,	others	were	not	affected	by	these	benefits	to	the	same	extent	or	in	the	same	way.		When	I	asked	Donya,	
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a	teacher	at	Al-Huda	in	Karachi,	about	qawwam,	she	was	eager	to	explain	to	me	how	she	dealt	with	her	initial	“gut	reaction”	against	the	concept	and	wrapped	her	head	around	the	passages	of	the	Quran	where	men	are	given	qawwam	over	women.		She	explained:	It	took	me	a	long	time	to	understand	what	that	ayat	(verse)	of	the	Quran	is	saying	where	it	says	men	have	qawwam…as	a	woman	there	are	a	lot	of	things	that	are	difficult	to	accept	but	what	happens	is,	alhamdulillah,	Allah	is	very	kind.		When	you	study	His	message	in	totality	and	you	juxtapose	it	and	support	it	with	your	understanding	of	how	the	Prophet	led	his	life	you	realize	that	it	is	a	package.	Somewhere	else	God	has	compensated	the	woman	as	well...That	is	why	there	are	these	misunderstandings	about	Islam.		People	pick	up	things	out	of	context.		But	to	understand	the	context	is	a	lot	of	work	and	few	people	want	to	do	that	work…Personally,	Al-Huda	has	just	made	me	more	aware	of	my	rights.		I	know	that	I	should	not	be	beaten	if	I	am	a	woman,	I	know	that	I	have	a	right	in	inheritance,	I	know	that	I	have	a	right	[to	ask	for	a]	divorce,	I	know	that	I	have	rights	in	different	roles	in	my	life	and	I	know	that	within	a	certain	framework,	I	am	my	own	person,	I	am	allowed	to	live	my	own	life,	I	am	allowed	to	explore	my	talents	so	all	of	that	has	been	very	positive…and	also,	I	know	better	what	my	responsibilities	are	towards	my	family.		It’s	a	more	balanced	approach	towards	life	and	I	think	if	its	done	the	proper	way	it	can	make	us	a	better	society,	better	people.		In	this	passage,	Donya	conveys	her	belief	in	the	need	to	engage	in	a	process	to	inculcate	acceptance	of,	and,	indeed,	desire	for	this	system	as	the	ideal	way	of	structuring	an	Islamic	society,	which	she	saw	as	a	necessary	component	of	her	piety.		She	went	on	to	state:		It	has	been	difficult	but	it	has	been	a	choice.		If	I	compare	it	to	leading	a	life	without	practicing	my	faith,	[I	realize]	that	[it]	would	be	tougher	for	me	because	it	is	too	huge	a	support	system	for	me.		This	is	what	keeps	me	going.		This	is	my	core	value	now.				Donya	suggests	that	qawwam	is	inextricable	from	the	practice	of	her	faith	when	she	says	that	she	had	to	make	a	choice	between	accepting	qawwam	or	leading	a	life	without	her	faith.		In	other	words,	it	was	important	for	Donya,	like	many	other	women,	to	secure	the	
qawwam	of	the	men	in	her	life	as	part	of	what	she	comprehended	as	necessary	steps	to	strengthen	her	piety.		Thus,	like	many	women	participating	in	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	piety	groups,	piety	and	patriarchy	figure	as	a	“conjoined	matrix”	(Mahmood,	2005,	p.	175)	in	her	
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religious	praxis.		Donya	describes	this	process	as	one	that	would	require	the	work	of	studying	qawwam	in	relation	to	the	“totality”	of	the	Quran	and	hadith	through,	for	instance,	joining	Quran	classes.		Indeed,	it	was	her	difficulties	with	the	concept	of	qawwam	that	initiated	Donya’s	interest	in	joining	a	Jamaat	Quran	class	in	the	first	place,	which	she	later	left	to	join	the	Al-Huda	diploma	course.		Moreover,	being	able	to	claim	that	her	understanding	of	qawwam	was	based	on	her	“study”	of	the	Quran	and	hadith	gave	her	some	credibility	when	it	came	to	attempts	at	implementing	qawwam	in	her	own	relationships.		Donya’s	acceptance	of	qawwam	as	part	of	belonging	to	a	system	of	rights	and	responsibilities	came	about	through	her	more	comprehensive	and	deeper	understanding	of	Islamic	gender	relations	facilitated	through	enrolment	at	the	Jamaat	and	Al-Huda.		In	turn,	to	be	able	to	claim	acceptance	of	qawwam	indicated	a	higher	level	of	education	and	comprehension	of	Islam.	Like	Fariha,	Donya	also	framed	her	understanding	of	qawwam	as	a	combination	of	rights	and	responsibilities	that	leads	to	a	more	“balanced”	life.		However,	in	Donya’s	comments,	there	is	less	emphasis	on	the	implications	of	qawwam	on	the	everyday	struggles	of	carrying	the	responsibility	of	reproductive	labour.		This	may	in	part	be	because	Donya	was	from	a	more	affluent	household	in	Karachi	where	cheap	domestic	labour	is	readily	available	to	the	middle	and	upper	classes.		Instead,	for	Donya,	the	difficulties	in	accepting	
qawwam	were	more	so	intertwined	with	the	way	she	and	her	husband	had	previously	associated	themselves	with	a	‘modern’,	‘liberal’	lifestyle.		To	structure	her	household	in	line	with	qawwam	would	invite	accusations	from	her	husband	and	from	parts	of	her	community	of	backwardness,	terrorism,	and	fundamentalism	(which	I	discuss	further	later	in	this	chapter).		These	discourses	haunt	her	comments	above	as	she	preemptively	asserts	
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a	sense	of	individual	autonomy	and	a	list	of	rights	that	women	are	given	through	Islam	–	assertions	which	may	have	also	been	motivated	by	assumptions	and	anticipations	of	my	resistance	to	the	concept	as	a	diasporic	researcher	based	in	the	West.		The	meaning	of	
qawwam,	for	Donya,	is	thus	caught	in	her	claims	to	knowledge	about	the	Quran	and	hadith	as	well	as	the	types	of	resistance	she	faces	in	practicing	qawwam	in	everyday	life.	Putting	qawwam	in	perspective,	many	other	women	distinguished	qawwam	from	a	totalizing	sense	of	submission	by	referring	to	it	as	part	of	a	gendered	system	of	rights	and	responsibilities	that	ensured	a	harmonious	and	structured	household	and	society	–	what	many	would	colloquially	refer	to	as	the	(heteronormative)	“family	system”,	which	for	them	was	the	bedrock	of	a	“good	society”.		This	was	emphasized	in	my	conversation	with	Ghazala,	a	long-standing	student	at	the	weekly	Jamaat	Quran	class	in	a	middle	class	neighbourhood	in	Karachi,	about	how	she	understood	qawwam.		As	Ghazala	explained:		The	very	first	rule	of	Islam	is	that	a	human	is	not	a	slave	to	another	human	–	and	this	is	also	important	for	women	to	know.		This	cannot	happen	that	one	human	can	enslave	another	human	or	be	their	master.		A	subordinate	is	a	different	thing.		That	happens	for	workflow	–	that	is	a	different	thing.		But	otherwise	a	human	is	a	subordinate	to	Allah	only.				Ghazala	mobilizes	corporate	business	language	of	“workflow”,	drawing	on	her	experiences	working	in	the	corporate	sector	in	Pakistan,	to	make	sense	of	the	practice	of	qawwam.		Ghazala’s	understanding	of	subordination	as	distinct	from	enslavement	and	as	part	of	a	system	of	“workflow”	is	indicative	of	how	many	women	imagined	the	family	system	and	how	their	“subordinate”	role	in	the	household	fit	into	the	bigger	picture	of	an	Islamic	society.		For	Ghazala,	the	distinction	between	woman	as	slave	and	woman	as	a	subordinate	is	based	on	first	establishing	men	and	women	as	“humans”	and	categorizing	the	“human”	as	subordinate	to	“Allah	only”.		Thus,	insofar	as	men	and	women	are	both	humans	and	
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subordinate	to	Allah,	there	can	be	no	other	master	but	Allah	according	to	Ghazala.		Her	comments	illustrate	how	she	understands	the	subordination	of	women	that	is	implicit	in	
qawwam	as	a	matter	of	efficiency	and	of	having	a	good	workflow	within	a	system,	and	less	about	implementing	an	absolute	gender	hierarchy	as	such.		As	Rabia,	a	teacher	at	Al-Huda	in	Karachi	put	it,	“if	Allah	had	not	made	it	this	way,	there	would	be	anarchy	in	the	house.		The	house	needs	a	leader”.		A	conceptualization	of	Allah’s	greater	plan	is	evident	in	Rabia’s	comment	about	the	ordering	of	the	household.		The	systematicity	of	qawwam	as	part	of	this	plan	provided	a	way	of	imagining	it	as	more	than	just	subordination	as	a	result	of	male	superiority	or	for	the	sake	of	male	domination.			To	reiterate,	while	qawwam	structures	gendered	rights	and	responsibilities,	it	is	not	considered	hierarchical	in	most	my	respondents’	understanding	–	that	is,	the	authority	of	men	over	women	in	the	household	does	not	assume	the	superiority/dominance	of	men	or	the	inferiority/passivity	of	women.		Through	an	understanding	of	the	systematicity	of	the	gender	relations	ordained	by	the	Quran,	many	women	not	only	worked	towards	improving	their	own	participation	in	existing	relationships,	but	were	also	able	to	articulate	the	shortcomings	of	the	men	in	their	lives	and	in	society	more	broadly.		Romana,	a	graduate	of	Al-Huda,	brought	up	the	problem	of	men	leering	at	women	as	an	example	of	such	shortcomings.		She	explained:		Why	are	there	all	these	things	to	be	applied	to	women	when	men	don’t	apply	it	to	themselves?		Women	have	to	do	purdah.		Why	don’t	men	lower	their	gaze	when	the	Quran	says	this?		Both	are	asked	to	lower	their	gaze.		If	a	woman	is	even	walking	around	naked,	the	man	has	to	lower	his	gaze,	he	should	have	nothing	to	do	with	her.		You	have	to	be	accountable	to	Allah	if	you	don’t	lower	your	gaze.		Why	don’t	you	then?		Has	Allah	not	given	any	commands	to	you?		Has	he	only	given	commands	for	women?		This	is	wrong.	There	are	commands	for	both	men	and	women.			
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In	a	similar	vein,	Sabeen,	a	volunteer	at	the	Jamaat	gave	the	example	of	domestic	violence,	“What	happens	if	a	woman	is	abused?		She	comes	to	us.		What	do	we	tell	her?		Practice	Islam?		Her	husband	is	the	one	who	needs	to	practice	Islam!”		Romana	and	Sabeen’s	exasperation	reflects	a	frustration	and	concern	with	the	uneven	application	of	Islamic	gender	roles	that	hold	women	more	accountable	than	men.		Their	respective	conceptualizations	of	qawwam	come	with	an	expectation	of	the	specific	ways	in	which	men	could	use	their	authority	over	women.		Qawwam	did	not	entitle	men	to	leer	at	women,	nor	did	it	permit	domestic	violence,	according	to	Romana	and	Sabeen.		While	the	institution	of	patriarchy	through	qawwam	produces	a	gendered	structure	of	power	in	these	women’s	understandings,	it	is	one	that	is	laden	with	rights,	responsibilities,	rules,	and	conditions	that	significantly	mitigate	the	establishment	of	a	gender	hierarchy	that	would	assume	and	reinforce	the	superiority	of	men.	Take,	for	instance,	the	renewed	understanding	and	valuation	of	motherhood	that	sustains	the	distinction	between	authority	and	superiority	and	facilitates	how	women	inhabit	qawwam.		In	one	of	Farhat	Hashmi’s	lectures	recommended	to	me	by	Rabia,	Hashmi	elaborates	a	variety	of	women’s	rights	in	Islam	and	many	of	them	are	anchored	through	women’s	roles	as	mothers.		The	status	given	to	mothers	in	the	Quran	and	hadith	firmly	establishes	the	importance	of	women	as	always	already	potential	mothers	and	leaves	little	room	to	claim	male	superiority.		This	is	not	to	say	that	women’s	worth	is	tied	to	the	act	of	mothering,	but,	rather,	that	Allah’s	bestowment	of	the	capability	and	responsibility	of	reproduction	on	women	is	evidence	of	the	heightened	value	Allah	places	on	women.		For	instance,	frustrated	with	the	status	of	women	in	Pakistani	society	Romana,	who	
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incidentally	did	not	have	children,	contrasted	it	with	the	status	given	to	women	in	Islam.		She	stated:	Woman	is	told	that	she	is	weak,	less	intelligent,	but	woman	is	not	weak	in	any	way.		If	she	is	weak,	then	why	has	Allah	put	this	treasure	(the	responsibility	to	have	and	raise	children)	in	her	hands?		Treasure	is	put	in	strong	hands.		So	Allah	could	have	given	it	to	men,	but	why	did	he	give	it	to	women?		This	is	my	question	for	you.		Why?		Why	has	Allah	given	woman	this	treasure,	this	blessing,	when	the	entire	society	says	that	her	brains	are	in	her	heels,	she	is	like	this,	or	she	is	like	that?		Why	did	Allah	give	women	offspring	if	she	is	weak	and	less	intelligent?		This	is	a	big	responsibility.		If	a	woman	is	degraded	in	your	eyes	or	less	intelligent	and	everything	rotten	is	in	her,	then	why	did	Allah	give	her	this?		Allah	did	not	think	of	her	as	weak.		Allah	did	not	degrade	women.		If	women	are	not	degraded	in	the	eyes	of	Allah,	then	why	are	they	degraded	in	your	eyes?		That	Allah	entrusted	women	with	this	role	was	evidence	of	women’s	strength,	intelligence,	and	virtue,	according	to	Romana.		This	was	in	contrast	to	normative	discourses	about	women’s	inferiority	and	the	undervaluing	of	motherhood,	which	Romana	described	as	a	categorically	un-Islamic	way	of	thinking	about	women	and	motherhood.		Romana	thus	mobilized	the	trope	of	motherhood	in	order	to	dismantle	stereotypes	about	women	and	foreground	the	significance	of	reproductive	labour.	Many	women	echoed	Romana’s	sentiments	when	citing	verses	and	stories	in	the	Quran	and	hadith	that	would	reaffirm	the	value	placed	on	motherhood	and	the	associated	status	of	women.		A	hadith	commonly	cited	in	several	interviews	declares	that	the	passage	to	heaven	–	that	is,	the	ultimate	reward	–	is	at	the	feet	of	your	mother	(Ayesha,	Ghazala,	Romana).		In	other	words,	motherhood	is	not	simply	a	gendered	reproductive	role,	but	it	also	functions	at	the	level	of	theological	evidence	of	the	status	of	women	in	Islam.		By	casting	motherhood	in	terms	of	status,	responsibility,	intelligence,	and	trust,	many	of	the	women	I	met	reclaim	motherhood	both	as	an	important	Islamic	duty	and,	more	importantly,	as	evidence	of	women’s	eminence.		This	sense	of	women’s	eminence	brings	
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the	thorny	issue	of	men’s	qawwam	into	some	relief	and	facilitates	a	sense	of	confidence	for	women	leading	processes	of	religious	subject	formation.		This	articulation	of	motherhood	marks	a	discursive	shift	from	the	ways	in	which	nationalist	discourse	codifies	women’s	roles	as	reproducers	of	the	nation.		The	women	I	interviewed	mobilized	motherhood	as	evidence	of	their	equality	to	men	in	order	to	reconfigure	their	place	in	social	formations	and	to	stake	a	claim	in	processes	of	formulating	and	directing	subject	formation	beyond	their	given	roles	as	reproducers	of	the	nation.	While	it	is	through	a	problematic	centralization	of	reproductive	capacity	in	a	heteronormative	schematic	that	a	patriarchal	hierarchy	is	complicated	and	destabilized	for	the	women	I	met,	many	women	used	this	understanding	of	motherhood	to	disrupt	and	redirect	their	familial	relationships.		Thus,	examining	the	ways	in	which	these	women’s	articulation	of	motherhood	relates	to	the	mobilization	of	reproductive	roles	in	nationalist	discourse	further	demonstrates	how	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	have	contradictory	relationships	with	ideas	of	Pakistani	nationhood.		As	mentioned,	the	institution	of	an	ostensible	patriarchy	could	be	mistakenly	interpreted	as	in	the	service	of	nationalist	discourse	where	the	domestic	space	and	the	regulations	of	women’s	bodies	becomes	a	site	for	reconciling	the	temporal	tensions	in	nationalist	discourse	(see	chapter	three).		However,	considered	in	light	of	the	akhira	and	related	processes	of	pious	subject	formation,	the	religious	praxis	of	the	women	I	interviewed	unsettles	the	assigned	role	of	women	as	reproducers	and	signifiers	of	the	nation	in	the	context	of	Pakistani	religio-nationalism.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	women	do	not	participate	in	perpetuating	gendered	notions	of	nationhood	and	national	duty:		In	chapter	five,	I	discuss	how	the	practice	of	
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dawah	draws	on	ubiquitous	discourses	of	women’s	roles	in	reproducing	the	nation	and	mobilizes	a	classed	project	of	religiosity	that	dovetails	with	nationalist	formulations	of	citizen-subjects.		However,	juxtaposing	gendered	notions	of	pious	subjectivity	in	the	Islamic	discourse	of	the	women	I	met	with	those	in	the	nationalist	narrative	of	the	Pakistani	state	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	illustrates	the	contrasting	ways	in	which	these	women’s	groups	and	the	nation-state	conceptualize	and	mobilize	the	relationship	between	women	and	Islam.		As	a	principal	component	of	both	Pakistani	nationalist	discourse	and	my	respondents’	discourses	of	Islamic	piety,	configurations	of	domestic	space	and	articulations	of	domestic	roles	and	relationships	become	a	site	for	the	contestation	of	different	itineraries	of	subject	formation.		Relatedly,	many	women	also	clarified	that	their	belief	in	qawwam	did	not	mean	that	they	were	forgoing	belief	in	gender	equality.		For	instance,	Shumaila,	a	student	and	teacher	at	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	Karachi,	juxtaposed	the	subordinated	status	of	women	in	the	here	and	now	with	equality	in	the	akhira	(afterlife).		She	explained:	What	is	there,	is	there.		A	man	can	divorce	a	woman,	a	man	can	marry	four	wives,	and	a	woman	has	to	cover	herself	but	coming	here	[to	Al-Huda]	and	learning	all	those	things	from	the	Quran	directly,	it	gives	you	acceptance.		It	says	so,	so	it’s	okay.		If	Allah	is	saying	this,	then	it’s	fine.		I	think	that’s	why	its	hard	for	people	who	are	not	religious	to	understand	it	because	when	you	are	studying	the	Quran	there	is	so	much	stress	on	the	conviction	that	there	is	an	akhira	and	everyone	will	be	repaid	for	what	they	do	in	this	life	–	once	you	realize	that,	then	you	are	like	okay,	alright,	in	this	life	I	do	have	to	wear	an	abaya	and	I	can’t	show	my	hair	and	that’s	fine	if	Allah	will	give	me	something	better	in	the	akhira.		At	least	in	the	akhira	men	and	women	will	be	equal.		Shumaila’s	comments	reveal	a	sense	of	compromise	in	her	references	to	what	you	have	to	do	in	this	life	to	get	something	better	in	the	afterlife.		Shumaila	asserts	that	veiling,	divorce	and	polygamy	are	instances	of	gender	inequality	in	Islam.		Notably,	not	all	the	women	I	met	would	describe	these	aspects	of	their	understanding	of	Islam	in	this	way.		For	example,	at	
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one	of	the	Quran	classes	I	attended	in	Mississauga,	several	women	discussed	their	opinions	on	polygamy.		One	of	them	expressed	her	desire	to	be	in	a	polygamous	relationship	to	elevate	her	piety	in	accordance	with	her	understanding	of	the	sunnah	(the	Prophet	Mohammed	had	multiple	wives)	but	she	could	not	convince	her	husband	to	marry	another	woman.		Shumaila’s	comments,	however,	reveal	her	discomfort	with	these	practices.		The	promise	of	equality	in	the	afterlife,	based	on	what	she	read	and	understood	from	the	“Quran	directly”,	not	only	tempered	how	she	felt	about	gender	inequality	in	Islam,	but	it	also	shaped	the	way	she	gives	meaning	to	inhabiting	this	inequality.		When	Shumaila	refers	to	her	predisposition	to	adhering	to	whatever	Allah	has	said,	she	suggests	that	she	accepts	
qawwam,	even	if	it	is	difficult	and	requires	sacrifices,	because	of	her	belief	in	the	akhira.		Like	Donya,	Shumaila	also	links	her	acceptance	of	gender	inequality	to	her	experience	of	being	a	student	at	Al-Huda	and	learning	directly	from	the	Quran	–	suggesting	that	her	acceptance	of	qawwam	was	an	indication	of	a	higher	level	of	education	and	piety.		That	is,	accepting	and	inhabiting	qawwam	is	a	mark	of	a	true	learned	believer.		In	Shumaila’s	statement,	she	recounts	a	number	of	what	may	be	perceived	as	inequalities	between	men	and	women	in	order	to	illustrate	and	emphasize	her	conviction	in	the	akhira	and	to	allude	to	an	epistemological	impasse	at	the	register	of	(non)	belief.		Her	distinction	between	the	ways	such	Islamically	sanctioned	inequalities	were	understood	by	believers	and	non-believers	reveals	the	akhira	as	a	pivotal	component	of	how	she	developed	and	inhabited	a	gendered	conceptualization	of	piety.					Belief	in	the	akhira	posits	an	extended	temporal	and	spatial	social	imaginary	that	complicates	trajectories	of	subject	formation.		At	first	glance,	the	language	of	rights	and	responsibilities	that	accompany	belief	in	the	akhira	renders	the	akhira	as	an	elongated	
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time-space	for	the	realization	of	liberal	feminist	ideals	of	individual	equality	and	autonomy.		However,	I	suggest	that	in	order	to	avoid	enfolding	these	imaginaries	into	feminist	or	nationalist	temporalities,	and	therefore	avoid	setting	up	an	“implicit	referent”	(S.	Ahmed,	2000,	p.	166)	and	reproducing	universalist	claims,	further	exploration	of	the	role	of	belief	and	transcendence	in	subject	formation	and	in	claims	of	equality	and	autonomy	is	necessary.		The	akhira	not	only	figures	as	a	futurity	or	a	deferred	space	of	an	alternative	(and	ultimate)	life	where	men	and	women	would	be	equal,	but	it	also	functions	as	a	central	concept	structuring	the	everyday	lives	of	women	in	profound	ways.		How	do	we	understand	everyday	practices	of	inhabiting	qawwam	that	are	based	on	belief	in	gender	equality?		How	does	the	akhira	make	itself	present	in	the	lives	of	women	who	are	striving	to	implement	qawwam	in	their	domestic	spaces?		Many	women	referred	to	the	anticipated	encounter	with	Allah	after	death	as	what	ultimately	structured	their	lives:		As	Romana	stated,	“My	father	won’t	be	with	me	in	my	grave.		And	neither	will	my	mother.		They	have	to	go	into	their	own	grave	and	I	am	to	go	in	my	own	grave”.		Romana	suggests	that	her	fate	in	the	hereafter	lay	in	her	personal	practice	of	piety	and	was	not	tied	to	what	her	mother	or	father	did.		Romana’s	understanding	of	the	hereafter	produced	a	sense	of	accountability	for	how	she	lived	her	life	that	drove	her	to	pursue	the	development	of	her	piety.		The	belief	that	there	is	an	akhira	coupled	with	the	belief	that	individual	women	will	be	held	equally	accountable	as	men	in	the	eyes	of	Allah	mobilized	a	sense	of	urgency	to	gain	knowledge	about	and	reconfigure	piety	such	that	it	ultimately	serves	the	interests	of	women	in	the	afterlife,	which	includes	transforming	their	familial	relationships	to	comply	with	qawwam.		Moreover,	acceptance	of	qawwam	became	a	mark	of	a	higher	level	of	Islamic	education	and	piety	for	some	women,	as	exemplified	in	Donya	and	Shumaila’s	
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comments	discussed	earlier.		It	is	in	the	context	of	reclaiming	Islamic	knowledge	and	practices	as	part	of	what	would	benefit	women	in	the	akhira	that	many	of	the	women	I	met	set	out	to	reconfigure	domestic	spaces	in	line	with	qawwam.			
Akhlaaq:	Understanding	the	Social	Ethics	of	Qawwam	Nearly	all	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	understood	and	accepted	qawwam	as	part	of	a	pious	system	that	governs	their	gendered	roles	and	relationships	through	their	eschatological	conviction	in	the	equal	responsibility	for	men	and	women	to	develop	personal	piety	and	to	(re)produce	a	good	Muslim	society.		This	is	further	evident	in	how	women	situated	qawwam	as	part	of	akhlaaq	(moral	and	ethical	social	behaviours)	in	their	religious	praxis.		Their	emphasis	on	akhlaaq	derives	from	their	engagement	with	the	
sunnah,	which	has	brought	the	practice	of	emulating	the	Prophet	Mohammed	in	their	everyday	lives	into	the	purview	of	women’s	piety.		Their	accounts	of	how	Islamic	akhlaaq	was	implicated	in	their	lives	illustrates	the	ways	in	which	mundane	sites	of	the	everyday	are	critical	aspects	of	their	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	and	how	women	find	ways	to	engage	everyday	aspects	of	their	lives	in	substantial	ways	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.			Many	of	the	women	I	met	explained	that	the	development	of	good	akhlaaq	based	on	the	way	the	Prophet	lived	his	everyday	life	(sunnah,	as	described	in	the	hadith)	is	imperative	for	the	successful	development	of	piety	that	would	benefit	them	in	the	akhira.		It	is	important	to	note	that	by	reclaiming	the	Prophet	and	the	sunnah	for	the	development	of	women’s	piety	through	the	cultivation	of	akhlaaq,	the	processes	of	religious	subject-making	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	disrupt	the	gendered	trajectories	of	nationalist	subject	formation,	which	did	not	extend	the	development	of	piety	in	this	way	to	women.		For	many	
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women,	(re)claiming	the	Prophet	is	a	response	to	women’s	piety	being	trivialized	in	the	project	of	establishing	a	monolithic	understanding	of	Islam	in	Pakistani	nationalist	discourse	as	a	“brotherhood”	or	“fraternity”	(see	chapter	three)	where	the	Prophet	is	claimed	as	male	and	for	men	and	his	incidental	interactions	with	women	are	the	only	parts	of	the	sunnah	that	are	considered	relevant	to	women.		Through	their	emphasis	on	akhlaaq,	the	women	I	met	unsettle	this	gendered	reading	of	the	sunnah	within	dominant	religio-nationalist	discourses	of	piety.		The	everyday	bodily,	affective,	ritual,	personal	and	social	sites	through	which	women	emulate	the	Prophet	demonstrate	the	extent	to	which	the	Prophet	serves	as	a	degendered	role	model	for	women.		In	what	follows,	I	elaborate	on	my	respondents’	explanations	of	akhlaaq,	how	it	related	to	their	practice	of	qawwam,	and	how	this	religious	praxis	complicates	the	gendered	tropes	of	religio-nationalist	discourse.			While	the	centrality	of	sunnah	in	Sunni	Islam	is	not	a	novel	observation,	I	argue	that	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	women	claiming	the	Prophet	as	part	of	their	piety	marks	a	moment	of	disjuncture	from	the	classification	of	women	as	symbols	and	reproducers	of	the	nation-state.		For	example,	recall	the	Pakistani	state’s	construction	of	the	Prophet	Mohammed’s	daughter,	Fatima,	as	a	role	model	for	Pakistani	women	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.		Although	members	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	revered	Fatima	and	other	female	Islamic	figures	immensely,	they	insisted	on	the	Prophet	Mohammed	as	their	ultimate	role	model.		Many	women	I	interviewed	disputed	the	androcentric	interpretation	of	Islam	propagated	by	the	Pakistani	state,	which	claims	the	Prophet	as	male	and	for	males,	by	centralizing	the	Prophet	in	their	articulations	of	women’s	piety.		Locating	the	Prophet	as	a	role	model	for	women	unsettles	dominant	iterations	of	Islamic	piety	and,	moreover	unsettles	gendering	of	citizenship	along	the	lines	of	his	rights/her	duties	(Saigol,	2000).			
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Several	women	I	interviewed	mentioned	that	they	would	approach	various	situations	by	considering	the	question	“what	would	the	Prophet	do?”		From	the	formalities	of	how	to	pray,	to	everyday	habits	like	making	one’s	bed,	women	looked	to	the	hadith,	a	compilation	of	accounts	about	how	the	Prophet	lived	his	life	(sunnah)	witnessed	by	those	closest	to	him,	for	guidance.		The	hadith	thus	operate	as	a	manual	and	a	measure	of	how	to	be	a	good	Muslim.		Most	women	referred	to	the	sunnah	when	determining	what/how	to	do	things	and	also	when	determining	what	not	to	do:		They	used	the	sunnah	as	a	resource	for	identifying	and	rejecting	certain	practices	as	un-Islamic	(discussed	in	further	detail	in	chapter	five)	and	they	also	used	it	to	firmly	establish	the	Prophet	as	a	role	model	for	everyday	life	for	all	Muslims,	and	not	just	men.			For	instance,	two	women	I	separately	visited	for	an	interview,	Zainab	and	Romana,	consented	to	the	interview	without	reading	the	document	I	had	put	together	with	information	about	the	research	project.		I	offered	to	read	it	to	them	in	case	they	felt	it	was	too	tedious	to	look	it	over	but	they	declined.		Upon	my	insistence	they	agreed	but	then	referred	to	sunnah	to	clarify	why	they	did	not	need	to	read	the	document.		Zainab,	explained,	“Our	Prophet’s	entire	life,	every	moment,	everyone	knows	it.		He	didn’t	have	anything	to	hide...I	don’t	need	to	read	that	paper	because	I	should	have	nothing	to	hide”	(Zainab).		Zainab	refers	to	the	sunnah’s	very	existence	as	evidence	of	the	Prophet’s	way	of	living	where	his	life	was	open	and	instructive	to	others.		This	understanding	of	the	Prophet	influenced	her	decision	and	willingness	to	open	up	and	tell	her	story	with	a	sense	of	generosity.		When	I	met	Zainab	again	a	few	weeks	after	the	initial	interview,	she	thanked	me	for	giving	her	the	opportunity	to	tell	her	story	because	it	made	her	feel	closer	to	the	
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Prophet	and	to	Allah.		As	such,	the	act	of	the	interview	became	a	part	of	her	practice	of	piety	as	it	gave	her	a	novel	opportunity	to	emulate	the	Prophet.	Romana,	another	graduate	of	Al-Huda,	conveyed	a	similar	conviction	when	she	sat	down	with	me	for	an	interview.		Referring	to	people	who	would	be	concerned	about	confidentiality,	Romana	said:		They	are	not	clear	on	what	they	are	here	for.		It’s	simple.		I	am	not	going	to	say	anything	wrong	so	why	should	I	be	afraid?		I	will	be	presenting	myself	in	front	of	Allah,	you	understand?		So	anything	I	say,	I	am	putting	Allah	first	in	my	mind	and	in	my	heart	the	way	our	Prophet	did.		Implicit	in	Romana’s	sense	of	confidence	in	opening	herself	up	to	me	was	a	sense	of	how	both	she	and	I	would	ultimately	be	accountable	to	Allah.		She	seemed	confident	that	she	wouldn’t	say	anything	“wrong”	and,	at	the	same	time,	she	was	reminding	me	that	I	would	be	accountable	to	Allah	no	matter	what	it	said	on	the	consent	form.		To	foreground	the	omnipresence	of	Allah	at	the	outset	of	the	interview	was	an	effort	to	emulate	the	way	the	Prophet	“put	Allah	first”.		Both	Zainab	and	Romana	used	the	exemplar	of	the	strength	of	the	Prophet’s	belief	in	Allah	to	give	rise	to	a	sense	of	fearlessness	in	telling	their	stories.		That	is,	their	understanding	of	sunnah	influenced	their	affective	disposition	to	the	interaction	of	the	interview,	exemplifying	how	emulation	of	the	Prophet	pervades	their	lives.		According	to	several	women	I	interviewed	at	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	to	aspire	to	good	akhlaaq	rooted	in	a	rigorous	understanding	of	the	Quran	and	hadith	is	a	challenging	and	comprehensive	project	that	encompasses	all	aspects	of	personal	and	social	behaviours,	relationships,	and	interactions.		Little	is	left	unscripted	in	this	notion	of	the	ideal	Islamic	society	that	takes	seriously	the	common	refrain	that	“Islam	is	a	way	of	life”.		In	the	Islamic	way	of	life	espoused	by	many	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	achieving	‘good	akhlaaq’	requires	that	people	are	aware	of	their	haqooq	(rights;	haq	for	singular)	and,	perhaps	more	
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importantly,	both	men	and	women	need	to	live	up	to	their	faraiz	(duties	or	responsibilities;	
farz	for	singular),	which	for	many	women	in	Al-Huda	is	the	crux	of	pious	social	relationships.		As	Romana	put	it,	“when	taking	what	is	your	right,	the	fear	of	Allah	is	not	present	there.		But	to	give	what	is	your	responsibility,	there	the	fear	of	Allah	is	present.		Think	about	it.		Your	farz	is	to	give	what	is	someone	else’s	haq”.		When	Romana	refers	to	the	presence	or	absence	of	the	“fear	of	Allah”,	she	suggests	that	fulfilling	responsibilities	to	others	is	the	true	test	of	piety	because	it	requires	a	more	pronounced	consciousness	of	Allah.		According	to	Romana,	knowing	and	claiming	her	rights	is	an	easier	aspect	of	piety	that	does	not	require	her	to	foreground	the	fear	of	Allah.		As	her	comments	suggest,	developing	a	consciousness	of	her	responsibility	to	fulfill	other’s	rights	is	integral	to	her	conceptualization	of	what	it	means	to	fear	Allah	and	be	pious.	Ayesha,	a	student	of	a	home-based	Al-Huda	Quran	class,	also	explained	her	understanding	of	akhlaaq	in	terms	of	rights	and	responsibilities.		She	stated:	The	bottom	line	is…there	are	only	two	things	when	you	read	the	Quran,	akhlaaqiat60	and	ibadat	(worship).		Ibadat	are	your	responsibility	and	Allah	says	he	can	forgive	you	for	not	doing	it	but	akhlaaqiat	is	tied	to	haqooq-ul-ibad,61	that	is,	people’s	right	to	forgive.	So	if	a	person	doesn’t	forgive	you	for	something	you	did	to	them,	then	God	cannot	forgive	you	either.		People	just	become	obsessed	with	doing	hajj	and	
umrah	(pilgrimages	to	Mecca	and	Medina).		Some	people	go	for	umrah62	or	hajj	every	year!		And	then	their	kids	memorize	the	Quran	and	then	they	think	they	are	the	best	Muslims.		They	don’t	even	talk	to	their	neighbours	even	though	in	Islam	your	neighbours	have	so	many	rights…not	only	the	people	right	next	door	but	40	houses	in	front	of	you,	40	houses	behind	you	and	40	to	the	left	and	40	to	the	right.																																																										60	Akhlaaqiat	refers	to	the	study	of	akhlaaq,	however,	it	is	often	used	colloquially	to	refer	to	akhlaaq	in	plural	form.	61	Haqooq-ul-ibad	translates	to	the	rights	of	people.		In	my	respondents’	usage,	it	referred	to	the	responsibility	one	has	to	fulfill	and	be	conscientious	of	other	people’s	rights.		It	is	closely	connected	to	the	notion	of	akhlaaq	because	it	produces	a	practice	of	social	conduct	based	on	understandings	of	other’s	rights.	62	Umrah	is	the	pilgrimage	to	Mecca	performed	outside	of	the	times	allotted	for	the	pilgrimage	in	the	Islamic	calendar.		Pilgrimages	performed	during	the	allotted	time	are	known	as	hajj.		Although	the	women	I	met	understood	performing	hajj	at	least	once	in	their	lifetimes	as	a	compulsory	part	of	practicing	their	piety,	they	did	not	understand	umrah	as	compulsory.		Notably,	many	of	them	had	performed	both,	indicating	their	socio-economic	privileges.			
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	Both	Ayesha	and	Romana	foreground	the	need	to	be	conscientious	of	the	social	dimension	of	piety,	that	is,	to	fulfill	their	understanding	of	Islamically	ordained	responsibilities	to	others,	haqooq-ul-ibad.		This	is	an	important	and	arguably	a	more	demanding	aspect	of	pious	subject	formation	than	fulfilling	required	practices	of	worship,	ibadat.		It	also	serves	to	strengthen	consciousness	of	Allah,	taqwa	by	making	the	fear	of	Allah	present.		According	to	Ayesha,	while	Allah	may	forgive	the	failure	to	fulfill	practices	of	worship	such	as	prayers,	fasting,	and	pilgrimages,	the	failure	to	fulfill	one’s	responsibilities	to	fellow	humankind	must	be	forgiven	by	other	people	before	it	can	be	forgiven	by	Allah.		Her	understanding	of	the	power	invested	in	people	to	forgive	an	offence	and	the	need	for	forgiveness	from	others	in	order	to	receive	the	forgiveness	of	Allah	produces	a	social	dynamic	laden	with	ethical	accountability.		In	effect,	this	produces	a	“texture	of	obligation”	(T.	Ahmad,	2010)	in	social	interactions	by	mobilizing	a	social	discourse	of	being	attentive	to	those	around	you,	what	your	relationship	to	them	is,	and	what	it	ought	to	be	according	to	the	Quran	and	hadith.			To	further	elaborate	on	what	akhlaaq	may	include,	I	briefly	recount	one	of	Hashmi’s	recorded	lectures	that	was	played	at	one	of	the	Quran	classes	I	attended	in	Karachi	on	the	topic	of	an	Islamic	way	for	women	to	participate	in	a	majlis	(gathering).		In	her	lecture,	Hashmi	outlines	several	personal	behaviours	that	are	discouraged	in	a	majlis	such	as	yawning,	looking	around,	arriving	late,	picking	your	nose,	coughing,	fidgeting,	lingering	too	long	after	the	event	is	over,	speaking	too	much,	not	speaking	at	all,	not	listening,	laughing	too	loud,	not	laughing	at	all,	not	smiling,	and	not	interacting	with	others,	to	name	a	few.		Hashmi’s	detailing	of	these	minor	behaviours	as	practices	of	piety	are	part	of	Al-Huda’s	discourse	of	Islam	where	every	aspect	of	life	presents	an	opportunity	to	practice	one’s	piety	(also	echoed	in	the	Jamaat).		In	another	lecture	that	I	attended	in	Islamabad,	Hashmi	
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discussed	the	need	for	self-awareness	in	the	habitual	practices	of	everyday	life.		She	implored	her	audience	to	engage	in	daily	reflection	on	their	habits	and	routines,	trace	how	they	developed	them,	where	they	came	from,	assess	whether	or	not	they	were	inspired	by	the	Prophet’s	practice	of	Islam	(as	detailed	in	sunnah)	and	make	changes	accordingly.			The	invocation	of	variations	of	these	questions	in	dealing	with	a	variety	of	situations	demonstrates	the	centrality	of	the	Prophet	in	my	respondents’	practices	of	piety	and	processes	of	subject	formation.		For	example,	Shumaila	talked	about	the	many	challenges	she	faced	at	her	elite	college	in	Karachi	when	she	started	wearing	the	hijab.		She	saw	a	change	in	the	way	her	peers	interacted	with	her.		Some	would	ask	her	questions	like	“what	have	you	done	to	yourself?”	others	would	avoid	her	altogether;	some	would	inadvertently	feel	judged	because	they	were	not	committed	to	developing	their	piety	in	the	same	way.		At	first,	she	felt	angry	and	uncomfortable	whenever	she	had	to	go	to	class	–	bracing	herself	for	the	next	snide	remark,	or	the	next	person	who	wouldn’t	look	her	in	the	eyes,	or	the	snickers	when	she	would	excuse	herself	from	social	situations	to	go	say	her	prayers.		She	responded	to	these	experiences	with	reference	to	sunnah:	One	of	the	greatest	things,	one	of	the	greatest	weapons	–	and	this	is	something	that	Islam	stresses	–	is	smiling.		It	is	stressed	so	much	in	our	class	[at	Al-Huda].		One	of	the	hadith	is	that	someone	said	that	they	never	saw	anyone	smiling	as	much	as	the	Prophet.		I	thought	that	was	a	great	motivation	-	that	he	smiled	the	most	out	of	anyone.		I	think	it	just	opens	people	up	to	you	and	makes	them	feel	like	they	can	talk	to	you	and	its	welcoming.		[When	I	started	smiling	more]	...that	made	people	think	that	she’s	not	the	type	that	you	can’t	talk	to	or	something.		Shumaila	relates	this	experience	as	evidence	of	the	positive	impact	of	following	the	sunnah	in	everyday	life.		As	she	explains,	she	was	able	to	disarm	her	peers,	change	hostile	relationships,	and	facilitate	her	own	transition	to	a	more	visible	embodied	practice	of	piety	(veiling)	by	looking	to	the	hadith	and	sunnah	for	guidance	on	her	akhlaaq.		As	another	
178	
embodied	practice,	smiling	gave	Shumaila	the	feeling	of	being	close	to	the	Prophet	through	emulation	and,	at	the	same	time,	it	changed	her	presence	and	interactions	in	her	social	space,	which	facilitated	her	continuation	of	turning	to	and	learning	from	the	sunnah.		Through	this	story,	Shumaila	also	highlighted	the	ability	to	produce	similarity	to	the	Prophet	through	the	simple	act	of	smiling,	which,	for	her,	humanized	the	Prophet	in	ways	that	rendered	Islam	more	accessible	and	applicable	to	her	everyday	life.		For	minor	practices	like	smiling	to	count	as	a	practice	of	piety	made	it	possible	for	many	women,	like	Shumaila,	to	conceive	of	themselves	as	pious.		Moreover,	the	value	placed	on	such	quotidian	practices	through	the	sunnah	also	made	the	aspiration	to	piety	a	realizable	goal	for	women.		The	sunnah	are	thus	a	central	factor	in	fashioning	transformations	in	many	women’s	relationships	to	Islam	by	infusing	their	everyday	lives	with	pious	meaning.			Sumaya’s	recounting	of	her	struggle	to	abide	by	her	husband’s	qawwam	described	at	the	opening	of	this	chapter	exemplifies	how	husbands	are	positioned	as	both	the	enablers	and	obstacles	to	piety	for	many	women.		Keeping	in	mind	that	for	many	women,	these	encounters	emerge	out	of	the	multifaceted	reclaiming	of	Islam	as	the	domain	of	(some)	women,	it	is	problematic	to	read	qawwam	as	seamlessly	intertwined	with	the	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalist	discourse	of	the	state.		At	the	same	time,	it	is	problematic	to	read	their	divergences	from	nationalist	discourse	as	evidence	of	a	culturally	particular	feminist	resistance.		As	part	of	akhlaaq,	the	institution	of	qawwam	occurs	in	tandem	with	women’s	efforts	to	take	back	the	Prophet	and	the	sunnah	for	the	development	of	women’s	piety.		The	impact	of	the	emphasis	on	akhlaaq	in	my	respondents’	discourses	of	piety	is	clear	in	how	women	described	changes	in	the	way	Islam	was	present	in	their	lives	in	relatable	and	applicable	ways.		Moreover,	the	intricacies	of	how	different	women	
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conceptualize	qawwam	reflect	the	complexity	of	the	concept	as	it	is	developed	and	applied	to	women’s	lives	and,	most	significantly,	that	it	does	not	translate	to	an	absolute	sense	of	male	domination	for	the	women	I	met.		Rather,	for	most	women,	qawwam	was	best	understood	as	part	of	a	divine	system	of	rights	and	responsibilities	–	belief	in	which	pivots	on	belief	in	the	akhira,	where	women	and	men	would	be	judged	by	Allah	equally.		The	sense	of	women’s	eminence	made	evident	in	many	women’s	comments	on	the	place	of	motherhood	in	Islam	further	demonstrates	how	women	reconciled	qawwam	as	part	of	Allah’s	plan.		In	what	follows,	I	elaborate	further	on	the	complex	and	contradictory	ways	in	which	women	inhabited	qawwam	in	their	everyday	lives.		
Negotiating	Qawwam	in	Heteropatriarchal	Contexts	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	established	their	commitments	to	qawwam	in	tandem	with	frustrating	the	male-gaze	through	women-only	spaces.		As	discussed	in	chapter	one,	the	collective,	pedagogical,	and	discursive	community	spaces	provided	by	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	gave	many	women	a	sense	of	belonging	and	robust	ownership	of	their	piety	that	contributed	to	creating	the	conditions	for	women	to	begin	a	process	of	transforming	their	relationships,	including	bringing	some	in	line	with	
qawwam.		The	reclaiming	of	collective	practices	of	piety	were	key	to	these	transformations.		That	is,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	provided	women	with	communal	spaces	outside	their	own	homes,	where	women	developed	relationships	and	gained	Islamic	knowledge	with	other	women.		However,	as	Rabia	explained,	many	people	she	knew	felt	that	women	do	not	need	to	take	up	religious	practices	outside	the	home:	“People	say	things	like	for	women,	namaaz	at	home	is	better…or	a	woman	should	not	be	leaving	the	house	for	dawah	because	her	
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responsibilities	are	at	home”.		Such	approaches	to	how	women	should	practice	Islam	led	to	a	perception	that	women-centered	piety	groups	had	“messed	up	the	priorities	of	women”	(Rabia).		That	is,	in	these	perceptions,	drawing	women	out	of	the	home	for	praying,	teaching,	learning,	dawah,	and/or	volunteering,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	impeded	women’s	responsibilities	in	the	household.		This	stands	in	contradistinction	to	how	many	women	who	joined	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	expressed	a	renewed	commitment	to	their	household	duties	developed	through	the	further	strengthening	of	their	knowledge	of	their	domestic	rights	and	responsibilities.		This	contrast	is	indicative	of	the	extent	to	which	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	disrupt	normative	Pakistani	scripts	of	gendered	religiosity.	Ghazala	explained	that	such	resistance	to	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	came	about	because	they	represented	a	shift	away	from	male-centered	Islamic	practices	that	revolved	around	the	exclusively	male	space	of	the	masjid	(mosque):	“it	was	previously	that	father	goes	to	the	masjid,	he	learns	something	good,	but	he	would	never	tell	his	family.		He	would	try	to	practice	alone”	(sic).		Ghazala’s	description	of	the	gendering	of	collective	practices	of	piety	reflects	her	sense	of	frustration	with	the	centralization	of	the	Muslim	male	as	the	normative	Muslim	subject	of	Pakistani	nationalist	discourse.		In	her	comments,	she	attributes	the	curtailment	of	Pakistani	women’s	Islamic	praxis	to	the	gendered	delineation	of	collective	religious	spaces.		The	controversy	over	women	praying	in	jamaat	(together	as	a	collective)63	led	by	women	further	indicates	the	anxieties	over	women	finding	a	communal	space	for	religious	practice.		Donya	elaborated	that	at	Al-Huda	“it’s	a	big	thing	
																																																								63	The	use	of	the	term	jamaat	(lower	case)	here	is	different	from	references	to	the	Jamaat	(upper	case)	throughout	this	dissertation,	which	is	a	shortened	version	of	Jamaat-e-Islami,	one	of	the	organizations	that	some	of	the	women	I	interviewed	belonged	to.		Here	I	refer	to	the	practice	of	collective	religious	gatherings	and	prayers.	
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for	women	to	pray	in	jamaat	and	women	can	lead	women	in	prayer.		[Some	people]	have	a	huge	problem	with	that”.		Donya	conveys	her	frustration	with	how	women	were	denied	the	opportunity	to	gain	the	blessings	of	praying	in	jamaat	when	she	refers	to	it	as	a	“big	thing”.		She	perceived	this	problem	as	one	rooted	in	misconceptions	about	women	claiming	“imamat”	(religious	leadership	of	a	congregation)	when	leading	prayers	for	other	women.		She	clarified	that	a	woman	leading	prayers	for	other	women	was	not	considered	the	same	as	a	woman	claiming	to	be	an	imam	for	the	whole	congregation	(including	men).		Donya	further	explained	that	the	denial	of	this	collective	practice	was	because	of	exaggerated	fears	of	the	potential	of	women	to	claim	to	be	an	imam	that	were,	in	turn,	tied	to	securing	the	already	established	androcentricity	of	jamaat.	Shumaila	also	echoed	the	importance	of	collective	religious	practices	when	she	described	her	first	impression	of	an	Al-Huda	classroom.		She	stated:	I	don’t	know	what	it	was	but	it’s	a	very	welcoming	environment	and	it’s	a	very	peaceful	kind	of	thing	that	pulls	you	in	somehow.			There	is	a	hadith	where	people	study	the	Quran	together	and	the	angels	descend,	mercy	descends,	and	I	could	actually	feel	that	being	there	with	these	women.		Shumaila	saw	evidence	of	the	special	blessings	bestowed	on	collective	religious	praxis	in	the	atmosphere	of	an	Al-Huda	classroom.		She	related	the	feeling	of	peace	that	drew	her	into	the	class	to	the	promises	of	blessings	of	mercy	and	angels	upon	those	engaged	in	the	collective	study	of	the	Quran.		Shumaila,	Donya,	and	Ghazala	were	aware	of	the	significance	of	jamaat	in	Islam.		Their	comments	suggest	that	they	found	it	frustrating	that	whereas	men	had	opportunities	for	participating	in	collective	practice	at	the	masjid,	there	was	no	tradition	of	women	praying	in	jamaat	in	their	communities	and	that	efforts	to	create	spaces	for	women’s	jamaat	were	resisted	with	fervor.			
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Several	women	I	met	described	the	multiple	ways	these	resistances	manifested	in	their	familial	relationships:		Some	men	did	not	allow	or	made	it	difficult	for	their	wives,	sisters,	and	daughters	to	join	these	groups,	others	denounced	the	leadership	of	women	Islamic	scholars	as	inherently	un-Islamic,	and	rumours	abounded	about	what	goes	on	in	these	women-only	spaces.		Accusations	of	“brainwashing”	or	“joining	a	cult”	compounded	the	stigmatization	of	these	women’s	collective	spaces.		However,	for	many	women,	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat’s	opposition	to	the	normative	reservation	of	collective	aspects	of	Islamic	praxis	for	men	was	a	valuable	intervention	that	allowed	them	to	elevate	their	practices	of	piety.	 As	several	women	I	interviewed	observed,	many	men	in	their	lives	guard	the	androcentricity	of	the	domain	of	intellectual	discussion	about	religion	(and	other	things)	by	reasserting	a	gendered	order.		Opposition	to	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	from	men	thus	also	emerges	from	their	perception	that	joining	Al-Huda	or	the	Jamaat	was	a	sign	of	women	claiming	the	domain	of	religious	knowledge	and	practice	in	a	way	that	did	not	require	the	participation	or	leadership	of	men.		Illustrating	the	patriarchal	condescension	that	pervades	religious	discussions,	Ayesha,	a	regular	attendee	of	a	Quran	class	taught	by	an	Al-Huda	graduate	in	a	middle	class	neighbourhood	in	Mississauga,	described	the	gender	dynamics	she	observed	in	social	gatherings	as	follows:		When	it	comes	to	religion,	men	can	discuss	things	amongst	themselves	but	if	a	woman	tells	them	that	it	actually	says	this	in	the	Quran	they	don’t	take	her	seriously.		This	is	an	important	thing	to	change…I	notice	if	there	is	a	discussion	happening	[about	religion]	where	there	are	men	sitting	around	and	a	woman	says	something	and	gives	her	opinion,	these	Pakistani	men,	they	don’t	really	listen.		Their	reaction	is	that	this	is	just	a	woman,	what	does	she	know.		It	doesn’t	even	matter	if	she	is	more	educated	than	them	–	they	will	still	think	this.		They	assume	that	it’s	a	woman,	she	is	going	to	speak	illogically	and	she	can’t	say	educated	things.					
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Implicit	in	Ayesha’s	observations	are	her	frustrations	with	how	men	dismiss	her	knowledge	of	Islam	within	her	social	circles.		Even	as	she	was	deepening	her	knowledge	of	Islam	through	Quran	classes,	she	found	few	spaces	outside	of	the	class	to	engage	with	others	where	she	did	not	feel	silenced.				Other	women	faced	direct	criticism	and	ridicule,	often	in	the	form	of	misogynistic	sarcasm,	for	taking	on	religious	education.		Farida,	a	student	and	a	teacher	in	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	an	upper	class	neighbourhood	in	Karachi,	for	instance,	frequently	dealt	with	her	husband	belittling	her	knowledge	of	Islam.		She	stated:			If	there	was	any	issue,	some	religious	thing	that	we	are	discussing,	he	would	say	things	like	‘You	didn’t	know	that?		You	should	know	these	things	because	you	have	done	the	course	so	you	should	know.		They	didn’t	teach	you?’		Do	you	see	what	I	mean?		Obviously	I	am	not	perfect.		I	got	taunted	a	lot	that	oh	you	are	going	to	Al-Huda	so	you	should	have	a	lot	of	knowledge	and	you	should	know	all	these	things.		I	felt	very	frustrated	from	inside.				Farida	recounted	how	her	husband	would	test	her	in	this	way	to	make	it	seem	like	her	joining	Al-Huda	was	a	waste	of	time.		She	explained	that	this	reaction	was	in	part	because	he	was	not	happy	with	her	participation	in	Al-Huda.		When	Farida	enrolled	in	the	Al-Huda	diploma	program,	it	was	in	face	of	resistance	from	her	family	and	especially	her	husband.		She	described	his	reaction	as	follows:	When	I	wanted	to	join	the	course	I	had	some	trouble	with	my	husband.		He	just	had	something	against	doing	religious	things	like	this	because	he	would	say	‘why	can’t	you	just	read	at	home?		Why	do	you	need	to	go	there	and	make	it	a	big	issue?		Everyone	reads	the	Quran	at	home	and	I	read	it	with	the	translation	at	home.		Why	do	you	have	to	go	there?’		It	was	difficult	to	explain	to	him	that	learning	from	learned	scholars	is	a	different	experience.		Somehow	I	did	get	his	permission	to	take	the	course	and	I	don’t	know	how	we	got	through	that	time	but	he	was	not	happy.			Farida’s	account	of	her	husband’s	insistence	that	she	read	the	Quran	at	home	if	she	was	so	inclined	demonstrates	the	layers	of	anxieties	he	had	over	her	finding	a	community	outside	the	home,	and	her	becoming	more	actively	pious	through	a	space	that	excluded	him.		As	
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Farida	explained,	these	spaces	offered	a	means	to	gaining	knowledge	and	developing	her	piety	that	she	felt	would	only	be	possible	through	a	relationship	with	a	“learned	scholar”	and	not	on	her	own.		She	understood	her	husband’s	taunting	and	belittling	of	her	efforts	to	gain	Islamic	knowledge	as	an	indication	of	his	continued	discomfort	with	her	participation	in	these	spaces.	Because	of	such	suspicions	and	discomforts	of	women’s	spaces	of	Islamic	learning,	many	of	the	women	I	met	were	forced	to	negotiate	qawwam	in	order	to	join	and	participate	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	as	students	and	volunteers.		That	is,	these	women	had	to	balance	contradicting	components	of	their	piety	where	their	belief	in	their	husbands’	authority	posed	the	threat	of	obstructing	the	development	of	their	piety.		The	way	the	women	I	interviewed	worked	through	this	contradictory	balance	reveals	the	limits	and	malleability	of	qawwam	as	a	lived	experience.	As	Sumaya’s	interaction	with	her	husband	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	demonstrates,	many	women	had	to	contend	with	a	deep-seated	hesitation	towards	and	suspicion	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	to	the	extent	that	some	men	would	forbid	their	wives	(or	daughters)	from	joining	these	groups.		While	many	women	gained	access	to	the	teachings	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	in	informal	ways	(home-based	dars;	online,	audio	and	print	material)	without	drawing	much	attention,	it	was	official	membership	that	garnered	direct	and	explicit	opposition	from	their	husbands	and	created	the	conditions	where	
qawwam	became	pitted	against	women’s	piety.		Beenish	relayed	her	frustration	with	having	to	allay	her	family’s	fears	that	she	was	becoming	‘extreme’	when	she	decided	to	join	the	Jamaat	as	a	student	and	a	volunteer:	“People	would	say	that	I	am	going	to	an	extreme	and	I	shouldn’t	go	that	way.		This	thing	was	something	I	had	to	explain	to	people.		In	my	
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marriage	there	were	many	ups	and	downs	because	of	this	but	I	feel	like	that’s	why	I	was	closer	to	Allah”.		Zainab	too	faced	resistance	from	her	brothers	for	similar	reasons	once	she	joined	Al-Huda:	“They	are	afraid	that	Al-Huda	might	make	me	into	Taliban.		My	brother	told	me	that	one	day	Farhat	Hashmi	is	going	to	hand	you	a	Kalashnikov!		I	said	let’s	see!		If	she	hands	me	one,	I’ll	bring	it	to	you!		So	it	has	been	10	years	and	she	has	not	handed	me	a	Kalashnikov	(laughs)”.		These	experiences	demonstrate	the	ways	in	which	negotiations	of	
qawwam	included	negotiations	with	fears	of	religious	extremism	enhanced	through	the	context	of	the	militarized	Pakistani	security	state	and	War	on	Terror	discourse.	For	many	of	the	women’s	families	and	communities,	concerns	over	involvement	in	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	were	articulated	within	the	dominant	discourse	of	terrorism	as	a	perilous	backward	or	fundamentalist	version	of	Islam.		In	addition	to	being	a	testament	to	the	ubiquity	of	War	on	Terror	discourse,	these	fears	of	lurking	extremism	are	also	indicative	of	how	the	male	gaze	is	frustrated	by	the	proliferation	of	women-only	spaces.		Donya	explained	how	opposition	to	Al-Huda	(and	the	Jamaat)	is	articulated	differentially	by	different	sections	of	Pakistani	society:		The	very	conservative	groups	are	very	against	Al-Huda…they	see	Farhat	Hashmi	as	a	Westernized,	radical	feminist.	Then	the	liberals	say	she	is	very	conservative	because	she	has	made	women	wear	the	niqab.		So,	she	gets	that	backlash	from	all	sorts.		Nobody	is	happy.				Several	women	understood	these	forms	of	resistance	and	ridicule	as	fundamentally	about	an	underlying	resistance	to	the	leadership	of	women:	“Why	Al-Huda	is	controversial…this	is	not	a	misunderstanding.		Our	society	is	male	chauvinistic.		People	cannot	take	a	woman	as	a	Quran	teacher.		I	think	it’s	more	so	that”	(Rabia).		Shumaila	also	observed:		Religion	has	never	been	the	domain	of	women.		Anywhere	really,	Islam	was	never	in	the	women’s	domain	and	now	all	of	a	sudden	[it	is]	–	and	I	think	that’s	where	a	lot	of	
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the	criticism	comes	from	because	Al-Huda	is	managed	by	a	woman,	women	teach	and	learn	here,	a	woman	started	it	and	[men]	don’t	really	know	what	is	happening.				That	major	changes	on	multiple	levels	of	self,	family,	and	community	are	fashioned	and	enacted	through	these	spaces	intensifies	the	impact	of	this	obfuscation.		In	other	words,	as	the	women	explained	in	the	above-mentioned	accounts	of	their	experiences,	the	men	in	their	lives	levied	the	charge	of	extremism	in	order	to	act	out	against	being	left	out	of	a	conversation	in	which	‘their	women’	were	redefining	their	sociality.			
Navigating	Heteropatriarchal	Relationships	The	process	of	reclaiming	religion	and	piety	for	women	has,	as	would	be	expected,	set	in	motion	an	array	of	changes	in	the	way	women	themselves	practice	and	understand	Islam	and	in	the	structure	of	gendered	relationships	that	are	considered	to	be	in	line	with	their	notion	of	piety.		Perhaps	the	most	vexed	site	of	such	transformations	was	the	spousal	relationship	because	of	the	obstacles	posed	by	the	qawwam	of	the	husband.		Many	men	in	the	lives	of	the	women	I	met	felt	that	the	idea	of	qawwam	represented	an	archaic	or	anti-modern	approach	to	gender	relations	and	they	resisted	having	this	particular	form	of	authority/responsibility	within	their	households.		How	would	women	persuade	their	resistant	husbands	to	adopt	a	pious	way	of	life	while	simultaneously	giving	him	the	place	of	the	patriarch	and	trying	to	locate	themselves	in	a	subordinate	role?		How	would	women	respond	to	their	husbands’	qawwam	when	it	contradicted	their	practice	of	piety?		For	many	of	the	educated,	career-oriented	women	hailing	from	the	liberal	upper	classes,	qawwam	was	not	only	a	difficult	command	to	accept	but	it	also	contradictorily	put	them	in	the	position	to	have	to	create	the	conditions	of	their	own	‘subordination’	in	compliance	with	
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Islam	within	their	households	–	a	project	that	itself	paradoxically	requires	women	to	occupy	an	authoritative	role	in	their	spousal	relationships.		This	is	not	to	deny	that	forms	of	patriarchy	already	existed.		Rather,	the	emphasis	here	is	on	how	women	navigated	and	reconfigured	these	systems	to	comply	with	their	understanding	of	gender	relations	in	Islam.	 As	discussed	earlier,	several	women	clarified	that	qawwam	was	not	equivalent	to	a	totalizing	superiority	of	men	over	women.		Rather,	their	conceptualizations	of	qawwam	drew	on	their	broader	understanding	of	rights	and	responsibilities	as	expounded	in	their	explanations	of	their	commitments	to	cultivate	good	akhlaaq.		The	range	of	ways	in	which	women	inhabit	this	conceptualization	of	the	qawwam	of	men	demonstrates	the	complexity	of	qawwam	as	a	lived	experience	–	which	further	complicates	how	we	might	unpack	its	association	with	gendered	subordination	in	dominant	Pakistani	discourses	of	Islam	and	feminism	(see	chapter	three).		In	the	narratives	of	the	women	I	met,	negotiations	of	
qawwam	were	entangled	with	their	assessments	of	their	husband’s	intentions	and	commitments	to	develop	a	pious	household.		These	assessments	determined	how	many	women	navigated	their	husbands’	obstructions	of	the	development	of	their	piety.		It	also	shaped	their	understanding	of	where	qawwam	met	its	limits.		While	not	all	women	were	able	to	act	on	these	assessments	in	direct	and	confrontational	ways,	many	of	them	engaged	in	subtle	acts	of	subversion,	which	I	discuss	below.	When	I	started	my	research,	one	of	the	most	common	stereotypes	I	heard	about	the	relatively	recent	trends	in	piety	that	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	represented	was	that	joining	these	groups	leads	to	broken	families.		Speaking	with	Rashida,	one	of	the	media	relations	volunteers	at	the	Al-Huda	head	office	in	Islamabad,	I	was	informed	that	this	was	a	rumour	
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that	Al-Huda	had	to	contend	with	frequently	but	she	insisted	that	marital	problems	exist	with	or	without	Al-Huda,	that	Al-Huda	only	asks	women	to	follow	the	faith,	and	that	this	accusation	is	more	so	related	to	people	not	being	able	to	bear	seeing	an	independently	pious	woman.		While	the	bigotry	of	these	stereotypes	cannot	be	understated,	there	were	some	women	who	experienced	disruptions	in	their	family	life	because	of	the	intensification	of	their	religiosity.		Donya	described	her	experience	and	the	changes	it	brought	to	her	life	and	to	the	lives	of	her	classmates	as	follows:	“Initially	the	pressure	was	very	strong.		It	was	too	emotional.		We	were	literally	ready	to	give	up	our	homes,	our	lives,	everything	because	the	message	of	the	Quran	is	so	profound	and	it	is	Allah’s	word	so	it	is	very	very	strong”.		Donya	described	how	many	women	she	knew	felt	that	their	lives	were	in	need	of	drastic	change	after	hearing	what	an	Islamic	life	based	on	the	Quran	should	be.		Donya	went	on	to	explain	how	Al-Huda	had	“come	of	age”	since	those	days	and,	responding	to	those	accusations,	had	now	taken	an	approach	that	was	more	conscientious	of	impacts	on	familial	relationships.		Nevertheless,	many	women	explained	that	they	still	found	themselves	torn	by	the	tensions	their	new	practice	of	piety	brought	into	their	households	as	they	attempted	to	transform	various	aspects	of	their	lives	to	adhere	to	what	they	were	learning	about	Islam.				Many	women	I	met	mentioned	that	they	adopted	a	non-confrontational	and	diplomatic	method	of	dealing	with	these	tensions	that	was	simultaneously	attuned	to	their	husbands’	qawwam	and	did	not	compromise	their	commitments	to	developing	their	piety.			Farida’s	struggle	to	complete	the	course	exemplifies	how	the	negotiation	of	qawwam	took	place	on	a	day-to-day	level.		Describing	her	struggle,	she	stated:	The	course	I	took	was	2	years	long	and	classes	were	3	days	a	week.		I	don’t	know	how	I	finished	the	course.		It	was	very	demanding.		I	used	to	do	it	tactfully.		Like	
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when	my	husband	came	home	from	work	then	I	would	quickly	close	the	books	as	if	I	wasn’t	doing	anything	and	I	wouldn’t	even	mention	anything	about	the	course.		In	the	morning	I	would	try	to	go	after	he	left	for	work	and	come	back	before	he	came	back	and	not	mention	a	word	about	it.		His	work	timings	are	not	so	strict	and	sometimes	he	goes	later	to	work.		My	classes	started	at	9:30	so	I	would	pray	that	he	leave	before	I	need	to	leave!		Sometimes	when	he	would	go	at	like	10	[o’clock]	or	something	I	would	have	to	say	okay	I	am	going	to	class	I	could	see	in	his	looks	that	he	did	not	like	that	I	was	going.		It	was	very	hard	and	it	was	Allah’s	blessing	that	I	somehow	finished	the	course.		I	would	need	to	do	my	assignments	and	study	for	tests	at	home	but	when	to	do	it?		At	night,	we	would	go	to	bed	together.		What	I	would	do	then	is	once	he	fell	asleep	and	I	could	hear	him	snoring	I	would	come	out	and	go	to	the	other	room	and	study	and	do	my	homework	and	sometimes	it	would	be	late	into	the	night.		The	children	were	teenagers	by	then	so	they	were	not	so	dependent.		There	would	be	some	nights	that	I	would	study	till	3	am	but	I	had	this	motivation	that	I	had	intended	to	do	this	and	I	wanted	to	finish.		Then	finally	I	somehow	completed	the	course.		As	Farida	explained	in	this	passage,	maneuvering	around	her	husband’s	work	and	sleep	schedule	was	one	way	she	thought	to	reduce	confrontation	over	her	enrolment	at	Al-Huda.		But,	as	she	explained	further,	she	also	withheld	information	and	stories	so	as	not	to	enter	into	a	situation	where	she	would	have	deal	with	direct	forbiddance.		Farida	explained:	He	never	asked	me	what	was	going	on	with	the	course	or	how	much	of	it	was	left	or	anything.		I	was	also	not	bothered	[to	tell	him].		I	used	to	feel	so	restricted	like	I	was	bottled	up.		Sometimes	you	want	to	share	if	there	is	an	incident	or	there	are	so	many	things	that	you	are	reading	and	you	want	to	talk	to	someone	about	them.		He	was	also	concerned…because	obviously	the	children	were	young	and	kids	are	kids	and	they	are	not	perfect.		We	try	to	teach	them	but	they	make	mistakes	obviously.		He	would	say,	‘You	should	correct	your	children.	What	is	the	need	to	go	over	there	[to	class]?		This	is	your	farz	to	teach	them	to	pray	on	time.		It	is	not	your	responsibility	to	get	in	the	car	and	go	over	there	everyday.		That	is	not	your	[Islamic]	duty.		Don’t	they	teach	you	that?		Fix	your	children	first.’		He	did	not	pass	up	any	chance	to	say	things	like	this.		Farida	describes	how	she	did	not	wholly	submit	to	her	husband’s	wishes	–	that	is,	she	clearly	knew	he	did	not	want	her	to	have	anything	to	do	with	Al-Huda	yet	she	found	a	way	to	continue	her	participation	–	but	at	the	same	time	she	did	not	completely	dismiss	his	objections,	taking	care	to	not	upset	him,	putting	up	with	his	snarky	remarks,	and	thus	ensuring	that	he	did	not	invoke	his	qawwam	to	revoke	his	permission.				
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Describing	why	she	took	the	Al-Huda	course	despite	these	hassles	and	objections	from	her	husband,	Farida	said:		There	was	this	thing	that	I	am	doing	this	for	Allah.		As	they	say	the	best	thing	you	can	do	is	learn	the	Quran	and	teach	it	to	others	–	that	is	the	best	job	somebody	can	do.		That	one	thing	is	the	motivation.		I	am	doing	the	best	thing.		I	wanted	to	finish	my	commitment	to	Allah	and	somehow	finish	this	course.			As	we	spoke	further,	it	became	clear	that	she	did	not	think	that	her	husband	would	ever	join	her	on	this	path	nor	would	he	agree	with	or	support	this	commitment	to	Allah.		Instead,	he	was	doing	whatever	he	could	to	discourage	her.		Thus,	to	obey	someone	who	had	qawwam	over	her	but	was	purposefully	directing	her	off	the	pious	path	was	something	she	had	to	contend	with	in	creative	ways	within	the	parameters	that	she	understood	to	be	set	out	in	the	Quran	and	hadith.			Many	women	would	understand	Farida’s	story	as	one	of	admirable	jihad.		Rendered	in	terms	of	jihad,	negotiations	of	qawwam	take	on	new	meaning	as	an	opportunity	to	utilize	one’s	knowledge	about	Islam	and	to	strengthen	and	prove	one’s	commitment	to	piety	in	this	life	by	enduring	and	managing	such	struggles	in	an	Islamic	manner.		For	instance,	Ghazala	understood	these	conflicts	as	a	part	of	a	process	of	pious	subject	formation.		Sharing	her	thoughts	about	her	struggle	against	the	objections	of	her	husband	and	her	in-laws,	she	stated:	One	day	I	was	sitting	and	I	read	an	ayat	(verse)	and	it	basically	said	‘what	do	you	think?	Allah	is	not	going	to	put	you	through	trials	and	tribulations	and	just	give	you	heaven?’	I	was	like	okay	fine.	If	it	is	so	that	because	of	all	these	little	tribulations	Allah	is	going	to	give	me	jannah	(heaven),	then	I	should	be	bearing	it!		I	should	be	welcoming	them!		And	believe	you	me,	the	paradigm	shifted.				Ghazala’s	describes	the	shift	in	her	understanding	of	“trials	and	tribulations”	in	relation	to	the	afterlife.		As	mentioned	earlier,	the	time	and	space	of	the	akhira	bears	heavily	on	how	many	women	approach	their	relationships	and,	to	some	extent,	it	also	informs	how	women	
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feel	about	these	struggles.		That	is,	reminding	themselves	of	the	prospect	of	the	hereafter	informs	how	women	manage	their	affective	responses	by	locating	their	struggles	in	relation	to	the	afterlife.		Fariha	described	how	she	understood	the	struggles	she	saw	other	women	from	her	Quran	class	go	through	to	participate	in	Al-Huda	spaces:		In	these	houses	there	are	a	lot	of	problems	and	they	struggle	more.		They	have	more	
jihad	so	they	accordingly	get	more	reward...We	think	that	we	are	born	Muslim	and	we	will	just	be	received	in	heaven	because	of	that.		Before,	we	used	to	think	like	this	–	heaven	is	there	and	when	we	die	we	will	see	it.		But	really	it’s	here	in	life	that	we	need	to	work	and	do	things	because	when	we	die	its	over.		Fariha	and	Ghazala	describe	their	understandings	of	“struggle”	or	“trials	and	tribulations”	in	terms	of	the	struggle	to	practice	their	piety,	emphasizing	the	prospect	of	attaining	greater	rewards	in	the	afterlife	through	an	opportunity	to	prove	their	piety	in	this	life.		In	this	discursive	rendering	of	the	struggle	to	practice	and	pursue	the	development	of	piety,	Farida’s	experiences	of	not	giving	up	and	working	around	her	husband’s	aversion	to	her	participation	in	Al-Huda,	for	instance,	acquire	meaning	as	a	process	of	being	tested	and	strengthening	her	piety.	Negotiations	over	veiling	provide	another	illustrative	example	of	the	complex	ways	in	which	women	embody	their	piety	while	inhabiting	the	qawwam	of	the	men	in	their	lives.		The	women	I	interviewed	were	unanimous	in	their	belief	that	wearing	the	hijab	(the	abaya	and	the	niqab	represented	further	elevated	modes	of	pious	practice)	and	dressing	modestly	was	a	requirement	for	Muslim	women.		Though	the	meaning	accorded	to	veiling	varied	and	not	all	the	women	I	met	wore	the	hijab	as	a	regular	practice,	many	understood	it	as	a	site	of	internal	struggle	and	considered	it	to	be	a	goal	to	strive	for.		In	addition	to	their	own	hesitations	and	struggles,	many	women	described	how	they	had	to	contend	with	their	families,	and	most	notably	their	husbands,	who	were	uncomfortable	with	the	symbolic	
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baggage	that	came	with	veiling.		Several	women	explained	how	they	dealt	with	their	husbands’	objections	to	certain	forms	of	veiling.		While	some	women	would	put	aside	their	own	convictions	on	the	topic	to	submit	to	their	husband’s	wishes	in	the	spirit	of	qawwam,	others	would	find	alternative	ways	of	ensuring	their	own	piety	was	not	compromised.		Sumaya,	for	example,	had	tears	in	her	eyes	when	she	described	how	much	it	hurts	her	that	her	husband	does	not	allow	her	to	wear	the	niqab	(face	covering)	in	addition	to	her	hijab	and	abaya	even	though	she	felt	a	deep	desire	to	elevate	her	piety	through	this	embodied	practice.		Donya	also	described	the	challenges	posed	by	veiling	in	her	marriage:	“Hijab	was	a	biggie.		It	is	difficult	when	there	is	an	impact	on	your	marriage.		It	was	easier	for	my	friends	whose	husbands	were	religiously	oriented	or	who	wanted	their	wives	to	cover.	Those	husbands	were	quite	good	but	for	me	it	was	very	tough”.		Qawwam	thus	posed	an	obstacle	in	the	realization	of	the	ways	in	which	many	women	sought	to	embody	their	piety.	Concurring	with	Sumaya	and	Donya’s	experiences,	several	other	women	further	explained	how	their	husbands	similarly	opposed	the	embodiment	of	piety	via	the	hijab,	
niqab,	and/or	abaya	because	it	would	be	an	affront	to	normative	ideas	of	progress	and	modernity	in	the	educated,	upper	classes.		Farida,	described	at	length	how	she	faced	criticism	and	ridicule	from	her	husband	and	social	circles	when	she	stared	wearing	the	
hijab:		 I	started	wearing	the	scarf	(hijab).	Up	until	I	got	married	I	didn’t	take	a	scarf	or	anything.		I	didn’t	cover	up.		This	was	something	that	impacted	me	a	lot.		It	is	haram	(forbidden)	to	show	your	hair	and	we	are	so	casual	about	it	and	we	don’t	care.	Even	though	in	my	family,	on	my	mother’s	side	and	also	my	in-laws,	nobody	used	to	cover	their	hair	in	any	way	and	they	were	not	in	to	religion	so	much.		In	that	sense	it	was	a	big	step	from	me…First	when	I	took	the	scarf	my	husband	was	not	so	much	upset	but	he	was	not	very	happy	with	it	also.		He	would	say,	‘why	don’t	you	just	go	
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properly	covered.		Our	dress	is	shalwar	kameez64	and	it	is	covered.		Why	do	you	need	to	do	all	this?’		Then	I	started	to	go	to	this	weekly	dars	and	I	started	wearing	the	abaya	also	and	with	that	I	had	to	face	a	lot	of	negativity.	My	husband	was	like	‘What	is	this?		Why	do	you	have	to	do	this?’		People	used	to	ask	me	‘what	happened	to	you?’	as	though	there	were	horns	growing	out	of	my	head.		‘Why	did	you	start	this?’		Explaining	to	every	single	person	is	difficult,	no?		At	office	parties	and	things	like	that	[my	husband]	wouldn’t	want	me	to	go	covered.		I	can	understand	now	also	his	thinking.		It	does	make	an	impression.		There	is	something	in	our	culture	that	people	who	are	wearing	this	are	backwards,	or	that	they	are	on	a	lower	level,	or	they	are	from	a	low-income	group,	or	they	think	that	it	is	a	mullah	family.	Anyway,	slowly	I	convinced	him	but	there	were	things	like	when	we	were	going	to	a	wedding	or	something	and	he	would	say	please	don’t	wear	it	today	and	just	take	your	dupatta	and	I	had	to	assure	him	that	its	okay	and	nothing	will	happen.		There	wasn’t	a	big	fight	or	anything	but	eventually	he	did	approve…So	this	was	something	I	actually	had	to	face	and	in	the	family	too	it	was	the	same	especially	at	weddings	people	would	say	‘what	have	you	done	to	yourself?		Look	at	the	state	of	you.		Show	us	your	clothes	underneath.		Are	you	even	wearing	nice	clothes	under	there?		Are	you	just	wearing	your	night	suit?’		Of	course	it	is	very	convenient	because	you	don’t	have	to	dress	up	in	a	way	(laughs).		Colleagues	would	say	things	like	‘you	must	be	able	to	get	ready	so	quickly	in	the	morning?		Show	us.		Are	you	even	wearing	proper	clothes	under	there?		Do	you	even	need	to	iron	your	clothes	or	do	you	just	come	like	that?’		Well	these	are	jokes	and	I	understand	that,	but	it	gets	annoying.		Farida	explained	that	her	decision	and	desire	to	wear	the	hijab	emerged	as	she	gained	more	knowledge	of	the	Quran	through	study	at	Al-Huda.		As	is	evident	in	her	exasperation	at	how	dismissive	others	are	of	Quranic	passages	that	instruct	women	to	cover	their	hair,	Farida	asserts	that	the	hijab	is	an	essential	part	of	her	piety	and,	thus,	she	remained	committed	to	the	practice	despite	the	struggles	she	faced	within	her	family	and	social	circle.		Farida	understood	her	husband’s	discomfort	with	her	presence	at	his	office	parties	as	her	failed	status	as	a	symbol	of	his	modernity.		That	her	hijab	indicated	that	their	family	culture	was	“backwards”	or	of	a	“lower	level”	reflects	the	complex	entanglements	of	discourses	of	terrorism	and	class	status	that	constitute	his	attachments	to	modernity.		Farida	eventually	gained	a	fragile	approval	from	her	husband	for	her	practice	of	covering																																																									64	Outfit	commonly	worn	by	women	in	Pakistan	consisting	of	a	long	shirt	(kameez),	loose	pants	(shalwar),	and	a	long	and	wide	shawl	(dupatta).	
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but	it	still	required	her	to	do	the	work	of	providing	constant	assurances	that	“nothing	will	happen.”	Farida’s	experience	is	similar	to	that	of	many	women	who	join	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	and	go	through	a	transformation	of	their	religious	practice.		For	many,	the	hijab	aesthetically	cemented	their	status	as	an	anomaly	within	their	families,	which,	in	turn,	made	them	vulnerable	to	outright	aggressive	and	passive	aggressive	scrutiny	and	accusations	of	being	lower	class,	“backwards”,	“fundamentalists”	or	“extremists.”		Like	Farida,	Donya	also	had	to	contend	with	her	upper	class	family’s	anxieties	about	losing	class	status	because	of	her	hijab.		She	recounted:	I	remember	instances	in	which	I	would	be	in	a	gathering	and	my	brothers	literally	pulled	the	scarf	off	my	head	because	they	said	‘you	look	like	a	maasi	(domestic	worker).’		Yeah,	you	know	we	have	a	certain	kind	of	position	in	society	and	[they	are	worried	about]	what	will	people	think?		I	have	actually	been	through	that	phase	with	my	family	and	it	was	extremely	difficult.		In	these	comments,	Donya	explains	that	for	her	brothers	the	hijab	marked	the	gendered	embodiment	of	class	status.		She	described	the	extent	to	which	her	brothers	saw	her	hijab	as	a	threat	to	their	status	when	she	mentions	the	physical	aggressions	she	faced	when	her	they	pulled	off	her	hijab	in	social	settings.		That	they	pulled	of	her	hijab	in	public	is	symptomatic	of	the	impunity	with	which	such	logics	circulate	in	their	social	circles.		Their	association	of	the	hijab	with	domestic	workers	is	arguably	tied	to	the	common	practice	of	women	covering	their	heads,	at	times	as	a	matter	of	practicality,	when	using	public	transport.		Donya’s	hijab	thus	not	only	reflected	an	anti-modern	turn	in	her	religiosity,	but	it	also	projected	an	image	that	she	might	be	one	of	those	women	who	has	to	take	public	transportation	to	get	to	their	places	of	employment.			
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Furthermore,	talking	about	the	difference	between	her	and	her	mother-in-law,	Donya	observed	the	difficulty	people	have	in	seeing	a	younger	generation	of	women	taking	on	religion	and	disrupting	the	given	expectation	of	the	elders	being	the	repository	of	piety:		You	see	the	assigned	roles	in	this	society	-	the	elders	are	always	the	more	religious.	When,	as	a	daughter-in-law,	you	become	more	religious,	you	start	wearing	the	hijab,	then	you	are	expected	to	be	a	saint	and	of	course	no	one	is	perfect,	but	you	are	expected	to	be	on	perfect	good	behaviour	all	the	time	because	you	are	a	religious	person.		It’s	scary.		They	say,	‘You	study	the	Quran,	how	can	you	let	yourself	get	angry?	You	study	the	Quran,	how	come	we	saw	you	at	the	cinema?		You	study	the	Quran,	how	can	you	smoke?’		You	have	to	start	portraying	an	image	and	there	is	a	lot	of	internal	struggle	to	deal	with	this	expectation.		Both	Farida	and	Donya’s	experiences	are	marked	by	a	sense	of	isolation	borne	out	of	going	against	the	grain	of	established	scripts	of	religiosity;	not	only	do	they	change	the	script	with	a	new	approach	to	piety,	but	they	also	claim	piety	as	their	domain	in	order	to	make	space	for	their	practice.		In	addition	to	displacing	the	dominance	of	male	clerics	in	the	production	and	dissemination	of	religious	knowledge,	such	claims	also	challenge	the	idioms	of	piety	in	the	liberal	upper	classes	where	the	(loosely)	covered	head	of	an	‘elder’	woman	is	an	intelligible	and	acceptable	symbol	of	piety	while	the	hijab	on	a	younger	woman’s	head	is	read	as	a	red	flag	for	the	infiltration	of	‘mullahs’	or	‘fundamentalism’.65			Farida’s	experience	of	being	subjected	to	these	stereotypes	and	of	having	to	respond	to	family	members,	friends,	and	colleagues	who	felt	entitled	to	an	explanation	for	her	choice	to	wear	the	hijab	and	abaya,	was	echoed	in	Rabia’s	recollections	of	interactions	with	her	son:	“My	older	son	was	in	grade	9	at	the	time	[I	started	wearing	the	hijab]	and	he	said	that	‘when	you	used	to	come	to	my	school	everyone	used	to	say	that	my	mother	is	the	smartest	looking	and	now	my	image	is	being	ruined.’”		Women’s	struggles	against	their																																																									65	See	chapter	five	for	an	elaboration	of	how	the	trope	of	of	the	mullah	operates	in	my	respondents’	Islamic	discourses.	
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roles	as	the	embodied	markers	of	progress	and	modernity	were	further	reiterated	in	Donya’s	account	of	the	resistance	she	faced	from	her	husband.		In	Donya’s	marriage,	for	example,	the	hijab	came	to	signify	a	whole	bundle	of	changes	that	occurred	at	once:	“It	was	tough	for	him.		You	have	a	fine	and	good	wife	and	one	day	she	just	starts	covering	and	is	talking	about	religion	all	the	time,	she	is	not	listening	to	music	anymore,	she	doesn’t	want	to	watch	films	with	you	anymore,	she	doesn’t	want	to	talk	to	your	male	friends	anymore”.		Not	surprisingly,	Donya’s	choice	to	cover	was	the	tipping	point	for	her	husband	who	was	invested	in	the	‘modern’	lifestyle	of	the	urban	elite.		She	recounted	his	reaction	as	follows:	I	remember	my	husband	was	pretty	okay	with	the	dupatta	on	my	head…but	I	remember	he	was	very	ruffled	when	the	dupatta	became	a	scarf,	then	the	scarf	was	pinned	and	then	when	I	wore	the	abaya	he	started	throwing	a	fit.		Then	a	phase	came	when	there	was	a	lot	of	distance	and	he	would	say	‘I	can’t	introduce	you	to	people	anymore,	I	don’t	know	the	person	you	have	become,	I	don’t	know	who	you	are’...I	kept	on	wearing	it	but	when	he	was	around	I	wouldn’t	wear	it.		Then	one	day	I	went	to	him	and	I	said	‘you	know	I	am	going	through	these	phases	and	maybe	I	will	give	it	up	on	my	own	at	some	stage	but	right	now	I	have	to	do	it.		If	you	want	to	divorce	me	for	this,	you	are	welcome	to	do	that	but	this	is	my	inner	voice	saying	I	want	to	do	this	for	myself.		This	is	my	decision	what	I	wear	or	don’t	wear.’		He	was	still	less	traditional	so	he	accepted	it	in	the	spirit	of	freedom.		Many	others	didn’t.		Like	Sumaya’s	encounter	with	her	husband	described	earlier,	Donya’s	husband	asserted	his	modernity	by	accepting	his	wife’s	hijab	“in	the	spirit	of	freedom”.		Even	though	for	him	the	
hijab	was	antithetical	to	his	notions	of	modernity,	his	acceptance	of	it	marked	a	break	from	tradition	in	his	view,	in	that	he	was	not	going	to	assert	his	patriarchal	authority	to	forbid	this	practice.		At	the	same	time,	Donya	left	him	with	little	choice	as	is	evident	in	her	bringing	up	the	option	of	a	divorce.		Donya’s	assertion	of	her	practice	of	veiling	runs	counter	to	how	some	may	interpret	qawwam,	but,	according	to	Donya,	this	is	an	example	of	a	circumstance	where	qawwam	meets	its	limits.		As	Donya	explained,	her	husband’s	
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authority	over	her	practice	of	veiling	is	rendered	moot	once	it	is	clear	that	his	intentions	are	not	directed	at	developing	a	pious	life	and	household.		For	other	women,	like	Sabeen,	a	volunteer	and	a	teacher	at	the	Jamaat,	their	marriages	did	end	because	of	such	differences.		She	explained:			The	funny	thing	is	that	I	moved	here	[to	Karachi	from	Detroit]	and	five	minutes	later	he	got	a	divorce	from	me.		He	became	totally	Westernized	and	I	was	becoming	more	practicing	and	going	towards	Islam	and	he	was	having	a	hard	time	living	together	and	it	was	because	of	Islam.		That	was	difficult.		It	didn’t	shake	my	commitment.		It	really	didn’t.		I	knew	I	was	on	the	right	track…I	didn’t	do	anything	wrong.		The	track	was	right.				Like	Donya,	Sabeen	asserts	her	confidence	in	the	way	she	was	developing	her	piety	because	of	its	basis	in	her	enhanced	knowledge	of	Islam	gained	through	her	participation	in	the	Jamaat.		Sabeen	further	explained	that	her	participation	in	a	Jamaat	affiliated	group	in	Detroit	had	precipitated	through	her	experiences	as	a	volunteer	youth	advocate	at	her	local	community	centre.		She	suggested	that	many	of	the	problems	that	plagued	the	young	people	in	her	community,	such	as	youth	pregnancy,	sexual	violence,	sexually	transmitted	infections,	drug	addiction,	and	child	neglect,	were	directly	addressed	in	the	family	system	upheld	in	the	Jamaat’s	interpretation	of	Islam.		Sabeen	described	at	length	the	midnight	phone	calls	she	received	from	desperate	youth	and	the	parents	who	admonished	her	for	not	telling	them	about	their	children’s	afflictions.		As	she	became	increasingly	involved	in	the	Jamaat	affiliated	group	in	Detroit,	she	felt	the	need	to	move	back	to	Pakistan	where	she	thought	she	would	find	a	stronger	Muslim	community,	free	of	the	afflictions	that	were	becoming	a	taxing	aspect	of	her	community	work	in	Detroit.		At	the	same	time,	she	mentioned	that	her	husband,	who	was	also	peripherally	involved	in	the	Jamaat	affiliated	group	in	Detroit,	was	also	facing	formidable	obstacles	in	employment	and	felt	that	he	would	be	able	to	establish	himself	better	in	Pakistan.		Sabeen	explained	that	they	decided	
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together	to	move	back	to	Pakistan	with	their	three	children.		After	they	arrived	in	Karachi,	her	husband	was	able	to	quickly	establish	himself	in	the	corporate	sector	in	Pakistan	and	became	increasingly	involved	in	the	social	life	that	came	with	a	well-paying	corporate	job.		However,	her	aspirations	in	coming	to	Pakistan	took	her	on	a	path	that	conflicted	with	her	husband’s	ambitions.		Sabeen	explained	that	her	husband	disagreed	with	the	direction	her	piety	was	taking	and	tried	to	intervene,	at	times	aggressively,	in	an	attempt	to	have	her	play	the	role	that	fit	into	his	newfound	corporate	success.		That	their	marriage	was	troubled	“because	of	Islam”	put	Sabeen	in	a	position	of	having	to	choose	between	her	marriage	and	her	piety	–	she	chose	the	latter	because	she	felt	that	her	husband	was	taking	her	away	from	the	“right	track.”			By	contrast,	Rabia	submitted	to	her	husband’s	objections	to	her	wearing	the	niqab	because	she	respected	his	pious	intentions	in	asserting	his	qawwam	even	though	their	understandings	of	the	practice	differed.		She	submitted	to	her	husband’s	wishes	even	though	this	meant	that	her	teaching	repertoire	at	Al-Huda	would	be	constrained.		She	explained	her	decision	as	follows:			I	don’t	take	on	the	tafseer	(exegesis)	classes	–	because	I	don’t	cover	my	face.	They	(Al-Huda)	haven’t	said	this	as	a	rule	but	I	feel	that	if	I	teach	tafseer,	I	should	be	at	the	level	of	covering	my	face.	That	is	one	of	the	things	that	they	have	asked	me	to	teach	but	my	husband	would	not	be	very	comfortable	with	me	covering	my	face.		A	couple	of	times	I	tried	to	wear	it	and	he	said	‘No,	don’t	do	this.		Only	do	this	much	[hijab]’	because	he	didn’t	think	it	was	required...	So	I	don’t	teach	the	tafseer	classes.			As	Rabia	explained,	even	for	people	like	her	husband	who	was	more	or	less	supportive	of	her	religious	turn	and	was	on	the	same	page	in	terms	of	a	commitment	to	developing	a	pious	household,	the	niqab	and	Rabia’s	commitment	to	Al-Huda	initially	invoked	an	anxiety	about	extremism:	“He	thought	they	were	going	to	make	me	wahabi.		These	people	think	that	they	(Al-Huda)	are	from	wahabi	sect.		They	are	afraid	of	the	wahabi	sect”.		Many	
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women	at	Al-Huda	have	to	contend	with	the	accusation	that	they	are	practicing	a	wahabi	interpretation	of	Islam,	an	Islamic	sect	that	is	often	discursively	mobilized	as	a	gloss	for	fundamentalism	and	terrorism	(Jalal,	2008).66		Rabia	submitted	to	her	husband’s	qawwam	in	this	example	by	not	wearing	the	niqab,	however,	notably,	she	did	not	submit	to	his	stance	on	the	niqab.		That	is,	she	continued	to	believe	that	the	niqab	was	required	of	women	and	in	a	small	act	of	refusal,	she	gave	up	teaching	the	tafseer	class	in	order	to	stay	true	to	her	own	beliefs.		Rabia	excluded	herself	from	teaching	tafseer	because	in	her	understanding	of	piety	she	should	be	in	the	practice	of	wearing	the	niqab	in	order	to	teach	it,	even	though	this	is	not	a	rule	at	Al-Huda.		Notably,	Rabia’s	decision	to	not	teach	tafseer	also	exemplifies	how	the	practice,	meaning,	and	significance	of	wearing	the	niqab	is	not	dictated	by	Al-Huda’s	official	organizational	stance	on	the	niqab.	In	Donya’s	case,	if	her	husband	had	objected	to	her	veiling	on	the	basis	that	she	was	misinterpreting	Allah’s	commands	as	Rabia’s	husband	did,	she	may	have	not	had	the	religious	grounds	to	go	against	his	wishes	and	may	have	instead	engaged	with	him	on	the	finer	points	of	religious	interpretations	of	veiling.		However,	because	his	intentions	were	not	pious,	and	because	they	were	caught	up	in	the	instrumentalization	of	her	body	as	a	signifier	of	(his)	modernity,	she	was	able	to	Islamically	justify	her	‘disobedience’	and	risk	a	divorce.		For	others,	the	matter	of	assessing	their	husband’s	piety	or	intentions	did	not	
																																																								66	While	the	term	wahabi	refers	to	the	followers	of	Muhammad	Abdul	Wahab’s	eighteenth	century	reformist	interpretation	of	Islam,	the	connotations	of	the	term	have	transformed	over	time	including	contemporary	associations	with	organizations	such	as	Al-Qaeda.		Wahabism	is	often	associated	with	“conservative”	or	“orthodox”	practices	such	as	the	niqab.		For	a	historical	trajectory	of	the	term	in	South	Asia	see	Hay	(1988)	and	Jalal	(2000).		In	relation	to	the	women	I	met,	they	often	faced	accusations	of	being	wahabi	because	of	their	embodied	practices	of	veiling	that	took	the	form	of	the	hijab,	abaya,	and/or	niqab.		Because	these	practices	came	to	be	associated	with	Saudi	styles	of	veiling,	they	were	often	equated	with	wahabism.		Moreover,	this	accusation	was	often	used	to	insinuate	that	these	women	did	not	believe	in	following	the	
hadith.	
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come	up	in	the	same	way.		For	example,	Fatima’s	husband	asked	her	not	to	wear	the	abaya	in	addition	to	her	hijab	because	he	did	not	want	her	to	be	too	different	from	his	family	who	he	considered	to	be	more	“modern”.		She	listened	to	him	not	because	of	his	intentions,	but	because	she	felt	that	she	did	not	want	to	disobey	him	and	go	against	his	qawwam	as	a	matter	of	the	development	of	her	own	piety.		Instead,	she	said	that	she	believed	in	the	power	of	prayer	and	that	she	would	“pray	that	Allah	will	make	him	understand	one	day”.		Fatima	understood	her	husband’s	objections	to	her	wearing	an	abaya	as	a	matter	of	his	concerns	over	his	image	and	social	status	within	his	family.		However,	she	continued	to	believe	that	this	was	a	necessary	practice	and	turned	to	prayer	as	a	means	to	bringing	her	husband	into	compliance	with	what	she	understood	to	be	an	important	aspect	of	her	piety.			Underlying	these	tensions	over	veiling	was	the	dual	role	of	the	veil	as	an	embodied	symbol	and	an	embodied	practice	(Asad,	1993;	Hoodfar,	2001).		The	symbolic	function	of	the	veil	was	important	to	many	women	I	conducted	research	with	as	an	outward	declaration	of	their	commitment	to	piety,	however,	it	was	the	disciplinary	function	of	the	veil	as	a	means	through	which	religious	virtues	would	be	cultivated	in	the	self	that	they	felt	was	lost	on	those	who	opposed	their	practice	of	veiling	because	of	its	symbolic	baggage.		For	example,	the	mobilization	of	tropes	of	“backward”,	“extremist”,	“fundamentalist”	or	“wahabi”	to	forbid,	intervene	in,	and/or	ridicule	women’s	practices	of	piety	indicate	how	the	veil	functions	as	a	symbol	entangled	in	discourses	of	a	‘civilizing	mission’,	imperialism,	and	terrorism	that	many	women	had	to	struggle	against.		As	mentioned,	many	other	women	who	were	the	first	in	their	families	to	take	on	the	hijab	described	how	they	consistently	faced	the	association	of	the	hijab,	niqab,	and/or	abaya	with	being	‘backward’,	‘mullah’,	‘fundamentalist’,	and/or	‘wahabi’.		The	valence	of	such	accusations	is	symptomatic	
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of	the	confluence	of	the	dominant	discourse	of	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalism	in	tandem	with	the	discourse	of	the	War	on	Terror	and	the	power	of	the	militarized	nation-state.		In	other	words,	emboldened	by	the	ubiquity	of	War	on	Terror	discourse,	these	terms	evoke	the	need	for	military	and/or	developmental	intervention	in	order	to	mock,	fear	or	challenge	these	women’s	embodied	practices.		These	accusations	are	particularly	stinging	in	the	context	of	the	ostensibly	unshakeable	urban	upper	class	support	for	violent	military	interventions	in	other	parts	of	Pakistan,	such	as	Waziristan	and	Swat	Valley.		As	such,	these	visible	markers	of	the	wrong	and	dangerous	kind	of	piety	are	an	affront	to	the	normative	trajectories	of	subject	formation	in	the	urban	upper	classes.		Notably,	many	of	the	women	I	met	participated	in	these	discourses	of	military	intervention	in	complex	and	contradictory	ways	as	can	be	seen	in	their	own	practices	of	racialization	and	marginalization	of	other	communities	(see	chapter	five).		But	it	is	important	to	note	that	women	negotiated	
qawwam	differently	depending	on	their	assessment	of	their	husbands’	intentions	and	commitments	to	practices	of	piety,	which	can	be	read	as	an	effort	to	reaffirm	the	meaning	of	the	veil	as	an	embodied	practice	and	not	just	an	embodied	symbol.		Many	of	my	respondents’	practice	of	the	hijab	thus	complicates	nationalist	discourses	of	gender	and	reproduction.		The	way	they	perceive	their	practice	evades	the	ubiquitous	relegation	of	women’s	bodies	as	symbols	ensnared	in	the	fraught	dichotomy	of	Islam	and	modernity	within	nationalist	discourse.				
Conclusion	Many	women	I	interviewed	understood	the	gendered	system	borne	out	of	the	Islamic	concept	of	qawwam	as	an	inextricable	part	of	their	practice	of	piety.		The	ways	in	
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which	these	women	live	and	inhabit	qawwam	demonstrates	that	this	is	not	simply	an	instance	of	women	submitting	to	male	superiority.		Rather,	as	is	exemplified	by	the	place	of	motherhood	in	the	“eyes	of	Allah”,	the	belief	in	equality	in	the	akhira,	and	the	concomitant	focus	on	akhlaaq	in	their	Islamic	discourse,	the	women	I	met	imagined	their	gendered	positionality	in	transcendent	terms.		In	everyday	life,	this	often	results	in	the	seemingly	contradictory	practice	of	women	reconfiguring	gender	relations,	in	face	of	resistant	men	in	their	households,	to	bring	them	in	line	with	their	interpretation	of	Islamic	ideas	of	patriarchy	and	qawwam.		Some	of	the	conflicts	arising	out	of	these	attempts	elucidate	divergences	in	ideas	of	domestic	space,	reproduction,	and	embodied	signification	between	my	respondents’	discourses	of	piety	and	those	mobilized	in	service	of	consolidating	the	Pakistan	nation-state.		For	instance,	the	more	visible	markers	of	changes	family	members	perceive	in	the	embodied	practices	of	many	women	are	comprehended	and	criticized	through	the	common	tropes	of	discourses	of	terror	that	are	complicit	in	strengthening	the	power	of	the	Pakistani	state	through	increasing	militarization	and	surveillance.		By	recasting	the	gendered	tropes	central	to	nationalism,	the	religious	praxis	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	comes	into	conflict	with	the	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalist	discourse	of	the	Pakistani	state.		Because	the	ways	in	which	many	women	conceptualize	and	inhabit	qawwam	does	not	quite	correspond	with	gendered	itineraries	of	Pakistani	citizen-subject	formation,	it	disrupts	and	resists	the	imposition	of	the	temporal	itinerary	of	the	nation-state.			Simultaneously,	armed	with	formal	Islamic	education,	women	were	able	to	map	out	the	boundaries	of	qawwam	and	its	applicability	and	relevance	in	situations	where	their	own	piety	would	be	threatened	or	compromised	through	obedience	to	their	husbands.		As	
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the	examples	of	struggles	and	negotiations	over	veiling	and	joining	a	women’s	piety	group	demonstrate,	the	women	I	met	had	very	clear	ideas	of	the	limitations	of	qawwam	and	were	thus	able	to	take	explicit	and/or	implicit	positions	against	demands	that	ran	contrary	to	their	beliefs.		Paying	heed	to	the	multiplicity	of	refusals	that	constitute	their	inhabitance	of	
qawwam	is	essential	to	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	structure	of	gender	relations	my	respondents	aim	to	establish	where	belief	in	equality	in	the	akhira	informs	the	ways	in	which	women	assert	themselves.		Moreover,	even	though	many	women	faced	difficulties	in	maneuvering	around	pre-established	scripts	of	piety,	progress,	tradition,	and	modernity,	the	fruit	of	their	collective	efforts	to	bring	about	changes	in	their	homes	and	communities	is	evident	in	how	their	credibility	enhanced	over	time	as	their	pedagogical	pedigree	found	purchase	amongst	their	interlocutors.		However,	while	this	chapter	focused	more	so	on	how	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	articulate	and	inhabit	their	relationships	with	Islam,	in	the	following	chapter,	I	discuss	the	implications	of	how	the	authorizing	discourse	of	education	in	this	religious	praxis	affirms	and	constructs	forms	of	socio-economic	privilege	in	order	to	elaborate	on	how	these	women	are	also	complicit	in	Pakistani	heteropatriarchal	religio-nationalism.		
204	
Chapter	5:	Piety	and	Its	Others		 At	an	Al-Huda	centre	in	Karachi’s	affluent	Defence	Housing	Authority	neighbourhood,	a	few	Al-Huda	students	and	teachers	organized	a	weekly	“maasi	class”	especially	designed	for	the	women	domestic	workers	employed	at	the	homes	of	some	of	the	students	and	teachers	as	part	of	their	dawah	activities.		The	class	took	place	in	the	same	room	as	all	other	classes	and	the	domestic	workers	used	the	same	chairs	and	tables	as	all	other	students	at	the	centre.		The	centre	also	provided	these	workers	with	a	complimentary	hijab,	bag,	stationery,	and	prayer	books.		Such	‘egalitarian’	gestures,	while	unusual	in	many	upper	class	homes,	were	commonplace	in	Al-Huda’s	institutional	spaces.		As	Romana	explained,	“in	[Al-Huda’s]	eyes,	the	rich	weren’t	rich	and	the	poor	weren’t	poor”.		She	elaborated	that	everyone	at	Al-Huda	sat	in	the	same	spaces,	wore	the	same	uniform,	and	rotated	chores	on	the	campus.			However,	despite	the	egalitarian	and	charitable	intentions	of	the	organizers	of	the	
maasi	class,	many	of	the	domestic	workers	I	spoke	with	were	only	there	because	they	were	required	to	be	by	their	employer.		They	explained	how	they	were	there	because	their	employers	arranged	for	them	to	be	dropped	off	and	picked	up	from	the	centre,	suggesting	that	their	mobility	was	constrained	as	they	could	not	leave	the	class	if	they	felt	they	did	not	want	to	be	in	it.		Thus,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	their	employers	and	the	instructors	saw	the	maasi	class	as	an	act	of	benevolence,	this	educational	opportunity,	so	to	speak,	took	place	under	relatively	coercive	conditions.		Imagining	a	woman-to-woman	“trickle	down	effect”,	to	put	it	in	Shumaila’s	words,	from	the	educated	upper	classes,	women	affiliated	with	the	centre	dropped	off	their	domestic	workers	for	three	hours	a	week	to	learn	literacy	skills,	health	and	hygiene,	their	Islamic	and	civic	rights	and	duties,	Islamic	knowledge,	and	
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more	significantly,	to	unlearn	their	existing	practices	of	Islam.		Some	of	the	domestic	workers	I	spoke	with	at	the	class	described	their	existing	practices	of	Islam	as	reciting	verses	received	through	the	oral	traditions	of	their	families	and	communities,	and	going	to	the	shrines	of	Sufi	saints	on	special	occasions	–	practices	that	would	be	categorized	as	
biddat	and	shirk	in	my	respondents’	Islamic	praxis.		For	many	women	at	this	Al-Huda	centre,	these	domestic	workers	represented	irrational,	undiscerning,	ignorant	masses,	that	were	susceptible	to	the	influence	of	mullahs.		As	I	elaborate	later	in	this	chapter,	this	construction	of	the	domestic	workers	as	under	the	influence	of	mullahs	also	constitutes	my	respondents’	self-perception	as	learned	and	rational	Muslims	who	are	engaged	in	the	development	of	an	authentic	Islamic	practice.		This	discursive	othering	forms	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	delegitimizing	the	domestic	workers’	existing	Islamic	practices	with	impunity	in	the	maasi	class.			For	instance,	as	part	of	their	lesson,	these	workers	were	told	in	no	uncertain	terms	that	the	prayers	they	traditionally	recited	were	tantamount	to	a	sin	because	they	did	not	follow	a	rational	engagement	with	scripture.		According	to	the	teachers	at	Al-Huda,	the	domestic	workers’	traditional	prayers	were	irrational	because	they	did	not	know	the	literal	meaning	of	the	Arabic	verses	they	recited.		In	an	effort	to	convince	the	domestic	workers	to	change	their	ways,	one	of	the	teachers	at	the	centre	gave	a	short	lecture	about	how	the	domestic	workers’	prayers	could	not	be	“heartfelt”	because	of	this	lack	of	understanding.		Inversely,	the	domestic	workers	were	told	that	any	emotional	attachments	they	had	to	their	existing	practices	were	irrational,	and	therefore	un-Islamic.		The	ways	in	which	the	domestic	workers’	purportedly	sinful	prayers	were	meaningful	to	them,	then,	was	rendered	irrational	because	they	were	not	the	result	of	advancement	through	Al-Huda’s	
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scripted	stages	of	developing	a	rational	form	of	piety.		The	possibilities	of	the	workers’	practices	of	piety	were	characterized	as	truncated	because	of	their	lack	of	literacy	–	read	as	a	lack	of	rationality.		Notably,	the	need	to	develop	a	meaningful	and	“heartfelt”	relationship	to	the	text	is	an	important	component	in	my	respondents’	discourses	of	piety.		For	example,	many	women	I	met	mentioned	that	they	valued	and	desired	the	ability	to	spontaneously	weep	when	reading	or	listening	to	recitations	of	the	Quran	in	Arabic.		However,	in	their	Islamic	praxis	these	meanings	and	attachments	are	achieved	through	progression	along	stages	of	religious	subject	formation.		They	only	gain	their	validity	as	part	of	the	development	of	a	‘rational’	form	of	piety.			As	I	elaborate	in	this	chapter,	the	maasi	class	was	constituted	through	developmentalist	logics	of	rational	progress	and	the	imperative	for	Al-Huda	women	to	fulfill	their	dawah.		The	class	itself	functions	as	a	dynamic	site	in	the	ongoing	production	of	Al-Huda’s	discourse	of	piety	that	relies	on	its	own	conceptualizations	of	a	universal	subject.		Situating	the	domestic	workers	within	a	developmentalist	schema	as	inferior	consolidates	their	discourse	of	piety	as	having	universal	purchase.		That	is,	through	the	differentiated	inclusion	and/or	exclusion	of	others,	my	respondents’	discourse	of	piety	extends	beyond	their	immediate	communities.		However,	the	ways	in	which	some	of	the	domestic	workers	subverted	the	class	elucidates	the	incompleteness	of	this	process	of	consolidation.		During	one	of	the	maasi	class	sessions,	I	met	Nabeela,	an	older	woman	employed	by	one	of	the	students	at	Al-Huda.		She	was	particularly	vocal	and	eager	throughout	the	class	and	seemed	pleased	to	be	there.		She	mentioned	that	she	had	been	attending	the	maasi	class	ever	since	the	centre	started	it.		At	one	point	the	instructor	asked	everyone	to	pull	out	copies	of	the	Quran	and	turn	to	a	particular	page.		Since	I	did	not	have	my	own	copy,	I	was	told	to	share	
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with	Nabeela.		Nabeela	was	more	than	happy	to	share.		She	opened	up	the	book	and	placed	it	between	us.		I	looked	at	the	page	and	noticed	that	it	was	not	the	page	the	instructor	was	referring	to.		I	told	Nabeela	this	and	she	readily	brushed	it	off	but	continued	to	share	the	wrong	page	with	me.		The	instructor	asked	everyone	to	follow	the	recitation	by	moving	their	fingers	along	the	page	and	reading	out	loud	together.		Nabeela	placed	her	finger	on	the	wrong	page	she	was	sharing	with	me	and	her	finger	moved	through	the	text	with	confidence.		The	room	erupted	into	a	discordant	recitation	and	it	was	difficult	to	make	out	what	anyone	was	reciting.		I	could	hear	Nabeela	reciting	something	but	it	did	not	match	the	words	her	finger	was	moving	through	in	the	book,	nor	did	it	match	what	the	instructor	was	reciting	on	the	microphone.		She	noticed	my	confusion	and,	in	so	many	words,	told	me	to	just	go	along	with	it.			Later,	the	larger	maasi	class	broke	up	into	smaller	groups	of	three	or	four	women	according	to	their	levels	of	literacy.		I	followed	Nabeela	to	her	group	and	sat	in	on	their	session.		Before	the	instructor	had	a	chance	to	begin	the	lesson,	Nabeela	quickly	and	urgently	took	out	a	piece	of	paper	from	her	bag	and	gave	it	to	the	instructor	to	ask	her	to	read	it	for	her.		It	was	a	prescription	for	a	few	different	medications.		The	instructor	and	Nabeela	then	talked	at	length	about	the	medications,	why	she	needed	them	and	how	she	would	acquire	them.		I	wondered	why	Nabeela	had	not	asked	her	employer	to	read	it	for	her.		As	Nabeela	put	away	the	prescription,	another	domestic	worker	began	to	ask	other	health-related	questions.		The	instructor	told	me	later	that	this	was	a	common	occurrence	and	that	she	was	more	than	happy	to	help	them.		She	explained	that	some	domestic	workers	are	afraid	to	ask	their	employers	for	help	with	health	concerns	for	fear	of	being	seen	as	unreliable	or	as	a	liability.		For	Nabeela,	the	maasi	class	offered	a	space	for	her	to	
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gain	access	to	this	resource	while	reducing	the	risk	of	her	employer	finding	out	about	her	health	conditions.		I	could	not	help	but	interpret	Nabeela’s	eager	performance	in	the	earlier	class	in	relation	to	this	incident.		While	Nabeela	was	able	to	sufficiently	navigate	the	class,	her	goals	were	not	commensurate	with	the	explicit	goals	set	out	by	the	course	instructors.		That	is,	Nabeela	did	not	participate	in	the	maasi	class	as	a	materialization	of	different	stages	of	pious	subject	formation	where	the	instructor	and	domestic	worker-students	were	hierarchically	located	in	different	stages	of	religious	advancement.		Rather,	her	participation	was	shaped	by	concerns	for	her	health	and	employment.		Thus,	while	Al-Huda	teachers	attempted	to	lodge	the	domestic	workers	within	a	developmentalist	logic	of	rational	pious	subject	formation,	the	domestic	workers	participating	in	the	class	found	ways	to	subvert	this	logic.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	alongside	their	discursive	positioning	as	the	irrational	inferior	other,	domestic	workers	also	constituted	the	conditions	of	possibility	especially	for	the	upper	class	women	I	met	to	commit	to	and	engage	in	the	development	of	their	piety.		That	is,	employing	domestic	workers	alleviated	women’s	responsibilities	at	home	and	allowed	them	to	pursue	their	Islamic	education.		Many	women	described	how	participation	in	Al-Huda	required	creative	time	management	that	allowed	them	to	fulfill	their	duties	at	home	as	wives,	mothers,	and	daughters	while	they	took	on	formal	courses,	study	circles,	or	
dawah	activities.		For	several	women,	this	meant	employing	the	help	of	domestic	workers.		Rabia,	for	example,	described	how	she	dealt	with	the	demands	on	her	time	after	enrolling	in	the	Al-Huda	diploma	program:	I	remember	it	was	very	tough	for	me.		That	was	when	I	got	a	new	servant	because	who	is	going	to	come	home	and	cook	in	the	afternoon.		My	husband	was	very	supportive	when	I	told	him	that	I	couldn’t	do	it	because	I	was	getting	so	tired	and	he	said	okay	let’s	hire	someone…You	only	have	24	hours	so	you	have	to	somehow	
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manage	these	things.		It	is	also	that	we	were	lucky	that	we	found	good	cooks	and	good	people	and	the	kids	had	no	problem	–	I	think	this	was	a	blessing	from	Allah.		Similarly,	in	my	conversations	with	Zainab,	whose	struggles	to	complete	the	diploma	course	were	exacerbated	because	of	the	demands	of	cohabiting	with	an	extended	family	of	in-laws,	she	often	interjected	her	thoughts	with	gratitude	for	her	loyal	and	reliable	domestic	workers:	“My	driver,	mashallah,	he	is	my	right	hand”.		Domestic	workers	bringing	in	refreshments	or	asking	questions	about	what	to	cook	or	clean	would	often	interrupt	the	interviews	I	conducted	in	women’s	homes.		This	would	often	elicit	a	remark	from	many	women	about	how	these	domestic	workers	were	a	godsend	or	about	how	it	was	difficult	to	find	good	help.	Although	I	was	not	able	to	speak	in	private	with	the	domestic	workers	I	encountered	to	ascertain	personal	details,	the	demographics	of	domestic	workers	in	urban	Pakistan	would	suggest	that	their	‘assumed’	labour	was	determined	by	their	ethnic,	caste,	religious,	and	linguistic	identities.		The	relegation	of	certain	identities,	such	as	Christian,	Hindu,	Pathan,	Bangladeshi,	rural	Punjabi	and	Sindhi,	for	example,	to	domestic	work	is	pervasive	in	urban	centres	in	Pakistan	(Shahid,	2010).		Moreover,	domestic	work,	although	a	prevalent	form	of	labour,	is	not	a	recognized	form	of	labour	in	the	formal	economy	and	is	thus	excluded	from	labour	laws	that	would	offer	some	modicum	of	rights	and	protection	from	exploitation.		Al-Huda’s	maasi	class	occurs	within	this	context	of	ubiquitous	exploitation	of	domestic	workers	amongst	the	urban	upper	classes	in	Pakistan.		Speaking	to	analogous	experiences	of	black	women	in	service	work	in	the	United	States,	Claudia	Jones	(as	cited	in	Davies,	2008)	invokes	the	metaphor	of	a	“barometer”	(p.	39)	–	an	instrument	to	measure	atmospheric	pressures	–	as	a	way	to	think	about	what	is	revealed	about	the	status	of	all	women	through	an	analysis	of	the	status	of	black	women.		She	argues	for	interpreting	
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the	experiences	of	black	women	as	a	measure	of	the	severities	of	social	and	political	climates	in	order	to	gain	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	extent	and	complexity	of	systems	of	oppression.			If	we	are	to	conceive	of	the	domestic	workers	in	these	Al-Huda	women’s	lives	as	a	barometer	in	this	sense,	then	the	ways	in	which	they	are	located	in	a	relationship	of	“superexploitation”	(Jones,	as	cited	in	Davies,	2008,	p.	43)	is	painfully	evident.		Jones	used	the	term	“superexploitation”	to	refer	“to	the	ways	in	which	black	women’s	labour	is	assumed;	the	way	they	are	relegated	to	service	work	by	all	sectors	of	society,	with	the	complicity	of	progressives	and	white	women’s	and	labour	interests”	(Davies,	2008,	p.	42).		The	maasi	class	does	little	to	challenge	the	social	relations	that	constitute	the	assumed	labour	of	these	women	workers.		Furthermore,	as	‘illiterate’	women,	they	are	located	differently	than	other	students	at	Al-Huda.		This	difference	operates	at	several	levels	in	my	respondents’	constructions	of	the	self	as	possessors	of	rational	forms	of	piety.		That	their	“assumed	labour”	is	maintained	and,	in	fact,	remains	central	to	the	development	of	many	women’s	piety	makes	visible	the	limitations	of	the	domestic	workers’	inclusion	through	the	
maasi	class.			Together,	the	conditions	of	possibility	constituted	by	domestic	workers’	labour	and	the	developmentalist	dawah	targeted	at	them	illustrate	the	underlying	politics	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	in	my	respondents’	projects	of	religiosity.		On	one	hand,	the	domestic	workers’	always	already	assumed	labour	forms	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	many	students	and	teachers	at	Al-Huda	to	develop	their	piety.		On	the	other,	the	domestic	workers’	embodied	presence	at	the	Al-Huda	centre	as	students	also	does	the	discursive	work	of	the	“hypervisible	other”	(Mohanram,	1999,	p.	50)	in	these	Al-Huda	women’s	constructions	of	the	rational,	pious	self.			
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In	what	follows,	I	draw	on	interviews	and	participatory	observations	with	women	affiliated	with	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	to	suggest	that	as	a	process	of	subject	formation,	their	practices	of	piety	produce	a	genre	of	liberal	subjectivity	that	contributes	to	the	solidification	of	liberal	hierarchies	and	processes	of	exclusion/inclusion.		I	first	examine	the	role	of	scripture	and	the	concomitant	emphasis	on	literacy	to	map	out	how	rationality	is	constructed	through	the	centralization	of	the	text	in	my	respondents’	understanding	of	piety.		This	construction	of	rationality	marginalizes	the	illiterate	classes	from	my	respondents’	conceptualization	of	Islamic	piety	and	the	Muslim	subject.		I	then	focus	on	how	these	women	conceptualize	and	mobilize	the	Islamic	concepts	of	biddat	and	shirk	to	deem	other	practices	of	Islam	as	irrational	and	un-Islamic.		Their	mobilizations	of	these	concepts	coalesce	with	nationalist	constructions	of,	for	example	the	Hindu	other,	and	echo	anxieties	about	the	incompleteness	of	the	project	of	the	partition	of	India	(and	the	supposed	separation	of	Muslims	from	Hindus).		These	taxonomies	of	rationality	and	irrationality	are	acutely	evident	in	diasporic	discourses	of	piety	where	distance	from	Hindu/India	forms	the	basis	of	conjuring	a	better	possibility	for	practicing	an	‘authentic’	form	of	piety.		I	then	explore	how	self-perceptions	as	rational	student-subjects	of	Islam	are	tied	to	constructing	a	“genre”	(Wynter	in	Scott,	2000)	of	universalism	as	exemplified	in	the	developmentalist	logic	of	the	maasi	class	recounted	above.		Together	the	logics	of	rationality	and	developmentalism	echo	similar	distinctions	made	in	liberalism.		I	explore	how	we	can	understand	these	practices	of	othering	as	commensurate	with	liberalism	through	an	analysis	of	the	role	of	rationality	in	liberal	thought.		I	argue	that	the	constitutive	exclusions,	marginalizations	and	violences	produced	by	constructions	of	the	pious	self	are	
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commensurate	with	liberalism	and,	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	they	find	refuge	in	and	strengthen	one	another.				
Rational	Piety:	Text-Centrism	and	Literacy	
“Qur’an	for	all.		In	every	heart,	in	every	hand”.	(Al-Huda	International	slogan)	The	centrality	of	the	Quran	in	my	respondents’	envisioning	of	rational	pious	subjecthood	is	implicated	in	the	construction	of	good	and	bad	Muslims	in	Pakistan	and	in	the	diaspora.		In	the	maasi	class,	for	example,	Al-Huda	students	and	teachers	sought	to	help	their	domestic	workers’	unlearn	their	non-textual	practices	of	Islam	and	teach	them	how	to	read	the	Quran	and	understand	the	meaning	of	the	text.		Interrogating	how	the	text	operates	in	the	discursive	production	of	religiosity	is	imperative	in	order	to	avoid	the	tendency	to	reinscribe	a	homogenized	and	dehistoricized	conceptualization	of	Islam	that	assumes	an	a	priori	centrality	of	the	Quran	(see	chapter	two).		That	is	to	say,	the	role	of	the	Quran	varies	in	different	practices	of	Islam.		As	such,	keeping	in	mind	the	specificity	and	plurality	of	Islamic	practices,	the	making	of	the	centrality	of	the	Quran	must	be	read	as	part	of	the	politics	of	remaking	religious	subjectivities.		In	the	case	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with,	the	foundational	role	of	the	Quran	is	implicated	in	their	politics	of	representation	and	their	construction	of	difference.		That	is,	their	text-centrism	positions	the	self	and	other	on	a	singularized	trajectory	of	progress	and	development	with	education	and	literacy	as	its	central	ethic.		In	the	discourses	of	piety	of	the	women	I	met,	their	text-centric	approach	emphasizes	and	valorizes	the	form	of	text	(words	on	paper)	and	the	mechanics	of	engaging	with	the	text	through	literacy	skills.		Although	the	text	as	a	pedagogical	tool	operates	interconnectedly	on	multiple	registers	as	form,	content,	and	
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sacred	object,	I	elaborate	on	the	mobilization	of	text	as	form	in	line	with	how	it	operates	in	my	respondents’	discourses	of	piety	where	the	text’s	role	as	something	that	requires	a	certain	set	of	skills	produces	a	subject-position	shaped	by	the	acquisition	and	mastery	of	these	skills.			Central	to	my	respondents’	notions	of	piety	is	the	ethic	of	turning	to	the	text	for	guidance	and	reading	and	comprehending	its	meaning	for	the	purposes	of	understanding	and	practicing	how	to	be	better	Muslims.		Accordingly,	literacy	skills	such	as	reading	and	comprehension	are	pre-requisites	in	the	formation	of	a	rational	form	of	piety	for	many	of	the	women	I	interviewed.		Rendered	as	a	requisite	component	of	the	development	of	piety,	the	Quran	as	text	operates	as	a	test	for	rationality	and	a	standard	against	which	other	practices	of	Islam	are	measured	and	denounced.		In	this	sense,	the	text,	as	a	sign	of	rationality,	is	mobilized	to	set	up	the	vantage	point	of	the	self	as	a	rational	subject,	which,	in	turn	is	employed	to	identify	and	manage	difference.			The	necessity	of	engaging	with	the	Quran	in	a	methodical	and	literate	fashion	through	Al-Huda	and/or	the	Jamaat	emerges	as	a	response	to	common	practices	that	do	not	take	up	the	Quran	as	a	text	to	be	read	and	understood.		For	many	of	the	literate	classes	the	recitation	of	the	Quran	in	Arabic	is	sufficient	and	individual	understanding	of	the	translation	is	not	a	necessary	step	to	becoming	a	good	Muslim.		Describing	her	experience	with	her	Quran	teacher	as	a	child,	Ghazala	expressed	frustration	with	the	fact	that	her	teacher	never	knew	the	meaning	of	what	he	was	teaching	her:	“they	will	recite	a	number	of	
ayaats	but	the	relationship	to	our	lives	they	wouldn’t	know	because	they	haven’t	understood	any	of	it”.		She	went	on	to	contrast	this	with	her	first	chance	encounter	with	a	
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home-based	Jamaat	Quran	class	when	she	was	visiting	her	sister’s	house	as	an	adult.		She	described	this	encounter	as	follows:					I	went	to	the	room	and	I	was	sitting	there	and	I	was	listening	to	[the	teacher]	and	after	some	of	the	ayaats	(verses)	she	explained	I	felt	like	really?		Have	I	ever	read	the	Quran	before	or	is	it	the	first	time	I	am	listening	to	these	ayaats?		Because	the	way	she	was	explaining	it,	and	it	was	not	only	that	she	read	it	first	in	Arabic	and	gave	the	translation	in	Urdu,	no.		When	she	told	the	translation	and	afterwards	related	that	ayat	to	our	practical	life	[and	told	us]	how	to	implement	it	in	our	practical	life...It’s	been	seven	years	and	since	then	I	have	been	attending	this	session	so	regularly.		Similarly,	as	Aaliya	put	it	“our	tragedy	is	that	we	haven’t	read	the	Quran.		Our	parents	have	made	us	recite	it	[in	Arabic]	but	we	never	knew	the	meaning”.		Learning	the	phonetic	pronunciation	of	the	Arabic	text	without	understanding	its	meaning	was	a	common	practice	of	piety	for	many	in	the	literate	middle	and	upper	classes.		While	Arabic	pronunciation	and	recitation	remained	an	important	aspect	of	piety	for	the	women	I	met	as	well,	it	was	insufficient,	as	Aaliya	explained,	to	recite	it	without	understanding	its	translation,	meaning,	and	applicability.		For	many	women,	as	Aaliya	put	it,	the	absence	of	such	an	engagement	with	Islam	despite	having	sufficient	literacy	skills	was	tragic.	In	addition,	many	women	also	pointed	out	the	flawed	and	unproductive	treatment	of	the	Quran	as	a	revered	holy	object,	rather	than	as	an	accessible	manual	to	structure	one’s	everyday	life.		Describing	a	practice	common	at	a	Sufi	shrine,	Romana	said,	In	Pir	Pagaro’s	castle,	there	are	many	rooms	and	in	one	of	the	rooms	there	is	a	swing,	and	people	put	the	Quran	on	the	swing.		Whoever	rocks	the	swing,	his	heart’s	wishes	will	be	granted	–	this	is	the	absurd	concept	that	people	have.		You	could	put	any	book	on	there	and	rock	it.		Rocking	the	Quran	doesn’t	do	anything.		Reading	the	Quran	is	what	does	it.		So	instead	of	rocking	it	there,	take	it	home,	open	it	and	read	it.		Romana’s	characterization	of	this	practice	as	absurd	and	irrational	pivots	on	her	conviction	that	a	rational	approach	to	the	Quran	requires	one	to	read	it.		The	slippage	between	
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rationality	and	reading	is	one	that	marginalizes	the	illiterate	from	the	category	of	a	good	Muslim.		Interestingly,	the	word	for	illiterate	or	ignorant	in	Urdu,	jahil,	that	Romana	and	others	used	several	times	in	our	conversations,	carries	with	it	associations	with	pre-Islamic	Arabia,	which	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	jahiliyah,	the	era	of	ignorance.		The	significance	of	the	disenfranchisement	of	the	illiterate,	both	literal	and	figurative,	from	the	development	of	piety	is	clear	when	considering	it	within	the	context	of	Pakistan	and	its	ideology	of	a	Muslim	nation.		That	is,	the	expulsion	or	rehabilitation	of	the	jahil	corresponds	with	and	finds	legitimacy	in	grand	narratives	of	Islamic	history	through	the	linguistic	blurring	of	
jahil	and	jahiliyah.		For	Romana,	the	realizaton	of	an	Islamic	society	would	require	a	move	away	from	jahil	practices	that	did	not	take	up	the	Quran	as	a	text	to	be	opened	and	read.	Zainab	and	Shumaila,	both	teachers	and	students	at	Al-Huda,	also	conveyed	their	frustration	with	the	way	they	had	encountered	and	engaged	with	the	Quran	in	the	past.		They,	respectively,	stated:			In	my	family,	Islam	was	on	a	shelf.		It	was	like	this	–	in	Ramzan	we	would	go	and	take	the	book	off	the	shelf	and	read	it	speedily	and	then	on	the	27th	of	Ramzan	we	would	finish	it	and	then	after	that	we	would	forget	that	we	are	Muslims	and	put	[the	Quran]	back	on	the	shelf.	(Zainab)		 People	just	wrap	up	the	Quran	and	make	really	pretty	covers	for	it	and	put	it	on	a	shelf	and	on	someone’s	death	or	a	wedding	they	bring	it	out	and	put	it	on	their	heads	or	recite	prayers	but	they	don’t	realize	that	your	entire	life	and	how	you	are	supposed	to	live	it	is	in	there.	(Shumaila)		Their	critique	of	Quran-on-the-shelf	again	draws	on	a	notion	of	rationality	that	is	equated	with	reading	and	understanding	the	text	as	opposed	to	treating	it	as	a	holy	object.		Zainab	explained	that	the	practice	of	only	taking	the	Quran	off	the	shelf	for	the	purposes	of	recitation	on	a	special	holy	night	was	an	insufficient	practice	of	piety.		She	also	asserted	that	she	felt	that	this	was	a	superficial	and	disingenuous	way	for	her	and	her	family	to	
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sustain	their	Muslim	identity	when	she	referred	to	their	practice	of	only	taking	the	Quran	off	the	shelf	during	Ramzan.		Correspondingly,	Shumaila	associated	the	common	practice	of	making	ornate	covers	to	wrap	up	the	Quran	with	a	superficial	engagement	with	Islam.		In	her	comments,	she	conveyed	her	frustration	with	the	prevalence	of	the	tradition	of	bringing	the	Quran	to	a	wedding	or	funeral	and	treating	it	like	a	holy	object	that	would	endow	blessings	just	by	being	held	over	people’s	heads.		Moreover,	Shumaila	conveyed	her	astonishment	that	these	practices	elide	the	use	of	the	Quran	as	a	denotative	and	instructive	text	for	everyday	life.			This	perception	of	common	Pakistani	practices	is	perhaps	best	illustrated	by	how	several	women	articulated	their	rejection	of	the	common	ritual	of	the	Quran	khaani	–	a	collective	reading	of	the	Quran	on	special	occasions.		The	goal	of	a	Quran	khaani	is	to	complete	the	Arabic	recitation	of	an	entire	Quran	collectively	in	one	sitting	by	a	group	of	people.		Typically,	those	in	attendance	will	take	one	siparah	(chapter)67	of	the	Quran	and	read	it	in	Arabic,	at	times	with	faulty	pronunciation,68	to	themselves	without	attending	to	the	translation	or	meaning	of	what	they	are	reading.		Those	who	read	faster	get	through	multiple	chapters,	slower	readers	may	split	one	siparah,	and	at	times	children	are	also	included	and	are	usually	given	the	shortest	siparah.		A	common	scene	towards	the	end	of	a	
Quran	khaani	is	when	there	is	only	one	siparah	left	and	one	reader	is	struggling	to	get	through	it.		At	times,	another	reader	will	assist	them,	the	two	will	sit	side	by	side	and	one	will	read	one	page	while	the	other	reads	the	adjacent	page	to	get	it	done	quickly.		For	most	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	this	is	a	nonsensical	practice.		As	one	member	of	Al-Huda,	
																																																								67	A	Quran	khaani	will	often	use	a	version	of	the	Quran	where	each	chapter	is	split	into	a	separate	booklet.		68	Preoccupations	with	correct	Arabic	pronunciation	became	particularly	noticeable	in	the	late	twentieth	century	and	widespread	by	the	1990s.	
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Rabia,	put	it	“Quran	is	a	text.		If	I	take	this	book	and	start	reading	one	page	and	you	read	the	other	page,	will	I	be	able	to	make	heads	or	tails	of	it?”		For	Rabia,	the	text	is	something	to	be	made	sense	of	through	reading	and	comprehension.		Shumaila	also	expressed	exasperation	with	the	ritual	of	the	Quran	khaani:	“You	are	not	supposed	to	just	go	and	recite	a	couple	of	things	and	come	home”.		In	these	comments,	Shumaila	asserts	that	the	recitation	of	arbitrary	parts	of	the	Quran	in	random	order	by	multiple	people	without	any	intent	to	learn	what	it	means	or	how	it	can	be	applied	was	not	in	line	with	her	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	practice	Islam.		In	Shumaila	and	Rabia’s	view,	correct	engagement	via	text	is	structured	through	the	form	of	a	book,	that	is,	through	the	methodical	procession	of	an	individual	reading	and	understanding	one	page	at	a	time	in	sequential	order.		The	Quran	
khaani	thus	represents	a	practice	that	by	virtue	of	its	collectivity	defies	the	underpinning	principle	of	individual	possession	of	rationality	in	Al-Huda’s	text-centric	discourse	of	piety.	Notably,	the	Quran’s	status	as	a	holy	object	and	the	practice	of	Arabic	recitation	is	present	in	the	discourse	of	piety	of	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat,	including	for	Aaliya,	Romana,	Zainab,	Shumaila,	and	Rabia,	however,	they	are	committed	to	foregrounding	the	role	of	the	Quran	as	a	text	with	deep	and	complex	meaning	and	directions	for	the	development	of	piety.		As	mentioned	in	previous	chapters,	for	many	women,	this	was	a	pivotal	shift	in	the	way	they	perceived	their	relationship	to	Islam.		As	Donya	put	it,	“reading	the	Quran	with	translation…This	is	a	big	big	contribution	of	the	Jamaat-e-Islami”.		Deviating	from	practices,	such	as	the	ones	mentioned	above,	that	have	conventionally	characterized	the	extent	of	relationships	to	the	Quran	for	many	people	in	the	upper	literate	classes,	the	women	I	met	regard	access	to	the	Quran	and	the	tripartite	ability	to	recite,	understand,	and	apply	it	as	tantamount	in	becoming	a	good	Muslim.		The	structure	of	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	classes	also	
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reflects	this	emphasis	on	the	text	where	the	instructor	and	students	go	through	the	Quran	line	by	line	perfecting	their	Arabic	recitation,	translating	each	word	with	attention	to	grammar,	and	then	engaging	in	tafseer	(exegesis)	where	the	instructor	provides	historical	and	textual	context	and	they	together	discern	the	meaning	and	contemporary	relevance	of	the	passages.		For	many	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	this	centralization	of	the	mastery	of	the	text	in	the	development	of	piety	is	an	affirmation	of	their	identity	as	educated	and	rational	women.		As	Rabia	put	it,	“I	thought	to	myself,	I	am	an	educated	woman	and	I	have	been	blessed	–	my	brain	and	memory	power	is	a	lot	–	so	why	not	read	the	Quran	and	understand	it”.		Rabia’s	reflections	exemplify	how	many	women	mobilize	a	construction	of	a	rational,	intelligent	self	who	is	capable	of	engaging	with	the	content	of	the	Quran.		For	Rabia,	this	was	also	a	moment	of	applying	a	set	of	skills	that	she	had	learnt	for	and	through	other	purposes,	such	as	schooling	and	professional	life,	but	had	not	applied	them	to	her	practices	of	piety	in	the	past.		Using	these	readily	available	skills	seemed	to	her	like	a	logical	step	in	the	development	of	her	piety.		In	this	sense,	Al-Huda’s	discourse	of	a	rational	and	logical	engagement	with	the	Quran	validated	her	sense	of	self	and	produced	a	feeling	of	belonging	through	an	affirmation	of	her	merits.	Across	nearly	all	the	interviews	I	conducted,	the	purchase	of	words	such	as	“reason”,	“rational”,	and	“logical”	was	immediately	evident.		The	pride	with	which	several	women	described	their	approach	to	Islam	in	this	way	was	an	important	aspect	of	how	they	reconciled	their	religiosity	as	rational,	modern,	authentic,	individual	and	agential.		This	pedagogical	discourse	is	reminiscent	of	how	Shahnaz	Rouse	characterizes	the	historical	emergence	of	women’s	education	in	Pakistan.		Rouse	argues	that	women’s	education	was	“part	of	the	process	whereby	the	bourgeoisie	would	define	itself	in	opposition	to	its	
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‘others’,	most	notably	the	working	and	producing	classes,	as	well	as	‘tribals’”	(95).		This,	she	argued,	would	work	to	reinforce	the	“universalist	grounds”	that	form	the	means	by	which	the	bourgeoisie	“would	rationalize	their	rule	and	socio-political	domination	over	the	rest	of	the	population”	(Rouse,	95).		Similarly,	pedagogies	of	piety	are	implicated	in	processes	of	othering	in	the	service	of	such	agendas	as	can	be	seen	in	the	power	relations	constituting	the	maasi	class.	Mapping	out	the	boundaries	between	rational	and	irrational	practices	of	Islam	also	occurs	through	an	invocation	and	appeal	to	scientific	rationality	where	the	text	functions	as	the	“proof”	that	authorizes	engagement	in	practices	of	piety.		In	fact,	science	is	mobilized	in	multiple	ways	to	legitimize	their	approach	to	Islam.		Several	women	would	refer	to	the	presence	of	medical	doctors	in	Al-Huda	or	the	Jamaat’s	membership	as	an	accolade	that	illustrates	their	commensurability	with	scientific	rationality.		In	my	conversations	with	Zainab,	for	example,	she	prefaced	much	of	what	she	said	with	references	to	her	“science	background”:	“I	was	coming	from	a	background	of	having	studied	medicine…if	you	are	in	a	scientific	field	like	I	was,	you	may	not	believe	without	proof”.		Others	mentioned	that	they	were	drawn	to	Al-Huda	and/or	the	Jamaat	because	of	their	“scientific”	approach	to	religion,	referring	to	how	they	use	the	text	as	“proof”.		Fatima,	for	instance,	described	why	she	chose	Al-Huda	over	other	organizations	she	explored:	“Al-Huda	provided	solid	facts	and	proofs	followed	by	a	verse	of	the	Quran	with	reference	or	a	strong	hadith	based	on	the	teachings	of	our	Prophet	with	reference.		So	when	you’re	answered	with	answers…right	from	Allah’s	book	or	the	sunnah,	you’re	convinced”.		Fatima’s	comments	reflect	the	value	she	places	on	formal	academic	practices	such	as	strong	references	and	solid	facts	and	proofs.		She	found	the	process	of	learning	about	Islam	in	this	way	convincing	because	of	the	way	the	Quran	
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and	hadith	were	used	as	evidence	to	back	up	claims	of	how	to	be	a	pious	Muslim.		The	use	of	the	Quran	as	proof	also	left	little	room	for	dissent	or	disagreement	because	it	was	“right	from	Allah’s	book”.		For	many	women,	this	approach	led	to	a	strengthening	of	their	conviction	in	their	practice	of	piety	because	of	the	rationality	and	credibility	they	associated	with	a	proof-based	pedagogy.		This	discursive	privileging	of	rationality	is	also	integral	to	how	many	women	I	met	construct	and	manage	difference.		As	illustrated	in	the	Al-Huda	maasi	class,	the	absence	of	engagement	with	the	words	of	the	text	structured	through	literacy	allows	for	the	denunciation	of	popular	practices	of	piety	as	without	any	“rhyme	or	reason”	(Rabia).		As	Sabeen,	a	volunteer	at	the	Jamaat	elaborated:		There	is	reason	to	everything	and	you	don’t	need	to	blindly	believe	in	things.		There	is	a	reason	for	everything.		You	need	to	know	why.		Why	are	we	doing	this?	Why	are	we	practicing	Islam?		Why	are	we	praying?		Why	are	we	covering	ourselves?		What	is	the	meaning	of	life?		This	is	what	the	Quran	can	tell	us.		Sabeen’s	intimation	that	blind	belief	is	the	modus	operandi	for	prevalent	practices	of	Islam	amongst	Pakistanis	relies	on	the	assumption	that	the	only	way	one	can	practice	Islam	with	and	for	a	reason	is	through	an	engagement	with	the	Quran	as	a	text.		Sabeen	sees	the	Quran	as	the	proof	required	and	the	source	of	the	reason	why	any	given	practice	would	be	considered	Islamic	or	not.		In	turn,	a	reasonable	practice	of	Islam	would	be	one	that	is	rooted	in	knowledge	of	why	and	what	it	means	in	terms	of	piety.		As	such,	for	Sabeen,	the	practice	of	Islam	without	denotative	reference	to	the	content	of	the	Quran	is	not	a	reasonable	practice	of	Islam.		Within	this	logic,	the	possibility	that	these	practices	may	draw	their	logics	from	other	sources	of	reason	is	a	moot	point.		Like	many	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with,	Sabeen	projected	the	absence	of	reason	onto	othered	Islamic	practices	after	establishing	the	literate	self	as	in	possession	of	reason.		Consequently,	a	
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reasonable	and	correct	practice	of	Islam	can	only	take	place	through	literate	access	to	the	text	of	the	Quran	according	to	these	women.			This	discourse	is	foundational	in	how	many	women	I	interviewed	censure	prevalent	practices	of	Islam,	such	as	those	of	the	domestic	workers	in	the	maasi	class,	as	un-Islamic.		As	was	made	evident	in	the	denunciation	of	the	domestic	worker’s	existing	practices	of	Islam,	such	as	reciting	prayers	learnt	through	oral	traditions,	the	role	of	the	text	in	establishing	their	own	practices	of	piety	as	rational	was	paramount	for	many	women.				
Taxonomies	of	Othering:	Biddat,	Shirk	and	the	“Imitation	Ummat”	
“It’s	better	to	be	a	student	than	an	imitation.”	(Aaliya)	In	Aaliya’s	statement	above,	the	opposition	of	“imitation”	and	“student”	echoes	the	way	many	of	my	respondents’	constructed	their	own	subject-position	in	relation	to	what	they	perceived	as	common	practices	of	piety.		This	opposition	produces	a	dynamic	of	progress	driven	by	aspirations	towards	a	more	individualistic	and	rational	engagement	with	Islam	and	away	from	the	irrationality	of	“mindless”	imitative	practices	that	they	believe	are	contaminated	by	“cultural	baggage”.		The	concept	of	“imitation”	produces	hierarchical	subject-positions	through	its	dual	meaning	as	the	process	of	copying	and	as	being	fake/inauthentic.		In	relation	to	the	former,	for	many	women	I	interviewed,	the	allure	of	imitating	common	practices	of	piety	without	engaging	with	them	in	a	learned	manner	was	an	example	of	the	damaging	effects	of	culture	to	the	progress	of	Islam.		A	rational	engagement	with	Islam	would	not	be	imitative	in	this	sense,	rather,	it	would	be	deliberate	and	methodical	based	on	what	it	says	in	the	Quran.		The	opposition	of	“imitation”	and	“student”	also	indicates	an	underlying	opposition	between	culture	and	religion	where	the	
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rational	practice	of	religion	requires	an	objective	stance	free	of	the	subjectivity	produced	by	culture.		In	the	discourse	of	many	women	I	met,	it	is	only	by	becoming	a	“student”	(of	the	text)	that	one	can	identify	and	move	away	from	so-called	cultural	biases	present	in	prevalent	Islamic	practices	and	toward	a	more	rational,	authentic	and	culture-free	practice	of	Islam.			Implicit	in	this	hierarchical	opposition	is	a	deep	contempt	and	fear	of	the	ignorance	and	vulnerability	of	the	jahil	(illiterate/ignorant)	masses.		In	an	impassioned	conversation	about	the	state	of	Islam	in	Pakistan,	Aaliya	targeted	her	frustrations	towards	“poor”	people.		She	stated:	If	you	go	to	any	poor	person…they	don’t	know	[Islam]	but	they	are	the	ones	who	are	brought	out	on	the	streets	to	do	this	or	that	in	the	name	of	Islam.		They	are	sheep	and	goats.		They	don’t	know	anything.	They	are	ignorant.		They	are	illiterate.		They	don’t	know	what	they	are	saying,	what	they	are	eating,	what	they	are	doing.		They	don’t	know	the	meaning	of	anything	let	alone	Islam.		Aaliya’s	frustration	stemmed	in	part	from	recurring	images	in	the	media	of	violent	protestors	reacting	to	an	attack	on	Islam,	such	as	the	2012	protests	against	the	YouTube	film,	Innocence	of	Muslims.		For	Aaliya,	these	protestors	did	not	know	anything	about	Islam,	yet	they	came	to	represent	what	a	commitment	to	Islam	looks	like	in	the	news	media.		She	conflated	the	protestors	with	the	“poor”,	whose	ignorance	seemed	like	an	ontological	condition	in	her	comments.		The	poor,	for	Aaliya,	were	not	only	ignorant	of	Islam,	but	their	ignorance	was	evident	in	every	other	aspect	of	their	lives	–	saying,	eating,	doing.		The	enormity	of	their	ignorance	posits	a	near	impossibility	of	their	salvation.		In	other	words,	not	only	did	they	not	know	anything	about	Islam,	but	they	could	not	know	anything	about	Islam.		Several	other	women	echoed	Aaliya’s	sentiments	in	their	use	of	various	descriptors	such	as	“mindless”,	“mob	mentality”,	“ritualistic”,	and	“ignorant”,	when	referring	to	the	
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religious	practices	of	this	“inscrutable	mass”	(Mehta,	1999,	p.	68)	of	people.		In	turn,	the	Islamic	customs	and	traditions	discursively	associated	with	the	poor	were	reduced	to	animalistic	and	undiscerning	“imitation”	of	arbitrary	practices	that	did	not	follow	any	legitimized	form	of	rationality	and	certainly	not	an	Islamic	one	–	hence	Aaliya’s	phrase	“imitation	ummat”	(community	of	Muslims).		Rendering	the	impoverished	as	an	imposturous	community	of	Muslims	through	allegations	of	imitation,	in	both	senses	of	the	word,	was	a	powerful	discourse	in	many	women’s	construction	of	the	rational	pious	self.	The	essentialization	of	the	practices	of	the	majority	of	the	Pakistani	population	as	‘imitation’	was	further	reinforced	and	validated	through	textual	sources	in	the	discourses	of	many	women	I	met	while	also	conjuring	a	notion	of	‘authenticity’.		Many	of	the	women	I	interviewed	categorized	prevalent	religious	practices	using	the	Quranic	concepts	of	biddat	and	shirk.		As	mentioned	earlier,	biddat	refers	to	practices	that	are	‘innovations’	and	are	not	true	to	the	Quran	and	sunnah,	and	shirk	refers	to	equating	someone	or	something	with	Allah	and	therefore	challenging	the	oneness	of	god.		As	Fatima,	a	regular	listener	at	an	Al-Huda	centre,	explained:		The	gist	of	a	hadith	is	that	anything	that	is	invented	in	the	religion,	which	was	not	a	teaching	of	our	Prophet,	peace	be	upon	him,	would	be	rejected	by	Allah.		What	more	clear	an	evidence	can	we	gather	that	something	that	is	done	which	was	not	taught	by	our	Prophet,	peace	be	upon	him,	we	should	not	do	it?		Innovation	or	invention,	in	this	lexicon,	does	not	connote	reformations	that	contribute	to	the	progress	of	Islam,	rather	it	refers	to	invented	customs	and	traditions	that	are	foreign	to	Islam	but	are	clothed	in	the	guise	of	Islam.		Consequently,	categorizing	something	as	biddat	is	part	of	a	project	to	expel	certain	practices	mired	by	“cultural	baggage”	from	what	is	considered	to	be	a	movement	toward	an	“authentic”	Islam	that	emerges	out	of	a	text-centric	discourse	of	piety.				
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In	a	pamphlet	titled	Bidah:	Innovations	in	Islam,	given	to	me	by	Zainab,	it	is	suggested	that	the	“cure	for	innovation”,	is	reinvesting	sole	authority	in	the	Quran	and	Sunnah.		The	pamphlet	states:	…true	credence	should	be	given	to	Quran	and	Sunnah	of	the	holy	prophet	(p.b.u.h)	only.		The	sayings	of	all	other;	regardless	of	how	great	an	imam,	faqih,	muhaddith,	
mufassir,	scholar,	and	muttaqi69	he	might	be;	should	be	judged	according	to	the	criterion	of	the	Quran	and	Sunnah.	(“Bidah,”	n.d.,	p.	10)				According	to	the	pamphlet,	any	authority	on	Islam	can	and	must	be	held	accountable	to	the	Quran	and	sunnah.		Fatima	went	on	to	provide	some	examples	of	common	practices	that	find	no	textual	support:	“when	have	we	been	told	or	taught	by	our	Prophet,	peace	be	upon	him,	to	visit	the	shrines,	wear	amulets,	do	fateha70	over	food,	hold	milaads,	or	even	the	way	we	do	weddings…it’s	sad	and	its	all	biddat”.		As	such,	the	Quran	and	sunnah	were	used	to	determine	the	authenticity	and	validity	of	practices	or	rituals	that	are	being	presented	as	Islamic.		Access	and	ability	to	read,	comprehend,	and	apply	the	Quran	and	sunnah	is	thus	essential	to	avoid	biddat	and	shirk	according	to	this	approach	to	Islam.		Correspondingly,	reiterating	the	mindless	conformity	driving	the	presence	of	biddat	in	the	Islamic	practices	of	the	illiterate	masses,	Rabia	explained	that	“all	those	things	are	ritual	more	than	religion”	–	a	distinction	that	is	mapped	on	to	the	distinction	between	text-centric	(religion)	and	non-text-centric	(ritual/culture)	approaches	to	Islam.		Accordingly,	for	Rabia,	the	prevalence	of	
biddat	and	shirk	is	a	consequence	of	practices	that	are	not	grounded	in	the	text	acquiring	
																																																								69	The	pamphlet	is	referring	here	to	the	different	types	of	religious	authorities	in	Muslim	societies.		An	imam	is	a	religious	leader,	a	faqih	is	an	Islamic	jurist,	muhaddith	is	someone	who	is	well	versed	in	the	hadith,	a	
mufassir	is	someone	who	provides	or	authors	tafseer,	a	muttaqi	is	a	pious	person.	70	Fateha	is	the	practice	of	blessing	food	with	the	recitation	of	particular	verses	and	then	distributing	it	to	others	as	a	form	of	repentance.		The	women	I	met	denounced	this	practice	because	they	argued	that	it	had	no	basis	in	scripture.	
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the	status	of	ritual	amongst	those	who	are	not	willing	or	able	to	discern	the	validity	of	these	practices.	The	ways	in	which	biddat	and	shirk	are	mobilized	as	categories	of	othering	is	evident	in	how	some	women	I	interviewed	repudiated	the	celebration	of	milaad.		A	milaad	is	a	devotional	gathering	dedicated	to	the	Prophet	Mohammad	and	it	includes	singing	
naatein	(hymns),	shaeree	(reciting	and	free	styling	poetry),	prayer	and	general	discussions	about	the	Prophet	Mohammad.		For	many	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	the	milaad	is	shirk	because	it	borders	on	the	worship	of	the	Prophet	and	thus	poses	a	challenge	to	the	oneness	of	Allah,	and	it	is	also	biddat	because	it	finds	no	basis	in	holy	texts.		As	Shumaila	put	it,	“obviously	there	is	no	concept	of	milaad	in	Islam,	there	is	no	room	for	it,	there	is	nothing	in	the	Quran	or	the	sunnah	for	it…if	its	not	there,	then	why	are	we	doing	it?”		These	sentiments	were	echoed	in	Romana’s	comments:	“We	used	to	have	milaad	or	strange	antics	like	neyaaz71	and	we	used	to	distribute	sweets	and	fast	on	some	random	days.		These	nonsensical	things	have	been	slowly	removed.		These	things	are	not	part	of	Allah’s	commands”	(Romana).		The	lack	of	textual	proof	renders	the	milaad	an	irrational	and	therefore	irredeemably	un-Islamic	practice.		As	such,	many	women	were	engaged	in	a	process	of	removing	the	practice	of	milaad	from	their	communities.	Since	nearly	all	the	women	I	met	associated	the	absence	of	rationality	with	the	mindless	following	of	custom	or	an	imitative	mode	of	being,	I	asked	women	I	interviewed	where	these	other	“un-Islamic”	practices	come	from.		Harkening	to	nationalist	narratives	of	partition	and	the	Islamic	basis	of	Pakistan’s	independence,	several	women	traced	the	
																																																								71	Neyaaz	is	the	practice	of	distributing	items,	such	as	food	or	clothing,	to	others	as	part	of	special	prayer.		Like	fateha,	the	women	I	met	denounced	this	practice	because	they	argued	that	it	lacked	scriptural	basis.		
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presence	of	biddat	and	shirk	amongst	Pakistanis	to	“cultural	baggage”	left	over	from	once	living	amongst	Hindus	in	India.		Evidence	of	these	remnants	of	Hinduism	in	the	cultural	and	religious	fabric	of	Pakistan	was	found	in	a	range	of	practices	from	visiting	shrines	of	saints	to	the	way	weddings	are	celebrated	to	common	ritualistic	gestures.		Romana,	a	student	at	Al-Huda,	expressed	her	frustration	with	biddat	in	her	community	as	follows:	Our	Muslim	ummah	is	being	distracted	and	is	going	off	the	path	by	these	little	things	and	are	leaving	the	direction	their	faith	would	take	them.		This	is	a	big	thing	that	is	happening	and	we	need	to	finish	it.		It	is	a	problem	that	we	are	not	doing	the	things	that	Allah	has	asked	us	to	and	we	are	spending	our	time	on	these	other	things.	These	things	are	mostly	things	we	have	gotten	from	Hinduism…celebrating	everything.		Just	because	they	celebrate	everything	we	also	thought	we	should	celebrate	everything?		We	only	have	two	eids	to	celebrate,	that’s	it.		Romana	expressed	her	frustration	with	the	stubborn	presence	of	normalized	un-Islamic	micro-practices	amongst	Pakistani	Muslims	when	she	refers	to	these	“little	things”	that	are	a	“big	thing”.		Thus	far	undetected	because	of	their	little-ness,	these	practices	pose	a	great	obstacle	to	the	realization	of	‘authentic’	Islamic	practice	in	the	context	of	Pakistan	for	Romana.		Furthermore,	implicitly	appealing	to	the	Islamic	virtue	of	moderation	and	juxtaposing	it	with	the	perceived	excesses	of	Hinduism	in	her	reference	to	celebrations,	Romana	delineates	the	markers	of	a	good	Muslim	through	opposition	to	Hinduism.			As	we	spoke	further,	it	was	clear	that	Romana	saw	this	“cultural	baggage”	as	the	most	pertinent	challenge	to	Islamic	reform	and	revival	–	a	concern	echoed	by	many	women	I	interviewed.		Rabia,	a	graduate	and	instructor	at	Al-Huda,	referred	to	a	common	ritualistic	gesture	as	evidence	of	the	pervasiveness	of	mindless	imitation	of	Hindu	practices.		She	described	the	gesture	as	follows:	When	we	were	in	India	we	lived	together	with	Hindus	and	that	has	an	impact	on	our	society,	on	our	country…Whatever	influences	were	around	them,	they	started	adopting	and	doing	that	too	because	their	commitment	[to	Islamic	knowledge]	wasn’t	there.			They	were	brought	up	with	these	practices	and	did	not	have	the	
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understanding	or	knowledge	of	why	they	were	wrong.		If	you	are	giving	money	for	charity	that’s	fine,	but	there	is	no	need	to	circle	it	around	your	head	before	giving	it.		That	is	un-Islamic.		How	many	of	us	do	that?		I	had	to	tell	my	sister	too,	please,	for	god’s	sake,	don’t	do	that.		She	laughed	and	said	she	forgets	every	time.	These	things	have	been	around	for	so	long.		It	will	take	time	for	it	to	go	away	from	society.		The	common	gesture	of	removing	any	ill	will	by	circling	money	around	someone’s	head	before	giving	it	to	them	acquired	an	insidious	meaning	as	cultural	baggage	that	signaled	a	sort	of	infiltration	by	Hindus	every	time	it	was	practiced.		Rabia’s	comments	are	thus	marked	by	a	sense	of	incompleteness	or	insufficiency	of	the	project	of	partition	in	producing	an	Islamic	nation	–	which	for	her	is	evidenced	by	the	presence	of	such	“un-Islamic”	micro-practices.		As	Ayesha,	a	student	at	an	Al-Huda	inspired	home-based	Quran	class,	put	it:	It’s	just	the	status	quo	that	keeps	going.		What	our	ancestors	did	with	their	eyes	closed	we	think	we	should	keep	doing	it	whether	it’s	right	or	wrong.		[They	are]	in	state	of	denial.			Even	if	you	try	to	tell	people	that	it’s	not	like	this	in	Islam,	then	people	are	ready	to	fight	you.		Rabia	and	Ayesha’s	comments	draw	on	a	discourse	of	religious	reformation	that	seeks	a	systematic	repudiation	of	Indian/Hindu	practices,	as	well	as	practices	associated	with	India	and	Hinduism,	through	for	example	the	Sufi	and	Barelwi72	practices	of	Islam,	and	thus	resonates	with	nationalist	rhetoric	that	seeks	to	consolidate	a	singular	Muslim	identity.		Both	of	their	comments	also	acknowledge	the	enormity	of	the	project	of	unlearning	Hindu	practices.73		They	are	resigned	to	the	idea	that	it	will	take	some	time	to	change	the	status	quo.		Again,	both	their	comments	reiterate	the	notion	that	these	Hindu	practices	are	
																																																								72	Sufi	and	Barelwi	Islamic	movements	in	South	Asia	are	known	for	their	mystical	devotional	practices.		See	Jalal	(2000)	and	Metcalf	(2009)	for	more	on	the	historical	development	and	significance	of	these	movements.	73	As	I	discuss	later	in	the	chapter,	their	understandings	of	Hinduism	are	limited	and	homogenizing.		For	many	women,	understandings	of	Hinduism	are	produced	through	stereotypes	proliferated	through	popular	media	(Bollywood,	Zee	TV	etc.),	and	nationalist	rhetoric.	
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practiced	blindly	and	without	any	reason	because	they	find	no	credence	in	the	Quran	or	
hadith.		The	process	of	completing	the	project	of	partition	is	thus	entangled	with	establishing	the	authority	of	the	Quran	and	hadith	as	a	guide	for	how	not	to	be	Hindu.	The	print	literature	circulated	by	and	amongst	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	members	also	carries	references	that	indicate	the	persisting	place	of	partition	in	discourses	of	piety.		For	instance,	the	previously	mentioned	pamphlet	also	outlines	the	reasons	for	the	prevalence	of	biddat	in	Muslim	communities:	1. Blindly	following	the	ignorant	ways	of	one’s	ancestors	2. Exceeding	in	respect	of	elders	3. Imitating	the	rituals	of	imported,	non-Muslim,	especially	the	Hindu	culture	4. Disharmony	between	various	religious	groups	and	distortion	in	their	ideologies	5. Lack	of	knowledge	regarding	the	Sunnah	of	the	holy	prophet	(p.b.u.h)74	6. The	misunderstanding	that	innovation	is	just	a	matter	of	“difference	of	opinion”	(“Bidah,”	n.d.,	p.	5)		Echoing	the	generational	anxiety	in	the	reasons	for	biddat	implicit	in	Rabia’s	conviction	that	these	practices	will	take	time	to	go	away,	the	pamphlet	also	implicates	previous	generations	and	the	concomitant	dangers	of	“respect	for	elders”.		The	figuration	of	the	elders	as	repositories	of	fraught	nationalist	histories,	some	of	them	having	pre-dated	the	partition	of	India	and	the	independence	of	Pakistan,	constructs	an	embodied	teleology	of	time	and	space	in	the	development	of	piety.		Many	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	especially	those	whose	parents	were	born	prior	to	1947,	cast	their	parents’	practice	of	Islam	in	these	terms	–	that	is,	as	not	adherent	to	the	text	and	infected	by	Hinduism.		In	this	sense,	piety	acquires	a	temporality	through	the	nationalist	framing	of	a	generation	gap.		Together,	their	Hindu	proclivities	and	their	status	as	elders	made	the	elders	a	formidable	obstacle	to	the	realization	of	an	authentic	Islamic	praxis.		Thus,	even	as	the	women	I	interviewed	disrupt																																																									74	P.b.u.h	is	an	acronym	for	“peace	be	upon	him”,	a	phrase	commonly	used	after	mentioning	the	Prophet.	
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the	gendered	relationships	tied	to	the	Pakistani	nation-state	as	discussed	in	chapter	four,	there	are	several	ways	in	which	their	religious	praxis	is	also	commensurate	with	nationalist	discourses	of	unity	and	othering.	For	example,	in	the	previous	chapter,	I	use	the	example	of	qawwam	to	discuss	how	the	religious	praxis	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	disrupts	dominant	nationalist	discourses.		However,	it	is	important	to	note	the	ways	in	which	qawwam	acquires	legitimacy	and	settles	into	place	as	an	integral	part	of	piety	through	multiple	and	interrelated	discursive	registers.		In	addition	to	being	contextualized	in	relation	to	the	
akhira	and	as	part	of	akhlaaq,	qawwam	is	distinguished	in	nationalistic	and	xenophobic	terms	from	women’s	experiences	of	oppression,	which	would	often	be	attributed	to	remnants	of	Hinduism.		As	Shumaila	put	it,	“It’s	not	that	men	and	women	aren’t	equal	in	Islam,	it’s	more	that	men	and	women	aren’t	equal	in	Pakistani	society.		I	feel	like	that	is	the	major	issue”.		Shumaila’s	assertion	here	is	indicative	of	an	underlying	critique	of	the	inability	of	the	Pakistani	nationalist	project	to	establish	an	Islamic	state	and	society	through	her	distinction	between	“Islam”	and	“Pakistani	society”.		For	her,	the	claim	that	Islam	was	not	egalitarian	was	because	of	the	mistaken	conflation	of	Islam	and	Pakistan.		Beenish,	a	teacher	and	volunteer	at	the	Jamaat,	was	more	explicit	in	her	critique	of	the	Pakistani	state	as	she	attributed	the	oppression	of	Pakistani	women	to	a	lack	of	implementation	of	Islamic	rights.		She	explained:		Women’s	rights	[in	Islam]	are	alhamdulillah	so	well	designed	that	any	problem	can	be	addressed	through	them	–	these	are	the	basic	teachings.	We	ourselves	don’t	implement	these	teachings	properly.	Implementation	is	the	issue	here	in	Pakistan.		We	know	that	this	is	an	Islamic	state	and	we	know	that	all	these	rights	are	given	to	women	but	because	there	is	no	implementation,	that’s	why	we	have	such	problems.		So,	I	think	that	if	these	things	were	implemented	properly,	then	this	propaganda	against	Islam	would	have	no	impact.		
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Beenish	locates	the	oppression	of	women	in	the	failure	to	implement	Islamic	rights	in	what	is	supposedly	an	Islamic	state.		In	addition	to	her	critique	of	the	Pakistani	state,	Beenish	argues	that	the	impression	that	Islam	is	oppressive	to	women	is	the	result	of	“propaganda”	against	Islam	and,	by	extension,	that	there	is	a	need	for	women	to	secure	themselves	against	such	misrepresentations	that	may	preempt	a	fuller	engagement	with	the	development	of	piety	for	fear	of	being	drawn	into	an	oppressive	situation.	In	fact,	this	is	something	very	actively	addressed	in	Al-Huda’s	discourse	of	piety	as	is	evident	in	one	of	Farhat	Hashmi’s	recorded	lectures	recommended	to	me	by	Rabia	where	she	spends	much	time	explaining	that	nowhere	in	Islam	is	a	man	considered	to	be	better,	superior,	more	valuable	or	preferred	by	Allah	over	a	woman	(Hashmi,	n.d.).		Speaking	categorically	against	practices	such	as	female	infanticide	and	the	perception	of	a	girl	child	being	a	burden,	Hashmi	explains	that	first	and	foremost	a	female	has	the	same	right	to	life	as	a	male	and	that	these	anti-female	practices	find	no	support	in	the	Quran	or	hadith.		Hashmi’s	series	of	lectures	on	the	topic	have	been	effective	in	assuaging	the	discomfort	of	her	audience	of	educated,	middle/upper	class	women	by	distinguishing	the	patriarchal	gender	relations	stemming	out	of	her	interpretation	of	qawwam	from	other	patriarchal	practices	that	would	be	characterized	as	ignorant	cultural	practices	of	the	illiterate	classes.	Using	the	example	of	the	hijab,	Kanwal,	a	student	of	a	weekly	home-based	Quran	class	taught	by	an	Al-Huda	graduate,	made	a	distinction	between	women	who	were	forced	to	wear	it,	and	those	who	chose	to	wear	it	through	the	development	of	their	religious	consciousness.		She	explained	the	difference	as	follows:		There	are	definitely	oppressed	women	like	when	you	go	to	Saudi	Arabia	you	can	see	that	–	the	way	some	men	treat	their	women…I	don’t	wear	the	hijab	but	there	are	two	kinds	of	people	who	wear	the	hijab.		One,	those	who	have	chosen	to	wear	the	
hijab	–	these	are	young	girls	like	your	age	or	a	bit	older	than	you	who	have	chosen	to	
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wear	hijab.…and	two,	those	who	have	been	made	to	wear	the	hijab	by	their	parents.			The	ones	who	have	chosen	to	wear	the	hijab,	they	are	the	ones	who,	in	my	opinion,	are	really	liberated	women.		Very	self-confident,	don’t	care	what	the	world	thinks,	want	to	make	a	statement	and	they	are	doing	it	only	for	one	reason,	to	please	Allah,	and	that’s	it.		These	women	are	really	self-confident.		Kanwal	deploys	the	stereotype	of	oppressed	Saudi	women	in	order	to	emphasize	the	agency	of	women	who	arrived	at	the	practice	of	wearing	the	hijab	through	“choice”.		Kanwal’s	notion	of	‘choice’	is	to	some	extent	symptomatic	of	the	ubiquity	of	liberal	ideals	of	the	autonomous	individual	who	is	free	from	coercion	and/or	the	oppressive	force	of	conformity.		The	‘liberated’	status	of	Kanwal’s	ideal	hijabi	is	thus	dually	linked	to	her	condition	of	freedom	and	her	ability	to	make	a	conscientious	choice.			However,	as	Saba	Mahmood	(2005)	cautions,	an	ethic	of	individual	choice	does	not	necessarily	reproduce	the	central	assumptions	of	liberalism.		For	Mahmood,	although	the	exercise	of	choice	carries	with	it	inflections	of	liberal	individualism,	it	does	not	necessarily	refer	to	the	valorization	of	individual	will	that	would	be	the	basis	of	choice	in	liberalism.		Instead,	she	argues,	the	notion	of	choice	must	be	read	within	the	field	of	possibilities	laid	out	as	part	of	a	discourse	of	piety.		That	is	to	say,	“choice	is	understood	not	to	be	an	expression	of	one’s	will	but	something	one	exercises	in	following	the	prescribed	path	to	becoming	a	better	Muslim”	(Mahmood,	2005,	p.	85).		While	Mahmood’s	point	is	salient	in	terms	of	teasing	out	the	specificity	of	meaning	accorded	to	concepts	like	‘choice’	that	are	often	held	hostage	to	liberalism’s	claims	to	universalism,	I	emphasize	here	the	identity	produced	and	affirmed	through	the	deployment	of	such	terms	by	the	women	I	interviewed.		The	politics	of	representation	underpinning	Kanwal’s	portrayal	of	“liberated	women”,	for	example,	operate	through	a	process	of	othering	that	is	constitutive	of	their	piety	as	lived	experience.		In	other	words,	the	comfort	drawn	from	discursive	othering	of,	Saudi	women,	
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Hindus,	and	the	illiterate,	is	integral	to	how	women	submit	to	qawwam	while	maintaining	their	self-perception	as	conscientious,	educated	and	modern	women.		So,	while	‘choice’	may	not	follow	a	strictly	liberal	form	in	the	practices	of	piety	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	its	significatory	currency	is	drawn	from	its	association	with	liberal	modernity.		Several	women	I	met	echoed	such	perceptions	of	their	Islamic	praxis	and	expressed	frustration	with	misperceptions	of	the	status	of	women	in	their	notions	of	piety.		Ayesha,	a	student	at	an	Al-Huda	inspired	home-based	Quran	class	in	Mississauga,	pointed	out	that	there	is	a	willful	ignorance	about	the	aspects	of	Islam	that	relate	to	women.		She	stated:			Quran	gives	every	single	person	rights.		The	wife	has	these	rights,	the	husband	has	these	rights,	children	have	these	rights.	Inheritance	should	be	this	much	for	this	person	and	that	much	for	that	person.		In	Pakistan	if	women	only	knew	of	their	right	of	inheritance.		People	don’t	give	women	their	rightful	part	of	inheritance.		When	it	comes	to	that,	no	one	wants	to	know	what	Islam	says.		So,	for	Ayesha,	it	is	not	only	a	matter	of	the	Pakistani	state	and	society	ignoring	what	the	Quran	says,	but	also	that	they	especially	ignore	the	aspects	of	Islam	that	relate	to	women’s	rights	and	entitlements.		In	line	with	this	critique,	Ayesha,	like	Beenish	and	Shumaila,	contends	that	Islam	is	not,	strictly	speaking,	the	cause	of	experiences	of	gendered	oppression.		Instead,	like	many	of	the	women	I	met,	she	attributed	the	oppression	of	women	to	un-Islamic	practices	that	have	pervaded	gender	relations	amongst	Pakistanis.	These	un-Islamic	practices	are	typically	attributed	to	either	Saudi	Arabia,	the	West	or	to	Hinduism.		However,	it	is	interesting	to	note	how	the	women	I	interviewed	mobilized	each	of	these	foreign	influences	differently.		Explaining	the	reasons	for	women’s	experiences	of	oppression	in	Pakistan,	Ghazala	said:	The	reason	being	again,	if	you	don’t	mind,	is	that	we	have	lived	with	Hindus	for	900	years.		What	they	used	to	say	about	women	is	that	they	are	just	like	dust	on	our	shoes.		They	used	to	treat	women	as	though	she	has	no	right	to	her	life	–	she	is	only	associated	with	a	man.		She	has	no	identity	herself.		As	an	individual	she	is	nobody.	
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This	is	how	Hindus	think	about	women.		Mohammad	has	never	beaten	a	woman.		The	degree	to	which	Islam	protects	women,	the	degree	to	which	Islam	has	given	women	status	by	making	her	a	mother,	just	look	at	all	the	conveniences	Allah	has	provided	for	women	through	this.		Woman	herself	doesn’t	know.	Why?		They	of	course	weren’t	going	to	tell	her,	and	woman	herself	didn’t	try	to	find	out.		The	basic	problem	in	Pakistan	is	that	woman	herself	doesn’t	know	her	rights,	what	Islam	gives.		What	she	is	running	after	is	those	rights	that	the	West	is	talking	about.		See,	the	West,	they	never	gave	any	rights	to	women.		They	always	considered	women	as	a	body,	as	a	commodity,	as	a	thing	that	can	be	associated	with	selling.		Like	it’s	a	creature	that	is	sent	to	this	earth	to	be	humiliated	always	and	is	capable	of	nothing.		Whereas,	if	we	look	at	the	history	and	if	we	look	at	the	era	when	the	Prophet	was	ruling	and	if	we	look	at	Medina,	the	city	where	actually	Islam	was	being	practiced,	if	we	look	there,	woman	is	such	that	a	person	would	be	amazed.		For	Ghazala,	the	influence	of	Hindus	is	a	historic	circumstance	that	poses	the	threat	of	oppression	to	Pakistani	women,	however,	she	positions	the	West	as	the	means	through	which	many	women	mistakenly	think	they	will	find	respite	from	these	oppressive	Hindu	practices.		Thus,	she	instead	proposes	an	informed	practice	of	Islam,	where	women	would	know	their	Islamic	rights,	as	a	proven	course	for	women	to	fight	oppression	as	exemplified	in	Islamic	history.		In	other	words,	Ghazala	thinks	of	the	West	and	Islam	as	contesting	solutions	–	albeit	where	Islam	wins	out	–	to	the	problem	of	Hindu	oppression.		Sabeen	also	explained	how	women	are	navigating	the	legacy	of	Hinduism	in	Pakistan	in	the	fight	against	gendered	oppression:	I	think	all	over	the	world,	women	are	oppressed.		Yes,	they	are.		It	doesn’t	matter	where	they	are	living,	they	are	[oppressed]	to	one	degree	or	another	and	in	Pakistan	they	are	also	oppressed.		The	reason	is	that	we	are	not	following	the	Islamic	way	and	neither	are	we	following	any	Western	values.		We	are	just	in	limbo.		So	we	are	not	getting	any	kinds	of	rights.		We	are	not	getting	the	rights	that	a	Western	woman	has	and	we	don’t	have	the	Islamic	rights.		We	are	nowhere.		So	whatever	the	culture	is,	it	is	a	culture	borrowed	from	Hindus…whatever	we	were	left	with	after	so	many	years,	thousands	of	years,	and	so	we	have	that	cultural	baggage	that	I	was	talking	about.		It	(cultural	baggage)	is	that	men	can	dominate	women,	they	can	oppress	them,	they	can	force	them	to	stay	home.		They	can	do	anything	they	want,	they	can	kill	women	also…We	don’t	have	an	Islamic	system	so	out	with	that,	we	don’t	have	any	western	laws	and	rules	and	everything	so	out	with	that.		We	have	nothing	to	protect	ourselves.		That	is	my	perspective	of	how	the	world	is	basically	right	now.		
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Echoing	Ghazala’s	argument,	Sabeen	also	posited	the	West	as	a	competitor	to	Islam	in	terms	of	a	solution	and	located	Hinduism	as	the	root	of	the	problem	of	women’s	oppression.			Sabeen	and	Ghazala’s	characterizations	of	Western	and	Islamic	laws	as	mechanisms	through	which	women	can	gain	protection	(from	Hinduism)	rest	on	several	assumptions.		Their	understanding	of	the	oppression	of	women	was	mired	within	the	tensions	of	tradition	and	modernity	where	both	Islam	and	the	West	were	rendered	in	terms	of	modernity	and	Hinduism	in	terms	of	tradition.		The	ontological	claims	that	constituted	the	Manichean	logic	of	the	tradition-modernity	binary	are	evident	in	how	both	Sabeen	and	Ghazala	represented	Hinduism	in	Orientalist	terms.		By	homogenizing	Hinduism,	discursively	locating	it	in	the	past,	and	essentializing	it	as	inherently	oppressive	to	women	they	presented	themselves	as	belonging	to	modernity.		Thus,	underpinning	the	distinction	between	qawwam	and	oppression	was	a	nationalist	narrative	of	Islamic	modernity.		While	Al-Huda	women	in	particular	were	ostensibly	ambivalent	to	questions	of	the	nation-state	in	the	sense	that	they	reject	the	nation-state	as	a	defining	feature	of	their	social	imaginaries	(unlike	the	Jamaat),	the	persistent	invocation	of	the	Hindu-other	is	indicative	of	the	hegemony	of	Pakistan’s	existential	nationalist	mythologies	of	Hindu-Muslim	animosity.		In	addition,	this	form	of	othering	reaffirms	the	marginalization	of	Hindus	by	covering	over	the	historical	presence	of	Hindu	communities	in	Pakistan	and	classifying	them	as	foreign	in	the	interest	of	consolidating	Islam	as	the	basis	of	the	nation-state.		In	contrast	to	the	purportedly	Hindu-influenced	oppression	of	women	by	Pakistani	Muslims	who	do	not	know	any	better,	the	text-centric	approach	to	Islam	engendered	by	the	women	I	met,	then,	is	presented	as	an	alternative	pedagogy	and	method	of	practicing	Islam	that	has	a	powerful	
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claim	to	authenticity.		Developmentalist	dawah	opportunities	like	the	maasi	class,	for	instance,	are	thus	as	much	rendered	in	terms	of	saving	those	women	from	un-Islamic	practices	as	they	are	in	terms	of	saving	them	from	Hindu	oppression.		
Diasporic	Authenticity	The	discourses	of	piety	propagated	by	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	in	the	Pakistani	diaspora	in	the	West	have	been	instrumental	in	further	sharpening	this	notion	of	cultural	baggage	and	Hindu	influence.		Distance	over	time	and	space	presents	an	opportunity	to	expunge	and	renew	the	practice	of	Islam	for	diasporic	Pakistani	women	and	detach	from	Hindu/India.		An	illustrative	example	was	a	conversation	I	had	with	Razia,	a	woman	I	interviewed	in	Mississauga,	who	responded	to	my	upcoming	fieldwork	trip	to	Pakistan	by	saying:	“If	you	want	to	know	about	Islam	you	should	speak	to	women	here	(in	Mississauga)”.		Her	explanation	for	this	was	that	“In	Pakistan	we	are	living	in	the	past	because	we	are	too	close	to	the	past.		It	is	right	there	next	to	us	in	India	so	it	is	not	easy	to	let	it	go	and	move	on	to	Islam”.		Razia	collapses	the	temporal	and	spatial	here	into	a	teleological	narrative	of	progress	where	Islam	is	simultaneously	the	basis	and	the	not	yet	realized	telos	of	the	Pakistani	nation.		Central	to	her	(re)construction	of	the	Muslim	subject	is	a	reconfiguration	of	the	way	Islam	is	incorporated	into	Pakistani	national	identity,	which	unsettles	it	from	its	rigidified	place	as	an	existing	identity	upon	which	the	demand	for	Pakistan	was	made	and	relocates	it	temporally	and	spatially	by	imagining	it	as	a	notion	of	progress	that	is	intertwined	with	and	reinforced	through	experiences	and	narratives	of	migration.			
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In	other	words,	insofar	as	Islam	was	understood	as	the	ultimate	basis	for	the	Pakistani	nation	in	the	dominant	nationalist	narrative,	it	was	conceptualized	as	a	pre-existing	component	of	society	-	that	is,	Pakistan	is	supposed	to	be	an	expression	of	an	existing	Islamic	identity.		But	through	the	reconfiguration	of	the	temporality	of	Islam	in	the	discourse	of	the	nation,	the	women	I	met	trouble	this	conceptualization	of	the	nation.		This	temporal	imaginary	that	simultaneously	locates	Islam	as	the	past	(the	foundation)	and	the	future	(the	not	yet)	sets	in	motion	a	sense	of	national	duty	for	these	women	that	as	Pakistani	Muslims	there	is	a	need	to	actively	aspire	to	Islam.75		Furthermore,	the	simultaneous	location	of	India	as	a	geographic	neighbour	and	a	spectre	reflecting	the	past	(and	present)	of	Pakistan	produces	an	intimate	enemy,	an	ever-present	and	unrelenting	threat	holding	back	the	progress	of	the	nation	toward	Islam.		Thus,	proximity	is	a	problem	in	both	senses	–	as	similarity	and	space.			The	expedited	piety	of	the	diaspora	is	thus	enabled	through	the	mitigation	of	this	proximity	in	the	West	(read	as	Judeo-Christian).		In	a	booklet	recommended	to	me	by	another	member	of	Al-Huda	titled	Understanding	the	Evil	of	Innovation:	Bid’ah	(Ibn	Mohar	Ali,	2006),	Judeo-Christian	contexts	are	considered	relatively	safe	because	“their	falsehood	is	evident	and	less	likely	to	cause	us	to	stray”	whereas	in	the	case	of	those	who	are	submerged	in	cultures	rife	with	biddat	“it	is	more	difficult	to	shift	the	truth	from	falsehood”	
																																																								75	Naveeda	Khan	(2012)	characterizes	similar	processes	as	“striving”	–	a	notion	of	“Muslim	becoming”	that	is	inherent	in	the	national	imaginary	of	Pakistan.		She	points	to	the	poetry	of	one	of	the	so-called	founding	fathers	of	Pakistan,	Mohammad	Iqbal,	as	evidence	of	this	“tendency”	towards	becoming	rather	than	being	Muslim	at	the	inception	of	the	nation.		However,	I	hesitate	to	use	her	formulation	in	the	context	of	this	dissertation	because	she	seems	to	trace	an	alternative,	but	still	monolithic	and	undifferentiated	ideology	of	Pakistan,	which	is	precisely	what	I	am	attempting	to	unpack	through	the	spiritual	epistemologies	of	the	women	I	interviewed.		Moreover,	her	use	of	the	work	of	Mohammad	Iqbal	to	make	this	point	is	also	problematic	in	that,	at	best,	it	assumes	a	literate	national	populace	or,	at	worst,	reproduces	the	exclusion	of	the	illiterate	from	the	national	imaginary.	
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and	they	are	“more	prone	to	attract	us	to	vanity	and	that	which	is	pernicious”	(p.	57).		The	West	figured	prominently	but	contradictorily	in	my	respondents’	transnational	discourse	of	piety	ranging	from	a	knowable	Judeo-Christian	religious	space,	to	a	depraved	space	of	enlightenment-gone-awry,	but	always	a	less	threatening	space	because	it	is	relatively	culture-free,	and	therefore	biddat-free.		In	the	first	instance,	the	characterization	of	the	West	as	Judeo-Christian	situates	it	within	familiar	narratives	of	historic	encounters	between	Islam,	Christianity	and	Judaism	–	encounters	that	are	relayed	in	the	Quran	and	
sunnah	and	can	thus	be	identified	and	dealt	with	in	relatively	straightforward	ways	by	referring	to	textual	examples.		The	perceived	depravity	of	the	West	poses	a	different	set	of	issues	in	the	diaspora	especially	in	relation	to	parenting,	however,	this	depravity	is	seen	as	a	degeneration	of	Christianity	or	Judaism,	which,	interestingly,	is	less	threatening	than	degeneration	(through	innovation/biddat)	within	Islam	that	confuses	Islamic	identity	in	far	more	exhaustive	ways.		Thus,	the	West	signifies	an	easier	and	simpler	route	to	piety	for	many	of	the	women	I	interviewed	both	in	Pakistan	and	the	Pakistani	diaspora.			Through	a	migratory	spatial	displacement,	an	expedited	piety	is	able	to	emerge.		That	is,	the	diasporic	context	presents	an	opportunity	for	the	practice	and	development	of	piety	that	many	in	the	diaspora	felt	was	not	possible	within	Pakistan	because	of	its	proximity	to	India/Hinduism,	the	related	presence	of	biddat	and	shirk,	and	the	social	compulsion,	temptation,	and	desire	to	join	in	them.		At	the	same	time	women	in	the	diaspora	also	expressed	a	nostalgic	longing	for	Pakistan.		For	example,	another	woman	I	interviewed,	Ayesha,	referred	to	the	ease	with	which	one	can	fulfill	the	Islamic	duty	of	
namaaz	(prayer)	and	roza	(fast).		Referring	to	Pakistan,	she	said:		Everyday	you	can	hear	the	azaan	(call	for	prayers)	no	matter	where	you	are.		In	Ramzan,	all	the	restaurants	are	closed	during	fasting	hours,	there	are	no	ads	for	
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food,	and	people	who	are	not	fasting	don’t	eat	in	public,	so	you	see,	its	so	much	easier	to	fast	in	a	place	like	Pakistan	because	people	have	a	lot	of	respect	for	these	things.				Others	brought	up	examples	of	not	having	to	worry	about	whether	food	is	halal,	not	having	the	temptation	of	alcohol,	and	not	having	to	feel	awkward	in	more	Islamically	appropriate	attire	when	in	Pakistan.		Dominant	nationalist	narratives	of	the	creation	of	Pakistan	as	a	safe	place	for	Muslims	reverberate	through	these	expressions	of	nostalgia	and	memories	of	belonging.		This	affinity	for	Pakistan	is	strengthened	(if	not	produced)	through	diasporic	experiences	of	disorientation	and	alienation	in	the	West.		Noreen,	one	of	the	founding	members	of	an	Al-Huda	study	circle	in	Mississauga,	explained:		When	I	first	came	to	Canada	it	was	just	before	9/11	and	up	until	then	I	was	not	so	interested	in	learning	and	practicing	Islam	in	depth.		After	9/11	so	many	people	would	ask	me	about	Islam	and	why	something	like	this	is	allowed	in	Islam	and	I	didn’t	know	how	to	answer	this	question.		So	I	formed	this	group	in	order	to	answer	other	people’s	questions	-	but	now	I	am	here	because	I	have	my	own	questions.		However,	while	many	expressed	a	longing	for	this	context	they	simultaneously	put	these	very	feelings	into	question	by	drawing	attention	to	the	religious	complacency	produced	through	these	amenities.		Without	undermining	the	importance	of	a	“safe	place”	for	Muslims,	many	suggested	that	being	in	this	place	can	make	one	a	“lazy	Muslim”.		That	is,	many	women	in	the	diaspora	worried	that	Islam	is	taken	as	a	given	because	of	the	construction	and	dissemination	of	notions	of	Islam	as	part	of	national	identity	and	therefore,	development	of	Islamic	piety	in	Pakistan	has	stagnated.		Fariha	put	it	this	way:	“Pakistan	is	not	an	Islamic	state	but	it	is	an	Islam-friendly	state”.		So,	even	as	they	fondly	remember	the	sounds	of	the	azaan	in	every	corner,	Pakistan	still	occupies	a	contradictory	position	as	the	place	that	both	enables	and	obstructs	the	development	of	piety	for	these	women.	
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Developmentalist	Dawah	“Give	me	a	good	woman	and	I	will	give	you	a	good	nation.”	(Beenish)	
“Give	me	good	mothers	and	I’ll	give	you	good	societies.”	(Ghazala)	
“Good	nations	are	born	in	a	mother’s	lap.”	(Romana)	Coalescing	and	relational	discourses	of	the	nation	infuse	how	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	position	themselves	and	their	pious	subject	formation	in	relation	to	notions	of	progress.		In	several	interviews	I	conducted	there	was	a	recurring	reference	to	a	version	of	the	quotations	above,	signaling	how	these	women	perceived	their	position	and	role	in	society.		This	gendered	role	to	bear	and	rear	good	nations	was	not	only	limited	to	their	familial	relationships	but	was	also	extended	outside	the	home	through	the	Islamic	concept	of	dawah,	which	translates	to	a	call,	invitation,	appeal,	or	summons	(Mahmood,	2005,	p.	57).		The	practice	of	dawah	is	a	common	element	in	several	Islamic	groups.		For	some	groups,	however,	dawah	is	central	to	their	practices	of	piety.		Studies	of	Muslim	women’s	piety	groups	in	Bangladesh	and	Egypt,	for	example,	illustrate	a	preoccupation	with	dawah	similar	to	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.		Samia	Huq	(2014)	argues	that	the	dawah	activities	she	observed	amongst	women	in	Bangladesh	“seek	to	transform	both	people’s	inner	spiritual	lives	as	well	as	the	public	space”	through	“conventional	preaching	to	friends	and	family,	and…going	into	the	public	space	in	a	more	thought-out	and	organized	manner”	(p.	81).		Mahmood	(2005)	similarly	observed	that,	in	the	case	of	the	Egyptian	women’s	
da’wa	movement,	a	range	of	activities	fell	under	the	practice	of	da’wa	including	“establishing	neighbourhood	mosques,	social	welfare	organizations,	Islamic	educational	
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institutions,	and	printing	presses,	as	well	as	urging	fellow	Muslims	toward	greater	responsibility,	either	through	preaching	or	personal	conversation”	(p.	58).		Many	of	the	women	I	interviewed	understood	dawah	as	a	way	of	“giving	back	to	the	community”	(Donya).		For	Donya,	dawah	was	a	“responsibility	as	a	Muslim	to	spread	good”	and	part	of	her	gendered	duty	to	create	a	strong	Islamic	society.		Farida	elaborated:		
Dawah	is	farz	(compulsory	responsibility).		Allah	has	said	that	even	if	you	have	learned	one	line	of	something,	one	ayat,	you	have	to	transfer	it	to	someone	else.		This	is	how	religion	will	continue…on	the	day	of	judgment	you	will	be	asked	that	you	had	this	knowledge,	what	did	you	do	with	it?		And	you	had	the	opportunity	and	the	resources…There	are	cars	standing	in	our	driveways.		We	are	going	all	over	the	place!		Farida’s	understanding	of	dawah	implicates	her	class	privilege	in	multiple	ways.		For	Farida,	it	is	even	more	egregious	that	those	with	resources	at	their	disposal	are	not	utilizing	them	towards	their	Islamic	duty.		The	cars	standing	in	her	driveway	represented	an	idle	resource	that	could	be	put	to	work	in	the	transfer	or	spread	of	Islamic	knowledge.		Farida’s	incredulity	evinces	her	perception	of	the	unfortunate	lost	potential	of	gaining	favour	for	the	afterlife	through	class	privilege.		The	implications	of	mobilizing	class	privilege	for	dawah	are	clearer	when	considered	in	relation	to	how	several	women	I	met	imagined	their	Islamic	praxis	in	terms	of	rationality.		As	Ghazala	mentioned,	another	reason	why	dawah	is	important	to	many	women	is	to	create	the	conditions	for	the	ongoing	maintenance	and	development	of	one’s	own	piety:	“If	you	want	to	be	a	pious	person,	you	have	to	make	others	just	like	you.		Otherwise,	it	is	very	easy	to	go	back	to	the	same	thing”.		Dawah,	in	the	religious	praxis	of	many	women	I	interviewed,	was	not	just	about	spreading	the	word	of	God	but	also	about	gaining	prospects	for	the	afterlife	and	homogenizing	practices	of	Islam	in	order	to	transform	the	public	space	and	reduce	the	possibility	of	different	practices	
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thwarting	the	development	their	own	rational	forms	of	piety.		Hence,	an	imperative	goal	in	the	practice	of	dawah	is	to	coax	others	to	become	like	the	rational	self.			
Dawah	takes	various	forms	in	the	practices	of	the	women	I	met	based	on	the	receivers	of	their	dawah.		In	particular,	I	noted	a	stark	difference	between	the	way	women	spoke	about	and	engaged	in	dawah	with	their	impious	counterparts	from	similar	social	locations	(upper	class,	literate,	urban,	English/Urdu	speaking)	and	those	from	othered	social	locations	(lower	class,	illiterate,	rural,	did	not	speak	English,	and/or	Urdu	was	not	their	first	language),	such	as	the	domestic	workers	in	the	maasi	class.		Dawah	activities	targeting	the	former	group	of	people	entailed	appeals	to	rationality	and	mobilizing	a	sense	of	similarity	through	commensurability	with	liberal	modernity	in	order	to	cast	their	version	of	piety	in	palatable	terms.		Contrastingly,	in	relation	to	the	latter,	their	dawah	took	the	form	of	developmentalist	activities	like	the	maasi	class	–	or	what	I	refer	to	as	‘developmentalist	dawah’.	I	often	found	myself	in	conversations	that	I	suspected	were	motivated	by	some	women’s	dawah	duties.		While	I	can	only	venture	a	guess	as	to	how	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	perceived	me,	I	imagine	that	they	located	me	higher	up	on	a	social	hierarchy	as	a	diasporic,	English-speaking,	educated,	middle-upper	class	Pakistani	woman.		This	was	particularly	evident	in	several	interactions	I	had	with	some	women	affiliated	with	Al-Huda.		I	began	noticing	this	perception	of	me	when	several	women	told	me	the	same	story	about	a	young,	‘modern’	girl	who	turned	her	life	around	through	Al-Huda.		The	stories	went	something	like	this:		One	day,	a	girl	showed	up	at	one	of	Dr.	Farhat	Hashmi’s	lectures	at	an	elite	hotel	venue	wearing	a	sleeveless	kameez	(long	shirt	that	is	typically	part	of	a	shalwar	
kameez	outfit).		Some	also	mentioned	that	she	was	wearing	capri	style	pants	and	no	
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dupatta	(long	scarf	typically	worn	with	shalwar	kameez	used	to	cover	the	chest	or	as	an	accessory).		Her	friend	had	brought	her	there.		The	girl	was	high	and/or	drunk	and/or	was	a	smoker.		She	stood	out	in	a	room	full	of	women	who	had	covered	their	heads	and	were	wearing	full	sleeves.		The	organizers	of	the	event	contemplated	turning	her	away	because	of	her	inappropriate	attire,	but	then	Farhat	Hashmi	asked	that	they	let	her	stay	and	that	they	not	say	or	do	anything	to	alienate	her.		The	girl	was	allowed	to	stay	and	listened	to	a	life-changing	lecture	that	made	her	break	down	and	cry.		After	the	lecture,	Farhat	Hashmi	asked	that	she	come	speak	with	her	in	private.		This	conversation	and	experience	made	this	girl	a	devout	and	active	member	of	the	Al-Huda.		She	“reverted”	to	Islam,	was	rehabilitated	from	her	vices,	started	covering	her	head,	and	stopped	wearing	sleeveless	clothes.	This	story,	with	its	references	to	the	elite	hotel	venue,	modern	styles	of	dress,	and	modern	vices,	was	meant	to	impress	people,	like	me,	who	were	read	as	“modern”.		Al-Huda’s	familiarity	with	things	that	are	otherwise	expected	to	be	absent	or	ostracized	within	stereotypical	understandings	of	conservative	Islamic	circles	is	a	way	of	signaling	their	difference	and	their	modernity.		Many	of	the	upper	class	women	I	interviewed	had	come	to	Al-Huda	through	a	lecture	or	a	daura-e-quran	held	at	one	of	the	elite	country	clubs	or	hotels,	such	as	the	Sheraton,	in	Karachi	or	Islamabad.		Donya	explained	how	the	elite	venues	were	used	as	“a	pull,	a	magnet”	and	students	were	drawn	to	these	venues	because	they	were	“curious	as	to	how	Islam	is	taught	at	the	Sheraton”.		The	success	of	Al-Huda	thus	lies	in	part	in	their	deliberate	efforts	to	create	classed	spaces	that	would	appeal	to	these	women.		As	Donya	explained,	several	smaller	organizations	inspired	by	Al-Huda	have	been	emerging	offering	“spiritual	spas”	and	retreats.		She	explained	their	emergence	as	follows:	You	have	these	things	where	they	take	you	to	the	country	club	for	five	days	for	[Islamic]	studies.		All	[these	kinds	of	things]	are	there.	That	is	the	need	of	the	
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day…urban	elite	women	are	rich	and	the	husbands	are	earning	and	basically	they	are	in	kitty	parties.				For	Donya,	Al-Huda,	and	other	similar	organizations,	are	able	to	appeal	to	elite	women	and	provide	an	alternative	to	how	they	spend	their	time.		Their	inclusivity	of	the	“sleeveless”	girl	is	not	only	evidence	of	their	ability	to	relate	to	the	modern	woman,	but	also	an	endorsement	of	their	Islamic	praxis	by	a	member	of	the	upper	classes.		That	this	“sleeveless”	girl	found	Al-Huda	to	be	a	relatable	and	credible	space	affirmed	Al-Huda	as	a	modern	and	progressive	phenomenon.			Along	similar	lines,	references	to	“white	converts”	who	are	members	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	played	a	major	role	in	establishing	the	legitimacy	of	their	religious	praxis	as	modern.		Many	women	would	say	that	white	converts	are	often	the	“best	Muslims”	or	that	they	are	“even	stronger	Muslims”	than	those	who	are	born	Muslim.		Like	the	perceived	absence	of	biddat	in	the	West	discussed	earlier,	the	valorization	of	white	converts	is	constructed	upon	underlying	assumptions	about	the	objective	cultural	neutrality	of	whiteness.		White	converts	are	not	only	valorized	because	they	embraced	Islam	despite	their	whiteness,	but	they	are	valorized	because	they	embraced	Islam	through	their	whiteness.		That	is,	whiteness	denotes	an	elevated	form	of	rational	engagement	with	Islam	that	is	free	of	the	“cultural	baggage”	that	Muslims	of	colour	have	to	contend	with.		The	very	presence	of	white	converts	in	their	membership	is	operationalized	as	a	means	to	objectively	establish	the	legitimacy	of	their	religious	praxis.		Together,	references	to	the	“sleeveless”	girl,	elite	hotels	and	“white	converts”	indicate	the	terms	upon	which	dawah	is	directed	at	the	“modern”	upper	classes.		Through	the	lure	of	familiarity	and	similarity,	many	women	I	interviewed	attempted	to	engage	in	dawah	with	those	they	viewed	as	their	peers	in	social	status.	
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Dawah	taking	place	within	these	relationships	is	markedly	different	from	how	
dawah	takes	place	with	those	considered	to	be	outside	the	reach	of	familiarity	or	the	realm	of	similarity.		This	disparity	was	made	further	evident	to	me	by	the	experience	of	being	privy	to	general	discussions	about	the	problems	in	the	practice	of	Islam	amongst	the	“illiterate”	lower	classes,	despite	perceptions	of	me	as	an	impious	Muslim	of	sorts.		I	was	reminded	of	Chandra	Mohanty’s	(2003)	critique	of	Western	feminism	where	she	draws	on	Trinh	Minh	Ha’s	critique	of	Western	philosophy:	“the	‘conversation	of	man	with	man’	is…mainly	a	conversation	of	‘us’	with	‘us’	about	‘them’,	of	the	white	man	with	the	white	man	about	the	primitive-native	man”	(p.	75).		Being	invited	into	the	“us”	to	have	a	conversation	about	“them”	indicated	to	me	the	perception	of	a	shared	privilege	and	status	between	me	and	the	women	I	was	having	these	conversations	with.		Although	this	shared	status	did	not	preclude	me	from	being	subjected	to	dawah	activities,	it	did	shape	these	encounters	through	a	perception	of	a	shared	outside	–	or	a	shared	‘them’.	The	complex	processes	of	othering	in	the	discursive	matrix	that	underpins	my	respondents’	practices	of	dawah	illustrates	the	ways	in	which	literalist	approaches	to	piety	can	be	entangled	with	liberal	hierarchical	dichotomies.		The	developmentalist	approach	taken	in	practices	of	dawah	aimed	at	women	and	girls	from	villages,	the	“illiterate”,	and	“the	poor”,	as	exemplified	by	the	maasi	class	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	emerge	out	of	this	perception	of	‘us’	and	‘them’.		Furthermore,	this	approach	is	formulated	at	the	intersection	of	their	text-centricism	and	the	rejection	of	custom/tradition	and	is	couched	in	the	language	of	benevolence,	progress,	and	rationality.		Thus,	these	interactions	are	occurring	on	drastically	different	terms	than	the	dawah	activities	targeted	to	the	upper	classes.		My	respondents’	text-centric	understanding	of	Islam	represents	one	of	many	ways	
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of	engaging	with	Islam	amongst	Pakistanis,	yet	it	structures	a	hierarchy	of	Muslimness	where	the	literate	are	at	the	top	and	the	illiterate	are	at	the	bottom	with	a	gradient	of	permutations	in	between.		This	is	not	to	say	that	the	women	I	met	consider	all	literate	Muslims	better	than	illiterate	ones,	however,	the	potentiality	of	becoming	a	good	Muslim	is	heightened	for	the	literate	since	direct,	individual	readings	of	holy	texts	is	foundational	to	their	notion	of	piety.		As	a	result,	they	construct	a	hierarchy	that	marginalizes	and	demonizes	many	popular	Islamic	practices	where	direct	access	to	Quranic	text	is	immaterial.				
Mullahs	and	Alim/as	The	demonization	of	popular	practices	is	exemplified	in	the	way	some	women	constructed	and	deployed	the	trope	of	the	mullah	and	contrast	it	to	the	alim/a	(alim	for	male,	alima	for	female).		Notably,	these	women	were	responding	to	accusations	hurled	at	them	for	being	“fundamentalists”	because	of	their	literalist	orthodox	take	on	Islam	as	mentioned	in	chapter	four.		As	such,	they	were	also	defending	themselves	against	these	accusations	by	redirecting	it	to	others.		Moreover,	at	least	one	woman	I	interviewed,	Donya,	made	the	effort	to	unpack	the	vilification	of	the	mullah.		When	I	discussed	this	issue	with	Donya	she	had	a	careful	and	nuanced	position	that	was	attuned	to	how	the	figure	of	the	
mullah	is	mobilized	in	the	upper	“liberal”	classes	to	homogenize	and	denounce	religiosity.		Nevertheless,	most	other	women	I	interviewed	participated	in	the	dissemination	of	this	trope.		Even	in	the	context	of	defending	their	own	practice	of	Islam,	they	relied	on	affirming	existing	stereotypes	of	the	mullah	to	establish	themselves	as	different.		Many	of	the	women	I	met	often	traced	the	prevalence	of	erroneous	ways	of	engaging	with	the	Quran	to	the	
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pervasive	influence	of	“mullahs”	–	note	that	the	plural	form	of	mullah	is	anglicized	by	adding	an	‘s’,	which	is	indicative	of	the	semantic	origins	and	the	circles	in	which	these	tropes	circulate.		The	category	of	the	mullah	is	evasive	because	of	its	vastness	in	the	sense	that	it	can	include	anyone	(male)	who	publicly	acts	as	an	authority	on	Islam.		However,	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	it	has	an	inescapable	connotation	of	irrationality	and	ignorance	–	a	connotation	that	emerged	during	the	colonial	era	and	became	particularly	damning	during	and	after	the	Zia-ul-Haq	regime	(Khan,	2012).		The	mullah	is	thus	constructed	as	a	despised	and	illegitimate	figure	because	of	the	popularity	of	his	authority	despite	his	dubious	knowledge	of	the	Quran.		Compounding	this	portrayal	of	the	mullah,	many	women	I	interviewed	also	described	mullahs	as	inherently	“scary”	and	“unapproachable”	because	they	are	“intolerant”,	“extremist”,	and	“backward”,	among	other	things.		Such	sensational	and	homogenized	representations	of	the	monstrous	
mullah	carry	much	currency	within	the	social	imaginaries	of	the	educated	classes	in	Pakistan	and	the	Pakistani	diaspora	where	the	mullah	becomes	a	figurative	punching	bag	who	can	be	blamed	for	almost	any	social	problem	arising	in	Pakistan	from	child-molestation	to	terrorism.		Underpinning	this	representation	of	the	mullah	is	a	mistrust	and	disdain	for	the	masses	that	are	in	turn	depicted	as	ignorant,	lacking	autonomy,	and,	therefore	vulnerable	to	the	mullah’s	dominance.		In	contrast,	the	alim/a	is	represented	as	a	learned	scholar,	with	a	worldly	outlook	and	a	studied	and	knowledgeable	approach	to	Islam.		To	circumvent	the	damaging	influence	of	mullahs,	the	women	I	interviewed	emphasized	the	role	of	the	alim/a	in	the	development	of	piety.		Ghazala,	a	regular	participant	of	a	home-based	Jamaat	Quran	class,	put	it	this	way:	
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This	character	of	the	mullah,	in	Islam	he	has	no	place.		Mullahs	have	no	place	in	Islam.		But	there	is	a	place	for	alims.		Alims	have	a	place	in	Islam.		Alims	know	about	everything	happening	in	the	world.		If	you	ask	an	alim	to	relate	something	to	the	Quran,	he	will	be	able	to	comprehend	and	relate	and	implement	it.		He	will	be	able	to	tell	people	how	to	relate	it	to	their	lives.		Implicit	in	Ghazala’s	statement	is	the	incommensurability	between	the	mullah	and	modernity	in	the	sense	that	the	mullah	is	not	even	able	to	comprehend	modern	day	problems,	let	alone	advise	on	them.		This	is	not	only	a	failure	on	the	part	of	the	mullah	to	embrace	modernity	but	it	is	also	symptomatic	of	his	inability	to	master	Quranic	text	and	manipulate	it	with	confidence	to	apply	it	to	modern	day	life.		The	alim/a,	by	contrast,	masterfully	engages	Quranic	texts	and	brings	it	into	conversation	with	modern	worldly	matters.			A	common	narrative	of	this	contrast	that	came	up	in	several	interviews	and	conversations	was	of	how	a	mullah	would	address	the	struggles	of	a	working	woman.		In	this	narrative,	the	mullah,	being	inextricably	fixed	in	his	“backward”	outlook	on	society,	would	impulsively	forbid	women	from	working	altogether,	while	an	alim/a	would	carefully	examine	the	particularities	of	a	woman’s	struggle	and	draw	on	his/her	expertise	of	holy	texts	to	give	advice	on	how	a	good	Muslim	woman	would	manage	her	circumstances.		This	narrative	pivots	on	the	construction	of	the	mullah-extremist	as	the	‘other’	who	is	constitutive	of	self-presentations	of	the	women	I	met.		For	instance,	Farida,	a	teacher	and	student	at	an	Al-Huda	centre,	gave	the	following	example	of	how	learning	from	Al-Huda	is	different	from	learning	from	a	mullah:	Al-Huda	doesn’t	have	an	extremist	view	about	things.		They	believe	that	you	don’t	have	to	leave	worldly	things	because	it	is	the	world	that	we	have	to	live	in.		When	we	watch	mullahs	we	see	what	their	views	are	and	they	say	things	like	[women]	should	stay	at	home	etcetera.		Al-Huda	is	different	because	they	say	that	[women]	can	go	out	also,	and	you	can	work	also	if	the	circumstances	are	good	for	women	and	the	environment	is	okay.	
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	Distancing	the	self	from	the	mullah-extremist-other	affirms	Al-Huda’s	place	in	modernity	in	that	it	shows	the	congruency	of	Al-Huda’s	literalist	approach	to	the	Quran	with	the	preferred	subject	position	of	a	modern	worldly	Muslim.		As	mentioned,	Al-Huda	further	demonstrates	its	investments	in	portraying	a	cosmopolitan	and	global	outlook	in	the	deliberate	choice	of	adding	the	suffix	“International”	in	naming	the	organization	“Al-Huda	International”.		Likening	the	self	with	the	alim/a,	further	consolidates	this	position	by	cashing	in	on	the	value	placed	on	the	learned,	scholarly,	cosmopolitan	subject	of	modernity	and	taking	advantage	of	the	legitimacy	this	affords.		Accordingly,	the	alim/a	emerges	as	the	agent	of	progress	in	the	discourse	of	the	women	I	interviewed.	At	the	same	time,	the	collapse	of	the	category	of	the	mullah	with	extremists	further	demonizes	mullahs	and	their	followers	by	associating	them	with	an	irrational	and	depoliticized	form	of	violence	–	an	association	with	exacerbated	implications	in	the	context	of	the	hegemony	of	War	on	Terror	discourse.		As	Sunera	Thobani	(2010)	points	out,	in	the	logic	of	the	War	on	Terror	the	enemy	other	is	constructed	as	an	“existential	enemy”	and	not	a	“political”	one	(p.	141).		This	discursive	depoliticization	of	the	other	renders	the	enemy	as	a	“mythic,	abstract	figure”	(p.	141)	and	excludes	any	possibility	of	the	existence	of	political	contexts	–	contexts	that	may	implicate	the	self	in	disturbing	ways	that	challenge	claims	of	innocence	and	benevolence.		The	existential	dimension	of	portrayals	of	mullahs,	as	exemplified	in	Ghazala’s	comments	about	mullahs	having	no	place	in	Islam,	is	particularly	haunting	in	the	context	of	this	discourse	and	the	corresponding	drone	warfare	in	northern	Pakistan	that	elicits	tacit	and	overt	support	from	influential	pockets	of	urban	middle	and	upper	class	Pakistanis.			
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It	is	important	to	note	that	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	liberal	logics	of	tradition,	education,	and	progress	operate	on	multiple,	interrelated	levels	and	the	discourses	of	the	women	I	met	are	situated	within	these	fraught	contexts.		First,	as	a	country	that	is	repeatedly	and	persistently	cast	in	the	imperialist	idiom	of	the	War	on	Terror	and	the	“failed	state	doctrine”	(Tahir,	2009),	Pakistan	figures	prominently	in	global	discourses	of	tradition	and	progress.		Accordingly,	Pakistan	is	vulnerable	to	imperialist	interventions	as	exemplified	by	the	contemporary	drone	warfare	inflicted	by	the	United	States	as	part	of	the	War	on	Terror.		Second,	within	Pakistan,	the	spectre	of	terrorism	and	the	collapsing	of	entire	communities	(Waziristani,	Pashtun,	Baloch,	Afghan	refugees)	into	the	category	of	the	terrorist	contributed	to	a	polarization	of	Muslim	identities	as	a	result	of	many	Pakistanis	attempting	to	consolidate	and	demarcate	this	category	further	in	order	to	distance	themselves	from	terrorism.		This	polarization	pits	the	literate	modern	Muslim	as	the	driver	of	progress	against	the	illiterate	anti-modern	(non)	Muslim	as	a	regressive	and	potentially	violent	force	in	Pakistan.		The	overlapping	discourses	of	terrorism	and	progress	and	the	consequent	mapping	of	good	and	bad	Muslims	propels	and	expands	liberal	hierarchies	and	forms	of	exclusion	and	marginalization	through	a	literalist	Islam.		
Liberal	and	Literalist	Islam	As	the	above	discussion	illustrates,	my	respondents’	self-proclaimed	literalist	engagements	with	the	text	implicate	their	processes	of	religious	subject	formation	in	socio-economic	hierarchies	and	discourses	of	othering.		In	this	section,	I	examine	how	conventional	ways	of	understanding	the	politics	of	Islamic	groups	like	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	who	take	a	literalist	approach	to	Islam,	make	invisible	the	commensurability	and	
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complicity	between	literalism	and	liberalism.		I	argue	that	taking	into	consideration	how	liberal	values	are	mobilized	through	the	privileging	of	the	literate	subject	brings	literalist	groups	into	conversation	with	liberalism	in	significant	ways.		This	requires	a	shift	in	focus	from	how	the	text	operates	in	definitions	of	liberal	Islam	where	the	practice	of	progressive/modernist	ijtihad	is	privileged	as	the	mechanism	through	which	Islam	is	reconciled	with	liberal	values.		In	other	words,	to	explicate	the	liberal	politics	of	literalist	groups	I	move	beyond	an	analysis	of	the	explicit	production/commensuration	of	liberal	values	with	and	through	the	Quran	to	an	analysis	of	the	implications	of	subject	formation	through	text-centricism.			This	discussion	shifts	the	focus	from	theorizations	of	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	liberalism	where	the	potential	for	commensurability	is	primarily	identified	in	terms	of	interpretive	practices	that	move	away	from	literalism	and	proceed	through	ijtihad	(Jackson,	2011;	Kurzman,	1998;	Ramadan,	2009).		As	mentioned	in	the	discussion	on	Islamic	feminism	in	chapter	three,	ijtihad	refers	to	the	systematic,	progressive,	and	contextualized	reinterpretation	of	holy	texts.		The	potential	for	commensurability	between	liberal	values	and	Islam	is	typically	situated	in	this	practice	because	it	represents	the	possibility	for	reconciliation	by	taking	up	Islamic	scriptures	as	flexible	texts	that	are	open	to	interpretation.		This	approach	to	Islam	is	akin	to	the	Islamic	modernism	of	Mohammad	Iqbal,	Sayyid	Ahmad	Khan	and	the	Aligarh	Movement,	or	what	some	have	termed	“liberal	Islam”	(Jackson,	2011;	Kurzman,	1998)	or	“secular	theology”	(Mahmood,	2006,	p.	335).		The	contours	of	this	conceptualization	of	liberal	Islam	are	further	sharpened	by	its	opposition	to	“traditionalist	Islam”,	which	is	defined	as	committed	to	upholding	historic	“Islamic	tradition”,	and	is	thereby	considered	to	be	in	opposition	to	liberal	notions	of	
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progress,	and	engaged	in	a	more	literal	interpretation	of	scripture	(Jackson,	2011;	Ramadan,	2011).		Maulana	Maududi	and	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	are	often	given	as	examples	of	this	approach.		The	women	I	conducted	research	with	would	be	considered	“traditionalists”	if	we	were	to	adhere	to	this	schematic.			The	defining	moment	in	this	dichotomous	mapping	of	liberal	and	traditionalist	Islam	is	the	rejection	of	“Islamic	tradition”	as	anti-modern	and	a	subsequent	engagement	in	progressive	interpretative	practices	that	reconcile	Islam	with	modernity	(imagined	as	a	universal	and	singular	phenomenon).		Accordingly,	one	of	the	reasons	why	literalist	traditions	tend	to	be	left	out	of	definitions	of	‘liberal	Islam’	is	because	of	their	alleged	allegiance	to	upholding	‘Islamic	tradition’,	where	Islamic	tradition	is	narrowly	defined	as	the	strict	adherence	to	replicating	the	historic	Islam	of	the	time	of	the	Prophet	(Jackson,	2011;	Kamrava,	2011;	Ramadan,	2009).		The	perceived	inability	and	unwillingness	of	literalist	traditions	to	contextualize	Islam	in	relation	to	modernity	because	of	their	resistance	to	questioning	and	rejecting	‘tradition’	is	taken	to	be	evidence	of	incommensurability	with	liberal	values.		I	argue	that	the	rejection	of	tradition,	as	is	suggested	in	such	definitions	of	liberal	Islam,	is	not	sufficient	in	and	of	itself	as	a	liberal	value.		Rather,	the	rejection	of	tradition	must	be	accompanied	by	a	commitment	to	progress,	driven	by	individual	liberty,	reason	and	rationality	in	order	to	be	considered	liberal.		In	failing	to	account	for	the	way	the	notion	of	“tradition”	operates	as	a	function	of	progress,	the	distinction	between	liberal	and	traditionalist	Islam	ignores	the	centrality	of	the	dynamic	produced	by	this	duality	in	liberal	political	formations.		This,	in	turn,	elides	an	understanding	of	the	significant	ways	in	which	liberalism	and	literalism	are	entangled.	
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To	briefly	elaborate	on	the	dynamic	of	tradition	and	progress	in	liberalism,	I	turn	to	critical	interventions	and	critiques	in	theories	of	liberalism	that	explicate	its	complicity	with	imperialism.		Uday	Mehta	(1999)	suggests	that	in	liberal	theory	customs	and	traditions	are	considered	antithetical	to	progress	because	they	“render	reason	unnecessary”	(Mill,	2009,	p.	7)	both	in	their	practice	and	inception.		The	exercise	of	mental	faculties	is	preempted	for	individuals	who	conform	to	customs	because	conformity	or	“imitation”	does	not	require	the	exercise	of	mental	faculties.		For	the	prominent	liberal	theorist	John	S.	Mill	(2009),	for	instance,	customs	predominantly	represent	a	lack	of	individual	choice	and	hence	are	inimical	to	progress	and	those	who	live	their	lives	conforming	to	customs	imbibe	an	“ape-like…imitation”	(p.	71),	which	effectively	reduces	individuals	to	automatons.		Moreover,	not	only	does	following	customs	not	strengthen	the	mental	faculties	and	contribute	to	progress,	it	actually	weakens	them	according	to	Mill	(2009).		Customs,	then,	are	to	be	rejected	as	a	regressive	force	in	society.		Societies	where	the	“despotism	of	custom	is	complete”	(p.	86)	are	categorized	as	“barbaric	societies”	(p.	88)	in	Mill’s	(2009)	theorization,	which	are	then	as	a	whole	equivalent	to	children	and	are	thus	not	extended	individual	liberty	until	they	are	appropriately	civilized.		Uday	Mehta	(1999)	has	shown	how	“maturity	of	mental	faculties”	(Mill,	2009,	p.	12)	as	a	pre-requisite	for	the	extension	of	individual	liberty	justifies	the	exclusion	of	entire	societies	by	infantilizing	them	and	mobilizes	colonialism	by	positioning	the	West	in	paternalistic	and	benevolent	terms	with	the	responsibility	to	bring	these	infantilized	societies	into	modernity	(Mehta,	1999).		Liberalism	thus	inevitably	inaugurates	a	civilizing	mission	that	in	Mill’s	day	took	the	form	of	British	imperial	expansion	and	colonialism,	but	now	can	be	seen	and	felt	in	more	multifarious,	hybrid	and	dispersed	forms	through,	for	example,	imperialist	wars	and	
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development	projects.		It	is	this	relationship	between	tradition/custom	and	progress	that	mobilizes	a	whole	set	of	imperialist	imperatives	within	liberal	discourses	and	is	what	gives	meaning	to	the	rejection	of	tradition	in	liberal	theory.			Moreover,	in	a	postcolonial	context	defined	by	the	project	of	nation-building,	liberal	secularism	holds	discursive	power	as	being	the	only	vehicle	through	which	both	gender	equality	and	religious	pluralism	can	be	guaranteed	through	its	privileging	of	the	autonomous	individual	(Needham	&	Rajan,	2007).		That	is,	recourse	to	the	central	tenets	of	liberal	political	philosophy	of	freedom	and	inclusion	based	on	an	ontological	conception	of	individual	autonomy	brings	questions	of	difference	into	momentary	(and	illusory)	relief	through	a	focus	on	institutionalizing	individual	rights.		Critics	of	liberalism	argue	that	this	focus	on	the	individual	demarcates	inclusion,	democratic	franchise,	and	freedoms	based	on	a	foundational	exclusion	that	emerges	out	of	the	pre-requisite	of	individual	possession	of	autonomous	rationality	(Mehta,	1999;	Mohanram,	1999;	Spivak,	1999).		That	is	to	say,	the	individual	subject	of	liberalism	must	be	in	possession	of	rationality	in	order	to	receive	individual	liberal	rights	and	freedoms.		For	Radhika	Mohanram	(1999),	the	individuality	of	the	liberal	subject	is	inextricably	tied	to	the	separation	of	the	mind	and	the	body.		In	her	exploration	of	articulations	of	the	liberal	body	Mohanram	argues	that	the	hierarchical	distinction	made	between	the	static	body	and	the	progressive	consciousness	enables	and	depends	upon	the	visibility	and	representation	of	marked,	othered	bodies.		While	the	liberal	body	is	achieved	through	a	hierarchical	separation	between	the	mind	and	body,	the	othered	body	is	only	ever	perceived	or	represented.		This	is	because	this	perception	is	constituted	through	the	process	of	“the	body	as	materiality	with	its	own	logic	and	agency	[getting]	left	behind	
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within	static	space,	a	punctuation	mark	in	the	maturation	and	socialization	process	of	the	[liberal]	subject”	(Mohanram,	1999,	p.	25).		The	material	body	is	thus	expunged	from	the	ideal	liberal	body	and	then	brought	back	in	through	representation	in	the	form	of	the	hypervisible,	different,	and	inferior	Other.		For	Mohanram,	the	way	the	othered	body	figures	is	always	tied	to	an	external	referent,	that	is,	the	ideal	liberal	body	–	or	in	the	case	of	the	women	I	met,	the	rational	pious	body.		The	domestic	workers	in	the	maasi	class,	then,	constitute	this	hypervisible	body	as	can	be	seen	in	how	the	scope	of	their	affect	was	reduced	to	a	bodily	response	that	has	not	yet	developed	to	maturation	through	the	enactments	of	the	rational	mind.		Moreover,	recall	how	my	respondents’	had	to	contend	with	their	embodied	practices	of	veiling	being	conflated	with	how	a	maasi	or	women	from	the	lower	classes	would	cover	themselves.		For	some	women	I	met,	this	conflation	was	offensive	because	they	felt	that	their	practices	of	veiling	were	different	from	the	maasi	and	lower	class	women	because	their	practice	came	out	of	a	rational	engagement	with	Islam	and	not	the	bodily	needs	of	a	worker	in	transit.		This	was	also	clear	in	the	way	these	embodiments	manifested	physically	–	the	distinction	between	what	the	forms	of	covering	looked	liked	signaled	the	level	of	rationality	associated	with	the	practice.		The	hierarchical	relationship	between	the	mind	and	the	body	articulated	through	the	separation	of	the	mind	and	the	body	is	thus	a	significant	and	formative	component	of	my	respondents’	Islamic	discourse.	Attending	to	these	features	of	liberalism	makes	visible	the	implications,	expanse	and	shifting	contours	of	‘liberal	Islam’	in	Pakistan.		The	earlier	discussion	about	my	respondents’	discourses	and	practices	of	othering	unpacks	and	decentres	the	conventional	association	between	liberalism	and	ijtihad	–	and	the	related	liberal	fetishization	of	
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“moderate”	Muslims	–	in	order	to	enable	a	thicker	description	and	critique	of	liberalism	by	opening	up	an	epistemological	space	for	considering	“literalist”	or	“traditionalist”	Muslim	groups	as	sites	that	are	complicit	in	processes	of	subject	formation	that	are	complicit	with	liberal	social	hierarchies.		The	commensurability	of	literalism	and	liberalism	is	evident	in	the	processes	of	othering	complicit	in	my	respondents’	modes	of	subject	formation	and	the	social	relations	that	are	constitutive	of	and	constituted	by	their	practices	of	piety.		I	use	the	language	of	commensurability	and	co-production	here	so	as	not	to	suggest	that	these	Islamic	formations	are	a	linear	derivation	from	liberalism,	and	at	the	same	time	to	move	away	from	a	futile	conversation	on	their	degree	of	authenticity	and	distinctness.		Thus,	as	an	analytical	framing,	co-production	does	not	presume	a	priori	distinctness	and	foregrounds	relationality	and	fluidity	(Mongia	2007).		As	such,	my	respondents’	complicity	in	social	relations	of	power	is	made	evident	through	the	authorizing	discourses	they	mobilized	to	establish	their	positionality	as	rational	subjects	of	Islam.		In	particular,	overlapping	authorizing	discourses	of	rationality/progress,	text-centricism,	and	developmentalism	illustrate	how	these	women’s	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	are	complicit	in	reifying	liberal	trajectories	of	progress.		The	distinction	between	liberal	and	traditionalist	Islam	cannot	be	made	based	on	the	content	of	their	interpretations	of	holy	texts,	rather,	liberalism	is	more	fruitfully	gauged	by	the	mechanics	of	how	holy	texts	are	engaged	and	the	subject-positions	these	mechanisms	produce.		
Conclusion	While	it	is	important	to	note	that	these	women’s	call	to	rationality	has	given	way	to	productive	possibilities	in	terms	of	dismantling	the	Pakistani	state’s	discourses	of	Islam	
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and	disrupting	and	reconfiguring	patriarchal	relationships	in	their	homes	and	communities	(see	chapters	three	and	four),	it	has	clearly	also	been	constituted	by	and	is	constitutive	of	hierarchical	relations	of	power.		The	centrality	of	the	text	in	my	respondents’	literalist	Islam	mobilizes	a	discourse	of	rationality	that	privileges	the	literate	student-subject	as	the	ultimate	model	for	modern	pious	subject	formation.		By	foregrounding	the	text	and	literacy	in	the	development	of	piety,	the	women	I	met	construct	an	elite	and	exclusive	practice	of	Islam	that	marginalizes	the	‘illiterate’	and	dismisses	practices	of	Islam	that	do	not	centralize	the	text.		As	mentioned,	these	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	are	also	co-imbricated	in	processes	of	nationalist	subject	formation	in	complex	and	contradictory	ways.		The	marking	of	difference	in	practices	of	Islam	along	the	lines	of	religion	and	culture	draw	on	nationalist	xenophobic	discourses	that	construct	Hinduism	and	the	Hindu	as	the	foreign	other.		This	same	distinction	between	religion	and	culture	is	mobilized	to	demonize	
mullahs	as	extremist	others	and	their	followers	as	mindless	‘sheep’.		Dawah	taking	place	within	and	through	these	processes	of	othering,	then,	is	part	of	constructions	of	the	self	as	a	rational	and	modern	pious	subject.		Thus,	as	a	process	of	subject	formation	that	mobilizes	mind/body,	rational/irrational,	and	tradition/modernity	as	foundational	binaries,	my	respondents’	literalist	approach	to	piety	constructs	its	own	hierarchical	structures	that	bring	it	into	complicity	with	liberalism.		
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Conclusion			 By	way	of	conclusion,	I	recount	two	anecdotes	of	interactions	I	had	with	other	academics	in	relation	to	my	research.		I	received	an	email	from	a	filmmaker	who	wanted	to	produce	a	documentary	film	about	women	and	Islam	for	her	graduate	thesis.		She	told	me	that	she	was	interested	in	finding	out	more	about	women	“extremists”,	women	who	perhaps	would	be	part	of	or	in	support	of	Al-Qaeda	or	the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	and	Levant	(ISIL).		She	thought	that	Al-Huda	women	would	fit	this	description.		I	asked	her	why	she	thought	she	would	find	“extremist”	women	at	Al-Huda.		She	retorted,	“how	are	they	not	extremists?	They	wear	the	niqab	don’t	they?”		When	describing	my	dissertation	research	to	other	academics	I	am	often	met	with	questions	and	comments	that	stem	from	Islamophobic	discourses	of	Muslim	women.		What	is	most	surprising	is	that	many	of	these	academics	are	respected	for	their	feminist	and	anti-racist	work	and,	indeed,	many	of	them	have	influenced	my	analytical	frameworks.		One	such	professor	in	Canada	responded	to	my	synopsis	of	my	dissertation	research	with	much	enthusiasm.		She	went	on	to	tell	me	about	a	talk	she	had	heard	about	women	who	wear	the	niqab	and	asked	me	to	guess	where	I	thought	most	women	who	wear	the	niqab	in	Canada	were	born.		She	then	exclaimed,	“can	you	believe	that	most	of	them	are	born	here	in	Canada?”		The	conversation	then	took	an	even	more	disturbing	turn	as	she	went	on	to	elaborate	on	how	she	never	knows	how	to	engage	with	students	in	her	courses	who	wear	the	niqab	and	that	after	having	attended	this	talk,	she	feels	more	comfortable	around	them.				 While	there	is	much	to	unpack	in	these	anecdotes,	I	recount	these	recent	encounters	to	highlight	the	academic	context	in	which	this	dissertation	was	produced,	where	popular	Islamophobic	discourses	persist	in	subtle	and	not	so	subtle	ways	and	continue	to	shape	
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how	Muslim	women	are	understood	not	only	in	knowledge	production	but	in	everyday	academic	interactions.		For	instance,	in	each	of	the	interactions	mentioned	above,	practices	of	veiling	and	especially	the	niqab	figure	as	the	pivotal	feature	for	defining	women	who	wear	the	niqab	and	for	determining	how	to	interact	with	them.		Moreover,	in	these	interactions,	the	niqab	figures	as	an	over	determined	symbol	that	conveys	a	whole	gamut	of	information	about	these	women	–	where	they	were	born,	their	politics,	their	social	skills.		That	Muslim	women’s	public	displays	of	piety	such	as	the	niqab	continue	to	be	perceived	as	evidence	of	irreconcilable	difference	demonstrates	the	persistence	of	Islamophobic	processes	of	othering	shaped	by	the	normative	secularity	of	academic	spaces.				The	persistence	of	these	reductive	and	essentialist	understandings	may	be	why	many	scholars	of	Islam	and	Muslim	women,	such	as	the	proponents	of	Islamic	feminism	discussed	in	chapter	three,	tend	to	frame	analyses	of	Muslim	women	through	secular	epistemological	frameworks	in	an	attempt	to	prove	that	these	women	and	their	practices	of	piety	can	be	reconciled	with	secular	modernity.		However,	this	tendency	often	results	in	explaining	away	practices	of	piety	by	reducing	them	to	social,	political,	or	economic	motivations.		For	instance,	veiling	is	often	explained	as	a	form	of	socio-economically	determined	patriarchal	oppression,	or	an	embodied	symbol	of	nationalist	identity,	or	a	form	of	resistance	to	Western	materialism.		At	times,	in	an	effort	to	combat	Islamophobic	discourses	about	Muslim	women,	these	characterizations	empty	these	practices	of	piety	of	the	sacred	in	order	to	redeem	them	as	intelligible	subjects	of	secular	modernity.		In	this	dissertation,	I	build	on	these	efforts	to	combat	Islamophobic	forms	of	knowledge	production	by	deepening	understandings	of	Muslim	women’s	processes	of	pious	subject	making.		I	do	this	by	taking	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	and	by	taking	
259	
the	sacred	seriously	when	the	women	I	met	with	explained	how	they	practice	Islam	and	what	shapes	their	various	practices	of	piety.		By	taking	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological,	this	analysis	contributes	to	unsettling	the	normativity	of	discursively	colonized	categories	of	analysis	that	reproduce	Islamophobic	analytical	frameworks	when	mobilized	in	relation	to	Muslim	women.		This	epistemological	framework	further	produces	an	analysis	of	women	engaged	in	developing	their	piety	that	does	not	confine	them	to	the	referent	of	the	gendered	Muslim	citizen-subject	or	the	Muslim	feminist	subject.		In	other	words,	in	this	dissertation,	their	relationships	with	Islam	are	not	just	understood	in	terms	defined	by	religio-nationalist	or	secular	feminist	projects	and	discourses.		Rather,	I	critically	analyze	my	respondents’	Islamic	subjectivities	as	entangled	with,	but	not	confined	by,	these	discourses.		This	not	only	permits	a	better	understanding	of	how	they	give	meaning	to	their	practices	of	piety,	but	it	also	enables	an	analysis	of	their	complicities	in	structures	of	power	and	discourses	of	exclusion.			Working	through	women’s	conceptualizations	of	qawwam,	which	is	often	taken	up	as	irrefutable	evidence	of	women’s	subjugation	in	Islam,	I	argued	against	a	reductive	understanding	of	women’s	belief	in	this	concept	as	indicative	of	submission	to	patriarchal	oppression.		Instead,	relying	on	how	the	women	I	interviewed	explained	how	they	understood	and	inhabit	qawwam,	I	maintained	that	it	is	best	understood	in	relation	to	the	
akhira	as	a	divine	system	of	rights	and	responsibilities	that	is	inhabited	and	negotiated	in	multiple	and	relational	ways.		The	example	of	how	women	conceptualize	qawwam	brings	into	focus	the	trappings	of	secular	epistemological	frameworks	that	would	fail	to	factor	in	the	sacred	dimensions	of	what	it	means	for	women	to	inhabit	the	qawwam	of	the	men	in	their	lives.		Accounting	for	the	sacred	dimension	of	qawwam,	as	per	how	several	women	I	
260	
met	understood	and	inhabited	it,	complicates	normative	readings	of	signs	of	patriarchy.		That	is,	for	example,	a	sexual	division	of	labour	or	adherence	to	strict	gender	roles	is	not	in	and	of	itself	evidence	of	patriarchal	oppression.		The	secularizing	impulse	in	knowledge	production	about	Muslim	women	extends	beyond	the	academy	and	can	be	seen	in	particularly	acute	ways	in	popular	representations	of	Muslim	women.		For	instance,	the	need	or	desire	to	normalize	Muslim	women	by	effacing	piety	is	evident	in	the	recent	surge	in	representations	of	fictional	Muslim	women	characters	in	popular	comic	books	and	animated	series	such	as	Ms.	Marvel,	Bloody	Nasreen,	and	Burka	Avenger.		The	central	character	and	hero	in	each	of	these	productions	is	a	Pakistani	Muslim	woman	who	fights	villains	using	her	superpowers,	street	smarts,	and/or	physical	prowess.		But,	as	in	the	case	of	Malala	Yousafzai,	they	are	represented	as	not	particularly	pious	or	their	piety	is	represented	as	parenthetical	to	their	heroism.		Although	these	representations	are	a	welcomed	counter	narrative	in	the	context	of	popular	cultures	that	seem	to	be	unable	or	unwilling	to	see	Muslim	women	as	anything	but	oppressed,	the	secularizing	impulse	remains.		That	is,	in	their	attempts	to	provide	an	alternative	image,	these	cultural	productions	represent	Muslim	women	as	empowered	because	of	their	secularity.		These	representations	reinforce	the	problematic	notion	that	Muslim	women’s	agency	can	only	be	recognized	or	achieved	through	secularism.	In	this	dissertation	I	also	argue	that	to	understand	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	not	only	produces	a	framework	that	elucidates	the	complexity	of	Muslim	women’s	subjectivities,	but	it	is	also	integral	to	a	robust	understanding	of	complicities	in	relations	of	power	and	forms	of	othering.		Take,	for	example,	the	ways	in	which	the	women	I	interviewed	position	themselves	as	the	rational	subject	of	Islam.		This	aspect	of	their	self-
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presentation	has	been	an	effective	tool	for	dismantling	religio-nationalist	constructions	of	the	ideal	Muslim	woman	and	for	combating	the	Islamophobia	they	encounter.		However,	the	authorizing	discourse	of	rationality	also	furnishes	their	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	with	dynamics	of	power	that	manifest	in	dawah	activities	such	as	the	maasi	class.		Their	emphasis	on	the	skills	and	ability	to	read,	understand	and	apply	holy	texts	produces	a	hierarchal	notion	of	piety	that	marginalizes	or	excludes	the	illiterate	from	the	category	of	a	good	Muslim.		Dawah	taking	place	within	and	through	these	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	then	is	constitutive	of	and	constituted	by	processes	of	othering.			While	the	women	I	interviewed	focused	their	dawah	activities	on	Pakistani	Muslim	communities,	they	have	also	had	an	impact	beyond	these	communities	through,	for	example,	welfare	activities	targeted	at	Christian	and	Hindu	minorities	in	Pakistan,	outreach	in	the	Somali	community	in	Canada,	and	missionary	work	in	the	Caribbean.		These	dawah	activities	are	shaped	by	how	race	and	caste	shape	conceptualizations	of	the	Pakistani	Christian	and	Hindu	other,	and	Caribbean	and	black	Muslims.		Tracing	how	constructions	of	the	pious	self,	and	concomitant	processes	of	othering,	manifest	in	the	context	of	these	relationships	would	further	enhance	understandings	of	the	complicities	of	piety	in	articulations	of	difference	and	forms	of	exclusion	and	marginalization.		Analytical	openings	produced	through	de-centering	secular	epistemological	frameworks	enable	the	foregrounding	of	such	nuances	of	Muslim	women’s	subjectivity.			 	
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